Joseph Latulas v. State ( 2020 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-18-00313-CR
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JOSEPH LATULAS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the 356th District Court
Hardin County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 23714
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Joseph Latulas 1 pleaded guilty to murder, and a jury assessed his punishment
at life in prison. On appeal, Latulas’s sole issue is whether the trial court erred by
overruling his objections to the State’s motion to amend his indictment. For the
reasons explained below, we affirm.
1 The record shows that Joseph Latulas is also known as Joseph Anthony
Latulas.
1
Background
In January 2016, Latulas stabbed his ex-girlfriend, Wendi Warner, to death
with a knife. 2 A month later, a grand jury indicted Latulas for murder, alleging he
“INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY CAUSE[D] THE DEATH OF, WENDI
WARNER, BY STABBING HER WITH A KNIFE.” More than two years after the
grand jury indicted Latulas, the State moved to amend the indictment. In its motion,
the State sought to add language to the indictment to allege Latulas used the knife as
a deadly weapon. The trial court granted the State’s motion and allowed the State to
amend Latulas’s indictment. As amended, the indictment alleges Latulas
“INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY CAUSE[D] THE DEATH OF, WENDI
WARNER, BY STABBING HER WITH A KNIFE, A DEADLY WEAPON.”
Around two months later, Latulas lodged two objections to the amended
indictment.3 Latulas first argued the amended indictment did not specify the manner
or means the State claimed he used to commit the murder. According to Latulas,
without the benefit of that information, the State failed to provide him with sufficient
notice of what it intended to prove during his trial. Second, Latulas argued that to
2 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1).
3 Before the trial court granted the State’s motion to amend the grand jury’s
indictment, Latulas moved to dismiss the original indictment that issued in his case.
The motion to dismiss advances arguments like the ones Latulas made in the hearing
the trial court conducted just before Latulas’s trial. The record, however, does not
show the trial court ever signed an order denying the motion to dismiss.
2
amend the indictment, the State had to resubmit the case to the grand jury and could
not amend it by a motion seeking to add a deadly weapon allegation to the
indictment.4
In response, the State argued both indictments notified Latulas it intended to
seek a deadly weapon finding in his trial based on the manner he used the knife when
committing the murder. The State also argued that it could notify a defendant that it
intended to seek a deadly weapon finding by moving to amend the indictment
without resubmitting the case to the grand jury, explaining that doing so did not
violate any of Latulas’s rights to have a grand jury indict him for murder. In other
words, the State argued the amended indictment notified Latulas it would seek a
deadly weapon finding when the trial court called his case to trial. The trial court
agreed, overruled Latulas’s objection, and signed an order granting the State’s
motion.
About seven weeks after the trial court granted the State’s motion, Latulas
pleaded guilty to the allegations in the amended indictment. After Latulas elected to
have a jury assess his punishment, the jury assessed a life sentence for the murder.
The judgment the trial court signed follows the jury’s verdict. After that, Latulas
filed an appeal. To support the appeal, Latulas filed a brief raising one issue, which
4 See Tex. Const. art. I, § 10.
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argues that the original indictment did not allege the elements required to prove
murder and that amending it required the State to submit his case to a grand jury to
avoid violating his rights.
Analysis
A reviewing court uses a de novo standard to review a trial court’s ruling on
a motion to quash an indictment. 5 In his brief, Latulas raises two arguments. We
address each in turn.
First, Latulas suggests the amended indictment fails to provide sufficient
notice of the manner and means the State intended to use in his trial to prove he
committed murder. We disagree. The amended indictment tracks the statute defining
murder,6 so it satisfies the requirements of the United States and Texas Constitutions
of due process.7
To provide fair notice, a defendant’s indictment “must be specific enough to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so that he may prepare
a defense.”8 In most cases, when the indictment tracks the language of the statute
codifying the offense, the indictment satisfies all constitutional and statutory
requirements of notice, as it need not include facts when they are merely evidentiary
5 Smith & H. v. State, 309 S.W.3d 10, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
6 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1).
7 See State v. Ross, 573 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).
8 State v. Moff, 154 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
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about the alleged crime. 9 That said, this construct applies only when “the language
of the statute” completely describes the offense. 10 When a statute fails that test, but
defines the offense in ways that would allow the State to prove the defendant
committed the crime by alternate means, the construction we have just discussed
does not apply.11
In Latulas’s case, the language in both of his indictments closely tracks the
language defining murder in section 19.02(b)(1) of the Penal Code. 12 Under section
19.02(b)(1), the State may prove a defendant committed murder by showing he
“intentionally or knowingly cause[d] the death of an individual[.]” 13 While the State
may choose to include language in an indictment that exceeds the allegations that it
must prove in the defendant’s trial, nothing in section 19.02(b)(1) requires the State
to prove that the defendant used an object, such as a knife, to show the defendant is
guilty of committing murder. 14 Stated another way, the State may prove a murder
occurred under section 19.02(b)(1) by proving the defendant intentionally or
knowingly caused the death of an individual. Here, each indictment alleges Latulas
committed murder.
9 State v. Mays, 967 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
10 Id. (cleaned up).
11 Id. at 407.
12 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1).
13 Id.
14 Id.
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The record from the court below shows Latulas’s original indictment alleges:
“Latulas . . . on or before January 10, 2016 in Hardin County, Texas[,] did . . . THEN
AND THERE, INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY CAUSE THE DEATH OF,
WENDI WARNER, BY STABBING HER WITH A KNIFE[.]” The amended
indictment simply added the phrase a deadly weapon right after the last word in the
original indictment. Thus, both the original and amended indictment closely track
the elements required to prove the crime of murder under section 19.02(b)(1), and
the section is not ambiguous.15 The fact a defendant uses an object to commit the
murder or uses an object as a deadly weapon are not elements of the crime of murder
under section 19.02(b)(1). 16 Stated another way, a conviction for the crime of murder
does not hinge on the grand jury having found (or not found) the defendant used a
deadly weapon during the murder because the use of a deadly weapon is not an
element of the crime. 17 As a result, Latulas had no right to have a deadly weapon
allegation in his indictment rather than in some other pleading. 18
Second, Latulas had no right to have the grand jury return an indictment
alleging he used the knife as a deadly weapon to commit the crime. The use of a
deadly weapon is not one of the elements required to prove murder, and the record
15 Id.
16 See Mays, 967 S.W.2d at 406-07.
17 See Brooks v. State, 957 S.W.2d 30, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
18 Id. at 34.
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shows the State notified Latulas more than seven weeks before his trial it would seek
a deadly weapon finding when the trial court called the case. So Latulas received
written notice that the State intended to secure a deadly weapon finding in his trial.19
Latulas has not even argued the State did not provide him with sufficient written
notice in some form that it intended to seek a deadly weapon finding in his trial. 20
For the reasons explained above, we overrule Latulas’s sole issue and affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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HOLLIS HORTON
Justice
Submitted on November 19, 2019
Opinion Delivered April 29, 2020
Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
19See Ex parte Minott, 972 S.W.2d 760, 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
20See Brooks, 957 S.W.2d at 34; Ex parte Patterson, 740 S.W.2d 766, 776
(Tex. Crim. App. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Beck, 769 S.W.2d
525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
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