Jason Eric Lenderman v. the State of Texas ( 2022 )


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  •        TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
    NO. 03-22-00679-CR
    Jason Eric Lenderman, Appellant
    v.
    The State of Texas, Appellee
    FROM THE 264TH DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY
    NO. 21DCR85475, THE HONORABLE PAUL L. LEPAK, JUDGE PRESIDING
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant Jason Eric Lenderman pleaded guilty on October 17, 2022
    to possession of methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200
    grams. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.115(d). He has not yet been sentenced. On
    October 26, 2022, he filed a notice of appeal challenging “the decision and judgment made in the
    264th District Court on October 17, 2022.”
    Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.1(b) provides:
    In a criminal case, a prematurely filed notice of appeal is effective and deemed
    filed on the same day, but after, sentence is imposed or suspended in open court,
    or the appealable order is signed by the trial court. But a notice of appeal is not
    effective if filed before the trial court makes a finding of guilt or receives a
    jury verdict.
    Tex. R. App. P. 27.1(b); see Franks v. State, 
    219 S.W.3d 494
    , 497 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet.
    ref’d) (observing that “a prematurely filed notice of appeal is one that is filed in the time period
    after the jury’s verdict and before sentence is imposed”).
    Because Lenderman filed his notice of appeal after the trial court accepted his
    guilty plea but before he was sentenced, we may consider his notice timely. Smith v. State,
    
    559 S.W.3d 527
    , 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see 
    id. at 532
     (noting that “[b]y the plain language
    of Rule 27.1(b), a notice filed after adjudication but before sentencing is effective to perfect an
    appeal of both.”); Blanco v. State, 
    18 S.W.3d 218
    , 219–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (upholding
    court of appeals’ dismissal where defendant waived right to appeal pursuant to plea bargain that
    was accepted by trial court but nevertheless attempted to appeal before sentencing). Thus, his
    premature notice of appeal does not deprive us of jurisdiction.
    However, the trial court has certified that this is a plea-bargain case for which
    Lenderman has no right of appeal and that Lenderman has waived his right to appeal. We are
    required to dismiss an appeal “if a certification that shows the defendant has a right of appeal has
    not been made part of the record.”         Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d); see Dears v. State,
    
    154 S.W.3d 610
    , 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of
    jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d). 1
    1   In addition, all pending motions are dismissed as moot.
    2
    __________________________________________
    Edward Smith, Justice
    Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Triana and Smith
    Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction
    Filed: December 16, 2022
    Do Not Publish
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-22-00679-CR

Filed Date: 12/16/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/20/2022