in the Interest of N.A.A. and K.D.A., Children ( 2015 )


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  • AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed January 14, 2015.
    S
    Court of Appeals
    In The
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-13-01311-CV
    IN THE INTEREST OF N.A.A. AND K.D.A., CHILDREN
    On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District Court
    Collin County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 380-52696-06
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Francis, Evans, and Stoddart
    Opinion by Justice Evans
    Father 1 appeals from the trial court’s order granting Mother’s counter-petition to modify
    the parent-child relationship. Representing himself without an attorney, Father presents four
    issues in which he (1) challenges the order denying his motion to disqualify Judge Benjamin
    Smith of the 380th District Court, (2) asserts all orders rendered by Judge Smith after the denial
    of his motion to disqualify are void, (3) complains Judge Smith denied him access to the court by
    failing to timely set hearings for his motions, and (4) contends Judge Smith denied him due
    process by “failing to provide equal protection under the law” and “not enforcing the Texas
    Rules of Civil Procedure on both parties and holding [him] to a higher standard.” Mother did not
    file a brief on appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s order.
    1
    Rather than identify appellant and appellee by their full names, we refer to them as “Father” and “Mother”
    pursuant to section 109.002(d) of the family code. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (West 2014).
    BACKGROUND
    Father was divorced from Mother in 2007 pursuant to a decree rendered in the 380th
    District Court in Collin County, Texas. In 2012, he filed a petition in the same court to modify
    the custody and support provisions in the final divorce decree with respect to the two children of
    the marriage. Mother filed a counter-petition to modify the parent-child relationship. Father
    filed a motion to disqualify Judge Smith of the 380th Judicial District Court complaining of the
    court’s scheduling process and asserting he was denied due process because of his difficulty in
    obtaining hearing dates for his motions.2 Judge Smith signed an order referring the motion to the
    Presiding Judge of the First Administrative Region. The Regional Presiding Judge then assigned
    Scott Becker, active district judge of the 219th District Court in Collin County, Texas to hear and
    dispose of Father’s motion to disqualify. The assignment order also directed the clerk to post a
    copy of the assignment on the notice board so that attorneys and parties may be advised of the
    assignment. A hearing was set for 9:00 a.m. on March 6, 2013 in the 219th District Court. 3
    Father did not appear at the March 6 hearing and Judge Becker, sitting by assignment, signed an
    order denying the motion to disqualify and instructing all further proceedings take place before
    Judge Smith in the 380th District Court.
    On May 13, 2013, Judge Smith heard and granted Mother’s motion for sanctions, striking
    Father’s pleadings with prejudice to refiling. 4 Ultimately, Judge Smith signed a final order in
    favor of Mother on her second amended petition to modify. This appeal followed.
    2
    In his motion, Father asserted he was a crew member for an airline and needed special consideration for
    scheduling hearings.
    3
    Father acknowledges notice of the March 6 hearing in the 219th District Court was sent to him on or about
    February 28, 2013.
    4
    Father filed a motion for continuance on May 10, 2013 and did not appear at the May 13 hearing. The trial
    court denied Father’s motion for continuance and other filings at the May 13 hearing.
    –2–
    ANALYSIS
    In his first issue, Father contends the order denying his motion to disqualify is void as a
    matter of law because Judge Becker lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion.             Relying on
    Alexander v. Russell, 
    699 S.W.2d 209
    (Tex. 1985), Father argues that because the 380th District
    Court had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over this cause pursuant to section 155 of the Texas
    Family Code, the case could not have been transferred to any other court except by motion and
    transfer order. Alexander was an appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights. 
    Id. at 209.
    Although the termination proceedings were conducted in the 243rd District Court and the caption
    on the termination judgment read “243rd Judicial District Court,” the judgment was signed by
    the judge of the 327th District Court simply as “Judge.” 
    Id. The court
    reasoned the 243rd
    retained exclusive jurisdiction over the matter because there was no motion and order
    transferring the cause to the 327th District Court. 
    Id. at 210.
    The court further concluded that
    the record did not show that the judgment of termination was signed by a judge acting as judge
    of the 243rd District Court. 
    Id. The cause
    was therefore remanded to the 243rd District Court
    for a new trial. 
    Id. at 211.
    Father’s reliance on Alexander is misplaced for several reasons. First, the record here is
    clear that Judge Becker was only assigned to dispose of the motion to disqualify rather than hear
    the case on the merits. Moreover, the order denying the motion retained the cause number of the
    380th District Court and indicated Judge Becker was “sitting by assignment” rather than in his
    capacity as active judge of the 219th District Court when he signed the order. To the extent that
    Father argues the order is void because Judge Becker did not conduct the hearing in the
    courtroom of the 380th District Court in accordance with the Regional Presiding Justice’s
    assignment, our review of the assignment order does not support Father’s position as there is no
    requirement that the hearing physically take place in the 380th District Court. See also TEX.
    –3–
    GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.003(b)(6) (West Supp. 2014) (district judge in county having two or
    more district courts may “occupy the judge’s own courtroom or the courtroom of another district
    court in the county.”).
    Father also complains he was not given notice of the assignment in accordance with
    section 74.053 of the Court Administration Act. In relevant part, section 74.053 states:
    (a) When a judge is assigned to a trial court under this chapter:
    ***
    (2) the presiding judge shall, if it is reasonable and practicable and if time permits,
    give notice of the assignment to each attorney representing a party to the case that
    is to be heard in whole or in part by the assigned judge.
    TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.053(a)(2) (West 2013). The Regional Presiding Judge’s order of
    assignment required the clerk to post a copy of the assignment on the notice board to advise the
    parties and attorneys. There is no indication in the record that the order of assignment was not
    posted. Moreover, Father has not argued, or provided any legal authority suggesting, that posted
    notice of the assignment was inadequate under section 74.053. See Dishner v. Huitt-Zollars,
    Inc., 
    162 S.W.3d 370
    , 374 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). We resolve Father’s first issue
    against him. 5
    In his second issue, Father contends that because his motion to disqualify was not ruled
    upon by a court of competent jurisdiction, the motion is still pending and all subsequent orders
    signed by Judge Smith are void. In light of our disposition of Father’s first issue, this complaint
    necessarily fails. We therefore resolve Father’s second issue against him.
    Father’s third and fourth issues arguably assert that Judge Smith deprived him of certain
    constitutional rights. Father’s brief, however, contains no discussion or argument with respect to
    5
    Under this issue, Father also suggests the notice of the March 6, 2013 hearing was defective “for it failed to
    fully state the issue before the 219th District Court.” Because Father has failed to put forth any discussion with
    applicable legal authority to support this contention, we consider the complaint waived due to inadequate briefing.
    See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
    –4–
    these issues. The rules of appellate procedure require Father to state concisely his complaints
    and provide understandable, succinct, and clear argument for why his complaints have merit in
    fact and law, and cite and apply law that is applicable to the complaints being made along with
    appropriate record references. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1 (f), (h), and (i); Bolling v. Farmers
    Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 
    315 S.W.3d 893
    , 895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.). Because
    Father has wholly failed to present any argument with respect to his third and fourth issues, he
    has waived these complaints for appellate review. See 
    Bolling, 315 S.W.3d at 895
    .
    We affirm the trial court’s order.
    / David Evans/
    DAVID EVANS
    JUSTICE
    131311F.P05
    –5–
    S
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    IN THE INTEREST OF N.A.A. AND                         On Appeal from the 380th Judicial District
    K.D.A., CHILDREN                                      Court, Collin County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 380-52696-06
    No. 05-13-01311-CV                                    Opinion delivered by Justice Evans, Justices
    Francis and Stoddart participating.
    In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order in suit to
    modify parent-child relationship is AFFIRMED.
    It is ORDERED that appellee Lisa Ann Astalos recover her costs of this appeal, if any,
    from appellant Mitchell Kazu Astalos.
    Judgment entered this 14th day of January, 2015.
    –6–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-13-01311-CV

Filed Date: 1/19/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021