Gareld Duane Rollins Junior v. Southern Baptist Convention ( 2021 )

Opinion issued February 25, 2021
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-19-00460-CV
———————————
GARELD DUANE ROLLINS, JR., Appellant
V.
H. PAUL PRESSLER III, NANCY PRESSLER, PAIGE PATTERSON,
JARED WOODFILL, WOODFILL LAW FIRM F/K/A/ WOODFILL &
PRESSLER, L.L.P., SOUTHWESTERN BAPTIST THEOLOGICAL
SEMINARY, AND FIRST BAPTIST CHURCH OF HOUSTON, Appellees
On Appeal from the 127th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2017-69277C
DISSENTING OPINION
The allegations of sexual abuse in this case are undeniably horrific. However,
because the law and the summary-judgment record compel it, I must dissent.
In a summary-judgment proceeding, an issue is conclusively established if
reasonable minds could not differ about the conclusion to be drawn from the facts in
the record. Cmty. Health Sys. Prof’l Servs. Corp. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 681
(Tex. 2017). I agree with the majority that Paul Pressler and the other defendants
aligned with him (“Pressler Defendants”), as summary-judgment movants, had the
burden to conclusively negate application of the unsound mind tolling doctrine to
Rollins’s claims. See Erikson v. Renda, 590 S.W.3d 557, 563 (Tex. 2019). But I
disagree with the majority’s determination that the Pressler Defendants failed to
meet this burden. Considering the Pressler Defendants’ evidence regarding the 2004
lawsuit filed by Rollins against Pressler in Dallas and the judicial admissions made
in Rollins’s pleadings, reasonable minds could not differ and would necessarily
conclude that Rollins was of sound mind in 2004 when his causes of action in this
suit accrued.
Legal Principles: Unsound Mind
Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 16.001(a)(2) provides that a person
is under a legal disability for purposes of the statute of limitations if that person is
“of unsound mind.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.001(a)(2). When a person
is of unsound mind at the time that his cause of action accrues, the applicable statute
of limitations will be tolled until the disability is removed. See id. § 16.001(b). “The
purpose of section 16.001(a)(2) is to protect a person of unsound mind by ensuring
2
that a legally disabled person’s right to bring suit will not be precluded by a statute
of limitations, prior to removal of the disability.” Gribble v. Layton, 389 S.W.3d
882, 893 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (citing Ruiz v.
Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tex. 1993)).
Generally, persons of unsound mind and insane persons are synonymous;
however, a person may be of unsound mind without having been adjudicated
incompetent. Doe v. Catholic Diocese of El Paso, 362 S.W.3d 707, 722–23 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.); see Hargraves v. Armco Foods, Inc., 894 S.W.2d 546,
547 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ) (noting that section 16.001 does not define
“unsound mind” and citing former probate code defining “unsound mind” as
“persons non compos mentis, mentally disabled persons, insane persons, and other
persons who are mentally incompetent to care for themselves or manage their
property and financial affairs”). The unsound mind tolling provision applies to a
person who suffers from an inability to participate in, control, or understand the
progression and disposition of his lawsuit. See Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 755.
The Pressler Defendants’ Evidence
Here, the summary-judgment record shows that, in November 2003, Rollins
and Pressler had an altercation in a Dallas hotel room. In July 2004, Rollins filed
suit against Pressler in a Dallas court based on the altercation. Rollins sued Pressler
for simple assault, citing Penal Code section 22.01(a)(1), which provides that a
3
person commits the offense of assault if he “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
causes bodily injury to another.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)(1).
In September 2004, the Hon. Ruby Sondock mediated the dispute. As a result
of the mediation, Rollins and Pressler settled and entered into a confidential
settlement agreement and a release of claims. Each party, including Rollins and his
attorney, signed the settlement agreement. By signing the agreement, each party
represented “that execution indicates [a] thorough understanding of the contents.”
Under the terms of the 2004 settlement, Pressler agreed to pay Rollins $1,500
per month for 25 years, totaling $450,000.1 In return, Rollins agreed to release and
dismiss his claims against Pressler. The record reflects that the case was then non-
suited. From October 2004 until October 2017, when this suit was filed, Pressler
paid Rollins $1,500 per month, totaling approximately $234,000.
Analysis
The Pressler Defendants’ evidence, showing that Rollins prosecuted and
settled the Dallas lawsuit against Pressler in 2004, conclusively negated Rollins’s
claim that he was of unsound mind in 2004. Even taking as true Rollins’s claim that
he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder and alcohol abuse, the Pressler
Defendants’ evidence sufficiently demonstrated that, in 2004, Rollins had the ability
1
Pressler also agreed to pay Rollins’s attorney $100,000. It is noteworthy that
attorney, Daniel Shea, represented Rollins in the 2004 lawsuit and that Shea filed
this suit for Rollins in 2017, advocating that Rollins was of unsound mind in 2004.
4
to participate in, control, and understand the instant lawsuit. See Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d
at 755.
Significantly, the 2004 Dallas lawsuit and this lawsuit have much in common.
Rollins filed the 2004 lawsuit against Pressler based on assaultive conduct
committed by Pressler against Rollins prior to 2004. In this case, Rollins sued the
Pressler Defendants for torts associated with assaultive conduct committed by
Pressler against Rollins before 2004. To distinguish the suits, Rollins points out that,
unlike here, nothing in the Dallas petition or settlement agreement indicated that
sexual abuse played any part in that suit. Even so, Rollins’s filing of the Dallas
lawsuit necessarily showed that he understood that Pressler had committed tortious
conduct against him for which he was entitled to seek redress, thereby demonstrating
Rollins’s ability in 2004 to recognize tortious conduct and to identify Pressler as a
tortfeasor capable of harming him. And, while the 2004 lawsuit is based on simple
assault, as defined in Penal Code section 22.01, and the instant suit is based on sexual
assault, as defined in Penal Code section 22.011, both offenses are categorized as
assaultive offenses in Chapter 22 of the Penal Code, indicating an underlying
commonality in the nature of the claims. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 22.01(a)(1),
22.011.
The Pressler Defendants’ evidence also showed that Rollins participated in
the filing, prosecution, and disposition of the 2004 Dallas suit. For the petition to
5
have been prepared and filed, Rollins necessarily would have relayed to others what
had occurred in the Dallas hotel room. Although the petition reflects that Rollins’s
mother was also a plaintiff in the suit, she claimed only that Pressler had breached
an informal fiduciary duty to her. She did not join Rollins’s assault claim or
otherwise indicate that she sued on Rollins’s behalf. Nothing in the petition indicates
that she was acting as Rollins’s guardian or that Rollins did not control his own
claims. Cf. Gribble, 389 S.W.3d at 884, 894 (reflecting that mother of individual,
determined to be of unsound mind, filed suit on his behalf as his court-appointed
guardian). It is reasonable to infer that Rollins, a named plaintiff, was in control of
his claims; it would not be reasonable to infer the opposite. See Nixon v. Mr.
Property Management Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985) (providing that
court reviewing summary-judgment evidence must draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of non-movant).
The evidence also reflects that, after engaging in mediation, Rollins signed his
name to the settlement agreement, acknowledging that he understood its terms. The
agreement reflects that Rollins agreed to the settlement on his own behalf and agreed
to release his claims against Pressler. The agreement states that each signatory
warranted and represented that he had authority “to bind the party . . . for whom such
party acts” and that the “claims . . . are owned by the party asserting same.” The
settlement document reflects that Pressler agreed to make the payments to Rollins
6
and that, in return, Rollins agreed to release his claims and dismiss the suit, which
he did. The record reflects that Pressler paid Rollins the agreed amounts for thirteen
years, totaling approximately $234,000.
Rollins intimates that he was of unsound mind in 2004 for purposes of
bringing this suit because he had, to some degree, repressed his memories of the
sexual abuse. He also asserts that he was unable to bring suit based on the sexual
abuse sooner because Pressler had convinced him that the abuse was divinely
sanctioned. However, limiting the unsound mind inquiry to the specific subject
matter of the suit has no support in Texas law.
As mentioned, Texas courts have considered persons of unsound mind as
being synonymous with insane persons, indicating that the unsound mind inquiry is
based on the person’s general mental state and ability to manage his own affairs
rather than the person’s specific mental state relating only to the subject matter of
the lawsuit. See Catholic Diocese of El Paso, 362 S.W.3d at 722–23; Hargraves,
894 S.W.2d at 547. And Texas courts have generally applied the doctrine of unsound
mind to toll limitations in cases in which a plaintiff’s mental impairment was
substantial and prolonged, preventing the plaintiff from being aware of, and able to
assist with, his lawsuit. See, e.g., Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 753 (holding unsound mind
tolling applied when plaintiff had severe and permanent head injury); Palla v.
McDonald, 877 S.W.2d 472, 474–77 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ)
7
(reversing summary judgment on limitations when plaintiff suffered from permanent
brain damage and blindness).
In contrast, the record here, including judicial admissions made by Rollins in
his pleadings, reflects that Rollins engaged in activities demonstrating an ability to
manage his own affairs, participate in a lawsuit, and understand his legal rights.
Specifically, the record reflects that, during adulthood, Rollins was employed,
attended college, traveled abroad, possessed a driver’s license, drove a car, and was
convicted of criminal offenses, including theft and numerous charges of driving
while intoxicated. See Catholic Diocese of El Paso, 362 S.W.3d at 724 (noting
evidence showing that plaintiff had been employed, attended college, remained
married, and had children tended to show he was sound mind). I agree with the
majority that these past activities, under the facts of this case, do not alone establish
that Rollins was of sound mind. See Myers v. St. Stephen’s United Methodist Church,
No. 01-96-001460-CV, 1998 WL 723887, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
Oct. 8, 1998, pet. denied) (not designated for publication). But these past activities
do provide important context for the Pressler Defendants’ evidence of the Dallas
lawsuit, which did conclusively establish that, when his claims in this suit accrued
in 2004, Rollins had the ability to participate in, control, and understand the
progression and disposition of a lawsuit against Pressler for tortious conduct. See
Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 755; cf. Myers, 1998 WL 723887, at *4 (reversing summary
8
judgment because movant had not presented conclusive evidence that plaintiff was
not of unsound mind at time his cause of action accrued).
Based on the record, I would hold that the Pressler Defendants met their
summary-judgment burden to conclusively negate the application of the unsound
mind tolling doctrine. Because the majority reaches the opposite conclusion, I
respectfully dissent.
Richard Hightower
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Landau, and Hightower.
Hightower, J., dissenting.
9