McAmis Harden v. State ( 2020 )

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed April 20, 2020
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-19-00116-CR
MCAMIS HARDEN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1676548-N
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Partida-Kipness, Nowell, and Evans
Opinion by Justice Evans
Appellant McAmis Harden appeals from the judgment adjudicating him guilty
of indecency with a child by contact. In a sole issue, appellant asserts that the
evidence was insufficient to prove the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
Appellant was charged by indictment with indecency with a child by contact.
Appellant pled not guilty and the case proceeded to a jury trial.
A. State Witnesses
Curtis Turner, complainant’s teacher and coach, testified that complainant
seemed different one morning during athletics because she was running with her
head down. Turner asked her what was wrong and complainant started crying and
said her uncle touched her. Curtis told his principal what complainant had said and
reported the incident to CPS.
Complainant testified that on the day of the incident, her uncle—the
appellant—came over to her house with a four-wheeler to ride. Complainant was
fifteen at the time of trial and thirteen on the date of the alleged incident. Appellant
is complainant’s deceased father’s brother. Appellant lived with his mother, Lenora,
who is complainant’s grandmother. After they returned from the ride, appellant
asked complainant if she wanted to spend the night at her grandmother’s—Lenora—
house. Later that night, complainant was in her room watching television when
appellant came in and laid behind her on the bed. Complainant testified that
appellant put his hand in her pants and pressed up against her so that she could feel
his penis behind her. Complainant said she felt scared while appellant touched her
breasts, vagina and butt with his hands and that the touching was not accidental. She
also testified that appellant had her perform oral sex on him and he performed oral
sex on her. Appellant told her to get cleaned up and complainant went to the
bathroom, locked the door, began crying and called her friend. Complainant said
she was “panicking” and trying to figure out how she was going to leave.
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Complainant tried calling her mother but she did not pick up so she called her other
grandmother, Mary, to come pick her up. Complainant was crying too hard to
explain what had happened so her friend told Mary in the three-way call. Lenora
asked what was wrong when complainant left the house crying and complainant said
she would tell her later. Complainant testified that appellant was panicking as she
was leaving because he kept trying to talk to Mary and kept calling her on the way
home. Mary told complainant’s mother, Elizabeth, what had happened since
complainant was crying. Elizabeth sent complainant to school the next day and that
is when complainant told Turner what had happened the night before. Complainant
further testified that she told the woman at the children’s advocacy center about the
touching but not the oral sex because it was embarrassing and she did not feel
comfortable talking about it. After some time had passed, complainant told her
mother about the oral sex and later told another person. Complainant admitted to
having anger issues, fighting with her mother, going to therapy and taking
medication for being “hyper.” Complainant also stated she was sent several times
to treatment centers to work with doctors and therapists because of her aggressive
behavior. Complainant also testified that she had never accused anyone of touching
her before this incident and currently takes four medications to help with anxiety,
depression, and mood stabilization.
Mary Atkins testified she was close with complainant and often stayed at
complainant’s house to help watch her and her sibling while Elizabeth worked.
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Mary testified that complainant called her late one evening and asked her to come
pick her up from Lenora’s house and that complainant was “very disturbed, crying,
scared, like panic.” Complainant’s friend was on the call and told Mary what had
happened. Mary went to get complainant and appellant walked complainant to the
car putting his “arms around her neck, whispering into her ear.” Mary said
complainant cried the whole way home and then told her mother that “Uncle June”
got in the bed with her and “started rubbing her over parts of her body.” Mary
testified that she broke down because complainant was so “brokenhearted.” Mary
stated that complainant had anger issues but this time she was acting like she was in
distress and had “never cried like that before.”
Elizabeth testified that while she had seen many angry outbursts from her
child, she had never seen complainant cry like that before. Elizabeth also said that
while complainant had anger issues and violent outbursts, she never had a problem
with complainant lying to her.
Megan Peterson, a forensic interviewer for the Dallas Children’s Advocacy
Center, testified that she conducted an interview with complainant. Complainant
was able to provide many periphery details and some sensory details which indicated
to Peterson that she had experienced the event. Peterson testified that she did not
see any indicators of coaching during complainant’s interview. Ana Guzman, a
counselor for the Dallas Children’s Advocacy Center, testified that she had fifteen
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sessions with complainant and stated that she suffered from post-traumatic stress
disorder symptoms.
B. Defense Witnesses
Dr. Michael Gottlieb, a psychologist, testified that he reviewed complainant’s
therapy records and was retained by the defense to testify in the case. Dr. Gottlieb
criticized Guzman’s assessment for failing to take into account complainant’s
behavioral history prior to the alleged abuse. He also stated that he had not seen all
of complainant’s records and had not met with complainant.
Lenora Harden, appellant’s mother and complainant’s grandmother, testified
at trial that if complainant is told “no,” she “totally loses control.” She testified that
complainant has attacked her both physically and verbally. Harden stated that “[i]f
[complainant’s] in trouble, she will lie to put the blame on another person. She lies
to throw -- to shift the blame on someone else.” On the night of the alleged abuse,
Harden testified that she was in her bedroom next to complainant’s room and did not
hear anything.
Appellant testified at trial and said that on the night of the alleged incident, he
went to say goodnight to complainant in her room at Lenora’s house and she asked
him to take her to see her friend. Appellant told complainant he would not take her
to her friend’s house and said complainant got upset. Appellant said he left the room
and went to bed. Appellant denies all of complainant’s allegations and does not
know why she would make the accusations.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing whether there is legally sufficient evidence to support a
criminal conviction, the standard of review we apply is whether, after reviewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Murray
v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). The evidence may be circumstantial or direct, and we
permit juries to draw multiple reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at
trial. Vernon v. State, 571 S.W.3d 814, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018,
pet. ref’d). The jury is the sole judge of witness credibility and of the weight given
to any evidence presented. Id. at 819–20. A jury may believe or disbelieve some or
all of a witness’s testimony. Id. at 820. On appeal, reviewing courts determine
whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the combined and
cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict. Murray, 457 S.W.3d at 448.
ANALYSIS
Pursuant to the penal code, a person commits indecency with a child by
contact if “with a child younger than 17 years of age, whether the child is of the same
or opposite sex and regardless of whether the person knows the age of the child at
the time of the offense, the person engages in sexual contact with the child or causes
the child to engage in sexual contact.” See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11(a)(1). Sexual
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contact is defined as “any touching of the anus, breast, or any part of the genitals of
another person with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.” See
TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.01(2).
Complainant testified about the sexual contact and stated appellant touched
her breast and vagina with his hands. She further testified that appellant had her
perform oral sex on him and he performed oral sex on her. This Court has previously
held that “[t]he testimony of the child victim alone is sufficient to support a
conviction for sexual assault.” See Lee v. State, 186 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2006, pet ref’d); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07 (“A conviction
under Chapter 21, Section 20A.02(a)(3), (4), (7), or (8), Section 22.011, or Section
22.021, Penal Code, is supportable on the uncorroborated testimony of the victim of
the sexual offense if the victim informed any person, other than the defendant, of the
alleged offense within one year after the date on which the offense is alleged to have
occurred.”). To the extent this case involves he-said, she-said incongruous
testimony, we note that “[w]hen the record supports conflicting inferences, we
presume that the jury resolved the conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that
determination.” See Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525–26 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012).
Appellant argues that the inconsistencies in testimony and complainant’s
mental health issues undermined the verdict to such a degree that no rational juror
could have found him guilty of the charged offense. We disagree. The factfinder is
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the exclusive judge of witness credibility, the determiner of the weight accorded to
each witness’s testimony, and the reconciler of conflicts in the evidence. See Lee,
186 S.W.3d at 655. It is not our role to become a thirteenth juror. Isassi v. State,
330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Here, complainant, Elizabeth, and
Mary all conceded that complainant had anger issues and violent outbursts, but
Elizabeth and Mary also testified that complainant’s behavior was different this time.
Both Elizabeth and Mary testified that they had never seen complainant cry like she
did that night. Complainant testified about the abuse and appellant testified that it
did not happen. Lenora testified that she was in the next room and did not hear
anything. To the extent the evidence contained credibility determinations and
resolutions of conflicting evidence, we defer to the jury’s assessment. Id. Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational trier of fact could
have found all the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. For
these reasons, we overrule appellant’s sole issue.
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CONCLUSION
On the record of this case, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/David Evans/
DAVID EVANS
Do Not Publish JUSTICE
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
190116F.U05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
MCAMIS HARDEN, Appellant On Appeal from the 195th Judicial
District Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-19-00116-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F16-76548-N.
Opinion delivered by Justice Evans.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Partida-Kipness and Nowell
participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered April 20, 2020.
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