Kyle Evan Allen v. State ( 2020 )


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  •              In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    ___________________________
    No. 02-19-00274-CR
    ___________________________
    KYLE EVAN ALLEN, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    On Appeal from the 355th District Court
    Hood County, Texas
    Trial Court No. CR14342
    Before Wallach, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.
    Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant Kyle Evan Allen appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his
    deferred adjudication community supervision, adjudication of his guilt, and sentence
    of twenty-four months’ confinement. We agree with Appellant’s appointed appellate
    counsel that this appeal is meritless as to the revocation, conviction, and sentence.
    However, we modify the trial court’s judgment and incorporated order to withdraw
    funds to delete an improperly assessed filing fee. We therefore affirm the trial court’s
    judgment as modified.
    Appellant pled guilty pursuant to a plea bargain to possession of less than one
    gram of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in exchange for four years’
    deferred adjudication, a $1500 fine, $180 in restitution, 300 hours of community
    service, and substance-abuse treatment as determined by a presentence investigation.
    See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 481.102(6), .115(a), (b); Tex. Penal Code Ann.
    § 12.35(a). The trial court followed the bargain and placed Appellant on deferred
    adjudication for four years.    Less than three weeks later, he tested positive for
    methamphetamine, and his community supervision officer recommended that as
    additional conditions of community supervision, Appellant serve eight days in jail and
    complete the TAIP1 Substance Abuse Program, an outpatient program. Appellant
    agreed to the trial court’s order amending his conditions of community supervision in
    1
    Treatment Alternative to Incarceration Program.
    2
    accordance with the officer’s recommendations. The order specified that Appellant’s
    eight days in jail would be served on weekends from 8:00 p.m. Friday through 8:00
    a.m. Monday, beginning Friday, March 22, 2019 and continuing each consecutive
    weekend until all eight days were served.
    On March 29, 2019, the State filed a motion to proceed with an adjudication of
    Appellant’s guilt, alleging that he violated his conditions of community supervision by
    not reporting to his community supervision officer and by failing to begin his eight
    days in jail on or about March 22, 2019. After a hearing, the trial court found the
    allegations true, revoked Appellant’s community supervision, adjudicated his guilt, and
    sentenced him to twenty-four months’ confinement, awarding him 205 days’ credit
    for time served.
    Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a
    brief complying with Anders v. California, representing that there is nothing in the
    record that might arguably support this appeal. 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 744–45, 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    ,
    1400 (1967). Counsel’s brief and motion meet the requirements of Anders by
    presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating why there are no
    arguable grounds for relief. See id.; In re Schulman, 
    252 S.W.3d 403
    , 406–12 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (analyzing the effect of Anders). Appellant had the
    opportunity to file a pro se response to the Anders brief but did not do so, nor did the
    State file a brief.
    3
    After an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on the
    ground that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, we must
    independently examine the record. See Stafford v. State, 
    813 S.W.2d 503
    , 511 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1991). Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson
    v. Ohio, 
    488 U.S. 75
    , 82–83, 
    109 S. Ct. 346
    , 351 (1988). We have carefully reviewed
    the record and counsel’s brief.
    After reviewing the itemized bill of costs and comparing it to the costs assessed
    when Appellant was first placed on deferred adjudication community supervision, we
    conclude that one amount must be deleted from the total amount charged as court
    costs in the judgment before us. The district clerk charged Appellant a $15 “Motion
    to Proceed/Revoke Fee.” However, we find no statutory authority for this charge.
    See Eubank v. State, No. 02-18-00351-CR, 
    2019 WL 2635564
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort
    Worth June 27, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Thomas v.
    State, No. 02-18-00337-CR, 
    2019 WL 166001
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Jan. 10, 2019, no
    pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We therefore modify
    the trial court’s judgment and incorporated order to withdraw funds to delete the $15
    filing fee. See Thomas, 
    2019 WL 166001
    , at *2.
    Except for this improperly imposed fee, we agree with counsel that this appeal
    is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the record before us that
    arguably might support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 
    178 S.W.3d 824
    , 827–28 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 
    206 S.W.3d 684
    , 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App.
    4
    2006). We therefore grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm as modified the
    trial court’s judgment and incorporated order to withdraw funds. See Bray v. State, 
    179 S.W.3d 725
    , 726 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.).
    Per Curiam
    Do Not Publish
    Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
    Delivered: April 30, 2020
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