in the Interest of A.C., K.C., D.K., and M.K., Children ( 2020 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-20-00003-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF A.C., K.C., D.K., AND M.K., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 140th District Court
Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2010-552,767, Honorable Jim Bob Darnell, Presiding
April 7, 2020
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
The trial court terminated F.C.’s parental rights to her four children, A.C., K.C.,
D.K., and M.K., and she appealed from that judgment. Appointed counsel for F.C. filed a
motion to withdraw, together with an Anders1 brief in support thereof. In the latter, counsel
certified that she diligently searched the record and concluded that the appeal was without
merit. Appellate counsel also filed a copy of a letter sent to F.C. informing her of her right
to file a pro se response. F.C. was also provided a copy of the appellate record, according
to counsel. By letter dated March 10, 2020, this Court notified F.C. of her right to file her
own brief or response by March 30, 2020, if she wished to do so. To date, no response
has been received.
1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967).
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In compliance with the principles enunciated in Anders, appellate counsel
discussed potential areas for appeal concerning the three grounds upon which the trial
court relied to terminate the mother’s parental rights. Those three grounds involved §
161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O) of the Texas Family Code. Counsel’s discussion
encompassed the sufficiency of the evidence to support 1) all three statutory grounds
upon which termination was based and 2) the finding that termination was in the children’s
best interest. Per our obligation specified in In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (citing Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005)), we too reviewed the appellate record in search of arguable issues for
appeal. None were found.
Per In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam), we also conducted an
independent review of the evidence underlying the trial court’s findings that termination
was warranted under § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) of the Texas Family Code. See In re
L.G., No. 19-0488, 2020 Tex. LEXIS 185 (Tex. Mar. 13, 2020) (per curiam) (court of
appeals erred “by not detailing its analysis [on (D) and (E)] as required by [In re N.G.].”
That evidence illustrated 1) F.C. abused controlled substances (methamphetamine)
during all of her past and present dealings with the Department, 2) all four children were
removed due to being left alone and ranged in ages from eight years old to one year old,
3) little food was found in the house and what food there was the eight year old was
preparing it for the other children, 4) F.C. continued to test positive for methamphetamine
(when she did submit to a drug test) and failed to work her service plan as ordered by the
court to regain possession of her children, 5) F.C. failed or refused to submit to court
ordered drug testing, 6) F.C. lived from motel to motel and refused to give her current
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address to her caseworker, and 7) the children were not enrolled in school for over a year
and when they did attend school they were dirty and usually late. Combined, this
evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support a finding warranting termination
under (D) and (E). See In re V.A., No. 07-17-00413-CV, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1521, at
*10 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Feb. 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that a parent’s
continued use of drugs demonstrates an inability to provide for the child’s emotional and
physical needs and a stable environment); In re S.H., No. 07-15-00177-CV, 2015 Tex.
App. LEXIS 9731 at *8 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating
that “[f]rom the evidence presented, the trial court reasonably could have reached a firm
conviction W.W. had pursued a course of conduct, through her chronic drug use, that
endangered S.H.’s physical and emotional well-being” which warranted termination
under § 161.001(b)(1)(E)); accord In re A.W., No. 07-19-00104-CV, 2019 Tex. App.
LEXIS 5203, at *2—3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 21, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.).
We concur with counsel’s representation that the appeal is meritless due to the
absence of arguable error. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.2
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
2 We call counsel’s attention to the continuing duty of representation through the exhaustion of
proceedings, which may include the filing of a petition for review. Counsel has filed a motion to withdraw,
on which we will take no action. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam).
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