in the Interest of M.H., M.H., and N. H. ( 2021 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-20-00233-CV
__________________
IN THE INTEREST OF M.H., M.H., AND N.H.
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 317th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. C-235,211
__________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mother and Father filed appeals following the trial to the bench of a suit
affecting their parental relationships with their children, Missy, Matt, and Nicole.1
Mother argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the
findings she endangered her children, constructively abandoned them, violated the
requirements of her court-ordered Family Service Plan, and to prove she used
1
To protect the identities of Mother, Father, and their children, we use
pseudonyms in the opinion in place of names. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(a), (b).
1
controlled substances in a manner dangerous to the health or safety of her children.2
Mother also argues the evidence does not support the trial court’s best-interest
finding, an additional finding the trial court relied on when it terminated her parental
rights.3 On the other hand, Father’s attorney filed a brief in which he concluded that
“no non-frivolous grounds for appeal” exist to warrant overturning the trial court’s
judgment.4
First, we conclude the record contains clear and convincing evidence
sufficient to show that Mother knowingly allowed the children to remain in
conditions that endangered them. Second, we conclude the record contains clear and
convincing evidence sufficient to prove that Mother engaged in conduct dangerous
to the physical or emotional well-being of her children. 5 Third, we conclude the
record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s best-
interest finding. Fourth, as to Father’s appeal, we agree with Father’s court-
2
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1) (D), (E), (N), (O), (P) (Supp.). For
convenience, we will refer to these in some parts of the opinion as subsections D, E,
N, O, or P.
3
Id. § 161.001(b)(2) (Supp.).
4
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also In re L.D.T., 161
S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (holding that Anders
procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases).
5
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.00(b)(1) (D), (E).
2
appointed attorney’s conclusion that Father’s appeal is frivolous. For the reasons
explained below, we affirm.
Background
In June 2019, a police officer stopped Mother for a traffic violation in Orange,
Texas. When the police searched Mother’s car, they reported they found drug
paraphernalia inside, two pipes the arresting officer knew to be the kind used by
individuals to use methamphetamine.
During the stop, Mother told the police officer her children were being
supervised by their eleven-year-old aunt in a motel. Shortly after that, the
Department received a report about the information Mother gave the police. Officers
with the Beaumont Police Department along with employees of the Department went
to the motel and checked on Missy, Matt, and Nicole. When they arrived, they found
them asleep and being supervised by an adult male. The man told the officers he and
Mother were friends.
While at the motel, caseworkers from the Department interviewed the
children. They discovered Missy had a severe sunburn on her back, face, and one of
her arms. Missy also had a ringworm infection on her chest, back, and arm. Matt had
a severe sunburn on his face, back, and arms, together with insect bites that covered
his legs. Nicole had a severe sunburn to her face, back and arms.
3
In June 2019, the trial court signed an emergency temporary order, authorizing
the Department to take the children into the Department’s temporary custody. At the
time of the removal, Father was in jail and awaiting trial on a motion to revoke a
community supervision order associated with his plea of guilty on a charge of
robbery. In the emergency order, the trial court named the Department the temporary
sole managing conservator of the children. Following the removal, the Department
sent the children to health care providers for exams. Those providers determined all
three children had second-degree sunburns and were suffering from ringworm. A
dentist who saw the children also reported that all three children had severely
decayed teeth and reported the decay was causing pain. Shae Living, the
Department’s investigator, explained when she testified in the trial that all three
children went through “several dental surgeries” to treat the dental problems the
dentist told the Department the children were having with their teeth.
The Department’s petition to remove the children from Mother’s and Father’s
care includes claims to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. On June 20,
the trial court conducted a full adversary hearing on the Department’s lawsuit.
During the hearing, the trial court instructed the Department to develop family
service plans for the parents and to outline the actions Mother and Father needed to
take to address the concerns the Department raised in the hearing.
4
On July 23 and September 24, 2020, the parties tried the case to the bench.
Mother and Father were represented by attorneys in the trial. The trial lasted two
days. Four witnesses testified in the trial, Shae Living, Rebecca Tobin (the special
advocate the court appointed for the children), Mother, and Father. Three weeks after
the last day of the trial, the trial court signed a judgment terminating Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights to Missy, Matt, and Nicole. 6 In the judgment, the trial court
found Mother and Father knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions
that endangered their physical or emotional well-being and had engaged in conduct
that endangered their physical or emotional well-being. Additionally, as to Mother,
the trial court found Mother constructively abandoned the children after the court
removed them from Mother’s home, violated a court-ordered family service plan,
used controlled substances in a manner that endangered the health and safety of
Missy, Matt, and Nicole, and failed to complete a drug abuse treatment program,
which violated the orders the trial court had signed in the case.7 The trial court also
found terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of
Missy, Matt, and Nicole. The judgment names the Department as Missy’s, Matt’s,
and Nicole’s permanent managing conservator.8
6
See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (P).
7
See id.
8
See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
5
Analysis
I. Father’s Appeal
Father filed an Anders brief in his appeal. The brief concludes that Father’s
appeal is frivolous. 9 The brief complies with the requirements of Anders. 10 It
includes a professional evaluation of the record and explains why Father’s attorney
found no arguable grounds existed to support an argument asserting the judgment
terminating Father’s rights should be overturned. The attorney represented he sent
Father a copy of the Anders brief, notified Father of his right to file a pro se response,
and explained how Father could obtain the record if he wanted to file a response to
support his appeal. The record shows that Father filed no response.
Based on the record and Father’s Anders brief, we conclude no arguable
grounds exist to support a merits-based argument in Father’s appeal. We further find
that Father’s appeal is frivolous.11 Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment
terminating Father’s parental right to Missy, Matt, and Nicole is affirmed.
9
See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d at 731.
10
See In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied).
11
See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also
In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.); In re D.D.,
279 S.W.3d at 850.
6
II. Mother’s Appeal
Mother raises six appellate issues in the brief she filed to support her appeal.
In issues one through five, Mother argues the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support the findings the trial court relied on to terminate her parental
rights under sections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O) and (P) of the Family Code.12
In issue six, Mother argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
support the trial court’s best-interest finding.
Since the grounds the trial court relied on to terminate Mother’s parental rights
include findings based on subsections D and E, we address Mother’s arguments
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on those findings first. 13
A. Standard of Review
In suits by the Department seeking to terminate the relationship between a
parent and the parent’s child, the Department must prove its allegation claiming that
a ground to terminate the relationship exists by clear and convincing evidence.14
Clear and convincing evidence means proof sufficient to “produce in the mind of
12
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (P).
13
See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (holding that reviewing
courts must review issues that complain about findings under subsections (D) and
(E) to avoid violating the parent’s constitutional rights).
14
In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005).
7
the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to
be established.”15 In addition to proving a statutory ground exists to justify the
termination of the parent-child relationship, the Department also proved that
terminating the relationship is in the child’s best interest.16 When, as here, the trial
court’s order terminates the parent-child relationship under sections
161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) as well as other grounds for termination, we must consider
the parent’s arguments in the appeal challenging the D and E grounds regardless of
whether the evidence supports the other grounds the trial court relied on in its
judgment to justify terminating the relationship. 17
Mother argues the evidence presented during the trial to terminate her parent-
child relationship under subsections D and E is legally insufficient to support the
judgment. When reviewing claims that argued the evidence is legally insufficient to
support a verdict, the evidence is reviewed in the light favoring the finding the
factfinder made in the trial against whether “a reasonable trier of fact could have
formed a firm belief or conviction that [the finding challenged in the appeal] was
true.” 18 In our review, we assume the factfinder resolved the facts in a manner
15
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007.
16
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (Supp.); see also In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d
at 84.
17
In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 236-39.
18
In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002).
8
consistent with its verdict.19 If, however, the evidence is such that no reasonable
factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding the appellant
is challenging in the appeal is true, the evidence is not legally sufficient to support
the finding.20 In that case, we must then decide whether the judgment can stand based
on the other grounds the trial court relied on in the judgment that it signed
terminating the parent’s relationship with her children.
Mother also argues the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial
court’s subsections D and E findings. When conducting a factual sufficiency review,
the appellate court reviews the evidence in the light that favors the factfinder’s
verdict. On appeal, the reviewing court must decide whether the evidence is such
that the factfinder could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding the
appellant challenged in the appeal is true.21
In this case, at least in part, the judgment relies on findings favoring the
Department under subsections D and E.22 Under subsection D, the Department
needed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mother “knowingly placed
or knowingly allowed [her children] to remain in conditions or surroundings which
19
Id.20
Id.21
Id.22
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).
9
endanger[d] their physical or emotional well-being[.]”23 Under subsection E, the
Department needed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mother “engaged
in conduct or knowingly placed the child[ren] with persons who engaged in conduct
which endanger[ed their] physical or emotional well-being[.]” 24 Subsection D
requires the conduct to be engaged in knowingly, while subsection E allows the
relationship to be terminated if the factfinder determines the parent engaged in the
conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the children. 25
To prove endangerment, the Department did not need to show that Mother
caused an actual physical injury to her children. That’s because the term
endangerment means “to expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize.” 26 Thus, regardless
of whether a parent’s conduct occurred before or after the child was born, the
factfinder may consider the conduct to decide whether the parent engaged in
conducted that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being. 27 The
23
Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D).
24
Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).
25
Compare id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).
26
Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987).
27
See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009) (“It necessarily follows
that the endangering conduct may include the parent’s actions before the child’s
birth, while the parent had custody of older children, including evidence of drug
usage.”); In re J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d 836, 848 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.)
(“Drug use and its effect on a parent’s life and [the parent’s ability to parent] may
establish an endangering course of conduct.”); In re S.N., 272 S.W.3d 45, 52 (Tex.
10
Department’s evidence about Mother’s alleged endangering conduct hinged on
Mother’s history of using meth. Even if some of Mother’s use of illegal substances
occurred before some of her children were born, the trial court, as the factfinder,
may consider the evidence about that conduct in deciding whether Mother was a fit
parent. It is evidence that is relevant to whether the trial court could have formed a
firm belief or conviction “that similar conduct will recur[.]”28
To support a judgment terminating the parent-child relationship, a finding
under subsections D or E must be coupled with a finding that terminating the parent’s
relationship with the child “is in the best interest of the child.” 29 When a parent
appeals and challenges the factfinder’s best-interest finding, we review the finding
based on several factors, which may include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the
emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional
and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of
App.–Waco 2008, no pet.) (“Evidence of illegal drug use or alcohol abuse by a
parent is often cited as conduct which will support an affirmative finding that the
parent has engaged in a course of conduct which has the effect of endangering the
child.”); In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)
(“Parental and caregiver illegal drug use and drug-related criminal activity likewise
supports the conclusion that the children’s surroundings endanger their physical or
emotional well-being.”).
28
In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no
pet.).
29
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2).
11
the individuals seeking custody; (5) any programs available to assist these
individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the evidence showing the
plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the
stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) any acts or omissions of the parent
that show the existing parent-child relationship is improper; and (9) any excuse the
evidence reveals to explain any acts or omissions of the parent. 30 Even should the
evidence conflict regarding these factors, the factfinder may weigh the evidence and
conclude that terminating the parent’s relationship with the child is in the child’s
best interest.31
In considering what is in child’s best interest, the factfinder may rely on both
direct and circumstantial evidence, the subjective facts, and the totality of the
evidence admitted in the trial.32 Generally speaking, in the appeal of a parent’s legal
and factual sufficiency arguments, evidence showing that a parent engaged in
conduct that endangered the child is relevant to both the findings the factfinder made
under subsections D and E as well as its best-interest finding. 33
30
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976); see Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 263.307(b).
31
See In re A.P., 184 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.).
32
See In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).
33
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(b) (history of harm or abuse to a child
is a factor in determining best interest); Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72 (current and
future danger to the children is a factor in determining best interest).
12
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence — Subsections D and E
In issues one and two of her brief, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the subsection D and E findings. Because Mother’s arguments
challenging the trial court’s subsection D and E findings largely overlap, we consider
issues one and two together in resolving these issues in her appeal. At trial, the
Department presented substantial evidence that allowed the trial court to infer that
Mother has a long-term history with abusing an illegal substance, methamphetamine.
Mother did not deny that she used meth in the trial. Instead, she tried to minimize
her use, swearing she only used meth “on and off” after she had children. A police
report, prepared by the City of Orange Police Department after an officer in that City
stopped Mother for violating a traffic law, shows the officer arrested Mother after
finding drug paraphernalia in her car. The police report, which is in evidence,
describes the paraphernalia found in the car as “meth pipes.” According to the report,
Mother admitted the pipes belonged to her. The report also states the arresting officer
noticed “burnt residue” when he inspected the pipes.
Shae Living, a caseworker employed by the Department, testified for the
Department on both days of the trial. According to Living, when the Department
interviewed Mother, she told them she had used methamphetamine and alcohol in
the past 30 days. The Department sent Mother for several drug tests after removing
13
Missy, Matt, and Nicole from Mother’s home. Records from the provider where
Mother was tested for drugs in November 2019 show that Mother tested positive for
meth. That same month, Mother told a licensed counselor at the Spindletop Center
she “has been using methamphetamine infrequently for the last couple months, about
three times per month.” Mother told the Department that while she had the children
in her care, she had gotten so high she could not care for them or go to work. Mother
told the Department during its investigation that her use of drugs had caused
problems with her family, problems with her friends, and had interfered with her
work.
When Mother testified, she admitted that in February 2020, she relapsed on
the efforts she had made to remain sober and stay off meth. According to Mother,
the relapse occurred when she snorted what she thought was cocaine after becoming
intoxicated at a bar. But as the factfinder, the trial court had no obligation to accept
Mother’s explanation as an excuse or to believe her claim that she did not know she
was snorting meth. The record before the trial court includes a drug test that is tied
to Mother’s testimony about her relapse. It is positive for meth. Mother also testified
she had used cocaine eight months after the Department removed the children from
her care. On cross-examination, Mother admitted her desire to use drugs was so
strong she would “use anything [she could] get [her] hands on[.]”
14
The evidence in the trial shows that Mother failed to appear for several
random drug tests and that her failure to appear for them violated the trial court’s
order requiring her to comply with a family service plan, which required her to
appear when requested to submit to drug tests. While Mother offered excuses for
missing these tests, the trial court, as the factfinder, was not required to believe
Mother’s testimony about why she missed these tests. Because Mother’s problems
with using meth were apparent from the time the trial court ordered the children
removed from Mother’s home, the trial court’s pre-trial orders also required that
Mother complete a drug treatment program. The record contains clear and
convincing evidence that Mother did not do so, so the trial court, as the factfinder in
the trial, had little reason to believe Mother’s testimony claiming she has the skills
she needs to stay off meth.
A report from Rebecca Tobin, the Court Appointed Special Advocate
(CASA), dated September 22, 2020, was admitted into evidence without objection
during the trial. The report reflects that Mother told Tobin she was planning to enter
a drug treatment program on September 14, 2020. The report also reflects however,
that as of September 22, Mother had not done so.
From the evidence before it about Mother’s use of drugs and the effects it has
had on Mother’s ability to parent, we conclude the trial court could form a firm
15
conviction that Mother has a history of abusing meth and her conduct would recur
should the children be returned to her care. Mother did not discontinue her use of
meth after the trial court removed the children from her home, nor did Mother obtain
treatment to deal with her desire to use meth. Based on the evidence relevant to
Mother’s use of drugs and failure to undergo a drug-abuse treatment program, the
trial court could form a firm belief or conviction that Mother engaged in deliberate
and conscious course of conduct that endangered the physical and emotion well-
being of her children.
One of the ways Mother’s parenting skills were affected by her drug use
involved the conditions the Department found the children in when the trial court
removed them from Mother’s care. All three children were suffering from health
issues. As the factfinder, the trial court could rely on that evidence to infer that the
health problems the children were suffering were tied to Mother’s neglect. Mother
failed to appear for several of her regularly scheduled visits after the children came
into the Department’s care, and this is additional evidence the trial court could
reasonably rely on to conclude Mother continued to engage in conduct after the
Department removed the children that are relevant to the trial court’s conclusion that
she is not a fit parent.
16
Deferring to the trial court’s role to decide what evidence is credible and to
weigh the evidence, we conclude the Department presented legally and factually
sufficient evidence that allowed the trial court to form a firm belief or conviction
and find Mother knowingly endangered Missy, Matt, and Nicole. We further
conclude the record contains legally and factually sufficient evidence to allow the
trial court to form a firm belief or conviction that Mother endangered the physical
and emotional well-being of Missy, Matt, and Nicole.34 The evidence demonstrating
how Mother cared for her children allowed the trial court to infer that Mother has
repeatedly placed her desire to use meth above providing her children with a safe,
stable and drug-free home. 35 While Mother testified she believed she could avoid
meth and other illegal substances and take care of her children, the trial court was
not required to believe her given the evidence showing she did not discontinue using
meth after the trial court removed the children from her home and failed to ever
complete a program designed to give her the skills she needs to abstain from using
illegal drugs.36
34
See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345.
35
See Toliver v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 217 S.W.3d 85, 98
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
36
See Vasquez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 190 S.W.3d
189, 195-96 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (terminating
parental rights even though the record contained no direct evidence to show the
parent’s continued drug use caused an actual physical injury to occur to the child).
17
We hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial
court’s subsection D and E findings.37 Because issue one and two lack merit, they
are overruled.38
In issues three, four, and five, Mother challenges the trial court’s findings that
rely on terminating her parental rights under subsections N, O, and P of the Family
Code. 39 But because we have overruled Mother’s first two issues, which challenge
the trial court’s D and E findings, we need not address issues three through five.40
Yet to resolve Mother’s appeal, we must address Mother’s sixth issue challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s best-interest finding.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence —the Best-Interest Finding
In Mother’s last issue, issue six, Mother argues the evidence is legally and
factually insufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. When the case
went to trial, Missy, Matt, and Nicole were seven, six and four years old. Upon being
removed from Mother’s care, the children exhibited various signs and symptoms
37
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at
266; In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d at 125; Edwards v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective &
Regulatory Servs., 946 S.W.2d 130, 138 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no pet.).
38
See In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Tex. 2014) (stating “clear and
convincing proof of any one ground will support a judgment terminating parental
rights, if similar proof also exists that termination is in the child’s best interest”).
39
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(N), (O), (P).
40
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (requiring the appellate court’s opinion to address
only those issues necessary to resolving the appeal).
18
attributable to their health. As the factfinder, the trial court could have inferred these
problems were tied to Mother’s neglect of their health. When Mother testified in the
trial, the only option she suggested she could provide for her children to live is the
home in which she was living with an unrelated adult male.
The trial court could have inferred Mother’s proposed placement was
unsuitable for several reasons. First, Mother has not completed a drug abuse program
in violation of the trial court’s orders requiring her to do so. Second, according to
Living, Mother lives in the home with an adult male and is unemployed. The
Department investigated the living arrangement to determine whether it might be a
suitable place for children to live. According to Living, the Department determined
the home is not suitable because the adult male living there told the Department that
he would not give up marijuana should Mother bring the children to his home. The
evidence before the trial court shows that Father is currently incarcerated, and
nothing shows that Father is willing or capable of assisting Mother with the expenses
of raising and housing children. The evidence also shows Mother and Father are not
married.
Both Living and Tobin, the CASA, testified they thought the children’s best
interest would be served by terminating Mother’s parental rights and appointing the
Department to be their permanent managing custodian. Tobin testified she tried to
19
find relatives where the Department could place the children, but she found none
who stated they were willing to take the children into their homes. According to
Living, she asked Mother whether the children had any relatives who might take
them into their homes. Mother refused to provide Living with any names. Living
also described that the children were currently living with foster parents in a foster
home. In that placement, according to Living, the foster parents have taken the
children to summer camp, the children are now reading, and the children have
improved significantly while they have been in the Department’s care. Living
testified: “As of right now[,] they are thriving.”
Deferring to the trial court’s role as the factfinder in the trial, we conclude the
evidence allowed the trial court to form a firm belief or conviction that terminating
Mother’s rights to Missy, Matt, and Nicole is in their best interest.41 For the reasons
explained above, Mother’s last issue is overruled.
Conclusion
We need not address issues three through five. Even if Mother could show in
her appeal the findings that are relevant to those issues are insufficient to support
them, matters we expressly do not reach, overturning these findings would not alter
41
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001(b)(2), 263.307(a); see also In re
J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72.
20
the outcome in Mother’s appeal.42 After Father’s court-appointed attorney filed his
brief, he filed a motion to withdraw. We deny the attorney’s motion. In parental-
rights termination cases, the duties of court-appointed counsel to the client continue
until the parent has either exhausted or waived the right to appeal from this Court’s
ruling.43 Should Father tell his attorney he wants to appeal, Father’s court-appointed
attorney may satisfy his obligations to Father “by filing a petition for review that
satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.”44
In conclusion, we find Father’s appeal is frivolous. We also conclude the
issues dispositive of Mother’s appeal—issues one, two, and six—lack merit. For
these reasons, the trial court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
_________________________
HOLLIS HORTON
Justice
Submitted on February 22, 2021
Opinion Delivered April 1, 2021
Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
42
Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
43
See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B) (Supp.); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d
24, 27 (Tex. 2016).
44
In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27-28.
21