David Ray Baker v. State ( 2020 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-18-00364-CR
___________________________
DAVID RAY BAKER, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 271st District Court
Wise County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR20549
Before Gabriel, Birdwell, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Gabriel
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant David Ray Baker was convicted by a jury of evading arrest or
detention using a vehicle, a third-degree felony. See Tex. Penal Code Ann.
§ 38.04(b)(2)(A). The jury found each of the enhancement paragraphs contained in
the indictment to be true and assessed his punishment at fifty years’ confinement.
The trial court sentenced him accordingly. Baker raises six issues on appeal. In his
first issue, Baker argues that the evidence to convict him was insufficient because the
subject stop was unlawful. In his second and third issues, Baker argues that the trial
court erred by refusing to suppress certain evidence obtained as a result of the stop.
In his fourth through sixth issues, Baker argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting certain evidence in the guilt-innocence and punishment phases
of his trial and that the cumulative effect of the admission of this evidence led to an
unfair trial.
Because we hold that the evidence was sufficient to prove that the subject stop
was lawful, we overrule Baker’s first issue. Because we hold that Baker failed to
preserve his complaint regarding the trial court’s purported refusal to suppress
evidence, we overrule Baker’s second and third issues. Because we hold that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the complained-of evidence in the
punishment phase of Baker’s trial, and because we hold that, even assuming error,
Baker was not harmed by the admission of the complained-of evidence in the guilt-
2
innocence phase of his trial, we overrule Baker’s fourth through sixth issues.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 18, 2017, Sergeant James Mayo, an investigator with the Wise
County Sheriff’s Office, received information that Baker was driving a Dodge pickup
truck through Wise County carrying narcotics. Mayo relayed the information to
multiple officers and told them to be on the lookout for the truck. The officers’ plans
were to follow Baker until an officer saw a traffic violation that would justify a stop.
Deputy Robert Sparks, one of the officers Mayo notified, observed Baker
driving the described truck and began following him. Sparks observed Baker turn off
the Highway 287 service road onto Highway 51 while failing to signal at least 100 feet
before turning. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.104(b). Sparks later observed
Baker turn into a restaurant’s parking lot while failing to signal at least 100 feet before
turning.1 See id. At that point, Sparks activated his patrol car’s emergency overhead
lights and initiated a traffic stop.
Baker’s truck slowed down following the activation of the patrol car’s
emergency overhead lights, and the truck seemed to stop “[f]or a brief second.” The
truck then took off at a high rate of speed, narrowly avoiding collisions with multiple
vehicles in the parking lot. Sparks followed in his patrol car and, according to his later
1
Sparks also testified that the rear-mounted center lamp in Baker’s truck was
not functioning.
3
testimony at trial, his patrol car reached approximately fifty miles per hour while he
pursued Baker in the parking lot. When Baker reached the edge of the parking lot, he
drove his truck through a fence at a high rate of speed, disabling the truck. Baker
exited the truck and started running across a field. Sparks pursued Baker on foot and
yelled for him to stop, but Baker continued to flee. As he was running, Baker briefly
fell in an area of pooled water. Shortly thereafter, Sparks and other police officers
apprehended Baker.
After apprehending Baker, Sparks, who was part of a K-9 unit, retrieved his
dog to conduct a drug sniff of Baker’s truck. The dog alerted to narcotics, so officers
searched the truck, but they did not find any narcotics. The officers then searched the
path they took in pursuit of Baker, and in the pooled water where Baker fell, officers
found methamphetamine inside a sandwich bag. Although methamphetamine
dissolves rapidly in water, the sandwich bag contained methamphetamine that had not
yet dissolved. Baker later told police that the bag had originally contained
approximately a quarter pound of methamphetamine.
A grand jury indicted Baker for evading arrest or detention with a vehicle and
tampering with evidence (relating to Baker’s attempts to conceal his possession of
methamphetamine). The State moved forward only on the evading-arrest charge.
After the jury found Baker guilty of evading arrest or detention with a vehicle and
assessed his punishment at fifty years’ confinement, he filed this appeal.
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II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his first issue, Baker argues that the evidence to convict him for evading
arrest was insufficient because the subject stop was unlawful. Baker contends that the
stop was unlawful because Sparks did not have probable cause sufficient to detain
him.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact-finder could have
found the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App.
2017).
B. THE LAW
Baker was convicted of evading arrest or detention with a vehicle. See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 38.04(b)(2)(A). One of the elements of that offense—and the only
element contested by Baker on appeal—is that the attempted detention be lawful. See
id. § 38.04(a) (“A person commits an offense if he intentionally flees from a person he
knows is a peace officer or federal special investigator attempting lawfully to arrest or
detain him.”); see also Rodriguez v. State, 578 S.W.2d 419, 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)
(listing the elements of evading arrest including that “the attempted arrest is lawful”).
A detention, as opposed to an arrest, may be justified on less than probable
cause if a person is reasonably suspected of criminal activity based on specific,
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articulable facts. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323,
328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). An officer conducts a lawful temporary detention when
he reasonably suspects that an individual is violating the law. Crain v. State,
315 S.W.3d 43, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005). Reasonable suspicion exists when, based on the totality of the
circumstances, the officer has specific, articulable facts that, when combined with
rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably conclude that a
particular person is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Ford,
158 S.W.3d at 492. This is an objective standard that disregards the detaining officer’s
subjective intent and looks solely to whether the officer has an objective basis for the
stop. Id.
Law enforcement personnel have probable cause to initiate a traffic stop when
they see a person commit a traffic violation. State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 469–70
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see State v. Ballman, 157 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2004, pet. ref’d). Because reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than
probable cause, an officer who has probable cause to detain a suspect necessarily has
reasonable suspicion to do so. Rodriguez v. State, No. 02-18-00159-CR, 2018 WL
3153479, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 28, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Rubeck v. State, 61 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2001, no pet.) (op. on reh’g).
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C. ANALYSIS
At trial, Sparks stated that the reason he decided to stop Baker’s truck was
because Baker had failed to signal at least 100 feet before turning into the restaurant’s
parking lot.2 Failure to continuously signal a turn at least 100 feet in advance of the
turn is a criminal offense in Texas. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.104(b). Baker
argues that the stop was unlawful because Sparks “did not provide any facts to
support his belief that a violation of law had occurred,” but only provided conclusory
statements. We disagree. Sparks testified that he personally observed Baker turn into
the parking lot and that he personally observed Baker signaling just before the turn.
Sparks estimated that Baker did not begin signaling until 25 feet before turning, and
that estimate was “being generous.” Video from the dash camera of Sparks’s patrol
car showing Baker turn into the parking lot and his signaling prior to the turn was also
admitted, from which the jury could test the reasonableness of Sparks’s opinion that
Baker had committed a traffic violation. The question is not whether Baker in fact
actually failed to continuously signal for 100 feet before turning; rather, it is whether
Sparks could have reasonably concluded based on specific, rational inferences from
the facts that Baker failed to continuously signal for 100 feet before turning. See Ford,
2
While Sparks stated that he pulled Baker’s truck over because of that violation,
he identified three purported violations: (1) failure to signal at least 100 feet before
turning off the Highway 287 service road onto Highway 51; (2) failure to signal at
least 100 feet before turning into the restaurant’s parking lot; and (3) operating the
truck with a non-functioning rear-mounted center lamp.
7
158 S.W.3d at 492; State v. Hneidy, 510 S.W.3d 458, 463 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2013, pet. ref’d).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that
Sparks could have reasonably concluded that Baker failed to continuously signal for
100 feet before the turn into the restaurant’s parking lot, and we therefore hold that
the evidence was sufficient to prove that the subject stop was lawful. See Ford,
158 S.W.3d at 492; Gray, 158 S.W.3d at 469–70. We thus overrule Baker’s first issue.
III. BAKER’S COMPLAINTS REGARDING THE TRIAL COURT’S
PURPORTED REFUSAL TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
In his second and third issues, Baker argues that the trial court erred by failing
to suppress evidence resulting from his arrest.
A. THE LAW REGARDING PRESERVATION
To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial
court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds, if not
apparent from the context, for the desired ruling. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Thomas v.
State, 505 S.W.3d 916, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Further, the party must have
obtained an express or implicit adverse trial-court ruling or objected to the trial court’s
refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2); Everitt v. State, 407 S.W.3d 259, 262–63
(Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Because it is a systemic requirement, this court should
independently review error preservation, and we have a duty to ensure that a claim is
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properly preserved in the trial court before we address its merits. Darcy v. State,
488 S.W.3d 325, 327–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
B. ANALYSIS
Here, Baker filed a motion to suppress all evidence, materials, and statements
as a result of his arrest. At the beginning of trial, the following exchange occurred
regarding that motion:
[Baker’s Counsel]: . . . I’ll hand one to the Court, just in case it’s
not in your queue – Defense motion to suppress the evidence. We think
we’re entitled to suppress the methamphetamine and the tamper charge,
which we don’t believe the officer was trying to lawfully stop the
Defendant. I’m not taking the position I’m entitled to the motion to
suppress on the traffic stop, but I think we’re entitled to suppress the
evidence they found as a result of the stop, other than the evading.
[Trial Court]: All right.
[Baker’s Counsel]: And we’re going to be asking the Court to rule
on that at some point during the trial.
[Trial Court]: All right. And when you’re – when you’re ready for
me to make that ruling, I’ll do it.
[Baker’s Counsel]: Well, the problem is, is if the State is allowed to
get into it right off the bat, it’s gonna be hard to get the skunk out of the
box.
[Trial Court]: Well, response to that, [State’s Counsel]?
[State’s Counsel]: [Gives an explanation for why he believes the
subject stop was lawful.]
[Trial Court]: Okay. I understand.
[State’s Counsel]: Yeah.
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[Trial Court]: All right. Anything else?
[Baker’s Counsel]: Nothing from the Defense, your Honor.
While Baker’s counsel stated that he would ask the trial court to rule on the
motion to suppress “at some point during the trial,” and while the trial court
expressed a willingness to rule on the motion whenever Baker’s counsel requested a
ruling, Baker’s counsel never requested a ruling on the motion. Based on this record,
Baker has failed to preserve his complaints regarding the trial court’s purported
refusal to suppress evidence because Baker never requested a ruling from the trial
court regarding his motion to suppress.3 See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1), (2); Thomas,
505 S.W.3d at 924; Everitt, 407 S.W.3d at 262–63. Accordingly, we overrule Baker’s
second and third issues.
IV. BAKER’S EVIDENTIARY COMPLAINTS
Baker raises certain evidentiary complaints in his fourth through sixth issues.
In his fourth issue, Baker argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence of his possession of methamphetamine and tampering of evidence during
the guilt-innocence phase of his trial. In his fifth issue, Baker argues that the trial
court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his prior convictions during the
punishment phase of his trial after he had already pleaded true to the offenses. And
3
While Baker did not preserve his complaints regarding his motion to suppress,
Baker’s counsel did raise numerous objections at trial to the admission of evidence
obtained as a result of the subject stop, and Baker’s fourth issue on appeal addresses
many of these objections.
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in his sixth issue, Baker argues that the cumulative effect of the improper admission
of this evidence denied him a fair trial.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse
of discretion standard. Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d 675, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009);
Prible v. State, 175 S.W.3d 724, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “As long as the trial
court’s ruling was within the ‘zone of reasonable disagreement,’ there is no abuse of
discretion, and the trial court’s ruling will be upheld.” Prible, 175 S.W.3d at 731
(quoting Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)); Montgomery v.
State, 810 S.W.3d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g). “If the trial court’s
evidentiary ruling is correct on any theory of law applicable to that ruling, it will not
be disturbed” regardless of the reason for the trial court’s ruling. Devoe v. State,
354 S.W.3d 457, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
B. BAKER’S COMPLAINT REGARDING EVIDENCE ADMITTED DURING
THE GUILT-INNOCENCE PHASE
In his fourth issue, Baker argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting evidence of his possession of methamphetamine and tampering of evidence
during the guilt-innocence phase of his trial. Specifically, Baker complains about the
following evidence on appeal: (1) a video from Sparks’s body camera depicting Sparks
finding the sandwich bag containing methamphetamine in the area of pooled water;
(2) a video from Sparks’s body camera depicting his dog performing the drug sniff on
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Baker’s truck; (3) two photographs of the inside of Baker’s truck showing a “BB gun
[that] had the same visual characteristics as a real firearm” stored in the truck; (4) a
chain of custody form pertaining to the seized methamphetamine; (5) testimony
relating to the amount of the seized methamphetamine; (6) five photographs of the
seized methamphetamine; (7) testimony relating to testing done to confirm that the
seized material was methamphetamine; and (8) a laboratory report confirming that the
seized material was methamphetamine.
Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court abused its discretion by
admitting this evidence, we may not reverse the trial court’s judgment unless the error
affected Baker’s substantial rights. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). The erroneous
admission of evidence is non-constitutional error. Gonzalez v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363,
373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Kennedy v. State, 193 S.W.3d 645, 660 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2006, pet. ref’d). Non-constitutional error requires reversal only if it affects an
appellant’s substantial rights. Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373 (citing Tex. R. App.
P. 44.2(b)); Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (citing same).
Substantial rights are not affected if the reviewing court has fair assurances that the
erroneous admission of evidence had no influence or only a slight influence on the
jury. Barshaw v. State, 342 S.W.3d 91, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at
355. “Put another way, to be reversible, the jury must have been ‘substantially
swayed’ by the improperly-admitted evidence.” Gillon v. State, No. 02-16-00148-CR,
2017 WL 1738039, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 4, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.,
12
not designated for publication) (quoting Hinds v. State, 970 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.)). In making this determination, we review the entire
record, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged
error, and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence in the case.
Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355. We may also consider the jury instructions, the State’s
theory and defensive theories, whether the State emphasized the error, closing
arguments, and voir dire. Id. at 355–56.
Based on our review of the record, there is overwhelming evidence supporting
the jury’s verdict. See id. at 357; Gillon, 2017 WL 1738039, at *4. As detailed above,
Sparks initiated a lawful traffic stop after personally observing Baker’s truck make a
turn without first continuously signaling for 100 feet. Sparks was in a marked patrol
car wearing his police uniform at the time of the stop, and he activated his patrol car’s
emergency overhead lights to initiate the stop. Rather than stopping, Baker took off
in his truck at a speed approximating fifty miles per hour, narrowly avoiding collisions
with multiple vehicles in the parking lot. Despite these near misses, Baker did not
stop, but he continued driving to the edge of the parking lot, where he drove his truck
through a fence at a high rate of speed, disabling the truck. Baker then fled on foot
and ignored Sparks’s pleas to stop.
While a significant amount of evidence was admitted during the guilt-innocence
phase relating to Baker’s possession of methamphetamine and tampering of evidence,
this evidence could be considered in connection with other evidence of his evading
13
arrest, namely, because it suggested a motive for his decision to flee and suggested his
intent to evade detention. See Tex. R. Evid. 404(b) (allowing the admission of
extraneous evidence to show, among other things, motive and intent). The trial court
gave several limiting instructions—both oral and in writing—that minimized the risk
that the jury would consider this evidence for an improper purpose or give it undue
weight.4 See Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (noting that
limiting instructions can minimize impermissible inferences of character conformity);
Harris v. State, 572 S.W.3d 325, 334 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, no pet.) (“The district
court’s limiting instruction in the charge about Zavala’s testimony minimized any risk
that the jury would consider the substance of her questioning for any improper
purpose or give it undue weight.”); see also Adams v. State, 179 S.W.3d 161, 165 (Tex.
4
In the jury charge, the trial court gave the following instruction:
The Defendant is on trial solely on the charges contained in the
indictment. The State has introduced in evidence an act or acts other
than those charged in the indictment. With reference to those other
acts, you are instructed that said evidence was admitted only for the
purpose of assisting you, if it does, for the purpose of showing the
defendant’s motive, intent, knowledge, absence of mistake or lack of
accident, if any were committed. If you so find beyond a reasonable
doubt, you can consider the evidence only for the purpose allowed. The
evidence may not be considered to prove the character of the Defendant
in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith on the occasion
in question.
Similar oral limiting instructions were given when the trial court admitted the
video of Sparks finding the methamphetamine and the video of his dog conducting
the drug sniff and when the trial court admitted two photographs depicting a BB gun
stored in Baker’s truck.
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App.—Amarillo 2005, no pet.) (“[W]e generally presume that the jury follows the trial
court’s instructions, including a limiting instruction regarding certain testimony.”).
And while several questions were posed to venire members regarding their views on
methamphetamine use and its impact on the community during voir dire, the State did
not mention methamphetamine during its initial closing argument, and it only
mentioned drugs once during its rebuttal closing argument, after Baker’s counsel
reminded the jury during closing argument that Baker was “not on trial for having a
whole lot of meth [but was] on trial for the felony offense of evading arrest with a
motor vehicle.”
On this record, we cannot say that the jury must have been “substantially
swayed” by the evidence concerning Baker’s methamphetamine possession and
evidence tampering. Assuming the jury considered this evidence at all, we are
persuaded that its admission had, at most, only a slight influence—not enough to
constitute reversible error. See Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355. We thus hold that Baker’s
substantial rights were not violated and hold that any error was harmless. See Tex. R.
App. P. 44.2(b); Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355. Accordingly, we overrule Baker’s fourth
issue.
C. BAKER’S COMPLAINT REGARDING EVIDENCE ADMITTED DURING
THE PUNISHMENT PHASE
In his fifth issue, Baker argues that the trial court abused its discretion in the
punishment phase by admitting evidence of his prior convictions after he pleaded true
15
to those convictions.5 Pointing to Harvey v. State, Baker argues that the admission of
this evidence was improper because “[p]leading true to an enhancement allegation
removes the burden of proof from the state to prove that [a] prior conviction was a
final conviction under law.” 611 S.W.2d 108, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Baker’s
reliance on Harvey is misplaced. While Harvey held that a defendant’s plea of true
obviated the State’s burden to offer evidence to prove a prior conviction, Harvey did
nothing to prohibit the State from offering evidence of a prior conviction following a
defendant’s plea of true. See id. Moreover, Article 37.07, Section 3(a)(1) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure specifically allows the State to offer evidence of a defendant’s
prior convictions during the punishment phase even after a defendant has pleaded
true to the prior convictions. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1). That
section provides, in pertinent part:
Regardless of the plea and whether the punishment be assessed by the
judge or the jury, evidence may be offered by the state and the defendant
as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing, including
but not limited to the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general
reputation, his character, an opinion regarding his character, the
circumstances of the offense for which he is being tried, and,
notwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, any
other evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act that is shown beyond a
reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by the defendant or for
which he could be held criminally responsible, regardless of whether he
has previously been charged with or finally convicted of the crime
or act.
5
The complained-of evidence that was objected to at trial consists of certified
copies of his prior convictions and a penitentiary packet.
16
Id. (emphasis added).
We overrule Baker’s fifth issue.
D. BAKER’S COMPLAINT REGARDING THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF
IMPROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE
In his sixth issue, Baker argues that the cumulative effect of the improperly
admitted evidence during the guilt-innocence and punishment phases of his trial
denied him a fair trial. The doctrine of cumulative error provides that the cumulative
effect of multiple errors can, in the aggregate, constitute reversible error, even though
no single instance of error would. Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999); Priddy v. State, No. 02-13-00586-CR, 2014 WL 5307180, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Oct. 16, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
However, for the doctrine to apply, the alleged errors complained of must actually
constitute error. Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 585 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Priddy,
2014 WL 5307180, at *1. “The doctrine of cumulative error . . . rarely results in
reversal, and is predicated upon meeting the standard of reversible error.” Vasquez v.
State, No. 2-04-214-CR, 2006 WL 133462, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 19,
2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
Here, as we have already explained, the trial court did not err by admitting the
complained-of evidence during the punishment phase of Baker’s trial. And we have
already determined that Baker was not harmed by the admission of the complained-of
evidence during the guilt-innocence phase of his trial. Baker’s cumulative-error
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complaint thus lacks merit because there is no error to cumulate. See Bell v. State,
No. 02-18-00244-CR, 2019 WL 1967538, at *9 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 2, 2019,
pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Bell argues that even if each of
his previous points do not constitute harm sufficient for reversal, their cumulative
effect does, undermining the fundamental fairness of the proceedings. But his
individual points either do not demonstrate reversible error or do not show that he
was harmed. Therefore, there is no error to cumulate.”); Baker v. State, No. 03-18-
00240-CR, 2019 WL 1646260, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 17, 2019, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Here, Baker’s cumulative-error
contention lacks merit because we have concluded, as to his preserved appellate
issues, that one complained-of error was harmless and that there was no error as to
the remaining complaints.”).
We overrule Baker’s sixth issue.
V. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Baker’s six issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/s/ Lee Gabriel
Lee Gabriel
Justice
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: April 23, 2020
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