Lisa Hawkins v. Michael Jenkins and Wanda Jenkins ( 2021 )

Affirmed and Opinion Filed January 8, 2021
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-19-01396-CV
LISA HAWKINS, Appellant
V.
MICHAEL JENKINS AND WANDA JENKINS, Appellees
On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-05076
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Myers, Osborne, and Carlyle
Opinion by Justice Myers
Lisa Hawkins appeals the trial court’s judgment awarding Michael Jenkins
(Jenkins) and Wanda Jenkins $9,701.44 on their claim for unjust enrichment.
Appellant brings one issue on appeal contending the trial court erred by determining
appellees were entitled to recover for unjust enrichment. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
BACKGROUND
Appellant is Jenkins’s niece. Appellant owned a house in DeSoto, Texas,
subject to a mortgage. In 2015, appellant had health and financial issues, and she
moved out of the house and into her mother’s house nearby. Appellant decided to
sell her house. Appellees were interested in purchasing the house and asked
appellant how much she wanted. Appellant told them she wanted the loans secured
by the house paid off plus an additional $7,500. At that time, appellant owed about
$152,000 on the note secured by the first mortgage on the house. 1 Based on those
terms, the parties agreed on a sale price of $160,000 subject to appellees finding
financing, and they signed a written contract based on those terms, including
conditioning the contract on appellees’ obtaining financing.
In the meantime, appellees moved into the house. Jenkins testified that when
appellees moved into the house in 2015, the house was worth $120,000. The parties
did not have a written lease agreement, but they orally agreed appellees would pay
appellant $1,500 per month until they could purchase the house. Jenkins said the
monthly payments were part of appellees’ purchase money that appellant was to use
to pay down the loan. Appellant testified the money was rental payments and that
she used them to pay the debt owing on the house.
When appellees tried to obtain financing to purchase the house, they
encountered problems. The lender balked at lending the money because the parties
1
There was another note for $14,000 secured by a second mortgage. Appellant negotiated a reduction
in the debt to $3,000. Jenkins testified he gave appellant $3,000 to pay off this note. Appellant testified
that Jenkins gave her the $3,000, but she testified Jenkins was behind on the payments. So she used $2,000
of the $3,000 towards the second mortgage and the other $1,000 towards the first mortgage. Appellant
testified she provided the other $1,000 to pay off the second mortgage.
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were related. The lender required appellees to show twelve months of payments to
appellant. Meanwhile, appellees, believing they were going to purchase the house,
began making repairs and improvements while they tried to obtain financing. They
replaced the air conditioning units, repaired the fence, fixed the plumbing, replaced
the appliances, did landscaping including planting grass, removing a tree, and
building a patio, and other tasks. Appellees presented evidence that they spent at
least $22,000 improving the property, and Jenkins, who is a professional carpenter,
requested an additional amount for his labor to bring the total improvements to at
least $52,000.
When appellees went back to the lender with proof of payments to appellant,
the lender refused to loan money for their purchase of the house because appellant
had stopped paying the loan which was then in “pre-foreclosure.” Appellees then
stopped paying appellant the $1,500 per month. Appellant continued to pay the
mortgage, and the house was not foreclosed. By the time of trial, appellees had
missed twenty-three of the monthly payments.
Appellees learned the amount owing on the mortgage was $80,000 or
$90,000, and they wanted the purchase price reduced to $150,000. Appellant refused
and insisted the price remain $160,000. Appellees then sued to quiet title and for
breach of contract seeking transfer of the title of the property to them. They also
alleged claims for fraud in a real estate transaction and unjust enrichment for their
expenditures on improving the property. Appellant answered with a general denial.
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She did not assert a counterclaim or any affirmative defenses. Shortly before trial,
appellant sold the house to her daughter for at least $197,395.2
At the trial, appellees agreed they no longer had a claim for transfer of the title
to them, and they limited their claims to their expenditures on improving the
property. After a trial before the court, the court found for appellees, awarding them
$9,701.44. The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law including:
 appellant and appellees intended that appellees would purchase the home;
 the parties failed to execute a contract for the purchase of the home;
 appellees made improvements to the home in anticipation of purchasing
the home;
 Jenkins’s testimony as to his intent to purchase lacked credibility;
 much of appellant’s testimony lacked credibility;
 appellees expended $44,201.44 improving the property;
 appellant paid $34,500 when appellees “failed to make any payments to
[appellant] for rent or mortgage payments on the property”; and
 appellant owes appellees $9,701.44.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
In her sole issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by determining
appellees were entitled to recover for unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment occurs when a person has wrongfully secured a benefit or
has passively received one which it would be unconscionable to retain. Eun Bok Lee
2
The record includes the daughter’s note and deed of trust for $197,395. The record does not show
the amount of any down payment or other cash payment. However, the trial court mentioned that
documents showed the sale amount as being $199,000.
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v. Ho Chang Lee, 411 S.W.3d 95, 111 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no
pet.). Unjust enrichment is not a proper remedy, however, merely because it might
appear expedient or generally fair that some recompense be afforded for an
unfortunate loss or because the benefits to the person sought to be charged amount
to a windfall. Heldenfels Bros., Inc. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39, 42
(Tex. 1992). However, the right to recover for unjust enrichment does not depend
on the existence of a wrong, and the plaintiff need not show the defendant committed
a wrongful act. Walker v. Walker, No. 14-18-00569-CV, 2020 WL 1951631, at *4
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 23, 2020, no pet.). Unjust enrichment is an
equitable remedy, and it does not apply when a valid, express contract exists between
the parties governing the subject matter of the dispute. Fortune Prod. Co. v. Conoco,
Inc., 52 S.W.3d 671, 683–84 (Tex. 2000); Lake v. Cravens, 488 S.W.3d 867, 907
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.).
Findings of fact in an appeal from a nonjury trial carry the same weight as a
jury verdict and are reviewed under the same standards that are applied in reviewing
evidence to support a jury’s verdict. Shaw v. County of Dallas, 251 S.W.3d 165,
169 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied). In evaluating the legal sufficiency of
the evidence to support a finding, we view the evidence in the light favorable to the
fact finder’s finding, indulging every reasonable inference supporting it. City of
Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). We “must credit favorable
evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregard contrary evidence unless
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reasonable jurors could not.” Id. at 827. The ultimate test is whether the evidence
allows reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the finding under review. See id.
Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support a
challenged finding. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors,
960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998). In a factual sufficiency review, we view all the
evidence in a neutral light and set aside the finding only if the finding is so contrary
to the overwhelming weight of the evidence such that the finding is clearly wrong
and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); Morris v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 334 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.).
Appellant first argues that the trial court’s finding that the parties failed to
execute a contract for the home is against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence. The trial court admitted appellant’s exhibit, which was a contract for
appellees’ purchase of the home for $160,000. The contract was signed by appellant
and both appellees. This finding, however, is irrelevant. The sale of the home was
not in issue. By the time of trial, appellant had sold the house to her daughter.
Appellees did not claim any right to the funds from the sale, nor did they challenge
the validity of the sale. Therefore, even if the finding was erroneous, appellant has
not shown the finding probably led to the rendition of an improper judgment, and
any error is not reversible. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1).
Appellant argues the remedy of unjust enrichment was not appropriate
because there was no evidence of any wrongdoing, such as fraud, duress, or the
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taking of an undue advantage. However, unjust enrichment may be appropriate
when there was no wrongdoing by the defendant. See Walker, 2020 WL 1951631,
at *4.
The issue in the case is whether it would be unconscionable for appellant to
retain the benefits of the improvements carried out and paid for by appellees. Those
benefits were the increased value of the home due to the improvements, which
appellant reaped when she sold the house to her daughter in 2019. Jenkins testified
that the house was worth $120,000 when appellees moved into it in 2015. Appellees
presented evidence that the Dallas County Appraisal District appraised the property
at $223,000 in 2019, and they presented evidence that appellant sold the house to
her daughter in 2019 for at least $197,395.
The evidence shows appellant was aware of some of the improvements. She
knew the air conditioning system in the house was broken, and she knew appellees
replaced the air conditioning units. She had been in the house and seen the new
appliances. She had driven past the home and observed some of the landscaping.
She did not object to appellees making the improvements because she believed they
were going to purchase the home.
Appellant argues appellees reaped the benefit of the improvements because
they lived in the house for four years. However, the record contains evidence that
appellant reaped a financial benefit from the improvements: she sold the house for
$77,000 above its value before appellees made the improvements. Jenkins testified
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that the increased value of the home was due to the improvements. Although the
trial court expressed doubt that all the appreciation was due to the improvements as
Jenkins testified, no evidence shows that some of the appreciation was not due to the
improvements or that the improvements were responsible for less than $44,201.44
of the appreciation. The court could reasonably have concluded it was unjust for
appellant to receive the profit from the increased value of the property due to the
improvements without reimbursing appellees for their expenses from improving the
property. See Barclay v. Richey, No. 09-17-00026-CV, 2019 WL 302661, at *8
(Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 24, 2019, pet. denied) (unjust enrichment awarded for
improvements to home: “The remodeling labor and materials Richey paid for
became an inseparable part of the residence.”).
Appellant argues appellees are not entitled to the equitable remedy of unjust
enrichment because the trial court found: “Jenkins’ testimony, as to his intent to
purchase, lacked credibility.” Appellant asserts this finding constitutes a finding that
Jenkins had unclean hands and therefore is not entitled to equitable relief. One of
the rules of equity is that “one who comes seeking equity must come with clean
hands.” Omohundro v. Matthews, 341 S.W.2d 401, 410 (Tex. 1960). This rule is
not absolute. Id. The party complaining of unclean hands must show injury from
the conduct constituting unclean hands. Id. Here, appellant has not shown how
Jenkins’s lack of credibility harmed her to justify the application of the clean hands
doctrine.
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Appellant also argues that the two-year statute of limitations bars appellees’
unjust enrichment claim as to many of the improvements. Limitations is an
affirmative defense that must be affirmatively pleaded. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 94. If
limitations is not pleaded, it is waived. See G.R.A.V.I.T.Y. Enters., Inc. v. Reece
Supply Co., 177 S.W.3d 537, 544 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). Appellant did
not plead limitations but raised it for the first time on appeal. Therefore, any
limitations defense is waived.
We conclude appellant has not shown the trial court erred in finding that
appellees were entitled to recover for unjust enrichment. We overrule appellant’s
issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Lana Myers/
LANA MYERS
JUSTICE
191396F.P05
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
LISA HAWKINS, Appellant On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial
District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-19-01396-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-05076.
Opinion delivered by Justice Myers.
MICHAEL JENKINS AND Justices Osborne and Carlyle
WANDA JENKINS, Appellees participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellees MICHAEL JENKINS AND WANDA
JENKINS recover their costs of this appeal from appellant LISA HAWKINS.
Judgment entered this 8th day of January, 2021.
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