Zachery James Hernandez v. State ( 2020 )


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  • Affirmed and Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed September 22, 2020.
    In The
    Fourteenth Court of Appeals
    NO. 14-19-00254-CR
    ZACHERY JAMES HERNANDEZ, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 253rd District Court
    Chambers County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 18426
    MAJORITY OPINION
    In this appeal from a conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon,
    we consider whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction, as
    well as several interrelated issues arising out of the prosecution’s untimely
    disclosure of evidence.
    BACKGROUND
    The evidence was undisputed that appellant shot the complainant. Appellant
    claimed that he had acted in self-defense, but the prosecution disputed his version of
    events and his belief that the shooting was justified.
    A.    The Defense’s Version of Events
    Appellant testified that he and the complainant worked together as electricians
    for a large energy and chemical company. On the day of the shooting, they both
    appeared at work, received their paychecks, and were dismissed early because of
    inclement weather.
    The complainant could not easily leave the jobsite because he carpooled with
    another coworker whose job was unaffected by the inclement weather. Rather than
    wait on the jobsite until the carpooler was released, the complainant asked to hang
    out with appellant and a mutual friend for the rest of the day. Appellant agreed, with
    the plan being that appellant would drive the complainant back to the jobsite later
    that afternoon so that the carpooler could take the complainant home.
    Appellant and the complainant then went to a gas station, where they cashed
    their paychecks. Afterwards, they went to a grocery store, where they purchased
    alcohol and food. They spent the rest of the afternoon drinking, playing pool, and
    singing karaoke.
    As the time got later in the day, the complainant’s body posture began to
    change, and he indicated that he was nervous about being seen by the carpooler. The
    complainant asked if appellant could drive him home instead, and appellant agreed,
    even though the complainant lived more than an hour away.
    On the drive home, the complainant began receiving multiple calls on his
    cellphone, but he did not answer any of them. When appellant asked about the
    2
    missed calls, the complainant responded that the calls were from a creditor, to whom
    the complainant owed a lot of money. The complainant also explained that he did
    not have enough money to pay the creditor, and so he was ignoring the calls.
    Once at home, the complainant asked to borrow some money from appellant,
    but appellant declined. The complainant then invited appellant inside to meet his
    girlfriend, and appellant obliged. They began drinking again, and the mood was light
    and friendly, until the complainant left the room and returned with a pistol. Appellant
    admired the weapon and asked to see it, but the complainant refused and put a bullet
    in the chamber instead. When appellant asked why the complainant had loaded the
    pistol, the complainant responded, “Oh, just in case.”
    Appellant suggested that he should leave, but the complainant said, “No, man.
    You don’t need to go anywhere.” Appellant acquiesced, and then his mind began to
    race with questions about the complainant’s behavior throughout the day. He
    wondered whether the complainant was involved with dangerous people, and
    whether the complainant might try to make a move against him, considering that he
    had several hundred dollars on his person.
    The complainant’s girlfriend then began to make unusual statements, like
    saying that appellant was cute, and admiring the keys to his truck. Appellant believed
    that the complainant was getting irritated by these comments, and so appellant
    indicated again that he should go home. Appellant stood up to leave, and then the
    complainant put his arm around appellant’s neck and said, “Hey, man. No, you ain’t
    going nowhere. We’re going to go smoke a cigarette real quick.”
    Appellant felt uncomfortable, but he followed the complainant outside after
    the complainant put the pistol down on the kitchen counter. After finishing the
    cigarette, appellant reentered the house and saw that the complainant was following
    closely behind. Appellant then grabbed the pistol off of the kitchen counter and told
    3
    the complainant, “Back the F up because I’m leaving this place.” The complainant
    charged at appellant instead, so appellant fired a single shot into the complainant’s
    chest.
    Appellant told the complainant’s girlfriend to call for an ambulance, and then
    appellant immediately left. When he got home, he called 911, reported that he had
    shot the complainant in self-defense, and then peaceably turned himself in.
    B.       The Prosecution’s Version of Events
    The complainant survived the shooting, and his statements regarding the
    course of the day mostly aligned with appellant’s statements, with some key
    differences.
    As an initial matter, the complainant agreed with the early timeline of arriving
    at work, receiving his paycheck, and then being dismissed because of inclement
    weather. He also agreed that he spent the afternoon hanging out with appellant, that
    appellant ultimately gave him a ride home, and that they spent the evening together
    drinking and smoking.
    However, the complainant testified that he never mentioned to appellant that
    he owed anybody money. The complainant also disagreed with appellant’s
    statements about receiving phone calls from a creditor. The complainant explained
    that he owned a prepaid cellphone and that he had exhausted all of its minutes several
    months before the shooting. Without any minutes, he could neither make nor receive
    calls, unless he was using an app on a wi-fi network. On the day of the shooting, the
    complainant actually borrowed appellant’s cellphone to let his girlfriend know his
    whereabouts.
    The complainant also described the events at his own home differently. The
    complainant said that he was a gun enthusiast, and that he brought out the pistol
    4
    simply to show it to appellant. Because appellant did not express any interest in
    holding it, the complainant left the pistol on the counter.
    The complainant said that he never put appellant in any sort of headlock, nor
    did he ever charge at appellant. The complainant testified that when appellant came
    back inside the house after smoking his cigarette, appellant picked up the pistol and
    pulled the slide back, causing a live round to eject and then fall on the floor. The
    complainant bent over to pick up the live round, which is when appellant shot him
    in the chest.
    Appellant never said anything to the complainant in the moments immediately
    preceding the shooting, and the complainant could not think of a single reason why
    appellant would have shot him. As he recalled the events of the night, the
    complainant said that there was nothing aggressive or disagreeable about either
    appellant or the topics of their conversation. Up until the shooting, their interactions
    had been “extremely pleasant.”
    C.    The Verdict
    The jury apparently believed the complainant because it convicted appellant
    of the charged offense. The trial court then imposed a sentence of seven years’
    imprisonment.
    SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
    Appellant does not explicitly challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in his
    brief. Instead, he argues that “the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence”
    because “the facts presented . . . clearly establish the legal defense of deadly force –
    self defense under Texas law.”
    Insofar as appellant believes that he established his self-defense theory as a
    matter of law, his argument is flawed because “the issue of self-defense is an issue
    5
    of fact to be determined by the jury.” See Braughton v. State, 
    569 S.W.3d 592
    , 609
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The prosecution’s burden on that issue is merely one of
    persuasion—i.e., to disprove the claim of self-defense—and the prosecution satisfies
    that burden by proving that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Id. at 608.
    Because the prosecution’s burden requires the production of legally sufficient
    evidence, we construe appellant’s argument as a challenge to the sufficiency of the
    evidence. See Bogan v. State, 
    180 S.W. 247
    , 247–48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1915)
    (holding that an argument that a verdict is contrary to the law and evidence only
    raises a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence).
    In this sufficiency challenge, we must determine whether a rational trier of
    fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
    doubt and against appellant on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. See
    Saxton v. State, 
    804 S.W.2d 910
    , 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The offense here was
    aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, which meant that the prosecution had the
    burden of proving the following essential elements: (1) appellant intentionally,
    knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to the complainant, and (2) appellant
    used or exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault. See Tex.
    Penal Code § 22.02. When deciding whether these elements were proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    jury’s decision. See Robinson v. State, 
    466 S.W.3d 166
    , 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
    Appellant’s own testimony established the essential elements of the offense.
    He admitted that he shot the complainant in the chest, thereby causing bodily injury,
    and during the commission of that assault, he used a pistol, which is a deadly
    weapon. Based on these admissions, the jury could have found the essential elements
    of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
    6
    The jury could have likewise found against appellant on the issue of self-
    defense. Appellant admitted that the complainant did not have a gun, a knife, a
    baseball bat, or any other sort of weapon at the time of the shooting. Appellant also
    admitted that the complainant never once communicated a verbal threat. Appellant
    claimed that he perceived a threat because the complainant charged at him, but there
    was a conflict on this point, as the complainant testified that he merely bent down to
    pick up a live round on the floor. Because we presume that the jury credited the
    complainant’s testimony under our standard of review, we conclude that the jury
    could have determined that appellant did not reasonably perceive an immediate
    threat of unlawful force from the complainant. That conclusion likewise means that
    the jury had sufficient evidence to find that appellant’s use of force against the
    complainant was not justified. See Tex. Penal Code § 9.31 (enumerating the
    requirements for the use of force in self-defense).
    We overrule appellant’s argument that he clearly established his claim of self-
    defense.
    UNTIMELY DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE
    After he was discharged from the hospital, the complainant was interviewed
    by a detective, who informed the complainant that appellant had called 911 and
    turned himself in. The detective also relayed the contents of appellant’s conversation
    with the 911 dispatcher, and more particularly, how appellant claimed that the
    complainant had received several phone calls from a creditor during the drive home.
    The complainant responded with disbelief, asserting that he had no minutes on his
    cellphone and that he could not have received any phone calls. The complainant then
    consented to have his cellphone imaged to prove that he did not receive any phone
    calls.
    7
    The cellphone was extracted and its data was saved to a disc, but the disc itself
    was never turned over to the defense in advance of trial because the detective
    apparently misplaced it, possibly during her change of employment between
    different law enforcement agencies. On the second day of trial, the disc was still not
    available, but the prosecution elicited testimony from the detective about the
    contents of the disc. The prosecution asked, “Do you recall whether or not you found
    or you saw anything on [the disc] that was relevant or that either backed up the
    defendant’s story that there was a bunch of calls coming in at the time?” The
    detective answered, “I did not find anything relevant.”
    After the detective testified, she went home and located the disc. She then
    notified the prosecution the following morning.
    Before the trial resumed, the prosecution disclosed to the defense and to the
    trial court that the disc had been found. The defense immediately moved for a
    mistrial, accusing the prosecution of misconduct and of intentionally violating the
    rules of discovery. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, but ruled that the
    prosecution would not be allowed to offer the disc into evidence. The trial court also
    ruled that the defense could offer the disc into evidence if the defense found anything
    beneficial on the disc.
    A recess was taken, in which the defense was given time to examine the
    contents of the disc. At the end of the recess, the defense asserted that it had not
    finished reviewing the disc, and that it may seek out an expert to analyze all of the
    data.
    The trial court then called on the police sergeant who had performed the data
    extraction. While still outside the presence of the jury, the trial court asked the
    sergeant if the disc contained the call log from the cellphone, or if the sergeant could
    determine whether calls had been deleted from the call log. The sergeant responded
    8
    that his impression was that the disc did not contain the call log, but he would need
    additional time to verify that belief and to determine whether any calls had been
    deleted.
    The defense interjected that it was uncomfortable with relying on the
    representations of the sergeant, who was a witness for the prosecution. The trial court
    reiterated that the prosecution could not use the disc in any event, and that the disc
    would be admitted for record purposes only, unless the defense affirmatively sought
    its admission for some other purpose. The defense ultimately decided to not use the
    disc.
    After the trial was over, the defense moved for a new trial on the basis that the
    prosecution had failed to turn over the disc in response to a timely discovery request.
    That motion was denied by operation of law.
    Appellant now complains in several issues that the trial court should have
    granted a continuance, a mistrial, or a new trial, all because of the prosecution’s
    untimely disclosure of the disc. We examine each of these points separately.
    A.      Motion for Continuance
    Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion
    for continuance, but he does not reveal where in the record that he ever requested a
    continuance. From what we can discern, the statement that most nearly approximates
    a motion for continuance is defense counsel’s representation to the trial court that he
    “need[s] to have somebody that understands all this much better than me review it.”
    If that statement can be construed as a motion for continuance, appellant never
    obtained an adverse ruling, which is necessary to preserve error. See Tex. R. App.
    P. 33.1.
    9
    Even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that appellant implicitly
    received an adverse ruling, this appellate complaint would still fail because counsel’s
    statement was oral, whereas motions for continuance must be written and sworn. See
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 29.03, 29.08; Anderson v. State, 
    301 S.W.3d 276
    , 279
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), declined to follow on other grounds by Grado v. State, 
    445 S.W.3d 736
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Because the oral motion, if any, did not comply
    with the applicable rules, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by
    denying it. See Gentry v. State, 
    770 S.W.2d 780
    , 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)
    (finding no abuse of discretion where the defendant’s mid-trial motion for
    continuance was oral, rather than written and sworn).
    B.    Motion for Mistrial
    Unlike with the motion for continuance, the record unmistakably establishes
    that appellant moved for a mistrial, and that the trial court denied his motion. We
    review such rulings for an abuse of discretion. See Ocon v. State, 
    284 S.W.3d 880
    ,
    884 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Because a mistrial is a serious remedy, it should be
    reserved for only extreme situations of highly prejudicial and incurable misconduct.
    Id. If the trial
    court could have reasonably determined that the challenged
    misconduct did not rise to that level, then the trial court’s denial of a motion for
    mistrial must be upheld.
    Id. Appellant argued in
    the trial court that he was entitled to a mistrial because
    the prosecution had engaged in intentional misconduct by withholding the disc from
    discovery and then by deliberating disclosing the disc in the middle of trial when the
    defense could not adequately review or analyze its voluminous contents. The trial
    court rejected that argument and refused to make a finding of bad faith: “I’m not
    saying the State hid anything.” That ruling was within the zone of reasonable
    disagreement.
    10
    At the time of the motion for mistrial, the trial court had already heard the live
    testimony of the detective, who opined that the disc must have been misplaced when
    she closed out all of her files because she was transferring to another law
    enforcement agency. The detective also testified that she had previously searched
    for the disc at the prosecution’s request, and that she had found neither a physical
    copy of the disc nor a digital copy on her hard drive. The trial court could have
    reasonably accepted the detective’s explanations and found that the untimely
    disclosure had been the result of negligence, not bad faith. And because that implied
    finding would have been based on an evaluation of the detective’s credibility and
    demeanor, we have no authority to disturb it.
    For similar reasons, the trial court could have also determined that the
    detective had no improper motive in withholding the disc because both the
    complainant and his girlfriend had testified that there were no minutes on the
    complainant’s cellphone, which tends to corroborate the detective’s ultimate opinion
    that there was no evidence on the disc relevant to appellant’s defensive theory.
    The record shows that the trial court was considerate of the defense’s interests.
    Because the disclosure of the disc had been untimely, the trial court precluded the
    prosecution from offering it into evidence. Mindful that the disc might still contain
    evidence that was beneficial to appellant, the trial court also provided a recess for
    the defense to examine the disc and determine whether it should be introduced into
    evidence. As the trial court stated, “You’re going to find out whether it’s helpful or
    not, and if it is helpful to your case, you’re going to get to use it. . . . It’s that simple,
    so you’re not at any disadvantage.”
    We agree with the trial court that the untimely disclosure of the disc was not
    the type of extreme occurrence that necessitated a mistrial. Lesser remedies were
    available, and the trial court provided them by preventing the prosecution from using
    11
    the disc and by affording the defense the sole of option to offer the disc into evidence.
    The trial court could have further instructed the jury to disregard the detective’s
    testimony, but the defense never made that request. Because there were less drastic
    means of addressing the prosecution’s discovery violation, we conclude that the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motion for mistrial. Cf.
    Wood v. State, 
    18 S.W.3d 642
    , 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (concluding that the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for mistrial in response to an
    alleged discovery violation because the defendant did not request the less drastic
    remedy of a continuance).
    C.    Motion for New Trial
    Four days after the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction, the defense
    filed a motion arguing that the trial court should grant a new trial in the interest of
    justice because the prosecution had violated appellant’s constitutional and statutory
    rights by failing to turn over the disc despite a timely discovery request. As stated
    above, the trial court denied the motion by operation of law.
    We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial for an abuse of
    discretion. See State v. Thomas, 
    428 S.W.3d 99
    , 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The
    test for abuse of discretion is not whether, in our opinion as an appellate court, the
    facts present an appropriate case for the trial court’s action, but rather, whether the
    trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles.
    Id. A trial court
    properly grants a new trial when the defendant (1) articulates a
    valid legal claim in his motion for new trial, (2) produces evidence or points to
    evidence in the trial record that substantiates his legal claim, and (3) shows that he
    was prejudiced. See State v. Zalman, 
    400 S.W.3d 590
    , 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
    12
    In this case, appellant did not establish the third requirement that he was
    prejudiced by the untimely disclosure of the disc. Even though he had had several
    extra days to review the disc by the time he filed his motion for new trial, appellant
    did not include any facts in the motion itself showing that the disc contained
    evidence that was relevant to his defensive theory. Quite the opposite, his motion
    ended with a recitation of facts about an unrelated criminal defendant from a
    completely separate trial.
    Appellant tries to make a claim for prejudice in his brief, asserting that he did
    not receive the cellphone extraction report until he filed his motion for new trial. He
    then contradicts that assertion by representing in the very next paragraph that he
    received the report eight months after he filed his motion for new trial, which was
    during the pendency of this appeal. Neither assertion is supported by a citation to the
    record, which indicates that appellant obtained access to the report when the trial
    court admitted the disc during the trial for purposes of the record.
    Appellant also attaches certain exhibits to his brief, including various emails
    and an affidavit, all of which are outside the official appellate record, and none of
    which contains any facts showing that he was prejudiced.
    He further relies on one other exhibit, an excerpt from the cellphone extraction
    report, which does happen to be part of the official appellate record. This exhibit
    contains information that tends to establish that the complainant’s cellphone was
    active on the day of the offense. Appellant asserts that this activity corresponds with
    actual phone calls, but we cannot draw the same conclusion because the quality of
    the information is hyper-technical and not plainly decipherable to the lay reader.
    There is no neatly organized call log, showing incoming and outgoing calls, for
    instance. Instead, there are strings of numbers and letters over sixty characters long,
    next to timestamps and what appear to be various types of server and folder data.
    13
    We cannot discern whether this information indicates that the complainant made or
    received calls over his prepaid carrier’s network (which might undermine the
    complainant’s story); whether the complainant made or received calls over a wi-fi
    network (which might be consistent with the complainant’s story); or whether the
    complainant used his cellphone for a purpose entirely unrelated to making or
    receiving calls (like taking or reviewing pictures).
    In any event, even if we were to assume that one of these exhibits somehow
    showed that the disc contained facts that were material to appellant’s defensive
    theory, those facts were never specifically brought to the attention of the trial court.
    Appellant did not mention such facts in his motion for new trial. He did not even
    supply the trial court with an expert affidavit explaining the information from the
    cellphone extraction report. Because appellant did not satisfy his burden of showing
    that he was prejudiced by the untimely disclosure of the disc, we cannot say that the
    trial court acted without guiding rules and principles by denying appellant’s motion
    for new trial. See Whitehead v. State, 
    130 S.W.3d 866
    , 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
    (“An appellate court may not consider factual assertions that are outside the record,
    and a party cannot circumvent this prohibition by submitting an affidavit for the first
    time on appeal. While the record may be supplemented under the appellate rules if
    something has been omitted, the supplementation rules cannot be used to create new
    evidence. Moreover, an appellate court’s review of the record itself is generally
    limited to the evidence before the trial court at the time of the trial court’s ruling.”).
    RESPONSE TO DISSENT
    Like the dissent, we strongly disapprove of the detective’s mishandling of the
    disc, which resulted in a discovery violation. However, a defendant is not
    automatically entitled to relief upon the mere occurrence of a discovery violation.
    The defendant must still carry his burden of proving that he was prejudiced.
    14
    The dissent would excuse appellant of this burden and shift the burden to the
    prosecution to prove that the untimely disclosed evidence was not favorable to the
    defense, but the dissent provides no authority whatsoever for this proposed burden-
    shifting framework, which is contrary to binding precedent. See Pena v. State, 
    353 S.W.3d 797
    , 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (holding that the defendant has the burden
    of showing that the prosecution withheld favorable evidence).
    The dissent goes on to suggest that the defense had no opportunity to
    demonstrate prejudice because the prosecution did not supply the defense with a
    copy of the disc until after the defense had filed its motion for new trial. This position
    is also untenable. The transcript shows that the disc was admitted for record purposes
    during the trial itself. The defense had access to the disc at that point.
    The defense also had thirty-two days to file its motion for new trial. See Tex.
    R. App. P. 21.4 (providing that a motion for new trial is due thirty days after the
    sentence is imposed); Tex. R. App. P. 4.1 (extending the period when, as here, the
    last day falls on a weekend). The defense did not exhaust that thirty-two day period.
    Nor did the defense ever file any sort of motion or pleading with the trial court
    claiming that it had been denied access to the disc. Instead, the defense filed a motion
    for new trial just four days after the trial was over, and rather than address the
    contents of the disc, the defense erroneously addressed the events of any unrelated
    criminal trial (most likely because the motion was recycled from the file of another
    client). The defense simply made no effort to demonstrate that appellant suffered
    prejudice.
    The defense filed a brief in this appeal nearly ten months after the trial was
    over. We know that the defense had direct access to the disc during some portion of
    that ten months because the defense addressed the disc in the brief. The defense cited
    to individual pages from the extraction report and argued that the evidence on those
    15
    pages demonstrated that appellant had been prejudiced by the untimely disclosure.
    We fully addressed those defensive arguments in the previous section of this
    opinion. But our dissenting colleague, apparently unsatisfied by appellant’s brief,
    believed that more arguments could have been made because she took the
    extraordinary step of combing through all 7,098 pages of the extraction report in
    search for other evidence of prejudice.
    In a point that was not raised anywhere in the briefing, the dissent argues that
    there is evidence of prejudice because the extraction report contains copies of text
    messages, and the dissent believes that the defense could have used these text
    messages to show that the complainant was experiencing certain financial hardships,
    which might then support appellant’s claim that the complainant owed a creditor a
    great sum of money. The dissent’s argument is unpersuasive because the text
    messages referred to mundane obligations, like a car note and certain court fees in
    an unrelated case. There were not any text messages that would substantiate a
    defensive theory that the complainant was in debt to a potentially violent creditor.
    To a certain extent, appellant may have benefited by not having this evidence
    presented to the jury because one of the text messages demonstrated that the
    complainant added $45 to his account in exchange for five gigabytes of data, which
    tends to corroborate the complainant’s testimony that his cellphone plan was
    prepaid.
    In another point that was never raised by the defense, the dissent argues that
    there is additional evidence of prejudice because the extraction report reflects that
    the complainant made contact with two people in the month preceding the offense,
    and he made a separate contact with a third person on the same morning as the
    offense. This evidence does not demonstrate prejudice either because the report does
    not indicate whether these calls were transmitted over a carrier’s network or over a
    16
    wi-fi network. Without knowing that information, no conclusion can be drawn about
    the complainant’s credibility or about the merits of appellant’s defensive theory.
    The record does not affirmatively reveal how much time during the trial that
    the defense had to review the disc, or even if the defense was able to carefully peruse
    the content of the text messages. All we know is that the defense made the sensible
    judgment under the circumstances to not offer the disc into evidence and then argue
    in closing statements that the absence of the disc provided grounds for reasonable
    doubt. The jury was unpersuaded by that argument, and the trial court found no
    reason for granting a new trial. After considering the issues raised in this appeal, we
    have no basis for questioning the trial court’s judgment because neither the defense
    nor the dissent has pointed to any evidence from the disc showing that the untimely
    disclosure resulted in prejudice.
    CONCLUSION
    The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
    /s/     Tracy Christopher
    Justice
    Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Jewell, and Hassan. (Hassan, J., dissenting).
    Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
    17
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-19-00254-CR

Filed Date: 9/22/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/28/2020