in Re T.O. ( 2020 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-20-00016-CV
___________________________
IN RE T.O.
Original Proceeding
Trial Court No. 233-522021-12
Before Gabriel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Wallach
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator T.O. (Father) complains that the trial court’s order granting Real Party
in Interest A.H.’s (Mother’s) “Amended Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and for
New Trial” (motion for new trial) in this suit affecting the parent-child relationship
(SAPCR) is void. Because the trial court signed the order granting a new trial after its
plenary power expired, we conditionally grant relief.
I. Statement of Facts
Father filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship in April 2019,
seeking to modify a 2012 order. The trial court signed the default Order in Suit to
Modify Parent-Child Relationship on August 21, 2019. The trial court has provided
this court with its electronic case management system entries for this case. The trial
judge’s August 21, 2019 entry provides, “Granted SAPCR after prove-up. Signed IWO
and Record of Support.” Mother timely filed her motion for new trial on September
13, 2019. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(b). On September 17, 2019, Father filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus asking the trial court to compel Mother to turn the children
over to him. The judge’s case management system entry for that day provides, “Signed
Order for issuance of a Writ.”
The trial court set the hearing on the motion for new trial for October 3, 2019,
but the trial court has advised us that the motion for new trial was heard on September
20, 2019, along with the petition for habeas corpus. The trial court’s September 20,
2019 case management entry provides, “Denied Writ and Granted Motion to Set Aside
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Prior Order. Granted Fee request of [Father]. Ordered introduction of children to the
parents for 2 hours on 9/21/2019 and in two weeks if necessary.”
The trial court has advised us that Father supplemented his modification petition
on September 25 and that Mother filed her counterpetition the next day. On September
30, 2019, the associate judge held a temporary-orders hearing and signed an associate
judge’s report and a pretrial conference order. The trial court’s order granting the
motion for new trial was not signed until December 10, 2019. Father filed this petition
for writ of mandamus on January 9, 2020.
II. Standard of Review
For mandamus relief, a relator must establish that an order is void or a clear
abuse of discretion with no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Nationwide Ins. Co. of Am.,
494 S.W.3d 708, 712 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding). A void order is an abuse of
discretion, and mandamus will issue to remedy it regardless of whether the relator has
an adequate remedy by appeal. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000)
(orig. proceeding); In re Pixler, 584 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, orig.
proceeding); In re Office of Att’y Gen. of Tex., 264 S.W.3d 800, 805 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding).
III. Discussion
When a trial court does not rule on a motion for new trial in a written order
signed within 75 days after the judgment is signed, the motion is overruled by operation
of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(c). The trial court has plenary power to grant a new trial
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or to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment for an additional 30 days after the
motion is overruled by operation of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(e). A trial court cannot
set aside a valid judgment after its plenary power expires except by bill of review. Tex.
R. Civ. P. 329b(f). An order (other than an order correcting a mere clerical error or
vacating a void order or judgment) that is issued after the expiration of a trial court’s
plenary power is void. In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998) (orig.
proceeding); see In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 829 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding); In re
Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d 66, 72 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding); Sw. Bell Tel. Co.,
35 S.W.3d at 605. “Mandamus relief is appropriate when a trial court issues an order
after its plenary power has expired.” Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d at 68; see also In
re Lovito-Nelson, 278 S.W.3d 773, 776 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding).
When the trial court did not sign a written order disposing of Mother’s motion
for new trial by November 4, 2019, the 75th day after the judgment was signed, the
motion was overruled by operation of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(c). The trial court’s
plenary power expired December 4, 2019. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(e). The trial court
therefore had no plenary power to grant the motion for new trial on December 10,
2019, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f), and the order purporting to do so was void. See
Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 829; Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d at 72; Sw. Bell Tel. Co.,
35 S.W.3d at 605; Dickason, 987 S.W.2d at 571.
Mother raises several arguments to dissuade this court from granting Father
mandamus relief. None of them have merit.
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First, Mother argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by signing the
order granting the motion for new trial and that Father could have appealed any
forthcoming final judgment. However, the trial court abused its discretion by signing
the void order, and Father’s ability to appeal a future void judgment does not block
mandamus relief from this void order. See Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 605; Pixler,
584 S.W.3d at 84; Office of Att’y Gen. of Tex., 264 S.W.3d at 805.
Second, Mother argues that the default judgment was not final under Lehmann v.
Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195, 200 (Tex. 2001). “[A]n order or judgment is not
final for purposes of appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party
or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it” does. Id. at 205; see also Elizondo,
544 S.W.3d at 827–28. If the order’s finality language is clear and unequivocal, we do
not examine the record. Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 828, 829. However, if the order’s
finality language is not clear and unequivocal, we do examine the record to determine
finality. See Pope-Nixon v. Howard, No. 05-18-01215-CV, 2019 WL 911745, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Feb. 25, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 827–
28).
Although the default judgment here includes a Mother Hubbard clause expressly
denying all relief not granted, a Mother Hubbard clause is not a conclusive sign of
finality. In re R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d 535, 541 (Tex. 2019); Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206–07.
The default judgment also does not contain all of the parties’ required identifying
information. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 105.006(a); R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d at 542–43.
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“[W]hen finality is contested, and the order lacks required statutory elements, a
reviewing court should examine the record to determine finality under Lehmann and its
progeny.” R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d at 542.
A judgment lacking clear finality language must dispose of all parties and all issues
to be final. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195. When necessary, we review the record to make
this determination. Id. at 205–06. Here, the mandamus record makes clear that the
default judgment disposed of all parties and all claims pending on August 21, 2019. The
case management entry for August 21, 2019 states that the trial court “[g]ranted SAPCR
after prove-up.” The 26-page default judgment states that
• Father announced ready for trial;
• Mother did not appear and wholly made default;
• A jury was waived; and
• The modification requested in Father’s petition is in the children’s best
interest and is granted.
The default judgment also contains required statutory warnings and disposes of
all of Father’s claims raised in his modification petition—child support, medical
support, unreimbursed medical expenses, conservatorship, possession and access,
costs, attorney’s fees, and postjudgment interest on those costs and attorney’s fees. The
one-page memorandum held interlocutory in R.R.K. left possession and child support
unresolved and omitted all statutorily required warnings. R.R.K., 590 S.W.3d at 541–
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43. The default judgment here leaves no issue unresolved. We therefore hold that it is
a final judgment.
Third, Mother relies on a misstatement of Rule 306a(2) to argue that the trial
court’s failure to sign an order within its plenary power does not invalidate it. That rule
provides,
2. Date to be shown. Judges, attorneys and clerks are directed to
use their best efforts to cause all judgments, decisions and orders of any
kind to be reduced to writing and signed by the trial judge with the date
of signing stated therein. If the date of signing is not recited in the
judgment or order, it may be shown in the record by a certificate of the
judge or otherwise; provided, however, that the absence of a showing of the date
in the record shall not invalidate any judgment or order.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a (emphasis added). The absence of a date from a written order is
not the issue in this case.
Fourth, Mother argues that the oral rendition granting the new trial was valid.
The parties did not provide us with a record showing an oral rendition granting the new
trial. The September 20, 2019 case management entry provides that the trial court
“[g]ranted Motion to Set Aside Prior Order.” Even if that entry did indicate that a
rendition occurred, an oral rendition is insufficient to grant a new trial. The Supreme
Court of Texas has consistently held that Rule 329b(c) requires a written order to grant
a new trial. Lovito-Nelson, 278 S.W.3d at 775–76. 1
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Although Mother fails to cite the statutory definition, we consider this argument
as fairly including the subsidiary issue of whether the trial court “rendered” its ruling in
accordance with Section 101.026 of the Family Code. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f) (“The
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statement of an issue or point will be treated as covering every subsidiary question that
is fairly included.”). We hold that it did not.
In 1995, the Legislature included in the recodification of the Family Code a
definition of “render” exclusive to suits affecting the parent-child relationship. See Act
of April 6, 1995, 74th R.S., Ch. 20, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 113, 124 (current version
at Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.026). Section 101.026 states,
“Render” means the pronouncement by a judge of the court’s
ruling on a matter. The pronouncement may be made orally in the
presence of the court reporter or in writing, including on the court’s
docket sheet or by a separate written instrument.
Id. By its terms, the definition is not limited to the pronouncement of judgments only
but applies to any “ruling on a matter” in a particular SAPCR. See id.
Nevertheless, without any reference to Section 101.026, in Lovito-Nelson, the
Supreme Court held that Rule 329b(c) mandated that a ruling granting a motion for
new trial in a SAPCR take the form of a written order, categorically excluding rulings
by oral pronouncement or docket sheet entry. 278 S.W.3d at 775–76 (rejecting trial
court’s initialed docket entry, “New trial granted. DHL,” and contemporaneous
execution of a “Pre-Trial Scheduling Order” setting a new trial date, signed by counsel
for all parties). In so doing, the court relied almost exclusively on those of its previous
decisions antedating the enactment of Section 101.026, and no decisions involving
SAPCRs. See id.
Accordingly, Lovito-Nelson binds us, and the oral pronouncement alleged by
Mother is insufficient to comply with Rule 329b(c). Even if we considered Section
101.026 controlling, Mother still fails to demonstrate that the trial court granted her
motion for new trial because she has provided no official transcript of the oral
pronouncement confirming “the presence of the court reporter” as required for a
SAPCR rendition. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.026.
Finally, as we observed in In re A.F., despite Section 101.026’s authorization of
docket sheet entry rulings in SAPCRs, no court has held that such authorization extends
to entries in the trial court’s case management system. No. 02-19-00117-CV,
2019 WL 4635150, at *9 n.7 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 24, 2019, no pet.). Here,
since the official docket sheet of the trial court does not contain a single entry
concerning Father’s SAPCR, including any entry concerning the entry of the default
judgment, this Court inquired as to whether there were any entries in the case
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Fifth, Mother argues that Father lost any right to mandamus relief by participating
in trial court proceedings after the trial court orally granted a new trial and by delaying
the filing of his petition for writ of mandamus. Although mandamus is not an equitable
remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles. In re Bahn, 13 S.W.3d
865, 871 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, orig. proceeding). One such principle is that
equity helps the diligent but not those who slumber on their rights. Id. The party
asserting the affirmative defense of laches must show both an unreasonable delay by
the other party in asserting its rights and harm as a result of the delay. Id. An
unexplained delay of several months can be grounds for denying a petition for writ of
mandamus. See Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, 858 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Tex. 1993) (orig.
proceeding). This petition was filed January 9, 2020, only about five weeks after the
trial court lost its plenary power to sign a written order granting the motion for new
trial. Mother has failed to show an unreasonable delay. See In re Tarrant Cty., No. 02-
05-00274-CV, 2005 WL 3436582, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 12, 2005, orig.
management system concerning Mother’s motion for new trial. On September 20,
2019, the trial court made the following entry: “Denied Writ and Granted Motion to
Set Aside Prior Order.” Although Mother had styled her motion for new trial as a
“Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment and for New Trial,” there were actually two
potential “prior orders” that this entry possibly referenced: the default judgment and a
writ of habeas corpus issued in execution thereof. As a result, even assuming this entry
constitutes a docket sheet entry pursuant to Section 101.026, there is sufficient
ambiguity in the trial court’s entry to foreclose the categorical granting of a new trial.
See id. (assuming entry in case management system attempted rendition pursuant to
Section 101.026, the absence of specific statutory findings foreclosed its consideration).
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proceeding [mand. denied]) (mem. op.). Also, void orders may be collaterally
challenged at any time. Gainous v. Gainous, 219 S.W.3d 97, 105 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f); In re E.R.,
385 S.W.3d 552, 566 (Tex. 2012).
Sixth, Mother contends without citing any authority that the associate judge’s
report signed September 30, 2019, modified the default judgment. In Blackburn v.
Blackburn, the wife, Peggy, argued that a temporary order signed after an oral
pronouncement of divorce set aside that oral pronouncement. No. 02-12-00369-CV,
2015 WL 2169505, at *10 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 7, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.).
We rejected her argument, explaining,
Temporary orders typically expire with the entry of a final
judgment. Although a temporary order may not supersede a judgment
once the temporary order has expired, a trial court may enter temporary
orders independently of the final decree. The rendition of a final divorce
decree does not in itself nullify any temporary order with respect to
payments past due. The decree supersedes the temporary order with
respect to future support, but the obligation for past support, as fixed by
the temporary order, continues unless modified by the provisions of the
divorce decree. Even though these legal principles are true, they pertain
to the determination of the continued enforceability of temporary orders
after the entry of a final decree, not the effect the entry of temporary
orders has on the finality of an oral rendition of divorce. We reject Peggy’s
contention that a temporary order can trump a final community property
division.
Id. (citations omitted). Applying the same reasoning and assuming without holding that
the associate judge’s report is a temporary order, we reject Mother’s contentions that it
modified the default judgment. Further, as a matter of logic, because no signed order
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granting a new trial was issued within the trial court’s plenary power, nothing gave the
associate judge power to hold a temporary-orders hearing in the first place, much less
issue a temporary order; the SAPCR begun by the April 2019 filing of Father’s petition
had been resolved. 2
Seventh, Mother argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by signing
the order granting the new trial after its plenary power expired because the default
judgment is unenforceable and void, as it does “not specify specific times for Mother
to exercise possession.” The default judgment was issued within the trial court’s plenary
power, and Mother has not challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction. See PNS Stores, Inc.
v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 272–73 (Tex. 2012). The default judgment is therefore not
void. To the extent Mother wishes to challenge the default judgment on its merits, she
must do so with a timely bill of review in the trial court, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(f),
Rivera, 379 S.W.3d at 275, not as a real party in interest to this original proceeding.
IV. Conclusion
Because the trial court’s plenary power expired before it signed the order granting
Mother’s motion for new trial, mandamus relief is appropriate. See Lovito-Nelson,
278 S.W.3d at 776. Accordingly, we conditionally grant Father’s petition for writ of
mandamus and direct the trial court to vacate its December 10, 2019 order granting the
2
We offer no opinion on the effect of Father’s supplemental petition, Mother’s
counterpetition, and the associate judge’s report regarding any new proceeding begun
after the default judgment.
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motion for new trial. We are confident that the trial court will promptly comply with
our directive. The writ will issue only if the trial court does not so comply.
/s/ Mike Wallach
Mike Wallach
Justice
Delivered: April 9, 2020
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