Triple Crown Moving and Storage, LLC v. Jeff Ackerman ( 2020 )

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
§
TRIPLE CROWN MOVING AND No. 08-19-00264-CV
STORAGE, LLC, §
Appeal from the
Appellant, §
County Court at Law No. 6
v. §
of El Paso County, Texas
JEFF ACKERMAN, §
(TC#2019-CCV00970)
Appellee. §
OPINION
Appellee Jeff Ackerman (“Ackerman”) sued Appellant Triple Crown Moving and
Storage, LLC (“Triple Crown”) in a justice of the peace court for damages he allegedly incurred
during a move. After the justice court found in favor of Ackerman, Triple Crown filed an appeal
to the county court. That appeal, however, was dismissed, because the county court found that
Triple Crown had failed to timely pay the costs on appeal as required by Rule 506.1(i) of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure. In this appeal from that ruling, we agree with Triple Crown that the
county court erred in dismissing its appeal because the record establishes that Triple Crown did
not receive actual or constructive notice from the county clerk’s office of the deadline for paying
1
the costs. We therefore reverse the county court’s order of dismissal and remand this matter for
further proceedings.1
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Justice Court Proceedings
Ackerman and Triple Crown entered into a contract in which Triple Crown agreed to move
Ackerman from Grand Prairie to El Paso, Texas. Ackerman, acting in a pro se capacity, thereafter
sued Triple Crown in a justice court for damages allegedly resulting from the move. Following a
bench trial, the justice court entered a judgment in Ackerman’s favor, awarding him $4,556.84,
together with interest and costs. Triple Crown thereafter filed a timely notice of appeal and posted
an appeal bond with the justice court on June 11, 2019 in the amount of $9,114. The justice court
thereafter issued an order dated June 18, 2019, granting the appeal.
B. The Failure to Pay the Appellate Costs
The El Paso County Clerk sent a notice dated June 25, 2019 to both parties by certified
mail, stating that it had received the transcript on appeal from the justice court, and advised Triple
Crown that it was required to pay costs of appeal in the amount of $227 within 20 days after
notification pursuant to Rule 143a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice further
warned that if the costs were not timely received, the appeal would be “deemed not perfected,”
and the clerk would return all papers in the matter to the justice court. The clerk’s record contains
three certified mail receipts indicating that the notice had been sent to Ackerman at a street address
in El Paso, and to both Triple Crown and its attorney, Michael Nevarez, at a post office box in El
Paso.
1
Appellee, who is not represented by counsel on appeal, did not file a responsive brief and our decision is therefore
based solely on Appellant’s brief.
2
As discussed in more detail below, Triple Crown contends that it never received the notice,
and admittedly did not pay the appellate costs by the date specified in the notice. Based on Triple
Crown’s failure to pay the costs, the county court issued an order on August 13, 2019, dismissing
Triple Crown’s appeal, and returning the matter to the justice court. The clerk’s record reflects
that thereafter, on or about September 12, 2019, the notices to both Triple Crown and Nevarez
were marked as “return to sender unclaimed unable to forward.”
C. The Motion to Vacate
On September 6, 2019, Triple Crown filed a verified motion to vacate the trial court’s
dismissal order. In its motion, Triple Crown acknowledged that the county clerk had mailed the
notice to pay the appellate costs to the correct post office box as designated in its pleadings, and
that the notice had been delivered to the post office box in a timely manner. However, Triple
Crown claimed that it did not receive notice of the delivery from the post office, and further did
not actually receive the notice prior to the deadline for filing the appellate costs.2 Triple Crown
therefore argued that the notice did not trigger the 20-day deadline for paying the appellate costs.
Accordingly, Triple Crown argued that the county court was not deprived of jurisdiction and that
it should consequently vacate its order of dismissal.
In support of its motion, Triple Crown attached affidavits from Nevarez and his paralegal,
both of whom averred that they never received the clerk’s notice, and that they were not aware of
the notice until after they received the county court’s order of dismissal through the State’s e-file
system on August 13, 2019. According to their affidavits, shortly after receiving the dismissal
order, Nevarez’s paralegal searched the county court’s website, and learned that the office had not
received notification of two other documents in addition to the clerk’s notice, including the civil
2
The motion also noted that other than its attorney, Triple Crown’s representatives resided in the Dallas area, and did
not have access to the El Paso post office box.
3
case information sheet and a copy of the justice court’s order granting the appeal. The paralegal
averred that she thereafter emailed the clerk’s office to request copies of the court documents on
August 19, 2019, which the firm received the next day. The paralegal further reported that on
August 23, 2019, she attempted to pay the costs on appeal, but the clerk’s office refused to accept
the payment, advising her that the case had been “closed.” In addition, Nevarez averred in his
affidavit that on September 3, 2019, he downloaded the “online ‘USPS Tracking Results’ of the
certified mail receipts of the Notice,” which indicated that the notice had been delivered and was
“Available for Pickup” as of June 28, 2019; he stated, however, that he did not receive any notice
of delivery from the post office.
Ackerman thereafter retained an attorney, who filed a response to the motion to vacate,
together with a plea to the jurisdiction, contending that the appeal was never perfected due to Triple
Crown’s failure to pay the appellate costs as directed by the clerk.3 Ackerman further argued that
because the appeal was never perfected, the case had returned to the justice court, which now had
jurisdiction over the matter, and that the county court therefore lacked jurisdiction to rule on Triple
Crown’s motion. At the hearing on Triple Crown’s motion, the county court agreed with
Ackerman that it did not have jurisdiction to rule on the motion to vacate or to otherwise grant any
relief to Triple Crown, believing that jurisdiction had already been returned to the justice court due
to Triple Crown’s failure to timely pay the costs. The county court therefore declined to rule on
the motion, leaving its order of dismissal in place, and Triple Crown thereafter filed an appeal to
this Court from the dismissal order.
3
Ackerman’s counsel no longer represents him on appeal.
4
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
In its first six issues on appeal, Triple Crown contends that the justice court committed
various legal errors when it ruled in Ackerman’s favor, contending among other things, that the
justice court failed to apply various venue, jurisdiction, and arbitration provisions in the parties’
contract. As explained below, however, given the de novo nature of appeals from justice court to
county court, a county court does not review alleged legal errors made by a justice court in such
an appeal, and those issues are therefore not relevant to our review. However, we do find relevant
Triple Crown’s last two issues on appeal, which we take in reverse order: (1) whether the county
court had jurisdiction to rule on Triple Crown’s motion to vacate its dismissal order; and (2)
whether the county court should have granted the motion.
III. THE COUNTY COURT’S JURISDICTION
A. Standard of Review
Whether a trial court has jurisdiction to decide a matter is a question of law, which an
appellate court reviews de novo. See State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642 (Tex. 2007); Socorro
Independent School District v. Hamilton, 579 S.W.3d 831, 834 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2019,
pet. denied). Accordingly, we review de novo the question of whether the county court had
jurisdiction to hear Triple Crown’s motion to vacate, as well as the question of whether it had
jurisdiction to hear the appeal itself. See Rowe v. Watkins, 340 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex.App.--
El Paso 2011, no pet.) (question of whether county court obtained jurisdiction over appeal from
justice court was a question of law to be reviewed de novo); citing Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale,
964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998); see also Pichini v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 569 S.W.3d 192,
193 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (recognizing that an appellate court reviews a
county court’s dismissal of an appeal from a justice court under a de novo standard).
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B. Applicable Law
Appeals from justice court to county court are governed by Rule 506.1 of the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure, which imposes two requirements on the appellant. First, the rule requires an
appellant to post an appeal bond within 21 days after judgment is signed by the justice court.
TEX.R.CIV.P. 506.1(a). The rule further provides that an appeal is “perfected” upon the filing of
the bond. Id. at 506.1(h). Second, the rule requires an appellant to pay the costs on appeal to the
county court in accordance with Rule 143a. Id. at 506.1(a), (i). In turn, Rule 143a provides that:
If the appellant fails to pay the costs on appeal from a judgment of a justice of the
peace or small claims court within twenty (20) days after being notified to do so by
the county clerk, the appeal shall be deemed not perfected and the county clerk shall
return all papers in said cause to the justice of the peace having original jurisdiction
and the justice of the peace shall proceed as though no appeal had been attempted.
TEX.R.CIV.P. 143a. It is well established that compliance with both requirements is jurisdictional,
and that a county court therefore lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal if the requirements are not
met. See Pichini, 569 S.W.3d at 194; Watkins v. Debusk, 286 S.W.3d 58, 60 (Tex.App.--El Paso
2009, no pet.); Martin v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 04-15-00233-CV, 2016 WL 1588517, at *2
(Tex.App.--San Antonio Apr. 20, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
However, when an appellant is able to establish nonreceipt of the clerk’s notice to pay the
appellate costs, the deadline for filing the costs is not triggered, and the trial court therefore does
not lose jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See, e.g., Martin, 2016 WL 1588517, at *3 (where record
established that appellant’s attorney never received notice sent by the county clerk to pay court
costs, the county court erred in denying appellant’s motion to reinstate appeal from justice court),
citing DePue v. Henderson, 801 S.W.2d 178, 179 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ)
(holding that county court erred in dismissing appeal from justice court for failure to pay costs on
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appeal where evidence reflected that clerk failed to duly notify appellants or their attorney of the
costs).
C. The County Court had Jurisdiction to Hear the Motion to Vacate
In Issue Eight, Triple Crown contends that the county court erred when it found that it
lacked jurisdiction to hear its motion to vacate. We agree.
Undoubtedly, when an appeal is not perfected as required by the above rules, that failure
deprives a county court of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the county court must
dismiss the appeal. See Rowe, 340 S.W.3d at 863. However, when a party raises the issue of
whether an appeal was--or was not--perfected, this in effect asks the county court to determine
whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. And this puts the case in a different
procedural posture, as there is a fundamental distinction between a court’s jurisdiction to hear the
merits of a case and its jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction in the first instance.
See Dolenz v. Vail, 200 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex.App.--Dallas 2006, pet. denied) (jurisdiction to
determine jurisdiction is the court’s inherent authority to decide “whether documents filed with it
invoke its jurisdiction [which] differs from a court’s jurisdiction to dispose of a case on the
merits.”), citing Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 209 n.3 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998); see also Ezy-Lift
of California, Inc. v. EZY Acquisition, LLC, No. 01-13-00058-CV, 2014 WL 1516239, at *7
(Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 17, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (recognizing distinction between jurisdiction to hear a case and jurisdiction to
determine whether jurisdiction exists). It is fundamental that a court always has jurisdiction to
determine its own subject matter jurisdiction, or conversely to determine whether it has been
deprived of such jurisdiction. See In re Lazy W Dist. No. 1, 493 S.W.3d 538, 544 (Tex. 2016);
see also Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 642 (Tex. 2004); Unit 82 Joint Venture v. Int’l
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Commercial Bank of China, Los Angeles Branch, 460 S.W.3d 616, 623 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2014,
pet. denied). In fact, even if the parties do not raise the issue, a court has an “affirmative
obligation” to ascertain that subject matter jurisdiction exists and must do so at the earliest
opportunity possible. In re Lazy W Dist. No. 1, 493 S.W.3d at 544, quoting City of Houston v.
Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam). Therefore, when necessary, a trial court
should hear evidence to resolve the issue of whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over a case.
See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 223 (Tex. 2004).
In this case, Triple Crown expressly raised the issue of whether the county court had subject
matter jurisdiction to hear its appeal from the justice court, and in particular, presented evidence
in its motion to vacate in an attempt to establish that it never received the clerk’s notice of appellate
costs, and that the timeline for paying the costs was not triggered. The county court was therefore
obligated to resolve the question of whether the notice was received, and in turn, whether or not it
was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Accordingly, we conclude that the
county court erred in declining to rule on Triple Crown’s motion to vacate. Triple Crown’s Issue
Eight is Sustained.
D. The Alleged Lack of Notice
In Issue Seven, Triple Crown argues that the unrebutted evidence in the record
demonstrates that it did not receive actual notice of the appellate costs, and that we may determine,
as a matter of law, that the trial court erred by refusing to vacate its order of dismissal. We agree.
When the parties do not dispute the evidence, and instead only dispute the “legal
significance of that evidence,” an appellate court may determine jurisdictional issues as a matter
of law. See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston v. McQueen, 431 S.W.3d 750, 757
(Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see also Univ. of Tex. at El Paso v. Isaac, 568
8
S.W.3d 175, 180 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2018, pet. denied) (“When the jurisdictional facts are
undisputed . . . ‘we make[ ] the jurisdictional determination as a matter of law based on those
undisputed facts.’”). In particular, when as here, the jurisdictional issue centers on whether a
party received the requisite notice of a document, if the facts are uncontested, an appellate court
may determine whether the notice was received for purposes of determining whether, as a matter
of law, jurisdiction exists. See McQueen, 431 S.W.3d at 756-757 (where it was undisputed that
defendant state hospital did not receive actual notice of the plaintiff’s claim in a timely manner as
required by the Texas Tort Claims Act, appellate court found, as a matter of law, that the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s claim); Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice v.
Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 348 (Tex. 2004) (“In many instances . . . actual notice can be determined
as a matter of law.”).
1. No evidence of actual notice
A party may receive either actual or constructive notice of a document, and we therefore
start our analysis with the question of whether Triple Crown received actual notice of the clerk’s
certified mailing notifying it of the deadline for paying the appellate costs. Rule 21a provides that
all notices, other than citation of service, may be “served in person, mail, by commercial delivery
service, by fax, by email, or by such other manner as the court in its discretion may direct.”
TEX.R.CIV.P. 21a(a)(1). Rule 21a(b)(1) further provides that “[s]ervice by mail or commercial
delivery service shall be complete upon deposit of the document, postpaid and properly addressed,
in the mail or with a commercial delivery service.” TEX.R.CIV.P. 21a(b)(1). Rule 21a therefore
sets up a presumption that a document properly addressed and placed in the mail was received by
the recipient in a timely manner. See Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. 1987) (“Rule
21a sets up a presumption that when notice of trial setting properly addressed and postage prepaid
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is mailed, that the notice was duly received by the addressee.”); see also Martin, 2016 WL
1588517, at *2 (recognizing that a notice “properly sent pursuant to Rule 21a raises a presumption
that notice was received.”); see also MM&J Investments LLC v. KTH Investments, LLC, 602
S.W.3d 687, 690 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 2020, no pet.) (if notice is properly served in accordance
with Rule 21a, this creates a presumption that the notice was received by the addressee).
However, Rule 21a expressly allows a party to rebut this presumption, providing that
“[n]othing herein shall preclude any party from offering proof that the document was not received,
or, if service was by mail, that the document was not received within three days from the date that
it was deposited in the mail, and upon so finding, the court may extend the time for taking the
action required of such party or grant such other relief as it deems just.” TEX.R.CIV.P. 21a(e).
As the Texas Supreme Court has recognized, the presumption of service under Rule 21a is not
considered “evidence,” and thus, any presumption “vanishes when opposing evidence is
introduced that [a document] was not received.” In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. 2009), quoting
Cliff, 724 S.W.2d at 780. Such opposing evidence of “nonreceipt” may consist of an affidavit
from the intended recipient attesting to the fact that the notice was not received. See Cliff, 724
S.W.2d at 779; see also Unifund CCR Partners v. Weaver, 262 S.W.3d 796, 797 (Tex. 2008)
(noting that the presumption may be rebutted by affidavit); In re Estate of Check, 438 S.W.3d 829,
834 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (former counsel’s affidavit that opposing counsel
“never served, delivered to or provided” him with a copy of the opposing party’s original
counterclaim and that he was unaware such a document had been filed was sufficient to overcome
the presumption of service); Texaco, Inc. v. Phan, 137 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex.App.--Houston
[1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (stating that mere denial of receipt is sufficient to rebut presumption of
receipt). And where such an affidavit is unrebutted or uncontested, courts have found that the
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affidavit may be sufficient to establish a lack of actual notice. See, e.g., Smith v. Holmes, 53
S.W.3d 815, 817-18 (Tex.App.--Austin 2001, no pet.) (presumption of service overcome by
party’s uncontested, unequivocal denial that he did not receive notice); MM&J Investments LLC,
602 S.W.3d at 691 (uncontroverted affidavit and testimony of party that he did not receive trial
notice was sufficient to overcome presumption that notice was received).
In addition, the presumption arising from a document being placed in the mail pursuant to
Rule 21a is negated when the document is returned as “unclaimed.” In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d at 5;
see also Rouhana v. Ramirez, 556 S.W.3d 472, 479-80 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2018, no pet.) (finding
that litigant did not receive proper notice of a trial setting pursuant to Rule 21a, where the evidence
demonstrated that the court sent litigant a trial setting by certified mail, but the letter was returned
as unclaimed), citing Approximately $14,980.00 v. State, 261 S.W.3d 182, 189 (Tex.App.--
Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (“Notice sent by certified mail and returned ‘unclaimed’ does
not provide the notice required by Rule 21a.”); Etheredge v. Hidden Valley Airpark Ass’n, Inc.,
169 S.W.3d 378, 382 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2005) (“a notice of hearing setting sent by certified
mail and returned ‘unclaimed’ does not provide the notice required by Rule 21a.”).
In this case, the record reflects that the county clerk sent the 20-day notice to pay the
appellate costs by certified mail, addressed to the same post office box to both Triple Crown and
Nevarez. And, although the record indicates that the notice was initially delivered to the post
office box, the unrebutted evidence in the record demonstrates that neither Triple Crown nor
Nevarez ever claimed the mail, and it was ultimately returned as “unclaimed” to the clerk’s office.
And finally, there is nothing in the record to contradict the affidavits submitted by Nevarez and
his paralegal in which they averred that they never received the clerk’s notice itself, were never
11
notified by the post office that the notice was available to pick up, and were unaware of the notice
until after the county court had already dismissed the appeal.
Accordingly, we conclude that any presumption that Triple Crown received actual notice
of the clerk’s mailing was conclusively negated, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary,
we conclude that Triple Crown did not, as a matter of law, receive actual notice of the clerk’s
directive to pay the appellate costs.
2. No evidence of constructive notice
There may be circumstances, however, in which a party did not receive actual notice of a
duly mailed document but the record nevertheless supports a finding that the party received
constructive notice of it. For example, a court may find that the party had constructive notice of
a document when the designated recipient returns it as “refused,” or when there is evidence that a
party or its attorney has otherwise engaged in “selective acceptance or refusal of certified mail
relating to the case.” Jacobs v. Jacobs, 448 S.W.3d 626, 632-633 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th
Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see also Rouhana, 556 S.W.3d at 479-80 (recognizing that “refusing to accept
duly mailed correspondence can constitute constructive notice if the intended recipient refuses all
certified mailings, or engages in repeated instances of selective acceptance of notices.”);
Approximately $14,980.00, 261 S.W.3d at 189 (“Constructive notice may be established if the
serving party demonstrates compliance with Rule 21a and presents evidence that the intended
recipient engaged in instances of selective acceptance or refusal of certified mail relating to the
case.”).
In this case, however, there is no evidence that Triple Crown refused the certified mailing
from the clerk’s office and instead, as set forth above, the record establishes that it was returned to
the clerk’s office as “unclaimed.” See Shackelford v. Cartercopters, LLC, No. 02-10-00414-CV,
12
2011 WL 3835638, at *4 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated
for publication) (noting distinction between “unclaimed” and “refused” mail). Further, there is
nothing in the record to suggest that either Triple Crown or its attorney engaged in any other
instances of selective acceptance or refusal to accept deliveries of registered or certified mail. See
In re E.A., 287 S.W.3d at 5-6 (finding insufficient evidence in the record to establish constructive
notice where there was no evidence that party “avoided or refused delivery of the amended petition,
nor that she received the certified mail notices.”).
In the trial court, Ackerman argued that Triple Crown had “constructive knowledge” that
it was required to pay the appellate costs, pointing out that Triple Crown acknowledged in its
notice of appeal to the county court that it was obligated to pay appellate costs “[i]n accordance
with Rule 143(a) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure” in the amount of $227. The fact that
Triple Crown’s attorney was aware of the legal requirement to pay appellate costs, however, is not
the same as having constructive knowledge that the clerk has sent out a notice establishing the
deadline for paying those costs. As explained above, the 20-day deadline for paying appellate
costs is not triggered until the appellant receives the clerk’s notice, and Rule 143a only allows for
dismissal of an appeal after that 20-day period has elapsed. TEX.R.CIV.P. 143a. Therefore,
because we have found no evidence in the record that Triple Crown received either actual or
constructive notice of the clerk’s notice to pay the appellate costs, the time table set forth in
Rule 143a was not triggered, and accordingly, the trial court did not lose jurisdiction to hear Triple
Crown’s appeal. 4 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred by not granting Triple
Crown’s motion to vacate its order of dismissal.
4
Triple Crown raises three other arguments in support of its argument that the county court did not lose jurisdiction
due to its failure to pay the appellate costs within the timeframe set forth in the clerk’s notice: (1) whether the county
clerk was required to send the notice through the e-file system; (2) whether Triple Crown was entitled to receive a
second notice pursuant to Rule 506.1(g), giving it seven days to cure the failure to pay the costs; and (3) whether
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Triple Crown’s Issue Seven is sustained.
IV. THE JUSTICE COURT’S ALLEGED LEGAL ERRORS
In its first six issues on appeal, Triple Crown contends that the justice court made several
legal errors when it ruled in Ackerman’s favor in the parties’ dispute. In particular, Triple Crown
argues that the justice of the peace court ignored certain provisions in the parties’ contract,
including a “choice of law” provision, a “mandatory venue and jurisdiction provision,” a
“mandatory arbitration” provision and a “mandatory damage claim substantiation” provision.
And, as a corollary to these arguments, Triple Crown contends that by ignoring these provisions,
the justice court improperly “re-wrote” the parties’ contract, and thereby committed clear “legal
error.”
Regardless of the validity of these arguments, the county court had no jurisdiction to review
these alleged legal errors, nor does this Court. As indicated above, appeals from justice court to
county court are de novo, which means that the entire case is presented to the county court “as if
there had been no previous trial.” TEX.R.CIV.P. 510.10(c). Therefore, upon the filing and
perfection of an appeal, the justice court’s judgment is in effect vacated, and a county court may
not affirm or reverse the justice court’s judgment. See Praise Deliverance Church v. Jelinis, LLC,
536 S.W.3d 849, 854 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied); Williams v. Schneiber,
148 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex.App.--Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); see generally Garza v. Chavarria,
155 S.W.3d 252, 255 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2004, no pet.) (recognizing the de novo nature of appeals
from justice court to county court). In other words, because of the de novo nature of the
Triple Crown’s due process rights were violated by the lack of actual notice. Because we find that the undisputed
evidence established that Triple Crown did not receive actual or constructive notice of the clerk’s 20-day notice to pay
the appellate costs as required by the Rules of Civil Procedure, we resolve the appeal on that basis alone, and we need
not address Triple Crown’s alternative arguments.
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proceedings, a county court does not sit as a true appellate court, and does not review the justice
court’s decision for legal errors; instead, it tries the case for itself as if no ruling had ever been
made in the justice court. See Villalon v. Bank One, 176 S.W.3d 66, 69-70 (Tex.App.--Houston
[1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). Accordingly, neither the county court nor this Court have any basis
for reviewing the alleged legal errors committed by the justice court.
Triple Crown’s Issues One through Six are overruled.
V. CONCLUSION
Because the unrebutted evidence in the record demonstrates that Triple Crown did not
receive actual or constructive notice of the clerk’s 20-day notice to pay appellate costs, we
conclude that the county court did not lose jurisdiction over Triple Crown’s appeal, and we
therefore reverse the county court’s order dismissing the appeal and remand the matter to the
county court for further proceedings.
JEFF ALLEY, Chief Justice
September 29, 2020
Before Alley, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
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