Buck Murray v. the Hondo National Bank ( 2020 )


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  •                                Fourth Court of Appeals
    San Antonio, Texas
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-19-00408-CV
    Buck MURRAY,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE HONDO NATIONAL BANK,
    Appellee
    From the 198th Judicial District Court, Bandera County, Texas
    Trial Court No. CVCD-XX-XXXXXXX
    Honorable M. Rex Emerson, Judge Presiding
    Opinion by:       Irene Rios, Justice
    Sitting:          Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
    Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
    Irene Rios, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: September 23, 2020
    AFFIRMED
    This is an appeal from a final judgment authorizing the Hondo National Bank (“the Bank”)
    to recover the unpaid balance on a promissory note from guarantor Buck Murray. On appeal,
    Murray argues the trial court erred by sustaining the Bank’s objections to his summary judgment
    evidence and by granting the Bank’s traditional and no-evidence summary judgment motions. We
    affirm.
    04-19-00408-CV
    BACKGROUND
    The Bank loaned $20,000.00 to the Bandera Community Foundation, Inc. (“the
    Foundation”), in May 2015. As part of this transaction, Murray signed a guaranty agreement in
    which he personally guaranteed the Foundation’s payment of the promissory note to the Bank.
    Before the note was repaid, the Foundation refinanced the original loan and signed another
    promissory note, agreeing to make monthly payments of $250.00 on the outstanding balance and
    a final payment of $12,323.35 on November 23, 2019. When the Foundation failed to make
    payments on the note as required, the Bank demanded payment from Murray under the guaranty
    agreement. However, Murray refused to pay the unpaid balance on the note. The Bank accelerated
    the note and sued Murray under the guaranty agreement to recover the unpaid balance on the note.
    Murray answered the Bank’s suit with a general denial. He also asserted multiple
    affirmative defenses and counterclaims. After conducting discovery, the Bank moved for no-
    evidence summary judgment on Murray’s affirmative defenses and counterclaims. The Bank also
    moved for traditional summary judgment on its claim to recover under the guaranty agreement.
    The Bank attached to its traditional summary judgment motion the promissory notes and the
    guaranty agreement signed by Murray. Murray filed a response to the Bank’s summary judgment
    motion and attached evidence to it. In his response, Murray broadly argued that the evidence
    attached to his response raised a fact issue as to several of his affirmative defenses and a
    counterclaim. The Bank filed objections to Murray’s evidence, many of which were sustained by
    the trial court.
    The trial court granted the Bank’s motions for traditional and no-evidence summary
    judgment, and rendered a final judgment authorizing the Bank to recover from Murray $18,533.66
    for the unpaid balance and interest on the note and $15,771.84 for attorney’s fees. Murray
    appealed.
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    04-19-00408-CV
    DISCUSSION
    Murray presents ten issues on appeal. In his first through seventh issues, Murray complains
    about the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, and in his eighth through tenth issues, Murray complains
    about the trial court’s summary judgment rulings. We begin our discussion by addressing Murray’s
    complaints about the summary judgment rulings.
    In his eighth, ninth, and tenth issues, Murray argues the trial court erred by granting the
    Bank’s summary judgment motions because he produced evidence raising a genuine issue of
    material fact as to his affirmative defenses of breach of fiduciary duty, fraud by non-disclosure,
    and mutual mistake, and his counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty. 1
    Summary Judgment Law and Standard of Review
    We review a trial court’s orders granting summary judgment de novo. Tarr v. Timberwood
    Park Owners Assoc., Inc., 
    556 S.W.3d 274
    , 278 (Tex. 2018). To prevail on a traditional summary
    judgment motion, the movant must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).
    Under Rule 166a(i) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move for a no-
    evidence summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential
    elements of a claim or defense on which the adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial.
    TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). “The [trial] court must grant the motion unless the respondent produces
    evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.”
    Id. 1
      Although Murray pleaded other affirmative defenses and counterclaims, on appeal he only addresses the issues of
    mutual mistake, fraud by non-disclosure, and breach of fiduciary duty. Because Murray does not challenge the granting
    of summary judgment as to his other affirmative defenses and counterclaims, we cannot address these rulings on
    appeal. See Ontiveros v. Flores, 
    218 S.W.3d 70
    , 71 (Tex. 2007) (concluding the court of appeals erred by reversing
    summary judgment as to claims the appellant did not challenge on appeal).
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    04-19-00408-CV
    A no-evidence summary judgment motion must state the elements for which there is no
    evidence. Id.; Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 
    286 S.W.3d 306
    , 310 (Tex. 2009). The burden then shifts
    to the respondent to produce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the elements
    challenged in the motion. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).; Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 
    206 S.W.3d 572
    ,
    582 (Tex. 2006). To defeat a no-evidence motion, the respondent must produce evidence raising a
    genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged elements. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). “[T]he
    respondent is not required to marshal [his] proof; [his] response need only point out evidence that
    raises a fact issue on the challenged elements.”
    Id. (cmt.—1997). Under well-settled
    legal precedent, a respondent to a no-evidence summary judgment
    motion must specifically identify in his response the supporting proof he seeks to have considered
    by the trial court. Solomon v. Whataburger Rests., LLC, No. 04-17-00255-CV, 
    2018 WL 2121360
    ,
    at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 9, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); Arredondo v. Rodriguez, 
    198 S.W.3d 236
    , 238 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.). “General references to the summary
    judgment record are inadequate to meet the [respondent’s] evidentiary burden.” Hinojosa v. Koen,
    No. 04-18-00907-CV, 
    2019 WL 5773672
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 6, 2019, pet.
    denied) (mem. op.). “Attaching entire documents and depositions [] to a response and referencing
    them only generally does not relieve the party of pointing out to the trial court where in the
    documents the issues set forth in the [] response are raised.” 
    Arredondo, 198 S.W.3d at 238-39
    .
    Neither this court nor the trial court is required to wade through the record to determine if the
    respondent carried his burden to produce evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to the
    elements specified in the no-evidence motion.
    Id. at 238;
    see Hinojosa, 
    2019 WL 5773672
    , at *3.
    “When a summary judgment respondent fails to direct the [] court to specific summary judgment
    evidence, a fact issue cannot be raised sufficient to defeat summary judgment.” Leija v. Laredo
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    04-19-00408-CV
    Cmty. Coll., No 04-10-00140-CV, 
    2011 WL 1499440
    , at *5 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 20,
    2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).
    No-Evidence Summary Judgment on Murray’s Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims
    In its no-evidence summary judgment motion, the Bank challenged specific elements of
    Murray’s affirmative defenses and counterclaims. However, in his response, Murray did not
    specifically identify the proof he sought to have considered by the trial court, nor did he point to
    the evidence that supported each challenged element of his affirmative defenses and his
    counterclaim. Instead, Murray generally argued that he “submitted enough evidence to support his
    claims and affirmative defenses which would require the court to deny” the Bank’s traditional and
    no-evidence motions for summary judgment. Murray’s response listed the evidence attached to it,
    then broadly asserted that this evidence was “sufficient to support the elements of his respective
    causes of action and affirmative defenses.” The evidence attached to Murray’s response, which
    consists of two affidavits, the deposition testimony of two witnesses, and numerous documents
    produced in discovery, exceeds two hundred pages. Because Murray failed to specifically identify
    any supporting proof in his response, we must conclude Murray failed to present evidence raising
    a genuine issue of material fact as to the challenged elements. See Hinojosa, 
    2019 WL 5773672
    at
    *3 (concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding respondents’ evidence not
    specifically cited in their summary judgment response); Leija, 
    2011 WL 1499440
    , at *5
    (concluding no fact issue was raised to defeat a no-evidence motion when the respondent generally
    pointed to his 173-page deposition to support his argument); 
    Arredondo, 198 S.W.3d at 239
    (“Because plaintiffs’ response did not direct the trial court to any specific portion of their summary
    judgment evidence, plaintiffs failed to raise a fact issue sufficient to defeat appellee’s no-evidence
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    04-19-00408-CV
    motion for summary judgment.”). Therefore, we hold that the trial court properly granted the
    Bank’s no-evidence summary judgment motion. 2
    Traditional Summary Judgment on the Guaranty Agreement
    To succeed on its traditional summary judgment motion, the Bank had to establish that no
    genuine issue of material fact existed and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on its
    claim to recover under the guaranty agreement. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). Murray does not argue
    the Bank failed to meet its traditional summary judgment burden on this claim. Murray only
    complains that he presented evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact as to some of his
    affirmative defenses and one of his counterclaims. We have already concluded the trial court
    properly granted the Bank’s no-evidence summary judgment on Murray’s affirmative defenses
    and counterclaims. Therefore, we hold the trial court properly granted the Bank’s traditional
    summary judgment motion.
    Evidentiary Rulings
    Finally, in his first through seventh issues, Murray argues the trial court erred by sustaining
    the Bank’s objections to his summary judgment evidence. However, these evidentiary issues have
    no bearing on the final disposition of this appeal. We have already determined that Murray failed
    to raise a genuine issue of material fact on each of the challenged elements of his affirmative
    defenses and counterclaim by failing to specifically identify his proof in his summary judgment
    response. Based on our resolution of Murray’s summary judgment issues, Murray’s evidentiary
    issues are unnecessary to the final disposition of this appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (requiring
    2
    Even in his appellate brief, Murray fails to cite to the specific summary judgment evidence raising a fact issue on
    each of the challenged elements of his affirmative defenses and counterclaim. As the appellant, Murray has a duty to
    show that the record supports his contentions. See Blake v. Intco Invs. of Tex., Inc., 
    123 S.W.3d 521
    , 525 (Tex. App.—
    San Antonio 2003, no pet.). “As an appellate court, we are not required to search the record for a scintilla of evidence
    raising a material fact issue without more specific guidance.”
    Id. -6- 04-19-00408-CV
    appellate court opinions to address only the issues raised and necessary to the final disposition of
    the appeal).
    CONCLUSION
    The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
    Irene Rios, Justice
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