Odelia Laura Caudillo v. Daniel Caudillo ( 2020 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-19-00198-CV
ODELIA LAURA CAUDILLO, APPELLANT
V.
DANIEL CAUDILLO, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 140th District Court
Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2015-517,163; Honorable Jim Bob Darnell, Presiding
April 24, 2020
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and DOSS, JJ.
Daniel Caudillo and Odelia Laura Caudillo were divorced by a Final Decree of
Divorce signed April 24, 2019. As part of the decree, Daniel was ordered to pay spousal
maintenance in the amount of $400 per month, with the first payment being due
retroactively on November 1, 2018, and each subsequent payment being due on the first
day of each consecutive month until the earliest of one of several listed events occurred.
Odelia argues the trial court abused its discretion by (1) changing the start date and
duration of the court-ordered spousal maintenance and (2) determining she was eligible
for spousal maintenance under section 8.054(a)(1)(C) instead of section 8.054(a)(2)(A)
of the Texas Family Code. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the divorce decree
of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
Daniel and Odelia married in 1977 and separated in 2015. On August 24, 2015,
Daniel filed for divorce. Odelia counter-petitioned, requesting temporary spousal support
and post-divorce spousal maintenance. A hearing regarding temporary orders was held
before an associate judge. At the conclusion of that hearing, the associate judge ordered
Daniel to pay to Odelia $700 per month in temporary spousal support. Daniel appealed
that ruling to the district court. Following a full de novo hearing, the judge ordered Daniel
to pay to Odelia $400 per month, beginning on November 15, 2015. Daniel did not begin
paying at that time and Odelia filed a motion to enforce the order. Daniel began paying
the temporary spousal support in April 2016.
On October 15, 2018, the court held a contested hearing concerning the
disposition of property in relation to Daniel and Odelia’s divorce. During that hearing,
both parties testified. Odelia testified she was disabled. She told the court it affected her
everyday life and her ability to obtain employment. She testified she began receiving
social security disability benefits the previous year. She also testified “[t]here’s no way I
can go back and get a job . . . [b]ecause I’m disabled. I got chronic arthritis, osteoarthritis.
I can’t do anything physical that much.” She said, “I can’t lift, crawl, climb stairs, stoop,
bend or—everything.” She testified that if she tries to do these things, it is “painful, very
painful.” Odelia also testified about her income from her disability benefits, her retirement,
as well as her customary monthly expenses. She answered “No” when asked whether
2
she would be able to pay for all of the expenses without Daniel’s spousal support. She
told the court her previous employment had been as a teacher but that she had not
worked in that capacity for many years.
Daniel answered affirmatively when asked whether he was aware that Odelia was
disabled. He also stated that he knew the federal government had determined she was
unable to work because of her disability. With regard to spousal maintenance, he said
he “could live with what I’m giving her right now,” which was the $400 per month ordered
after the de novo temporary hearing.
At the close of the hearing, the court asked for additional documentation and took
the matter under advisement. On October 18, 2018, the judge sent an email to counsel
with an attachment entitled “Property Division.” That document included the statement,
“Daniel will pay $400 per month beginning Nov[ember] 1, 2018.” The email was filed with
the court on October 29, 2018. Odelia’s attorney did not receive notice of the October 18
email until October 29 because the October 18 email was sent to an incorrect email
address. Through email exchanges between October 18 and October 29, Daniel’s
attorney and the judge discussed the duration of the spousal maintenance award. The
judge responded to Daniel’s inquiry concerning the duration of the award, stating “10 yrs
but would start when payments started under temporary orders.” Daniel had been
ordered to pay temporary spousal support beginning in November 2015. The Final
Decree of Divorce provided, however, that Daniel pay spousal maintenance in the amount
of $400 per month, “with the first payment being due on November 01, 2018, and a like
amount being due on the first (1st) day of each consecutive month thereafter until the
earliest of one of the following events: (1) seven (7) years; (2) death of either [Daniel] or
3
[Odelia]; (3) remarriage of Odelia [ ]; or (4) further orders of the Court affecting the spousal
maintenance obligation . . . .”
In early 2019, Odelia filed motions to enter judgment, requesting the trial court to
sign her proposed Final Decree of Divorce, which contained a spousal maintenance
provision that corresponded to the October 18 email, which included the memorandum
stating that “Daniel will pay $400 per month beginning November 01, 2018.” According
to Odelia’s interpretation, the email constituted a rendition of judgment providing for
indefinite spousal maintenance. In April 2019, the trial court held a hearing on Odelia’s
motion for judgment. At that hearing, Daniel’s counsel acknowledged the email
conversation between himself and the judge but argued there was not a substantial
change in the court’s ruling; rather, it was a mere clarification. Odelia argued the email
ruling left open the question of whether the court found she was disabled and also
changed the beginning date of the spousal maintenance award. On April 24, 2019, the
trial court signed its Final Decree of Divorce, containing the spousal maintenance
provision described above.
Thereafter, on June 7, 2019, the trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of
law. The conclusions of law included the above-stated provision for spousal
maintenance, with the exception of adding “or co-habitation” to the third contingency. The
trial court made no findings or conclusions that specifically contain the words “disabled”
or “disability” with reference to Odelia. Rather, the court made a more general finding
that Odelia “will lack the ability to earn sufficient income to provide for [her] minimum
reasonable needs on dissolution of the marriage.” The court further stated that, in
determining the nature, amount, duration, and manner of payment of spousal
4
maintenance, it had considered the “future earning potential of the parties” and the “ability
of each party to meet their minimum reasonable needs.”
ANALYSIS
ISSUE ONE—MODIFICATION OF SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE ORDER
In her first issue, Odelia contends the October 18 email and attached
memorandum constituted a rendition of judgment and the trial court erred because the
Final Decree contained a provision that changed the start date and duration of spousal
maintenance from that set forth in the email. We disagree.
Judgment is rendered when the trial court officially announces its decision in open
court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk. S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 892
S.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Tex. 1995) (citations omitted). The judge’s intention to render
judgment in the future cannot be a present rendition of judgment. Id. at 858 (citation
omitted). The rendition of judgment is “a present act, either by spoken word or signed
memorandum, which decides the issues upon which the ruling is made.” Id. (citation
omitted). A judgment is “‘signed’ when a judge actually signs a written order or decree;
and, it is ‘entered’ when the clerk performs the task of entering it in the minutes of the
court. Cook v. Cook, 243 S.W.3d 800, 804 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).
Whether a trial court has rendered a judgment is a question of fact. Escobar v. Escobar,
711 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1986).
Citing Cook, 243 S.W.3d at 804, Odelia begins her argument by saying “[t]he entry
of judgment goes through three stages: rendition, signing, and entry.” Odelia argues the
judge rendered his ruling when he signed, dated, and filed the memorandum entitled
5
“Property Division,” attached to his October 18 email which included the statement,
“Daniel will pay $400 per month beginning Nov[ember] 1, 2018.” Because she considers
this document to be the judgment rendered by the court, she contends the Final Decree
of Divorce later entered is incorrect because it contains different terms. We disagree.
The October 18 email to which the “Property Division” memorandum was attached
stated as follows:
Attached is a copy of property/debt division in Caudillo case. Since Daniel
Caudillo filed divorce petition, Ben will prepare decree; provide copy to Terri
and Megan for their review before e-filing. If anyone feels I left something
out, let me know.
This language does not indicate the judge’s intent to render a final appealable order at
the time he sent the email. In fact, the judge invited changes by asking the parties to
notify him if he “left something out.” In the area of family law, this is a common practice,
where many of the “details” contained in a final decree of divorce are not orally
pronounced, and the trial judge often exercises discretion when fine-tuning his ruling prior
to formal rendition. Further, the mere filing of that email and memorandum did not alter
the judge’s intent or constitute the rendition of a ruling any more than the email itself did.
The language of the email still indicated an intent to render a ruling at a later date, after
the parties had reviewed the decree and had the opportunity to suggest changes or
additions to the judge.
We also note Odelia’s argument that the judge changed his October 18 email
“decision” from an indefinite spousal maintenance award to one that was limited to a
period of seven years. Again, the mere fact that the email did not include the specific
term of payments did not mean that the trial judge had rendered a decision that the
6
spousal maintenance payments would continue indefinitely. Similar to the other details
to be included in the final order, the term of payments was a detail that remained within
the discretion of the trial judge.
As Odelia recognizes, a court may order maintenance to the spouse who is unable
to earn sufficient income to provide for his or her minimum reasonable needs due to a
physical or mental disability for as long as the spouse continues to satisfy the eligibility
criteria prescribed by the applicable provision. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.054(b) (West
Supp. 2019). While Odelia seems to take from this statute that the district court was
required to order spousal maintenance for that entire period, the unambiguous language
of the statute is discretionary in nature, setting forth that the court “may” make such an
order. It does not say that the court “shall” or is otherwise mandated to order spousal
maintenance for the entire period of disability.
Odelia also complains that the judge improperly took into account the spousal
support she received under the temporary orders when he reduced her spousal support
to a period of seven years in the Final Decree. As support for her argument, she lists the
factors set forth in section 8.052 of the Family Code, noting that none of them include
support received under temporary orders as that support is to assist with needs during
the pending suit. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.052. Again, the language of section 8.052 is
informative here. The beginning of that provision provides “[a] court that determines that
a spouse is eligible to receive maintenance under this chapter shall determine the nature,
amount, duration, and manner of periodic payments by considering all relevant factors,
including. . . [eleven enumerated factors].” (Emphasis added). TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
8.052. The use of the word “including” indicates that a judge should consider the eleven
7
factors set forth in section 8.052, but it does not preclude a judge from considering other
factors. The list is not exclusive. We thus do not find the trial court abused its discretion
here by considering factors, if it did, not specifically enumerated in section 8.052 of the
Family Code.
Lastly, we address Odelia’s argument that the Final Decree of Divorce does not
conform to the October 29 email because the decree states Daniel is to pay spousal
maintenance for a period of seven years commencing November 1, 2018, whereas the
October 29 email itself did not specify any term of duration and the email chain regarding
clarification of the court’s order provided for “10 yrs but would start when payments started
under temporary orders.” The de novo temporary orders provided that spousal
maintenance was to commence on November 15, 2015. Taking into consideration the
temporary spousal maintenance payments that had already accrued, the number of
spousal maintenance payments was the same. Either way, Daniel was obligated to make
the same spousal maintenance payment ($400 per month), for the same number of
months (November 2015 through November 2025).1 As such, we cannot find the district
court abused its discretion here either. Accordingly, we resolve Odelia’s first issue
against her.
ISSUE TWO—ELIGIBILITY FOR SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE
Via her second issue, Odelia contends the district court erred when it determined
the duration of her spousal maintenance under section 8.054(a)(1)(C) of the Texas Family
1
We acknowledge Odelia’s argument that Daniel did not actually pay the ordered temporary
spousal maintenance in November 2015. Odelia filed a Motion for Enforcement after Daniel failed to make
the payments. Daniel began making the payments on April 16, 2016. We do not find that the court abused
its discretion in declining to alter the spousal maintenance award time period based on those events.
8
Code, providing that a court may not order maintenance that remains in effect for more
than ten years after the date of the order, if the spouses were married for thirty years or
more, rather than section 8.054(a)(2)(A), which provides that the court shall limit the
duration of a maintenance order to the “shortest reasonable period that allows the spouse
seeking maintenance to earn sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s minimum
reasonable needs, unless the ability of the spouse to provide for the spouse’s minimum
reasonable needs is substantially or totally diminished because of: (A) physical or mental
disability of the spouse seeking maintenance.” See TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. §
8.054(a)(1)(C); § 8.054(a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2019).
We review the trial court’s decision to award spousal maintenance under an abuse
of discretion standard of review. Diaz v. Diaz, 350 S.W.3d 251, 254 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2011, pet. denied). See also In re Marriage of Boyd, No. 07-14-00211-CV, 2015
Tex. App. LEXIS 6452, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo June 24, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(citations omitted). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court’s
decision to award spousal maintenance. Amos v. Amos, 79 S.W.3d 747, 749 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). Under this standard of review, the proper inquiry is
whether the trial court’s assessment of spousal maintenance was arbitrary or
unreasonable. Garcia v. Garcia, 170 S.W.3d 644, 649 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, no
pet.) (citations omitted). Consequently, we must “determine whether, based on the
elicited evidence, the trial court made a reasonable decision. Stated inversely, we must
conclude that the trial court’s decision was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.” Id.
The trial court may exercise its discretion to award spousal maintenance only if the
party seeking maintenance meets specific statutory eligibility requirements. Roberts v.
9
Roberts, 531 S.W.3d 224, 227-29 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) (citing
Slicker v. Slicker, 464 S.W.3d 850, 859 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.)). Texas Family
Code section 8.051(2)(A) provides that “in a suit for dissolution of a marriage” the trial
court may order maintenance if the spouse seeking maintenance will lack sufficient
property, on dissolution of the marriage, to provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable
needs and that spouse is “unable to earn sufficient income to provide for her minimum
reasonable needs because of an incapacitating physical or mental disability.”
Once a trial court has determined that a spouse is eligible for spousal maintenance
pursuant to section 8.051(2)(A), the trial court may order maintenance for “as long as the
spouse [seeking maintenance] continues to satisfy the eligibility criteria prescribed by
[section 8.051(2)(A)].” See TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. § 8.054(b) (West Supp. 2019).
Therefore, while Odelia is incorrect in her contention that the trial court had the authority
to order spousal maintenance for more ten years pursuant to section 8.054(a)(2)(A), she
would nonetheless be correct if she were contending the trial court had that authority
pursuant to section 8.054(b). Roberts, 531 S.W.3d at 228.
As fact finder, the trial court may reasonably infer an individual’s incapacity from
circumstantial evidence or the competent testimony of a lay witness, including the
testimony of the person seeking spousal maintenance. Roberts, 531 S.W.3d at 228
(citing Reina v. Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 611 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. 1981)
(no medical evidence of disability required in case decided under former workers’
compensation statute); Pickens v. Pickens, 62 S.W.3d 212, 215-16 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2001, pet. denied)). A physical disability or incapacity does not need to be proven by
medical evidence. Roberts, 531 S.W.3d at 228-29 (citing Reina, 611 S.W.2d at 417;
10
Pickens, 62 S.W.3d at 216; Galindo v. Galindo, 04-13-00325-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS
3775 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 9, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (upheld disability finding
based solely on testimony of party seeking spousal maintenance)). “In fact, the testimony
of the injured party will support a finding of incapacity even if directly contradicted by
expert medical testimony.” Roberts, 531 S.W.3d at 228 (citing Pickens, 62 S.W.3d at
216). There is “no authority directly addressing the quantum of evidence required to prove
incapacity in a spousal maintenance action.” Roberts, 531 S.W.3d at 228-29 (citing
Galindo, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3775, at *4 (quoting Pickens, 62 S.W.3d at 215); Smith
v. Smith, 115 S.W.3d 303, 309 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)).
In the matter before us, Odelia told the court she began receiving social security
disability the previous year. On appeal, her counsel discusses the difficulty of satisfying
the burden to receive such benefits. Odelia testified before the district judge that “[t]here’s
no way I can go back and get a job . . . [b]ecause I’m disabled. I got chronic arthritis,
osteoarthritis. I can’t do anything physical that much.” She further testified saying, “I can’t
lift, crawl, climb stairs, stoop, bend or—everything.” She testified that if she tries to do
these things, it is “painful, very painful.” While Odelia did not testify about any efforts to
obtain employment of any kind or explain why her disability prevented her from doing any
type of work, such evidence was unnecessary since Daniel testified he was aware Odelia
was disabled and he did not otherwise contest that issue.
On appeal, Odelia contrasts Galindo, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3775, at *6-7 with
Wiedenfeld v. Markgraf, 534 S.W.3d 14, 20 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet. denied)
to support her contention that the evidence she presented to the district court was
sufficient to allow it to reasonably infer she was disabled. While we agree the court could
11
have made such a finding, we do not agree it was required to make such a finding.
Furthermore, even if the trial court determined Odelia was disabled, it was not required
to order spousal support for an indefinite duration.
In Galindo, the wife testified she was diagnosed with a “neuromuscular disorder of
the intestinal track” in 2000. Galindo, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3775, at *6. She told the
court it causes her to “get severe pain the upper gut area, and it is so bad that I just start
vomiting and going to the bathroom and can’t move . . . I just have to go to the hospital.”
Id. The wife further testified that in addition to the acute symptoms, she is “always in at
least moderate pain and suffers from anxiety.” Id. In addition, she took medication which
also impaired her abilities. Id. Given those facts, the appellate court concluded a fact
finder could reasonably infer the wife’s incapacity from her testimony and the substance
of her testimony was “such that she qualifies for spousal maintenance under section
8.051(2)(A).” Id. at *7. Odelia encourages this court to find that the evidence in this case
is similar to that presented in Galindo and to find that the trial court erred in its award in
the Final Decree of Divorce.
Odelia contrasts her case with that in Wiedenfeld, 534 S.W.3d at 19, in which the
former husband testified that during their marriage, he helped his wife obtain social
security disability benefits based on her medical issues. He also testified he did not
believe his former wife was unable to obtain or retain employment because she had
worked near the end of their marriage. The former wife testified she received disability
benefits and described her various medical conditions which included “heart disease,
diabetes, arthritis, memory problems, lupus, Sjogren’s disease, foot problems, and back
problems.” Id. She stated she believed her medical conditions affected her ability to
12
obtain and maintain employment because she did not believe an employer would be
pleased if she had to call in sick because she was unable to function. Id. She did note
she watched her roommate’s dogs when her roommate went out of town as a “side job.”
Id. In that situation, the appellate court concluded the trial court could have believed the
former husband’s testimony and noted the former wife did not testify about any effort to
obtain employment and did not dispute the fact that she had worked near the end of their
marriage. Odelia argues Wiedenfeld is distinguishable from her case because the former
husband provided controverting testimony about the former wife’s disability, whereas
Daniel did not.
We agree with Odelia that she presented testimony somewhat similar to the
testimony set forth in Galindo. Likewise, we agree that, unlike the former husband in
Wiedenfeld, Daniel did not controvert Odelia’s assertion she was disabled. When asked
whether he was aware that Ms. Caudillo was disabled, he responded, “Yes, ma’am.” He
was then asked, “And you understand that on the basis of that disability that the federal
government has determined that she can’t work?” He responded, “That’s what I’ve been
told.” And, we agree Odelia also established she received social security disability
benefits; whereas, unlike the former wife in Wiedenfeld, Odelia did not present any
testimony concerning what efforts she had made to obtain any kind of employment and
did not explain how or why her disability prohibited her from obtaining any type of gainful
employment.
Considering the two cases cited to us by Odelia, and considering the record before
us, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion. While we agree with Odelia that
her testimony alone would have been sufficient to support a finding that she suffered from
13
a disability, we do not agree with her position that the trial court was required to find she
had such a disability. The trial court was free to determine the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight to be given their testimony, and it was within its discretion to conclude
Odelia was not disabled to the degree that she required indefinite spousal maintenance
payments from Daniel. See Wiedenfeld, 534 S.W.3d at 19 (the trial court is the sole judge
of the credibility of the witnesses and can believe or disbelieve any witness’s testimony).
Odelia again contends the trial court erred when it substantially changed the
decision disclosed in the October 18 email because all of the evidence presented at the
final hearing was uncontroverted and supports a finding that she was disabled, making
an award of spousal maintenance for an indefinite period of time proper. Again, Odelia’s
argument presupposes that the October 18 email was the judge’s rendered ruling. As we
discussed in our analysis of Odelia’s first issue, that is not the case. The trial judge was
not required to find Odelia disabled, nor was he required to find that she was entitled to
an award of spousal maintenance for an indefinite period of time even if she was. See
O’Carolan v. Hopper, 414 S.W.3d 288, 308 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) (“Extended
maintenance is discretionary under the statute, even if a spouse is permanently
disabled.”) (citation omitted).
For these same reasons, we do not agree the judge erred by failing to include a
finding that Odelia was disabled. Odelia argues, citing In re S.R.O., 143 S.W.3d 237, 243
(Tex. App. –Waco 2004, no pet.), that because the evidence supports a finding that she
was disabled and because neither party notified the court that the finding on that element
had been omitted, nor did they request a finding on that element, we must presume the
trial court made a finding on that element in a way that supports its judgment.
14
While the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law do not expressly include a
finding that contains the word “disability” or “disabled,” the findings do include one that
says “Odelia Laurie Caudillo was married to Daniel Caudillo for ten (10) years or longer
and will lack the ability to earn sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s minimum
reasonable needs on dissolution of the marriage.” This was among the factors
considered and appears to include what the judge believed regarding Odelia’s disability
and its effect on her ability to work.
Odelia argues that the judge “must have either abused his discretion in awarding
maintenance for an indefinite period of time, or he implicitly found [Odelia] is disabled
such that his order complies with Texas Family Code § 8.054(a)(2).” We have already
determined the judge did not award spousal maintenance for an indefinite period of time
because the October 18 email was not a rendition of the trial court’s ruling. And, we have
already determined the judge included a finding that encompassed his conclusion
regarding Odelia’s disability and there is no reason to conclude the judge abused his
discretion in making that finding or in including the spousal maintenance award in the
Final Decree of Divorce. Accordingly, we overrule Odelia’s second issue.
CONCLUSION
Having resolved each of Odelia’s issues against her, we affirm the Final Decree of
Divorce of the trial court.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice
15