Lou D. Vasquez and Nilda A. Vasquez v. Firebird SFE I, LLC ( 2020 )


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  • AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed April 29, 2020
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-19-00057-CV
    LOU D. VASQUEZ AND NILDA A. VASQUEZ, Appellants
    V.
    FIREBIRD SFE I, LLC, Appellee
    On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. CC-18-05077-E
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Schenck, Molberg, and Nowell
    Opinion by Justice Nowell
    This is a forcible detainer action. Following a bench trial, the county court at
    law determined appellee Firebird SFE I, LLC (Firebird) had a superior right to
    immediate possession of the property at issue. Appellants Lou D. Vasquez and Nilda
    A. Vasquez appeal the trial court’s judgment. In three issues, appellants argue there
    was not a statutorily sufficient pre-suit demand for possession; Firebird lacked
    standing to prosecute its claim; and the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to apparent
    defects in the title to the property. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    The record shows Firebird filed a verified petition for forcible entry and
    detainer in the justice court, and the justice court found in Firebird’s favor. The
    Vasquezes appealed and, following a bench trial, the trial court also found in favor
    of Firebird. The trial court entered findings of fact stating: (1) Firebird purchased
    the property at a foreclosure auction on April 3, 2018, (2) via Substitute Trustee’s
    Deed dated April 12, 2018, Substitute Trustee Rick Montgomery conveyed the
    property to Firebird; (3) according to the Substitute Trustee’s Deed, the Vasquezes
    were the borrowers who were foreclosed upon; (4) via letter dated April 26, 2018,
    the Vasquezes were notified to vacate the property within three days; and (5) the
    Vasquezes failed to vacate the property. The trial court’s conclusions of law state:
    (1) the Vasquezes are proper parties to the lawsuit; (2) Firebird provided the
    Vasquezes with proper notice to vacate under the Texas Property Code; (3) the
    Vasquezes have unlawfully detained the property; and (4) Firebird is entitled to
    possession of the property.
    In their first issue, the Vasquezes assert the trial court erred by hearing the
    case and rendering judgment because Firebird failed to make a sufficient pre-suit
    demand for possession. The Vasquezes argue Firebird did not have a superior right
    to possession and, therefore, could not make a proper demand for possession. The
    record on appeal does not include a reporter’s record from the trial. The trial court’s
    findings of fact state Firebird notified the Vasquezes to vacate the property, and the
    Vasquezes failed to do so. Because there is no reporter’s record in this appeal, we
    –2–
    presume the evidence supports the trial court’s finding. See Bennett v. Cochran, 
    96 S.W.3d 227
    , 230 (Tex. 2002) (“[C]ourt of appeals was correct in holding that, absent
    a complete record on appeal, it must presume the omitted items supported the trial
    court’s judgment.”); Lyons v. Polymathic Properties, Inc., No. 05–15–00408–CV,
    
    2016 WL 3564210
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 29, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)
    (“The absence of a reporter’s record obligates us to presume the evidence presented
    supports the judgment.”); Heckendorn v. First Mortgage Co., No. 13–12–00451–
    CV, 
    2013 WL 5593520
    , at *4 (Tex. App—Corpus Christi 2013, no pet.) (“The
    reporter’s record does not appear in the appellate record. Because there is no
    reporter’s record, we must presume the missing record would support the trial
    court’s decision.”). In the absence of a reporter’s record in this case, we presume
    the evidence supports the trial court’s finding and judgment. Doing this, we
    conclude Firebird’s notice to the Vasquezes to vacate the property was sufficient.
    We overrule the Vasquezes’ first issue.
    In their second and third issues, the Vasquezes argue the substitute trustee’s
    deed was issued in violation of a “temporary restraining order of a sister court to the
    trial court.” Although the Vasquezes included the order that forms the basis of their
    second issue in the appendix to their brief; the order does not appear in our record.
    Because the document is not part of our record, we cannot consider it. See Bertrand
    v. Bertrand, 
    449 S.W.3d 856
    , 863 n.8 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.) (“We
    cannot consider documents cited in a brief and attached as an appendix if they are
    –3–
    not formally included in the record on appeal.”). Additionally, the trial court found
    that via Substitute Trustee’s Deed dated April 12, 2018, Substitute Trustee Rick
    Montgomery conveyed the property to Firebird. Absent a reporter’s record, we
    cannot conclude this finding was in error.    We conclude the Vasquezes have not
    shown the substitute trustee’s deed was issued improperly or the trial court’s
    judgment was in error. We overrule the Vasquezes’ second and third issues.
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    /Erin A. Nowell/
    ERIN A. NOWELL
    JUSTICE
    190057F.P05
    –4–
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    LOU D. VASQUEZ AND NILDA                       On Appeal from the County Court at
    A. VASQUEZ, Appellants                         Law No. 5, Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. CC-18-05077-
    No. 05-19-00057-CV           V.                E.
    Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell.
    FIREBIRD SFE I, LLC, Appellee                  Justices Schenck and Molberg
    participating.
    In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
    court is AFFIRMED.
    It is ORDERED that appellee FIREBIRD SFE I, LLC recover its costs of
    this appeal from appellants LOU D. VASQUEZ AND NILDA A. VASQUEZ.
    Judgment entered this 29th day of April, 2020.
    –5–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-19-00057-CV

Filed Date: 4/29/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/30/2020