Nathaniel Dalone Pickrom Jr. v. State ( 2020 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-19-00188-CR
No. 02-19-00189-CR
___________________________
NATHANIEL DALONE PICKROM JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 213th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 1591368R, 1591370R
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Gabriel and Womack, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Nathaniel Dalone Pickrom Jr. appeals his two convictions for
aggravated robbery while using a deadly weapon (a firearm).1 In two points, Pickrom
argues (1) that the trial court erred by including statutorily-mandated language in the
jury charge at punishment and (2) that the trial court erroneously assessed duplicate
court costs. Because we conclude that the trial court properly instructed the jury, but
we also conclude that the trial court erred by assessing duplicate costs, we modify the
judgment in trial court cause number 1591370R to delete the assessed court costs and
affirm that judgment as modified. We affirm the judgment in trial court cause
number 1591368R in its entirety.
II. BACKGROUND
Because Pickrom does not challenge the evidentiary sufficiency underlying his
convictions, we need not recount the facts in great detail. On May 11, 2017, the State
indicted Pickrom for aggravated robbery while using a deadly weapon (a firearm) in
trial court cause number 1591368R, and, on April 15, 2019, the State indicted Pickrom
for aggravated robbery while using a deadly weapon (a firearm) in trial court cause
number 1591370R.
1
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(2).
2
The two causes were tried together, and, on May 2, 2019, before the jury,
Pickrom pleaded guilty to both charges. After the jury heard punishment evidence,
the trial court gave its charge to the jury. In the charge, the trial court included the
statutorily-mandated “good time” parole instruction even though the nature of
Pickrom’s convictions make him ineligible for good time being applied to any
sentences the jury might have assessed.
After deliberation, the jury assessed punishment at twenty years’ incarceration
in cause number 1591368R and thirty-two years’ incarceration in cause number
1591370R. The trial court rendered judgments accordingly. In both causes, the trial
court’s judgments reflect an assessment of court costs in the amount of $319.00. And
in both causes, the bill of costs reflect identical charges amounting to $319.00. This
appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Jury Instruction
In his first point, Pickrom argues that the trial court’s jury charge on
punishment violated his rights to due process and due course of law. Specifically,
Pickrom argues that his rights were violated because the trial court included a “good
time” parole instruction and, because of his convictions, he is not eligible for good
time; thus, the instruction sowed confusion in the minds of the jury.
3
Pickrom candidly admits that the instruction complained of is authorized by
statute. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 4(a).2 Pickrom also
acknowledges that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has rejected this very
argument and that he is presenting this argument to this court “to preserve the issue
for further review.” Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355, 363–65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
This court is bound by, and has no authority to disregard or overrule, the
precedent of the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Hailey v. State, 413 S.W.3d 457, 489
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2012, pet. ref’d); Wiley v. State, 112 S.W.3d 173, 175 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d). And this court has consistently applied Luquis to
this very complaint and held that it does not violate due process or due course of law
protections for the trial court to include this instruction even when the defendant is
parole ineligible. See Knight v. State, 504 S.W.3d 524, 532 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2016, pet. ref’d); see also Esparza v. State, No. 02-18-00196-CR, 2019 WL 5608233, at
*4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 31, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). In light of this precedent, we overrule Pickrom’s first point.
2
In 2019, the legislature amended subsection 4(a) and removed all references to
“good conduct time.” Act of May 15, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 260, H.B. 1279, § 1(a).
The 2019 legislative amendments went into effect on September 1, 2019, and apply to
defendants sentenced for an offense on or after that date. Id. at ch. 260, § 2.
Pickrom’s trial was held on May 2 and 3 of 2019, and the jury was instructed on
May 3, 2019. Thus, the 2019 version is not at issue in this case.
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B. Court Costs
In his second point, Pickrom argues that he was unlawfully assessed duplicate
court costs. The State concedes this point, and we agree with both parties. 3
“In a single criminal action in which a defendant is convicted of two or more
offenses or of multiple counts of the same offense, the court may assess each court
cost or fee only once against the defendant.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 102.073(a). And when a trial court erroneously assesses court costs for multiple
convictions that were tried in a single proceeding, we normally retain the court costs
for the offense of the highest category and modify the judgment in the offense of the
lower category to delete the duplicate court costs. See Santoro v. State, Nos. 02-18-
00039-CR, 02-18-00040-CR, 2018 WL 3153564, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
June 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 102.073(b)). But when the convictions are the same category of
offense and the costs are all the same, the court costs should be based on the lowest
cause number. See Williams v. State, 495 S.W.3d 583, 590 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2016, pet. dism’d).
3
The State’s confession of error in a criminal case is important and carries great
weight, but it is not binding. See Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 884 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002). We are required to independently examine the error confessed because the
proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left merely to the stipulation of
parties. Id.; Rachal v. State, No. 02-18-00501-CR, 2019 WL 5996985, at *5 n.3 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Nov. 14, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
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Here, Pickrom was convicted in cause number 1591368R of aggravated
robbery with a deadly weapon, and he was also convicted in cause number 1591370R
of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. The cases were tried together in a single
criminal action, and the trial court assessed court costs in the amount of $319.00 in
each cause. Pickrom should not have been assessed court costs in each case. See Id.
We sustain Pickrom’s second point, and we modify the judgment in cause number
1591370R (the higher cause number) to delete the assessed court costs. Tex. R. App.
P. 43.2(b).
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Pickrom’s first point and having sustained his second point,
we modify the judgment in trial court cause number 1591370R to delete the assessed
court costs and affirm that judgment as modified. We affirm the judgment in trial
court cause number 1591368R in its entirety.
/s/ Dana Womack
Dana Womack
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: April 9, 2020
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