Juan Camacho v. State ( 2002 )

NO. 07-99-0460-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO

PANEL C

APRIL 12, 2002

______________________________



JUAN CAMACHO, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE



_________________________________

FROM THE 110^TH DISTRICT COURT OF FLOYD COUNTY;

NO. 3881; HONORABLE JOHN R. HOLLUMS, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before QUINN and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.

Appellant Juan Camacho appeals from his conviction for delivery of a controlled substance in an amount of more than one gram but less than four grams. He urges that the trial court erred in admitting a tape recording and in failing to sustain his challenge to a juror. He also urges that he had ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On January 23, 1998, Lubbock police officer Jonny Hutson was in Floyd County, Texas, acting as an agent for the South Plains Regional Narcotics Task Force. While in Floyd County, Hutson met with his informant, Martin Bueno. Hutson testified that he and Bueno discussed a plan for another Task Force agent, Manuel Reyna, to attempt to purchase cocaine from appellant using Bueno to introduce Reyna to appellant. Reyna and Hutson then equipped Bueno with a "wire" or transmitter, so that Hutson could monitor and record the conversation between Reyna and appellant.

After Reyna and Bueno first arrived at appellant's residence, Bueno spoke with appellant's wife. Reyna and Bueno then left appellant's residence and returned a few minutes later. Bueno then went inside appellant's residence with the money to make the buy. In the residence, Bueno asked appellant if he had the drugs. Appellant replied that he did, and asked Bueno for the money. Bueno gave appellant the money, and appellant gave Bueno the drugs. Bueno then left the residence and gave the cocaine to Reyna.

While Reyna and Bueno met first with appellant's wife, then with appellant, Hutson and another investigator were approximately a quarter of a mile east of appellant's residence, listening to and recording the conversations. After Bueno spoke with appellant's wife, Hutson rewound the tape. Later, when Bueno was inside appellant's residence, Hutson recorded the conversation between Bueno and appellant over the portion of the tape that had previously contained the conversation between Bueno and appellant's wife.

At trial, Bueno testified that the tape accurately recorded the conversation he had with appellant, and that there were no additions or deletions made to the tape as to the conversation between Bueno and appellant. Appellant objected to the admission of the tape recording on the grounds that the conversation between Bueno and appellant's wife had been recorded over and was not part of the recording offered. Appellant also objected based on the reliability and credibility of the recorded conversation with Bueno. The trial court admitted the recording over appellant's objection. The jury convicted appellant and assessed punishment at 15 years incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and a fine of $6000.

ISSUE ONE: THE TAPE RECORDING

By his first issue, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence a sound recording tape that appellant alleges was altered and was not a complete recording of the transaction. In support of this argument appellant relies heavily upon Edwards v. State, 551 S.W.2d 731 (Tex.Crim.App. 1977). Appellant cites no authority other than Edwards.

In Edwards, the Court of Criminal Appeals outlined a seven-step predicate for the admission of a sound recording into evidence. Edwards, 551 S.W.2d at 733. The Edwards court held that the following steps were necessary to test the admissibility of a sound recording: (1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony, (2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent, (3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording, (4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made, (5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording, (6) identification of the speakers, and (7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of inducement. Id.

As appellee's brief correctly notes, the Edwards test for admissibility of sound recordings has been superseded by Rule 901(a) of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See Tex. R. Evid. 901(a); ⁽¹⁾ Leos v. State, 883 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994); Schneider v. State, 951 S.W.2d 856, 862 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1997, no pet.). Rule 901(a) provides that "[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Rule 901(a).

Appellant does not argue that the sound recording admitted in his trial was inadmissible according to Rule 901(a), nor has appellant cited any other controlling case law or legal authority to support his argument. Failure to adequately brief the argument and provide relevant authority to support a particular issue waives the complaint. See Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 558 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995).

Moreover, we review a trial court's decision to admit evidence by the standard of abuse of discretion. See Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 101-02 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 390 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (op. on reh'g). A reviewing court should not reverse a trial judge's decision whose ruling was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Green, 934 S.W.2d at 102.

In this matter, Bueno testified that the recording accurately recorded the conversation he had with appellant, and that there were no additions or deletions made to the taped conversation. Appellant did not in the trial court and does not in his appellate brief point out any alleged erasures, alterations, unexplained gaps, errors or additions on the tape. Failing to preserve and offer into evidence the conversation between Bueno and appellant's wife does not alter the foundation proved as to the taped conversation actually offered and admitted. Even if appellant had not waived the issue, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the tape into evidence. See Schneider, 951 S.W.2d at 863. Appellant's first issue is overruled.

ISSUE TWO: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Appellant next alleges that he was denied effective assistance of counsel pursuant to the rights afforded him under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He bases his issue on counsel's voir dire of the jury panel when trial counsel failed to ask further questions of a veniremember whose response to a question indicated that he could not be an unbiased juror. When appellant's counsel was questioning the jury panel members on whether they could consider probation as a punishment for someone convicted of selling drugs, counsel asked the panel "All said and done, would you be able to do it, consider the evidence and not make up your mind until the end?" After another panel member answered the question, appellant's counsel said "Okay. Uh, thank you, Mr. Davis. Anybody else feel that way? Have a problem. Okay. Mr. Gilbreath." Gilbreath then stated, "I can't." Appellant's counsel then said "Okay. Mr. Gilbreath, what's your occupation?" Gilbreath replied, "Bus driver." Appellant's counsel asked no further questions of Gilbreath. Appellant urges that counsel's failing to follow up on Gilbreath's answer and then allowing Gilbreath to serve on the jury resulted in manifest harm because Gilbreath was, unquestionably, biased. We disagree with appellant's proposition.

We are obligated to follow United States Supreme Court precedent on matters of federal constitutional law. See Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 771 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). When confronted with an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we apply the two-pronged analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). See Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986).

Under the first prong of the Strickland test, an appellant must show that counsel's performance was "deficient." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. "This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. To be successful in this regard, an appellant "must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. Under the second prong, an appellant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. The appropriate standard for judging prejudice requires an appellant to "show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. Appellant must prove both prongs of Strickland by a preponderance of the evidence in order to prevail. See Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim. See McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996).

Assuming, arguendo, that appellant's trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness in failing to ask further questions of Gilbreath, appellant's suggestion that appellant was harmed because Gilbreath served on appellant's jury fails because it is not supported by the record. Appellant has not referred us to any part of the record to show that Gilbreath served on the jury. To the contrary, when the jury was polled following the reading of its verdict by the trial judge, the record reflects that Gilbreath was not one of the 12 jurors.

Because appellant's argument is predicated on the allegation that Gilbreath served on appellant's jury, and because this allegation is not supported by the record, appellant's argument fails the second prong of the Strickland test. Accordingly, appellant's second issue is overruled.ISSUE THREE: APPELLANT'S CHALLENGE OF

JUROR GILBREATH FOR CAUSE

By his third issue, appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling appellant's challenge of veniremember Gilbreath for cause. In urging this issue, appellant's brief states that appellant's counsel was presenting a list of peremptory strikes to the trial court when counsel brought Gilbreath's answer reflecting prejudice to the attention of the court. Appellant claims that he requested an additional peremptory strike with which to remove Gilbreath from the jury, the request was denied, and Gilbreath served as part of the jury.

In order to preserve error and demonstrate harm from the overruling of a challenge for cause, the appellant must show (1) that appellant exhausted all peremptory challenges, (2) the denial of a request for additional peremptory challenges, and (3) that an objectionable juror upon which appellant would have exercised a peremptory challenge actually served on appellant's jury. See Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 795 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986).

Appellant's suggestion that he was harmed by the trial court's overruling of appellant's challenge of Gilbreath for cause is based on his assertion that Gilbreath served on the jury. As we have previously noted, the record does not demonstrate that Gilbreath served on appellant's jury. Therefore, even assuming, arguendo, that the trial court erred in overruling a challenge for cause against Gilbreath, or in failing to grant another peremptory strike, appellant was not harmed in the manner he urges: Gilbreath did not serve on the jury. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). Appellant's third issue is overruled.

Having overruled appellant's three issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Phil Johnson

Justice

Do not publish.

1. Further reference to the Texas Rules of Evidence will be by reference to "Rule ____."

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NO. 07-08-00346-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL A

MAY 26, 2010

IN THE INTEREST OF B.L.M. AND C.D.M.,

 MINOR CHILDREN

 FROM THE 223RD DISTRICT COURT OF GRAY COUNTY;

NO. 34,251; HONORABLE LEE W. WATERS, JUDGE

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

G.D.M. (Father) and J.P. (Mother) are the parents of B.L.M. and C.D.M.  Through eight issues Father appeals the trial court=s order modifying a final decree of divorce.  We will affirm.

Background

Father and Mother were divorced in the Lubbock County Court at Law Number 3 by decree signed November 2, 1998.  The decree appointed Father and Mother joint managing conservators of B.L.M. and C.D.M. with Mother receiving the right to designate the primary residence of the children.  Father was ordered to make child support payments of $80 per week and provide health insurance.  Father and Mother were each ordered to pay fifty percent of any uninsured healthcare expenses. 

Mother remarried and moved from Lubbock County to Pampa in Gray County.  The record does not establish the date of her move.  On December 1, 2005, however, the Office of Attorney General filed a motion to transfer the case to Gray County.  On December 12, the Lubbock County Court at Law Number 3 heard a motion to modify the decree brought by Mother.  A resulting order was signed on January 13, 2006.  Among other things, the modification order required Mother to provide health insurance for the children and Father to pay Mother $80 per month medical support for the children. 

On February 15, 2006, the trial court signed a second modification order arising from the December 12 hearing.  It added to the January 13 order requirements affecting the amount of Father=s child support obligation.  Also on February 15, the trial court signed an order directing Father’s employer to withhold current support from Father’s earnings. 

On March 6, 2006, the case was transferred to Gray County.  On April 25, Mother, apparently appearing pro se, filed a motion entitled ACorrection and Justification for Motion to Modify.@ The pleading bears no signature or indication of service on Father.  Through it Mother requested modification or clarification of a prior order or orders.

Also on April 25, the transferee court signed an order bearing the printed heading AOrder in Suit to Modify-Parent Child Relationship.@ To this title, the trial judge added in longhand, ANunc Pro Tunc.@ The order granted some of the relief requested in Mother=s April 25 motion.  It altered Father=s support obligation based on what Mother alleged was a mathematical error in the February 15 order.  It also ordered Father pay fifty percent of uninsured healthcare expenses incurred for B.L.M. and C.D.M.  Contrary to a recital in the April 25 order, the record before us does not contain a modified order of withholding for support. 

On April 25, 2006, Mother also filed an unsigned motion requesting the trial court hold Father in contempt.  Father was not served with this motion until March 23, 2007.  Father answered and in August 2007 filed a motion to modify seeking appointment as sole managing conservator of the children. Also in August 2007, Mother, now represented by counsel, filed an amended motion to enforce child support.

Following a September 6, 2007, hearing the court signed a temporary order on November 27 providing that Father have primary custody of C.D.M. and Mother have primary custody of B.L.M.  The order specified “withholding orders directing [Father] to pay child support are modified effective September 21, 2007, to provide that child support be paid in the amount of $410.00 per month.  Credit for any overpayments shall be applied to future child support owed.” The order perpetuated the mutual obligation of the parties for payment of fifty percent of health care expenses not reimbursed by insurance.

On May 8, 2008, the court held a final hearing of the parties= pending motions.   Prior to the hearing, Mother and Father agreed that Father would be appointed managing conservator of C.D.M. and Mother would be appointed managing conservator of B.L.M.  After hearing the other matters raised, the trial court issued a letter ruling setting the child support obligations of Father and Mother, ordering Father reimburse Mother one-half of uninsured healthcare expenses incurred for the children, awarding attorney=s fees of $1,200 to Mother=s attorney, and taxing court costs against Father.  The letter ruling was formalized in an order signed June 30. Father timely filed a notice of appeal expressly challenging the June 30 order.

Discussion

In his second issue, Father argues the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court=s award to Mother of $850 for uninsured healthcare expenses.  In a finding of fact, the court found Mother incurred $1,700 of reasonable and necessary uninsured medical expenses for B.L.M. and C.D.M. and one-half this amount was the obligation of Father under an unspecified “previous order.”

We review a trial court=s ruling on a motion for enforcement under an abuse of discretion standard.  See In re M.K.R., 216 S.W.3d 58, 61 (Tex.App.BFort Worth 2007, no pet.) (reviewing trial court=s ruling on child support arrearages and payment of attorney=s fees under abuse of discretion standard); In re T.J.L., 97 S.W.3d 257, 265 (Tex.App.BHouston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (abuse of discretion standard applied in reviewing order enforcing payment of child=s healthcare expenses and uninsured medical expenses).  A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985). Under the abuse of discretion standard, the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are not independent grounds of error, but if implicated are relevant factors for determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.  Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex.App.BDallas, no pet.).  See also Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991). 

We review findings of fact for legal and factual sufficiency under the same standards applied on review of a jury=s findings.  Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994).

In determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding, crediting favorable evidence if a reasonable fact-finder could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact-finder could not.  City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 809 (Tex. 2005). 

When considering a factual sufficiency challenge of a finding on which the appellant did not bear the burden of proof, we first examine all of the evidence, Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp., 720 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex. 1986), and, having considered and weighed all of the evidence, set aside the verdict only if the evidence is so weak or the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust.  Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965).  The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight given their testimony.  Rego Co. v. Brannon, 682 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

The 1998 decree orders Father and Mother each Apay 50 percent of all reasonable and necessary health-care expenses not paid by insurance and incurred by or on behalf of the parties= child . . . .@ At the May 8, 2008 modification hearing, Mother presented evidence that she paid $1,700.37 in uninsured medical expenses for B.L.M. and C.D.M.  She testified that Father owed one-half this total.  The court admitted without objection an exhibit containing Mother=s calculations supporting the total and copies of medical bills for the children. Father did not challenge this evidence by cross-examination or direct evidence.

Father also argues under this issue that the January 13 and February 15, 2006, orders contain no language obligating him to pay one-half of uninsured medical expenses for the children.  Concerning these orders, this is correct.  But as noted, the 1998 decree fixed the obligation for payment of uninsured medical expenses and the record contains no order modifying this obligation.  Moreover, the orders of January 13 and February 15 each provide A[a]ll other terms of the prior orders not specifically modified in this order shall remain in full force and effect.@  A valid order thus existed obligating Father for payment of one-half any uninsured medical expenses incurred for B.L.M. and C.D.M.  We find in ordering reimbursement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  We overrule Father=s second issue.

By his fifth issue, Father contends the trial court failed to properly credit him for overpayment of child support under temporary orders. We review issues regarding payment of child support under the abuse of discretion standard.  Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990).  The November 27, 2007, temporary order provides in part, ACredit for any overpayments shall be applied to future child support owed [by Father].@ In its findings of fact and conclusions of law following the final hearing the trial court stated, AAny alleged overpayment of temporary child support was taken into account when awarding attorney=s fees to [Mother=s] attorney.@ Counsel for Mother sought attorney=s fees of $2,400.  The court awarded $1,200.  Under the facts presented, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by applying any credit due Father to the amount Father owed Mother=s attorney rather than to future child support payments.  We overrule Father’s fifth issue.

Through his sixth and seventh issues, Father contends the trial court ordered him to make excessive child support payments because it failed to find Mother was intentionally underemployed. 

If the actual income of a parent obligated to make child support payments is significantly less than what the parent could earn because of intentional unemployment or underemployment, the trial court may apply the support guidelines to the earning potential of the parent.  Tex. Fam. Code Ann. ' 154.066 (Vernon 2008). 

The evidence shows Mother held a cosmetology license but was unable to work in this trade because of a back injury.  The existence of the injury was not challenged.  The evidence further shows at the time of trial Mother held a part-time position for a school district transporting students twenty-seven miles between Pampa and Borger in a school district Suburban.  This position produced more income than Mother=s immediate past position with a drugstore.  On cross-examination, Mother testified she took the position with the school district to be at home with her children and for insurance benefits. Finally, the record does not show what Mother could earn under another employment scenario, such as practicing cosmetology with or without the limitations of a back injury.  Under these facts, the trial court acted within its discretion in finding Mother was not intentionally underemployed.  We, accordingly, overrule Father=s sixth and seventh issues.

By his third and fourth issues, Father argues the evidence did not support taxing him with costs of court and adjudging him responsible for payment of a portion of Mother=s attorney=s fees. The basis of the argument is neither party was Acompletely successful@ at the May 8 hearing.  Thus, Father contends, A[f]airness and equity dictate that each party should be responsible for their own attorney fees and court costs....@

The trial court has broad discretion to award attorney=s fees and costs under the Family Code.  See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. ' ' 106.001, 106.002 (Vernon Supp. 2008); Bruni v. Bruni, 924 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. 1996).  We accordingly apply an abuse of discretion standard on review of such awards.  Bruni, 924 S.W.2d at 368; In re M.A.N.M. 231 S.W.3d 562, 567 (Tex.App.BDallas 2007, no pet.).

Counsel for Mother testified that his fee in the case was $200 per hour which he believed reasonable.  He incurred twelve hours preparing for and trying the issues then before the court.  In his opinion, $2,400 was a reasonable fee for these services.  The court awarded Mother=s attorney a judgment of $1,200 against Father for attorney=s fees. It also taxed costs of court against Father.

At issue in the May 8 hearing were Father=s motion to modify, Mother=s motion to enforce, and Mother=s motion to sanction Father.  In his motion to modify, Father sought sole managing conservatorship of B.L.M. and C.D.M. or alternatively supervised visitation between the children and Mother. He also sought an order of child support, including healthcare coverage of the children, and attorney=s fees and costs.  Father contended Mother was intentionally underemployed.  Mother sought payment of fifty percent of uninsured healthcare expenses and medical insurance premiums for B.L.M. and C.D.M., a contempt citation, confinement of Father for contempt, modification of visitation exchange procedure, increased child support, a money judgment for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and attorney=s fees and costs.

Before the hearing, the parties agreed that each would have primary custody of a child.  Father=s support obligation increased based on his net resources.  But because of mother=s support obligation, net support due her decreased.  Father was ordered to reimburse Mother $850 for uninsured healthcare expenses.  Father was not, however, required to reimburse Mother for health insurance premiums. Father was not held in contempt nor sanctioned.  And Mother did not present her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Visitation was necessarily altered because of the primary custody agreement of the parties. 

The number and diversity of issues presented to the trial court with their concomitant differences in breadth and scope render it impossible to declare one party the Aprevailing party@ at the May 8 hearing.  A[I]n family law cases, it is not always so easy to determine who the prevailing party is.@  In re M.A.N.M., 231 S.W.3d at 566.  But determining the Aprevailing party@ in the trial court is unnecessary to our decision as attorney=s fees may be awarded even against the successful party in a family law case if based on the best interest of the child.  Nordstrom v. Nordstrom, 965 S.W.2d 575, 583 (Tex.App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied).  See In re A.M., 974 S.W.2d 857, 866 (Tex.App.BSan Antonio 1998, no pet.) (best interest of children is paramount in family law cases so that award of attorney=s fees and costs to prevailing party not always appropriate).  Here, in its findings of fact and conclusions of law issued after its June 30, 2008, final order, the court found Mother’s attorney’s fees were incurred “in relation to the children.” 

After review of the entire record, we are unable to say that the trial court abused its discretion by taxing attorney=s fees and costs against Father.  We overrule Father=s third and fourth issues.

In his first issue, Father complains that the April 25, 2006, order is not a proper judgment nunc pro tunc but the product of a judicial determination improperly modifying a prior final order.  He variously characterizes the April 2006 order as “void” and “voidable,” and appears to contend it forms the foundation for the June 30, 2008 order that is the subject of this appeal.

Although the April 2006 order addresses Father’s support obligation, by motions to modify filed during August 2007, Father and Mother continued litigating disputed issues including custody and support.  A September 2007 hearing produced an extensive temporary order affecting conservatorship, possession and access to the children, support, and payment of uninsured health care expenses of the children.  This order remained in place until the June 30, 2008, final order now on appeal. 

Assuming for the sake of argument the April 2006 order was improperly rendered, nothing before us demonstrates the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment on June 30.  See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1).  Father has not shown that error in the signing of the April 2006 order constitutes reversible error with regard to the present appeal.  Appellant’s first issue is overruled. 

Finally, although not designated an issue on appeal, Father requests remand of the case to Aa different court.@ The record contains no indication that Father challenged venue or sought a transfer in the trial court.^[1]  Absent presentation of the venue issue to the trial court and preservation of an adverse ruling, nothing is preserved for appellate review.  See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).  This issue is overruled.

Conclusion

Having overruled each of Father=s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                                                James T. Campbell

                                                                                                            Justice

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^[1] The Family Code provides the exclusive mechanism for challenging and transferring venue of suits affecting the parent-child relationship.  In re Leder, 263 S.W.3d 283, 286 (Tex.App.BHouston [1st Dist.] 2007, orig. proceeding).