Walter Alfonso Fajardo v. State ( 2021 )


Menu:
  • Affirmed and Opinion Filed February 23, 2021
    S
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-19-01277-CR
    No. 05-19-01278-CR
    No. 05-19-01279-CR
    WALTER ALFONSO FAJARDO, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District Court
    Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause Nos. F-1834266-U, F-1834270-U, F-1834271-U
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Schenck, Smith, and Garcia
    Opinion by Justice Garcia
    Appellant Walter Alfonso Fajardo appeals three aggravated-robbery
    convictions arising from a single criminal episode. We affirm.
    I.   Background
    In three indictments, appellant was charged with committing aggravated
    robbery against three different complainants, referred to herein as Mother, Daughter
    (age ten), and Son (age six).
    Appellant pleaded guilty without a plea bargain in each case. He also signed
    a judicial confession in each case.
    The trial court accepted appellant’s pleas and found him guilty.
    Testimony received during a bench trial on punishment showed that appellant
    and another person held Mother, Daughter, and Son at gunpoint while ransacking
    their apartment. Appellant and the other person took some property that was later
    recovered when appellant was arrested.
    The court sentenced appellant to sixty-five years’ imprisonment on each
    conviction, to run concurrently.
    Appellant timely appealed all three convictions and filed a separate appellate
    brief for each conviction.
    II.   Analysis
    In appeal no. 05-19-01279-CR, which relates to appellant’s conviction for
    committing aggravated robbery against Son, appellant raises two issues:
    insufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and lack of jurisdiction. In
    the other two appeals, he raises only the jurisdictional issue.
    A.    Is the evidence insufficient to support appellant’s conviction for
    committing aggravated robbery against Son?
    In his sufficiency complaint in appeal no. 05-19-01279-CR, appellant argues
    in his first issue that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because
    there is no evidence that he took any property belonging to Son. We reject his
    argument because that is not an element of the offense.
    –2–
    1.     Applicable Law
    When a defendant waives his right to a jury trial and pleads guilty to a felony,
    the State must introduce evidence showing that the defendant is guilty. See TEX.
    CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15; Jones v. State, 
    600 S.W.3d 94
    , 100 (Tex. App.—
    Dallas 2020, pet. ref’d), cert. denied, No. 20-5819, 
    2020 WL 6829104
     (U.S. Nov.
    23, 2020). A judicial confession is sufficient to support a guilty plea if it covers
    every element of the charged offense. Jones, 600 S.W.3d at 100.
    An appellant can raise an article 1.15 sufficiency complaint for the first time
    on appeal, without preserving error in the trial court. Euan v. State, No. 05-16-
    00252-CR, 
    2017 WL 1536514
    , at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 27, 2017, pet. ref’d)
    (mem. op., not designated for publication).
    The elements of aggravated robbery, as relevant here, are that the defendant
    committed robbery and used or exhibited a deadly weapon. See TEX. PENAL CODE
    ANN. § 29.03(a)(2). A person commits robbery, as relevant here, if he intentionally
    or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent bodily danger or death
    in the course of committing theft and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the
    property. See id. § 29.02(a)(2). “In the course of committing theft” means conduct
    that occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in immediate flight
    after the attempt or commission of theft. Id. § 29.01(1). And a person commits theft
    if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of property.
    Id. § 31.03(a). Thus, the relevant statutes do not, on their face, require an actual theft
    –3–
    of the complainant’s property for the offense of aggravated robbery against the
    complainant.
    2.     Application of the Law to the Facts
    Appellant’s judicial confession contains the following admission:
    [O]n or about the 11th day of May, 2018, in Dallas County, Texas, I
    did then and there intentionally and knowingly, while in the course of
    committing theft of property and with intent to obtain or maintain
    control of said property, threaten and place [Son] in fear of imminent
    bodily injury and death, and the defendant used and exhibited a deadly
    weapon, to-wit: A FIREARM[.]
    Appellant argues that his confession is insufficient to support his conviction
    because it does not show that he took any of Son’s property. He also argues that the
    punishment-trial evidence did not include any evidence that he took any of Son’s
    property.
    The State responds that the evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s
    conviction. We agree. Under the statutes discussed above, “the actual commission
    of the offense of theft is not prerequisite to commission of a robbery, nor need the
    victim of the theft or attempted theft and the victim of the robbery be the same.” Earl
    v. State, 
    514 S.W.2d 273
    , 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (emphasis added); see also
    Penn v. State, No. 14-13-00263-CR, 
    2014 WL 4557878
    , at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] Sept. 16, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
    (appellant committed robbery by shooting the complainant in the course of stealing
    property from another person at the scene; “the victim of the theft and the victim of
    the robbery need not be the same”); cf. Jones v. State, No. 05-13-01553-CR, 2015
    –4–
    WL 4722928, at *9 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 10, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not
    designated for publication) (the taking of property is not an essential element of the
    offense of robbery).
    Appellant cites only one case to support his premise that a theft from Son was
    a required element of the offense. That case has been overruled. See Cook v. State,
    
    840 S.W.2d 384
     (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), overruled by Ex parte Hawkins, 
    6 S.W.3d 554
    , 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In Cook, the court held that double jeopardy
    forbade convicting a defendant for two counts of aggravated robbery where the
    defendant committed only one theft. 
    840 S.W.2d at 389
    . The court repudiated that
    position in Hawkins. 
    6 S.W.3d at 561
     (double jeopardy did not bar defendant from
    being convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery where “he assaulted two
    victims in the course of committing a theft”).
    In sum, the elements of aggravated robbery do not include the taking of
    property belonging to the complainant, so the State was not required to produce
    evidence that appellant took Son’s property.
    We overrule appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in appeal
    no. 05-19-01279-CR.
    B.    Did the trial court lack jurisdiction because there was no order
    transferring the cases from the 203rd District Court to the 291st District
    Court?
    In all three appeals, appellant argues that the 291st District Court, which
    handled his cases and rendered judgment against him, lacked jurisdiction because
    –5–
    the indictments were presented to the 203rd District Court and there is no record of
    any orders transferring the cases to the 291st District Court. In support, he cites the
    Texas Constitution’s provision that “[t]he presentment of an indictment or
    information to a court invests the court with jurisdiction of the cause.” TEX. CONST.
    art. V, § 12(b). He also relies on Code of Criminal Procedure article 4.16, which
    provides that when two or more courts have concurrent jurisdiction of a criminal
    offense, generally “the court in which an indictment or a complaint shall first be filed
    shall retain jurisdiction.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 4.16 (emphasis added).
    Appellant acknowledges that existing precedent contradicts his position. His
    argument must be preserved in the trial court by a plea to the jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
    Keller v. State, 
    604 S.W.3d 214
    , 231 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. ref’d); Mills v.
    State, 
    742 S.W.2d 831
    , 835 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no pet.). This is because the
    lack of a transfer order “is a procedural matter, not a jurisdictional one.” Lemasurier
    v. State, 
    91 S.W.3d 897
    , 899 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref’d); accord
    Henderson v. State, 
    526 S.W.3d 818
    , 821 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017,
    pet. ref’d); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.003(b)(2) (generally, a district
    judge may “hear and determine any case or proceeding pending in another district
    court in the county without having the case transferred”). Seeing no such plea in the
    appellate record, we conclude that appellant forfeited this argument, and we overrule
    this issue in all three appeals.
    –6–
    Moreover, appellant’s argument fails on the merits. The indictment’s filing is
    the event that triggers article 4.16’s proviso that a specific court “shall retain”
    jurisdiction. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 4.16. In these cases, the indictments
    were assigned to the 291st District Court upon filing.       As we have held on
    substantially identical facts, no transfer order is needed when an indictment is
    presented to one court but then filed in another court. See Thompson v. State, No.
    05-14-00139-CR, 
    2014 WL 7399300
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 15, 2014, pet.
    ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Bourque v. State, 
    156 S.W.3d 675
    , 678 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. ref’d)). Thus, no transfer order was
    needed in this case.
    III.   Disposition
    We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
    /Dennise Garcia/
    DENNISE GARCIA
    JUSTICE
    Do Not Publish
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
    191277F.U05
    –7–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    WALTER ALFONSO FAJARDO,                      On Appeal from the 291st Judicial
    Appellant                                    District Court, Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. F-1834266-U.
    No. 05-19-01277-CR          V.               Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia.
    Justices Schenck and Smith
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
    AFFIRMED.
    Judgment entered February 23, 2021.
    –8–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    WALTER ALFONSO FAJARDO,                      On Appeal from the 291st Judicial
    Appellant                                    District Court, Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. F-1834270-U.
    No. 05-19-01278-CR          V.               Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia.
    Justices Schenck and Smith
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                 participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
    AFFIRMED.
    Judgment entered February 23, 2021.
    –9–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    WALTER ALFONSO FAJARDO,                       On Appeal from the 291st Judicial
    Appellant                                     District Court, Dallas County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. F-1834271-U.
    No. 05-19-01279-CR          V.                Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia.
    Justices Schenck and Smith
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
    AFFIRMED.
    Judgment entered February 23, 2021.
    –10–