Marian Fraser v. State ( 2020 )


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  •                                    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
    ________________________
    No. 07-15-00267-CR
    ________________________
    MARIAN FRASER, APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
    On Appeal from the 19th District Court
    McLennan County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2014-158-C1; Honorable Ralph T. Strother, Presiding
    March 2, 2020
    ORDER ON MOTION TO REMAIN ON CURRENT BOND
    OR FOR REASONABLE BAIL PENDING APPEAL
    Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
    By opinion and judgment dated December 20, 2019, this court reversed Marian
    Fraser’s conviction for the offense of murder for a second time and remanded the cause
    to the trial court for a new trial. See Fraser v. State, __ S.W.3d __, No. 07-15-00267-CR,
    2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 11105, at *19 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 20, 2019, pet. filed). See
    also Fraser v. State, 
    523 S.W.3d 320
    (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017), rev’d, 
    583 S.W.3d 564
    ,
    571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). On January 31, 2020, Appellant filed a motion in this court
    to remain on her current bond or have reasonable bail set pending a second appeal.
    While that motion was pending, on February 3, 2020, the State Prosecuting Attorney filed
    a petition for discretionary review. By letter dated February 4, 2020, this court notified the
    parties that Appellant’s motion to remain on current bond or for reasonable bail pending
    appeal was moot. The following day, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration.
    Relying on the plain language of article 44.04(h) of the Texas Code of Criminal
    Procedure and Murdock v. State, 
    870 S.W.2d 41
    , 43 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), Appellant
    maintains she made a choice to have this court rule on her motion. Remaining convinced
    that Appellant’s motion to remain on bond or for reasonable bail is moot, we include these
    additional comments.
    Article 44.04(h) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that upon
    reversal of a conviction, a defendant is entitled to release on reasonable bail, regardless
    of the length of term of imprisonment, pending final determination of the appeal by the
    State or defendant on petition for discretionary review. (Emphasis added). The statute
    provides in part that “[i]f the defendant requests bail before a petition for discretionary
    review has been filed, the Court of Appeals shall determine the amount of bail.” TEX.
    CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.04(h) (West 2018).
    In 2017, when this court reversed Appellant’s conviction the first time, bail was set
    at $50,000 by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. On September 11, 2019, the high
    court reversed this court’s decision—a final determination of the appeal on petition for
    discretionary review. However, the State never sought to revoke Appellant’s bond. See
    2
    Tucker v. State, 
    286 S.W.3d 558
    , 560 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009, order) (granting
    State’s motion to revoke bail after a final determination of the appeal by the Texas Court
    of Criminal Appeals).
    Appellant indicates that her counsel has been advised that the State opposes
    permitting her to remain on her current bond. However, this court has now reversed her
    conviction for a second time which entitles her to remain on bond. Considering that the
    Texas Court of Criminal Appeals originally set Appellant’s bail at $50,000 and that the
    State never sought to timely revoke that bail, this court need not set reasonable bail
    pending a second final determination on petition for discretionary review. See 
    Murdock, 870 S.W.2d at 42
    (concluding that a defendant may request bail only one time from one
    court).     Appellant’s motion for reasonable bail and motion for reconsideration are
    rendered moot.
    It is so ordered.
    Per Curiam
    Do not publish.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-15-00267-CR

Filed Date: 3/2/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/4/2020