in the Interest of M.H. and C.H., Children ( 2020 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-20-00013-CV
___________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF M.H. AND C.H., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 231st District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 231-527816-13
Before Birdwell, Kerr, and Bassel, JJ.
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A.H., the father of two children, appeals from a trial court’s order terminating
his parental rights and awarding permanent managing conservatorship of both
children to the Department of Family and Protective Services.1 See Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (b)(2). We affirm.
Father’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief in which he asserts that
Father’s appeal is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct.
1396, 1400 (1967); see also In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776–77 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth
2003, no pet.) (holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination
cases). The brief meets Anders’s requirements by presenting a professional evaluation
of the record and demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced
on appeal. Although provided with the opportunity to obtain a copy of the appellate
record and file a pro se response, Father has not done so. The Department of Family
and Protective Services has declined to file a response.
In assessing the correctness of a compliant Anders brief’s conclusion that an
appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights is frivolous, we must
independently examine the appellate record to determine if any arguable grounds for
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The trial court originally terminated Father’s rights along with the children’s
mother’s in a September 2018 judgment, which only Father appealed. See In re M.H.,
No. 02-18-00329-CV, 2019 WL 1284912, at *1 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth Mar. 21,
2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). We reversed that judgment as to Father and remanded the
case to the trial court for a new trial at which Father was to be afforded appointed
counsel. See id. at *2–3. This appeal is from the judgment after that new trial.
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appeal exist. In re C.J., No. 02-18-00219-CV, 2018 WL 4496240, at *1 (Tex. App.––
Fort Worth Sept. 20, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d
503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.––
Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). We also consider the Anders brief itself and any pro se
response. In re K.M., No. 02-18-00073-CV, 2018 WL 3288591, at *10 (Tex. App.––
Fort Worth July 5, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); see In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403,
408–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the appellate record. Finding no
reversible error, we agree with counsel that this appeal is without merit. See Bledsoe v.
State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850
(Tex. App.––Dallas 2009, pet. denied). Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s order
terminating Father’s parental rights to M.H. and C.H.
Counsel did not file a motion to withdraw, and the record does not show good
cause for withdrawal independent from counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
frivolous. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (order); In re C.J., 501
S.W.3d 254, 255 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 2016, pets. denied). Accordingly, counsel
remains appointed in this appeal through proceedings in the supreme court unless
otherwise relieved from his duties for good cause in accordance with Family Code
Section 107.016(3)(C). P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27.
Per Curiam
Delivered: April 30, 2020
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