Larry Joe Morgan v. Carol Christy Shaw, as the Administrator of the Estate of James Howard Shaw ( 2020 )

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-19-00471-CV
___________________________
LARRY JOE MORGAN, Appellant
V.
CAROL CHRISTY SHAW, AS THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF
JAMES HOWARD SHAW, Appellee
On Appeal from the 48th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 048-282589-15
Before Wallach, J.; Sudderth, C.J.; and Gabriel, J.
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Larry Joe Morgan filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s
summary judgment in favor of Appellee on Appellant’s claims against her. However,
Appellant is on the list of vexatious litigants subject to prefiling orders that is
compiled by the Office of Court Administration of the Texas Judicial System. See
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.104; see generally
http://www.txcourts.gov/judicial-data/vexatious-litigants. A clerk of a court may not
file an appeal presented, pro se, by a vexatious litigant who is subject to a prefiling
order unless the litigant obtains an order from the appropriate local administrative
judge permitting the filing. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.103.
On January 10, 2020, we notified Appellant that he had not provided this court
with an order from the local administrative judge permitting the filing of this appeal.
We cautioned Appellant that we would dismiss this appeal unless he provided this
court with such an order on or before January 30, 2020.
To date, Appellant has not provided this court with an order permitting the
filing of this appeal. Appellant has, however, filed “Appellant’s Second Motion for
His Perfect Appeals.” In that document, Appellant asserts that while he has been
declared a vexatious litigant, “he filed this suit before he was declared a vexatious
litigant.” He further asserts that he has appealed the trial court’s order declaring him a
vexatious litigant and subjecting him to the prefiling requirement, that the appeal is
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still pending, and that “[t]herefore the court has not affirmed the trial court ruling
meaning Appellant has as a matter of law a right to this appeal.”
Appellant cites no authority for the proposition that the prefiling order did not
take immediate effect and does not apply to this appeal, and nothing in the statute
supports his argument. See id. § 11.103(a), (d) (prohibiting a clerk of a court from
filing an appeal by a vexatious litigant subject to a prefiling order unless the litigant
obtains an order permitting the filing from the appropriate local administrative judge
and providing an exception only for an appeal from the prefiling order itself or a writ
of mandamus if an administrative judge denies permission to file litigation); Nunu v.
Risk, 567 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied)
(stating that a prefiling order is immediately effective), cert. denied, No. 19-713, 2020
WL 871734 (U.S. Feb. 24, 2020); Yazdchi v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 01-17-
00301-CV, 2017 WL 2255773, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 23, 2017,
no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (holding that prefiling order applied to an appeal in a
matter that had been pending in trial court at the time that the prefiling order was
signed in a different proceeding). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. See Tex. R.
App. P. 42.3, 43.2(f).
Per Curiam
Delivered: April 30, 2020
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