Jerry J. Hoell, Jr. v. Jennifer Hoell ( 2012 )


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  •                                   NUMBER 13-11-00733-CV
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    JERRY J. HOELL JR.,                                                                       Appellant,
    v.
    JENNIFER HOELL,                                                                          Appellees.
    On appeal from the 156th District Court
    of San Patricio County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides
    This appeal involves a post-judgment clarification and enforcement of a divorce
    decree.       By two issues, 1 appellant Jerry J. Hoell (“Jerry”) asserts (1) that the
    challenged language of the decree is too indefinite to be enforced; and, in the alternative,
    1
    We consolidate Jerry’s related second and third issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
    (2) even if the provision is enforceable, the trial court erred in making its award. We
    affirm.
    I.      BACKGROUND2
    Jerry and Jennifer finalized their divorce on October 31, 2008 in San Patricio
    County.       Both parties represented themselves pro se in the underlying action. The
    final decree stated, in part:
    It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that [Jerry] provide
    monetary assistance for the period, not to exceed, two years starting in the
    month and year of November 2008 until September 2010. [Jerry] has
    agreed to supplement [Jennifer’s] income in order to alleviate the burden of
    sufficient funds needed to pay debts in both [Jennifer and Jerry’s] name.
    In March 2010, after more than one year of making monthly monetary assistance
    payments, Jerry filed a “Motion for Clarification” of the final decree and requested,
    among other things, that the trial court declare the above order void due to its
    vagueness.       Jennifer filed a response and argued that Jerry was in violation of the trial
    court’s initial order for failure to pay under the “monetary assistance” provision of the
    decree and requested that the trial court find Jerry in contempt and enforce the order.
    After a hearing, the trial court found that Jerry was in violation of the divorce
    decree and ordered him to pay Jennifer $8,767.56 pursuant to the “monetary assistance”
    provision as “an obligation in the nature of a debt.” Jerry appealed.
    II.    VALIDITY OF MONETARY ASSISTANCE PROVISION
    In his first issue, Jerry contends that the monetary assistance provision is too
    indefinite to make it enforceable.
    2
    Because this is a memorandum opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will not
    recite them here except as necessary to advise the parties of the Court’s decision and the basic reasons for
    it. See TEX. R. APP. 47.4.
    2
    1.       Applicable Law & Standard of Review
    The language of a divorce decree should inform the parties of their obligations,
    without calling upon conflicting inferences or conclusions.                      Kimsey v. Kimsey, 
    965 S.W.2d 690
    , 694 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, pet. denied) (citing Ex parte Slavin, 
    412 S.W.2d 43
    , 44–45 (Tex. 1967)).                A trial court has the authority to render a clarifying
    order setting forth specific terms to enforce compliance with the original order.                      See
    TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.008 (West 2006); 
    Kimsey, 965 S.W.2d at 695
    .
    We review whether a divorce decree is ambiguous de novo as a question of law.
    See Hagen v. Hagen, 
    282 S.W.3d 899
    , 901–02 (Tex. 2009). A decree is ambiguous if it
    is “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”                      Shanks v. Treadway, 
    110 S.W.3d 444
    , 447 (Tex. 2003). If the decree is ambiguous, the court should adopt the
    construction that correctly applies the law.                    
    Id. Furthermore, if
    the decree is
    ambiguous, courts must interpret it by reviewing both the decree and the record as a
    whole.       
    Hagen, 282 S.W.3d at 901
    .
    2.       Discussion
    We agree with Jerry’s argument insofar as holding that the initial divorce decree
    provision was ambiguous because it did not state a specific formula or monthly amount
    for which Jerry was responsible.3 See 
    Shanks, 110 S.W.3d at 447
    .                             As written, the
    decree allowed for multiple reasonable interpretations as to the amount of “monetary
    assistance” needed to sufficiently satisfy the couple’s debts.                     See 
    id. However, we
    decline to declare it void because doing so would substantively modify and remove an
    3
    In her brief, Jennifer also does not dispute the provision’s ambiguity.
    3
    obligation where one previously existed.4 See McGhee v. Epley, 
    661 S.W.2d 924
    ,
    925–26 (Tex. 1983) (recognizing that a trial court does not have the power to modify a
    final decree, only clarify it); Wright v. Eckhardt, 
    32 S.W.3d 891
    , 894 (Tex. App—Corpus
    Christi 2000, no pet.). Because the initial provision was vague, the trial court acted
    within its authority to clarify Jerry’s monthly obligations under the decree.                 See TEX.
    FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.008; 
    Kimsey, 965 S.W.2d at 695
    .                   Accordingly, the trial court did
    not err in clarifying the ambiguous decree, not ruling it void, and ordering it enforceable.
    See 
    id. Jerry’s first
    issue is overruled.
    III.    POST-DIVORCE JUDGMENT
    In his second issue, Jerry asserts that even if the monetary assistance provision is
    enforceable, the trial court erred because its judgment was not supported by the
    evidence.
    1.      Applicable Law
    A trial court may render a money judgment for damages caused by a party’s
    failure to comply with a divorce decree.         See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.010 (West 2006).
    In its judgment, a trial court may render this judgment in the amount on unpaid payments
    to which the party is entitled.         
    Id. § 9.010(b).
         This remedy is available when one
    spouse does not make payments as ordered in the divorce decree.                    See De la Garza v.
    De la Garza, 
    185 S.W.3d 924
    , 930 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.); Jenkins v. Jenkins,
    
    991 S.W.2d 440
    , 445 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied).
    2.      Discussion
    4
    Jerry’s reliance on Chavez v. McNeely to argue that the provision is indefinite is misplaced. See
    
    287 S.W.3d 840
    , 842 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.). The Chavez case involves a
    separate contractual agreement incorporated into the agreed divorce decree. See 
    id. at 842–43.
    The
    record shows no such separate agreement exists between the parties and that Jerry’s obligations were
    ordered.
    4
    Here, Jerry argues that Jennifer “did not present a scintilla of evidence” that the
    amount awarded ($8,757.56) was an amount owed to her. We disagree.                 Jennifer
    presented to the trial court a calculation of what was owed.     Jennifer’s calculation was
    based on a list of all monthly bills that she paid totaling $3,000.00 per month, less $1,100
    per month paid in child support and four $538.74 car payments made by Jerry in 2010.
    Based on her calculations, Jennifer presented evidence to the trial court of a
    monetary-assistance arrearage of $8,767.56. This figure includes credits and offsets
    from monthly child support payments as well as car payments and reduced monetary
    assistance payments.      Finally, further evidence was presented indicating that Jerry
    complied with the terms of the divorce decree until he encountered financial difficulties
    and was instructed by counsel to stop making such payments.
    Based on the evidence presented, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
    rendering its judgment in the amount of $8,767.56.     See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 9.010;
    De la 
    Garza, 185 S.W.3d at 930
    .     Jerry’s second issue is overruled.
    IV.    CONCLUSION
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    __________________________
    GINA M. BENAVIDES,
    Justice
    Delivered and filed the
    19th day of July, 2012.
    5