Dominique Rashad Frazier v. State ( 2020 )


Menu:
  • DISMISS and Opinion Filed April 15, 2020
    S  In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-19-00849-CR
    DOMINIQUE RASHAD FRAZIER, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. F18-70781-I
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Myers, and Justice Carlyle
    Opinion by Chief Justice Burns
    Dominique Rashad Frazier was indicted for a second family violence assault,
    a third-degree felony. The indictment also alleged two prior felony offenses to be
    used to enhance the available range of punishment, making the punishment range
    life or not more than 99 years or less than 25 years. Appellant entered into an “open”
    plea agreement with the State. The July 3, 2019 written plea agreement states (1)
    appellant will plead guilty to “Assault FV Enhanced,” (2) “OPEN. CAP AT 10 TDC,
    strike 1st enhancement ¶,” and (3) the punishment range is “not more than 20 years
    or less than 2 years confinement” with an optional fine not to exceed $10,000. The
    agreement is signed by appellant, appellant’s counsel, the State’s attorney, and the
    trial court.
    That same day, appellant appeared in open court, was admonished, and
    entered his guilty plea and plea of true to the second enhancement paragraph. The
    State reminded the trial court that punishment “has been capped at ten [years.]” After
    several witnesses testified, including appellant who acknowledged the ten-year cap,
    the trial court found appellant guilty, found the enhancement paragraph true, and
    sentenced him to ten years. The following then occurred:
    Court:        Your attorney there has there in front of you a copy of trial
    court certification of defendant’s rights on appeal. You’ve gone over
    that document with him, correct? That’s there in front of you, it has
    your signature on it.
    Appellant: (Nods head.)
    Court:       Yes?
    Appellant: Yes, ma’am.
    Court:       So you understand your rights as it relates to appealing this
    case?
    Appellant: Yes, ma’am.
    Court:      Good luck to you, sir.
    (COURT ADJOURNED).
    The trial court’s July 3, 2019 certification of appellant’s right to appeal states
    the case is “not a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has the right of appeal.” The
    State did not object to or otherwise challenge the trial court’s statements or the
    –2–
    certification of appellant’s right to appeal. Five days later, the trial court appointed
    counsel to represent appellant in this appeal.
    In his February 5, 2020 brief, appellant concedes that by entering into a plea
    bargain, a defendant waives his right to appeal. He further acknowledges that the
    State’s recommendation of a “cap” on punishment and abandonment of an
    enhancement allegation in exchange for appellant pleading guilty is a plea bargain
    agreement. Nevertheless, he argues his plea should be characterized as a “non-
    negotiated plea” because “the maximum sentencing exposure of 10 years’
    confinement was the same as it would have been if the State formally abandoned
    both enhancement counts.” In his words, “the 10-year ‘cap’ was superfluous and
    gave no benefit” to appellant.
    In response, the State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the trial court’s
    certification is defective and contrary to the record. The State notes the plea
    agreement reflects appellant agreed to plead guilty and waive his right to appeal in
    exchange for the State abandoning the first enhancement paragraph and
    recommending a cap of 10 years. Because appellant agreed to waive his right to
    appeal, the State contends we lack jurisdiction to hear his direct appeal. After
    reviewing the record, we agree with the State.
    Rule 25.2 provides:
    In a plea bargain case—that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was
    guilty or nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the
    –3–
    punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the
    defendant—a defendant may appeal only:
    (A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and ruled on
    before trial,
    (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal, or
    (C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized by statute.
    TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). If the State abandons an enhancement paragraph which
    would have increased the maximum punishment that the defendant could have
    received or agrees to a cap on punishment in exchange for a defendant’s plea of
    guilty, the requirements of rule 25.2(a)(2) apply. See Shankle v. State, 
    119 S.W.3d 808
    , 813‒14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Carender v. State, 
    155 S.W.3d 929
    , 931 (Tex.
    App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.).
    Here, the plea agreement supports the State’s argument that appellant waived
    his right to appeal. It recites that appellant will plead guilty to the 3rd degree felony
    enhanced offense of assault family violence and, although the punishment range is
    not more than 20 years or less than 2 years, the State agrees to drop the first
    enhancement paragraph and to cap punishment at ten years. The agreement includes,
    “If the punishment assessed does not exceed the agreement between [appellant] and
    the prosecutor, the Court must give its permission to you before you may appeal any
    matter in this case except for those matters raised by written motions prior to trial.”
    The trial court followed the plea bargain agreement and sentenced appellant to 10
    years in prison.
    –4–
    Although the trial court’s certification states this is not a plea bargain case and
    appellant has the right to appeal, we conclude, based on the record, the certification
    is defective and should have indicated this was a plea-bargain case and appellant had
    no right to appeal. See Dears v. State, 
    154 S.W.3d 610
    , 614‒15 (Tex. Crim App.
    2005). Furthermore, the record shows no matters raised by written motion and ruled
    on before trial. Thus, appellant has no right to appeal under the rules. See TEX. R.
    APP. P. 25.2(a), (d).
    We dismiss this appeal.
    /Robert D. Burns, III/
    ROBERT D. BURNS, III
    Do Not Publish                              CHIEF JUSTICE
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
    190849F.U05
    –5–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    DOMINIQUE RASHAD FRAZIER,                   On Appeal from the Criminal District
    Appellant                                   Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. F18-70781-I.
    No. 05-19-00849-CR         V.               Opinion delivered by Chief Justice
    Burns. Justices Myers and Carlyle
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we DISMISS this appeal.
    Judgment entered April 15, 2020
    –6–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-19-00849-CR

Filed Date: 4/15/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/16/2020