Hanson Aggregates, LLC v. John Kowis, Carol Kowis, Gary Maple, Rhonda Maple, John McClellan, Patricia McClellan, Kirk Purdy, Stanley Metelski, and Edward Metelski ( 2020 )


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  • Dismissed as Moot and Memorandum Opinion filed April 21, 2020.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-20-00011-CV
    HANSON AGGREGATES, LLC; RGI MATERIALS, INC.; TEXAS
    CONCRETE SAND & GRAVEL, INC.; LGI LAND, LLC; LGI LAND I,
    LLC; LGI GP, LLC; LGI LAND, LTD.; LGI HOLDINGS, LLC;
    WILLIAMS BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.; LATTIMORE
    MATERIALS CORPORATION; LIBERTY MATERIALS, INC.; SAN
    JACINTO RIVER MATERIALS, INC.; TRIPLE P.G. SAND
    DEVELOPMENT, LLC; CAMPBELL CONCRETE & MATERIALS, LLC;
    GULF COAST STABILIZED MATERIALS, LLC; ALLEYTON
    RESOURCE COMPANY, LLC; AND GREAT SOUTHERN STABILIZED,
    LLC, Appellants
    V.
    JOHN KOWIS, CAROL KOWIS, GARY MAPLE, RHONDA MAPLE,
    JOHN MCCLELLAN, PATRICIA MCCLELLAN, KIRK PURDY,
    STANLEY METELSKI, AND EDWARD METELSKI, Appellees
    On Appeal from the 11th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 2018-66557
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellants Hanson Aggregates, LLC; RGI Materials, Inc.; Texas Concrete
    Sand and Gravel, Inc.; LGI Land, LLC; LGI Land I, LLC; LGI GP, LLC; LGI
    Land, Ltd.; LGI Holdings, LLC; Williams Brothers Construction Co., Inc.;
    Lattimore Materials Corporation; Liberty Materials, Inc.; San Jacinto River
    Materials, Inc.; Triple P.G. Sand Development, LLC; Campbell Concrete &
    Materials, LLC; Gulf Coast Stabilized Materials, LLC; Alleyton Resource
    Company, LLC; and Great Southern Stabilized, LLC (collectively the “Hanson
    Parties”) objected to venue in Harris County and moved the trial court to transfer
    venue as to the claims filed against them by plaintiffs John Kowis, Carol Kowis,
    Gary Maple, Rhonda Maple, John McClellan, Patricia McClellan, Kirk Purdy,
    Stanley Metelski, and Edward Metelski (collectively the “Kowis Parties”). The
    trial court overruled the Hanson Parties’ venue objections, denied their motions to
    transfer venue, and determined that each of the Kowis Parties independently had
    established proper venue in Harris County.
    The Hanson Parties timely perfected an interlocutory appeal from the trial
    court’s order under section 15.003(b) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See
    Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.003(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019
    R.S.). The Hanson Parties also had objected to venue in Harris County and moved
    the trial court to transfer venue as to the claims filed against them by numerous
    intervenors.     But, the trial court struck the petitions in intervention of these
    intervenors and dismissed the intervenors’ claims without prejudice. When the
    Hanson Parties perfected this interlocutory appeal, the Kowis Parties were the only
    parties with claims still pending in the trial court whose claims had been the
    subject of the Hanson Parties’ venue objections and motions to transfer venue.1
    1
    In each of the appellant’s briefs filed in this appeal, the appellants stated that the Kowis Parties
    were the only parties with claims still pending in the trial court whose claims had been the
    subject of the Hanson Parties’ venue objections and motions to transfer venue.
    2
    Thus, we conclude that the Kowis Parties are the appellees in this appeal, and we
    denominate them as such in our opinion and judgment. The Kowis Parties are
    represented by the same attorneys who represent John Earl Ellisor and other
    plaintiffs in the trial court.
    The Hanson Parties filed their appellants’ briefs, asserting various arguments
    as to why the trial court erred in determining that Harris County is a proper venue
    for the Kowis Parties’ claims against the Hanson Parties. About a week before the
    appellees’ brief was due, the Kowis Parties’ attorneys filed a suggestion of
    mootness, asserting that this appeal is now moot because each of the Kowis Parties
    had just nonsuited their claims against the Hanson Parties in the trial court. The
    Hanson Parties agree that the Kowis Parties’ nonsuit of their claims renders this
    appeal moot, and they ask this court to award the appellate costs in this case to the
    Hanson Parties under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.4, either because the
    Hanson Parties are the prevailing parties in this appeal or for good cause. See Tex.
    R. App. P. 43.4.
    Appellate courts are not to decide moot controversies, a rule rooted in
    constitutional prohibitions against rendering advisory opinions. See Valley Baptist
    Med. Ctr. v. Gonzalez, 
    33 S.W.3d 821
    , 822 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam); Nat’l
    Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Jones, 
    1 S.W.3d 83
    , 86 (Tex. 1999). If a judgment can
    have no practical effect on an existing controversy, the case becomes moot and any
    opinion issued on the merits in the appeal would constitute an impermissible
    advisory opinion. See Thompson v. Ricardo, 
    269 S.W.3d 100
    , 103 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
    The Kowis Parties have nonsuited their claims against the Hanson Parties.
    Thus, a judgment rendered by this court as to whether the trial court erred in
    concluding that venue for these claims is proper in Harris County would have no
    3
    practical effect on an existing controversy. See Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc. v.
    Espinoza, No. 04-10-00765-CV, 
    2011 WL 382779
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—San
    Antonio Feb. 2, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). Because this appeal has become moot,
    we must dismiss it on this basis. See
    id. Under Rule
    43.4, in this court’s judgment, the court generally should award
    to the prevailing party all costs incurred by that party related to the appeal. Tex. R.
    App. P. 43.4. Nonetheless, this court may tax costs otherwise as required by law
    or for good cause. See id.; Dolgencorp of Texas, Inc., 
    2011 WL 382779
    , at *1.
    Because this appeal has become moot before this court could reach the
    merits, we cannot say that either side is the prevailing party in the appeal. The
    Kowis Parties’ attorneys argue that good cause to award the appellate costs to the
    Hanson Parties does not exist because the record does not show gamesmanship and
    because doing so would punish the Kowis Parties for filing pleadings that the
    Multi-District Litigation Panel below2 authorized them to file in October 2019. The
    Hanson Parties perfected appeal on January 3, 2020. Thus, the Hanson Parties
    incurred all of their appellate costs after October 2019. The Kowis Parties could
    have nonsuited their claims against the Hanson Parties after October 2019, and
    before the Hanson Parties incurred their appellate costs. Under the circumstances
    of this case, we conclude that good cause exists to tax all the appellate costs in this
    case against the Kowis Parties. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.4; John Saenz & Assoc.,
    P.C. v. RGV Premier Scan LLC, No. 04-18-00366-CV, 
    2018 WL 4903051
    , at *1
    (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 10, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); Dolgencorp of
    Texas, Inc., 
    2011 WL 382779
    , at *1.
    2
    According to the parties, the lawsuit below is part of a potential Multi-District Litigation
    proceeding.
    4
    We dismiss the appeal as moot, and for good cause, we order the Kowis
    Parties to pay all costs incurred in this appeal.
    /s/       Kem Thompson Frost
    Chief Justice
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Jewell and Spain.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-20-00011-CV

Filed Date: 4/21/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/21/2020