Susana Galvan Thompson v. Nicholas Alexander Thompson ( 2008 )


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  •                                 NO. 12-08-00006-CV
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
    TYLER, TEXAS
    SUSANA GALVAN THOMPSON,                          §           APPEAL FROM THE 294TH
    APPELLANT
    V.                                               §           JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
    NICHOLAS ALEXANDER THOMPSON,
    APPELLEE                                         §           VAN ZANDT COUNTY, TEXAS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Susana Galvan Thompson filed an application for a protective order seeking protection from
    her estranged husband, Nicholas Alexander Thompson. The trial court denied Susana’s application.
    In one issue, Susana complains that the trial court erred in finding it lacked jurisdiction over the
    application. We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
    BACKGROUND
    Susana and Nicholas are in the process of obtaining a divorce. Susana alleges that Nicholas
    committed family violence against her during the marriage. A magistrate issued an order for
    emergency protection prohibiting Nicholas from having contact with Susana and their two minor
    children. On June 18, 2007, Susana filed an application for a protective order to extend the time
    period that Nicholas would be enjoined from having contact with Susana and the children. The trial
    court set the hearing on the application for June 28, but Susana did not appear. The hearing on
    Susana’s application was reset for July 26.
    After the July 26 hearing, the trial court found that Susana had not attached a description of
    Nicholas’s future conduct requiring a protective order pursuant to section 82.0085(2) of the Texas
    Family Code. Further, the trial court determined that it had not conducted a hearing within fourteen
    days of the filing of Susana’s application pursuant to section 84.001(a) of the Texas Family Code.
    Thus, the trial court found that it lacked jurisdiction and denied Susana’s application. It also ordered
    mediation prior to the trial or final hearing, made temporary orders regarding custody and possession
    of the parties’ minor children, and ordered that if the parties could not come to an agreement before
    trial, they must submit to a home study. According to the record, Susana and Nicholas’s divorce
    remains pending. However, the record does not indicate the current trial setting or final hearing.
    Susana appeals from the trial court’s order denying her application.
    JURISDICTION
    In her sole issue on appeal, Susana argues that the trial court erred in finding the fourteen day
    hearing requirement in section 84.001(a) of the Texas Family Code to be jurisdictional. Nicholas
    contends that we lack jurisdiction to consider Susana’s appeal because the trial court’s denial of her
    application was an interlocutory order and thus, not appealable. We agree.
    Appellate courts have jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments and specific
    interlocutory orders designated appealable by the legislature. In re K.S.L.-C, 
    109 S.W.3d 577
    , 578-
    79 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2003, no pet.); see, e.g., TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE ANN . § 51.014(a)
    (Vernon 2008). A judgment is final for purposes of appeal if it disposes of all parties and issues.
    Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 
    39 S.W.3d 191
    , 195 (Tex. 2001); see also Wagner v. Warnasch, 
    295 S.W.2d 890
    , 892 (Tex. 1956) (“To be final a judgment must determine the rights of the parties and
    dispose of all the issues involved so that no future action by the court will be necessary in order to
    settle and determine the entire controversy.”). If an order does not dispose of all parties and all
    issues, the order is interlocutory and, generally, not appealable. In re 
    K.S.L.-C, 109 S.W.3d at 579
    .
    Unless we have specific statutory authority, we lack jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal. 
    Id. Here, Susana
    seeks review of an order that does not dispose of all parties or all issues. Susana
    thus requests review of an interlocutory order, rather than a final order. See 
    Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195
    . But the interlocutory order in this case is not the type of order that the legislature has
    provided specific statutory authority for us to review. See TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE ANN .
    § 51.014(a). Consequently, we are without jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order denying
    2
    Susana’s application for a protective order.
    DISPOSITION
    Having determined that we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss Susana’s appeal for want of
    jurisdiction.
    BRIAN HOYLE
    Justice
    Opinion delivered November 5, 2008.
    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.
    (PUBLISH)
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Document Info

Docket Number: 12-08-00006-CV

Filed Date: 11/5/2008

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021