Mateo Cortez, as Representative of the Estate of Deborah Cortez v. Sandra Flesher Brown, Charlotte Flesher Ash, Charlene Flesher Johnston, Connie Lou Keith Barry, Randall Wayne Davis, Virginia Villers, Charles Roberts, Lisa A. Smith, Patricia Chapman, Betty J. Marks Webb, James Berl Marks, Linda Murray ( 2017 )

ACCEPTED
03-17-00365-cv
21265641
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
12/13/2017 12:56 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
NO. 03-17-00365-CV
FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 12/13/2017 12:56:51 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
MATEO CORTEZ, AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF DEBORAH CORTEZ,
APPELLANT,
V.
SANDRA FLESHER BROWN; CHARLOTTE FLESHER ASH; CHARLENE FLESHER
JOHNSTON; CONNIE LOU KEITH BARRY; RANDALL WAYNE DAVIS; VIRGINIA
VILLERS; CHARLES ROBERTS; LISA A. SMITH; PATRICIA CHAPMAN; BETTY J.
MARKS WEBB; JAMES BERL MARKS; LINDA MURRAY; THOMAS WAYNE
MARKS; AND DONALD LEMAN WHITED,
APPELLEES.
Appeal from the Probate Court No. 1 of Travis County, Texas,
Trial Court Cause No. C-1-PB-16-002348
APPELLANT’S RESPONSE TO APPELLEES’ MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant Mateo Cortez, as Representative of the Estate of Deborah
Cortez, files this response to Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss for Want of
Jurisdiction, respectfully showing the Court as follows:
1
Appellees claim that, under a line of cases decided by this Court, the
Court lacks jurisdiction over Appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s
sanctions order and ask the Court to summarily dismiss that challenge.
Because this case is distinguishable from the cited cases on multiple planes,
dismissal is inappropriate. Appellees’ motion to dismiss should be denied.
I. The impropriety of the trial court’s severance order is a threshold issue
that this Court must determine.
Appellant Mateo Cortez is the representative of the estate of his
deceased wife, Deborah, the only child of decedents William and Phyllis Short
(who were the settlors of the trust made the subject of this litigation). As
Cortez has shown the Court, trustee Linda Murray, having invoked the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Texas probate court and insisted on a standstill
that precluded the Estate from proceeding until the joinder of all the
alternative claimed beneficiaries (more distant relatives of the Shorts,
including Murray), then improperly filed a separate suit for the trust assets in
a West Virginia court on behalf of these relatives.1 Appellant Br. at 6-8. With
the Estate’s hands tied and to her own benefit, Murray, as trustee, successfully
shut the Estate out of the second-filed West Virginia suit, obtained summary
1
The relatives, Third-Party Defendants in the Texas probate court below, have relabeled
themselves “the Heirs” in their multiple motions to this Court.
2
judgment for the relatives there, and then—on the back of that ruling—
Murray, as another claimant to the Trust, gained partial summary judgment
against the Estate on its claims to the trust (those asserted under trust Article
VIII, Paragraphs C and D) in the Texas suit. 3CR 2177-2178. Over the
Estate’s objections, the probate court granted severance of that partial
summary judgment. 3CR 2181-2183.
More than four (4) months after the West Virginia ruling, a month after
the Texas court’s partial summary judgment and severance, and a week after
the Estate noticed its appeal, the relatives (Third-Party Defendants below,
Appellees here) sought sanctions against the Estate’s counsel for advocating
in Texas the Paragraph D argument the West Virginia court had rejected. The
Texas probate court awarded sanctions nearly entirely based on the West
Virginia ruling, then tacked that sanctions ruling onto the wrongly severed
summary judgment. 3CR2663-2667.
As the Estate has demonstrated, the Texas trial court’s severance of
intertwined issues and parties was improper making the partial summary
judgment against the Estate interlocutory. Appellant’s Br. at 15-18. Until that
threshold issue is considered, this Court’s jurisdiction is limited to
determining the propriety of the severance. Dalisa, Inc. v. Bradford, 81
S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. App.— Austin 2002, pet. granted) appeal dism’d 03-
3
03-00230-CV, 2003 WL 21940024 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 14, 2003, no
pet.) (mem. op.). Complete review will establish the quagmire created by
allowing severance in this artificially truncated case.
If the trial court’s severance was improper, which it was, then none of
its rulings, including the sanctions order, are ripe for appeal. Any defect in
the notice of appeal regarding matters other than the severance order is moot.
Because the Court must address this threshold question only after full briefing
and argument, if any, summary dismissal of the sanctions issue is
inappropriate.
II. Cortez has standing to challenge the sanctions order.
The gravamen of standing is remediable harm. The controversy
underlying the probate court’s sanctions order is whether certain legal
positions regarding the subject trust are frivolous and untenable, a question
this Court is asked to address. As Appellant has demonstrated, the frivolous-
filing sanctions in this case were sought for the purpose of—and continue to
be used for—aggressively quelling the Estate’s advancement of good faith
legal interpretations of the Trust and attempting to drive a wedge between
Estate representative Mateo Cortez, a person of limited means, and his chosen
counsel. Appellant’s Br. at 39-40. Because of the procedural morass created
by Appellees’ cross-country gamesmanship, the error in the probate court’s
4
sanctions order has profoundly prejudiced Cortez’s interests across four courts
in two states. None of the cases cited by Appellees have involved such
injurious effects on a party as a result of attorney sanctions.
Having invoked the exclusive jurisdiction of the Texas probate court
and gained a standstill of the Estate’s prosecution of its claims to the Trust,
Linda Murray and the other Appellee third-party defendants who stand to
personally gain from defeating the Estate then (1) filed a duplicative action in
West Virginia; (2) successfully shut the Estate out of the West Virginia action
and obtained a partial summary judgment against Mateo Cortez, individually,
but purporting to implicate and bind the Estate; (3) rushed to obtain a partial
summary judgment and severance against the Estate in Texas to get a quick
final order; (4) used the interlocutory West Virginia order to gain sanctions
against the Estate’s attorneys in Texas (after the severed final order in the
Texas trial court was rendered and appealed); and (5) used the Texas sanctions
order against the Estate’s attorneys to seek West Virginia sanctions against
the Estate, Cortez, and his attorneys (again asking for sanctions after there was
a final order in the West Virginia trial court). Appellant’s Br. at 8-12, 37-38;
App. C and E.
In addition to actively leveraging interlocutory rulings in the dual
proceedings, at every turn, Appellees have brandished the Texas sanctions
5
order (which wrongly found frivolous interpretation of only one aspect of the
Trust, Paragraph VIII, D) as a threat to Cortez unless he drops all his claims
and appeals in all courts in all capacities, including claims that were not
subject to either the Texas or West Virginia court’s summary judgments and
sanctions orders.
As only some examples of this ongoing aggressive and offensive use of
the probate court’s erroneous sanctions order, the following filings and
communications are in the records of the Texas and West Virginia courts:2
1. Letter from opposing counsel stating to Cortez, “on February 10,
2017, Judge Guy Herman [found] that the claims you filed against
my client were frivolous and/or unwarranted…The purpose of this
letter [sic] to demand that Mateo Cortez and/or the Estate of
Deborah Cortez immediately withdraw any and all claims to the
Trust Assets…I wish to now make clear that if you and/or your
client, Mateo Cortez (either personally or as representative of the
Estate of Deborah Cortez) do not immediately withdraw any and all
claims to the Trust Assets, then I will take appropriate action to: (a)
seek additional sanctions against your firm and (b) seek sanctions
against Mr. Mateo Cortez personally” 3CR 2798-2800;
2. Letter from opposing counsel stating to Cortez, “[t]he course of
action you are pursuing in West Virginia has already been found by
the Texas court to be frivolous as a matter of law…If [Cortez] is
unwilling to do the right thing and dismiss his frivolous claims to
2
This Court may take judicial notice of the court records in the West Virginia proceeding
and Appellant respectfully asks that it do so. See TEX. R. EVID. 201(b)(2); Freedom
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Coronado, 372 S.W.3d 621, 623 (Tex. 2012); WorldPeace v. Comm’n
for Lawyer Discipline, 183 S.W.3d 451, 489 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet.
denied)).
6
the Trust, then my client has authorized me to aggressively pursue
sanctions against [Cortez]” App. A at p. 2;
3. Connie Lou Keith Barry’s Motion for Leave to File Surreply to Give
Notice of Developments Relating to the Texas Litigation filed in
West Virginia litigation to sway the court against Cortez stating,
“purpose of the surreply would only be to provide this Court with
supplemental authority from the Texas litigation, to wit; the
[Sanctions order]” App. B at p. 1;
4. Connie Lou Keith Barry’s Response in Opposition to Motion to
Intervene and Request for Sanctions filed in West Virginia litigation
using the sanction order to defeat Cortez’s motions, arguing that
Cortez is rearguing “the same ridiculous and insupportable legal
theories that led to sanctions against his lawyers in Texas” and
seeking, on this basis, to dismiss all of Cortez’s motions before the
court and “all of his other frivolous claims for relief” and sanction
his attorneys. App. C at p. 4;
5. Connie Lou Keith Barry’s Response in Opposition to Cortez’s Post-
Judgment Motion to Dismiss filed in West Virginia litigation citing
extensively language of the Texas trial court’s sanctions order then
asking that for the same reasons stated in her Response in
Opposition to Motion to Intervene and Request for Sanctions. App.
D at p. 5;
6. Linda Murray’s, in her capacity as the trustee, Response to the
Motion to Intervene filed by the Estate of Deborah Cortez using the
sanction order to support the denying the Estate’s intervention into
the West Virginia case, which was successful. App. E at pp. 5-6.
7. Based upon the pleadings of Linda Murray and Connie Barry, the
West Virginia Court denied all of Mateo Cortez’s and the Estate of
Deborah Cortez’s motions on June 27, 2017. App. F at p. 2.
8. Memorandum in Support of Defendant Connie Lou Keith Barry’s
Motion for Sanctions filed in West Virginia against Cortez
individually and in his capacity as personal representative of the
7
Estate of Deborah Cortez relying heavily not only upon the
sanctions order itself, but upon the transcripts from the sanctions
hearing. App. G. Specifically, Barry requests that the trial court
follow the Texas trial court’s lead of awarding sanctions and do the
same in West Virginia (against Mateo Cortez, individually and as
representative of the Estate and all of his attorneys). App. G. at pp.
17 and 22; and
9. Barry’s sanctions motion has survived a final judgment under Sally-
Mike. App. G, Paragraph 11. Each of the combined final orders
state explicitly that the trial court’s final orders do not address, moot,
or otherwise dispose of the sanction motion. See Ruling in: App.
H at p. 13; App. I at pp. 9-10; and App. J at pp. 13.
The West Virginia case in now before the West Virginia Supreme
Court, see Appellant’s Br. at 11. But unless the Estate is able to challenge and
overturn the Texas trial court’s sanctions order, West Virginia law, under
Sally-Mike, leaves Cortez at ongoing risk of personal, representative, and
attorney sanctions based on the Texas trial court’s erroneous finding that the
Estate’s Paragraph D claim is frivolous and untenable as the trial court in West
Virginia has deferred his ruling on the sanctions.
Although it may, in some instances, be the case that sanctions against a
party’s attorney implicates only the attorney’s interests,3 the injurious effects
of the probate court’s sanctions order here seriously impact Appellant’s
3
White v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-08-00411-CV, 2008 Tex. App.
LEXIS 9508 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 22, 2012, no pet.) (finding no jurisdiction over
party’s appeal of district court order denying recovery of appointed attorney’s fees, which
appellant equated to sanctions).
8
important procedural and substantive due process rights and cannot be
divorced from the monetary harm to his attorneys. Because Cortez has a
sufficient relationship with the sanctions challenge to have a justiciable
interest in the outcome and because his interests are gravely prejudiced by the
error in the probate court’s judgment, he has standing to appeal the sanctions
order. Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005);
Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 843 (Tex. 2000). Thus, even if
the Court’s jurisdiction were not initially limited by the severance challenge,
see Sec. I, supra, because Appellant has alleged and demonstrated unique
harm that further distinguishes this case from the Court’s prior opinions, full
review and analysis is warranted and summary dismissal is inappropriate.
There is no prejudice to Appellees in requiring them to brief and argue this
issue—they have done so on multiple occasions in the lower courts of two
states.
III. Even if Cortez lacked standing, his second notice of appeal
sufficiently invoked this Court's jurisdiction to permit correction to
include Brotherton
Even if this Court’s jurisdiction were not initially limited by the
severance challenge (Sec. I) and even if the sanctions order did not so
injuriously implicate Appellant’s interests (Sec. II), Appellant believes that
9
his second notice of appeal is, at worst, curably defective and sufficient to
imbue this Court with jurisdiction over the sanctions challenge.
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.1(b) states that:
The filing of a notice of appeal by any party invokes the appellate
court’s jurisdiction over all parties to the trial court’s judgment
or order appealed from. Any party’s failure to take any other step
required by these rules, including the failure of another party to
perfect an appeal under (c), does not deprive the appellate court
of jurisdiction but is ground only for the appellate court to act
appropriately, including dismissing the appeal.
Subsection 25.1(g) permits amendment of a notice of appeal in order to correct
a defect or an omission even after the opening brief has been filed. TEX R.
APP. P. 25.1(g). The liberal provisions for amending a notice of appeal are in
keeping with the Texas Supreme Court’s decisions that a party should be
allowed to amend its perfecting documents if that party makes a bona fide
attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Walker v. Blue Water
Garden Apartments, 776 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tex. 1989); Woods Explor. &
Prod. Co. v. Arkla Eq. Co., 528 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Tex. 1975).
If an “appellant timely files a document in a bona fide attempt to invoke
the appellate court’s jurisdiction, the court of appeals, on appellant’s motion,
must allow the appellant an opportunity to amend or refile the instrument
required … to perfect the appeal” even if “the appellant filed the wrong
instrument” in a misguided attempt to perfect an appeal. Grand Prairie Sch.
10
Dist. v. Southern Parts, 813 S.W.2d 499, 500 (Tex. 1991)(per curiam); Sweed
v. Nye, 323 S.W.3d 873, 874–875 (Tex. 2010)(“this Court has consistently
held that a timely filed document, even if defective, invokes the court of
appeals’ jurisdiction”). The rule allowing a bona fide attempt to invoke
jurisdiction is based on the principle that “the decisions of the court of appeals
[should] turn on substance rather than procedural technicality” Blankenship v.
Robins, 878 S.W.2d 138, 139 (Tex. 1994)(per curiam); Verburgt v. Dorner,
959 S.W.2d 615, 616–617 (Tex. 1997)(“appellate courts should not dismiss
an appeal for a procedural defect whenever any arguable interpretation of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure would preserve the appeal”).
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals recently addressed a circumstance
where the trial court sanctioned an attorney, but not the attorney’s client. St.
Mina Auto Sales, Inc. v. Al-Muasher, 481 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied). The notice of appeal named only the client.
Approximately two and a half months later, after the deadline to file a motion
for new trial had passed but before the appellant’s brief was due, the attorney
amended the notice of appeal to add himself. Id. at 666.
The Houston Court of Appeals concluded that, pursuant to Rule 25.1(b),
because one of the parties to the trial court’s judgment filed a notice of appeal,
the appellate court had jurisdiction over all the parties to the judgment.
11
Accordingly, the court had jurisdiction over the attorney’s appeal, and could,
within its discretion, hear the attorney’s appeal. Id. at 666 (“Any party’s
failure to take any other step required by these rules, including the failure of
another party to perfect an appeal…does not deprive the appellate court of
jurisdiction but is grounds only for the appellate court to act appropriately,
including dismissing the appeal.”). The court of appeals concluded that the
rule eliminates any jurisdictional bar to the consideration of a late-filed notice
in which at least one of the parties has appealed the trial court’s order or
judgment. Id.
Here, the probate court’s eleventh-hour sanctions ruling was not a
stand-alone order, but rather was embedded in the probate court’s amended
judgment. 3CR2663-67. In addition, Mateo Cortez, as representative of the
Estate of Deborah Cortez, Cortez’ counsel, William Brotherton and the
Brotherton Law Firm, are parties to the appealed amended order and
judgment. One of those parties, Cortez, filed a second amended notice of
appeal specifically to include the sanctions order. 3CR2668-70 and App. K at
p. 4.
Under Rule 25.1, this Court thus has jurisdiction to exercise its
discretion to allow correction of the second amended notice of appeal to
expressly include William J. Brotherton and the Brotherton Law Firm. The
12
criteria justifying such leave are present—Brotherton timely made a bona fide
attempt to invoke the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over the sanctions order,
and Appellees can demonstrate no surprise or prejudice by allowing the issue
to be determined on the merits, rather than a technicality. Appellant formally
seeks the Court’s leave to file a corrected notice via motion for leave filed
contemporaneously with this response.
We recognize and respect that this Court has reached a different result
than the St. Mina opinion by concluding in Sluder v. Ogden, No. 03-10-00280-
CV, 2011 WL 4424294 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. denied) that a
sanctioned attorney must file a separate notice of appeal to invoke appellate
jurisdiction. We also acknowledge that the Court has applied this holding in
subsequent similar cases.4 Because the Texas Supreme Court has expressly
refrained from ruling on this specific issue5 and because the circumstances of
this case are unique, we urge the Court to apply Rule 25.1 to find jurisdiction
over the sanctions issue. In any event, given the complexities of this case,
summary dismissal is inappropriate.
4
Berger v. Flores, No. 03-12-00415-CV, 2015 WL 3654555 (Tex. App. —Austin, June
12, 2015, no pet.); White v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-11-00394-
CV, 2012 WL 593529 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 22, 2012, no pet.); Bahar v. Baumann, No.
03-09-00691-CV, 2011 WL 4424294 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 23, 2011, pet. denied).
5
Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 928 n.6 (Tex. 1991) (“We express no opinion on the
question whether, in order to seek review of sanctions by appeal, an attorney must perfect
a separate appeal apart from that perfected by his client.”).
13
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
The procedural posture and unique circumstances of this case
distinguish it from the authorities relied on by Appellees. Because the
severance challenge initially limits the Court’s jurisdiction, because Cortez
has alleged and demonstrated harm requiring at least the Court’s
comprehensive standing analysis, and because Cortez’s second notice of
appeal sufficiently invoked the Court’s jurisdiction over the sanctions issue to
permit correction to include Brotherton, Appellees’ motion to summarily
dismiss Appellant’s sanctions challenge should be denied. At most, the
motion should be carried with this appeal to permit complete review and
development of the appellate record to allow proper presentation to the Texas
Supreme Court on further appeal, if any.
14
Respectfully submitted,
BROTHERTON LAW FIRM
By: /s/ William J. Brotherton
William J. Brotherton
State Bar No. 00789989
Shawn M. Brotherton
State Bar No. 24064956
BROTHERTON LAW FIRM
2340 FM 407, Suite 200
Highland Village, TX 75077
Phone: 972-317-8700
Fax: 972-317-0189
Susan S. Vance
State Bar No. 24036562
susan@svancelaw.com
SUSAN VANCE LAW PLLC
201 W. 5th Street, Suite 1100
Austin, Texas 78701
Phone: 512-736-7295
Fax: 866-523-5449
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
15
I. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant’s
Response to Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss for Want of Jurisdiction was
forwarded, on this 13th day of December, 2017, to the following:
Amanda G. Taylor Craig Hopper
Beck Redden LLP Brian T. Thompson
515 Congress Avenue, Suite 1900 Claire D. East
Austin, TX 78701 400 W. 15th Street, Suite 408
Austin, TX 78701
Attorneys for Appellees: Linda Lou Marks Murray, individually; Charlene
Rae Flesher Johnston; Charlotte Fae Flesher Ash; Sandra Kay Flesher
Brown; Thomas Wayne Marks; James Berl Marks; Betty J. Webb; Patricia
A. Chapman; Lisa A. Smith; Charles Bruce Roberts, Jr., Virginia Ann
Roberts Villers; Randall Wayne Davis; Sherry Lynn Whited Salsbury; Terry
Lee Whited; Michael Ray Whited; Donald Leaman Whited; and Connie Lou
Keith Barry
/s/ William J. Brotherton
William J. Brotherton
16