Bruce Wayne Suza v. State ( 2018 )

Opinion issued June 14, 2018
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-17-00116-CR
———————————
BRUCE WAYNE SUZA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 412th Judicial District Court
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 77839-CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Bruce Wayne Suza appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual
assault of a child under 14 years old. In three issues, Suza argues (1) the evidence
was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence of an extraneous offense; and (3) the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing the complainant’s mother to testify as the outcry witness
because she was not the first adult to whom the complainant reported the sexual
assault. We reject each of Suza’s arguments and affirm.
Background
Suza was charged with aggravated sexual assault of L.S., a child under 14
years old, and the case proceeded to trial.
L.S., who was six years old at the time of trial, testified that about a year before
trial, when he lived with his father and his grandfather (Suza), Suza touched his
private part with Suza’s hand and mouth.1 According to L.S., this happened “a lot.”
When asked what his private part was, L.S. responded “[m]y wee.”
Wade Nichols, an Investigator with the Brazoria County Sheriff’s Office, also
testified. He explained that, in November 2015, Christian Suza reported the sexual
assault of her son, L.S. Nichols obtained a written statement from Christian, which
the State submitted into evidence. Nichols also made an appointment at the
Children’s Advocacy Center for L.S. and his siblings. Nichols reached out to Suza
and asked to meet with him. Suza initially agreed but later changed his mind. At
trial, the State introduced a voicemail Suza left for Nichols. In it, he denied touching
1
Before L.S. testified, the trial judge met with L.S. in his chambers. The trial judge
asked L.S. the difference between a truth and a lie and he asked L.S. to promise to
tell the truth in the courtroom. L.S. agreed.
2
L.S., but noted that he put L.S. under a blanket, naked, while he washed L.S.’s
clothes.
Kristi Belloumini, the Director of the Brazoria County Alliance for Children,
testified that she met with L.S. and conducted a forensic interview. Belloumini
testified that L.S. became visibly uncomfortable during the “disclosure” portion of
the interview, he avoided eye contact, started looking around the room, and tried to
change the subject.
Dr. Angela Bachim, a pediatrician with a specialization in child abuse
pediatrics, testified that she examined L.S. in November 2015. Dr. Bachim noted
that L.S. exhibited symptoms that showed he was under a lot of stress. Those
included decreased appetite, diarrhea and constipation, nausea, and, according to his
mother, weight loss. He also developed secondary enuresis—he began urinating in
his bed despite being potty-trained.2
After reviewing her notes (which were admitted into evidence), Dr. Bachim
testified that she asked L.S. if he knew why he was there that day, and L.S. responded
“My grandpa sucked my wee wee. My grandpa told me to take off all my clothes
and that’s all.” When she asked L.S. how many times this had occurred, L.S.
responded “Six. I know because I counted every day.” Dr. Bachim testified that L.S.
2
Dr. Bachim testified that it was not unusual for children who were victims of sexual
abuse to “have accidents.”
3
became withdrawn at that point. L.S. also told her that his grandfather touched his
bottom. Dr. Bachim examined L.S. and there were no injuries to L.S.’s genitals or
his anus. She noted, however, that the findings from the exam were not inconsistent
with the reported abuse because both anal and penile injuries were rare, particularly
with regard to the reported abuse. Dr. Bachim confirmed that L.S. told her directly
about the abuse and the information he provided was clear and consistent.
A. Outcry Witness
The State designated L.S.’s mother Christian as an outcry witness, and the
trial court held a hearing outside of the jury’s presence to determine the admissibility
of Christian’s testimony. In that hearing, Christian testified that, in October 2015,
her children—L.S. and his two sisters—moved back in with her after living with
their father, Troy, and paternal grandfather, Suza. In November 2015, Christian
obtained a restraining order to keep Troy away from her and her residence. Christian
testified that because she was unable to obtain a restraining order with regard to the
children, but had one for herself and her home, she decided to pull the children out
of school and homeschool them to keep their father away from them.
As to the abuse, Christian testified that when she told L.S. that she was going
to keep him home, he said that he did not “want to go back to Dad’s house.” When
Christian asked him why, L.S. said that he did not “want to see Grandpa and Dad”
and that he did not “like being over there.” L.S. then told her: “Grandpa likes to suck
4
on [my] wee wee.” Christian testified that she asked him whether he was sure and
understood what he was saying, and L.S. responded that he knew what he was saying
and that it had happened. He stated that Grandpa (Suza) would also touch him on his
bottom and make L.S. sleep naked with him. L.S. stated generally that he had told
his father, but his father “patted him on the head and smiled at him and walked
away.” Christian testified that she was the “first adult that . . . he shared the entire
story with.” Christian then went to the police, reported Suza, and completed a written
statement that the State offered into evidence.
Following Christian’s testimony outside of the jury’s presence, the State
moved to have her declared an outcry witness under section 38.072. Suza’s counsel
did not object and stated that he had no response. The trial court permitted Christian
to testify as an outcry witness and she offered similar testimony before the jury.
B. Extraneous Offense
The trial court also held a hearing outside of the jury’s presence to determine
the admissibility, under article 38.37 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, of
evidence of sexual assault of another child. This evidence concerned an allegation
by a minor, D.C., that Suza had abused him.
At the hearing, Scott Eldridge, a former criminal investigator with the
Chambers County Sheriff’s Office, testified that, in 2010, he was assigned to an
investigation focused on a complaint by a minor child, D.C., against Suza. Suza lived
5
with D.C.’s mother for a period of time and watched D.C. when his mother was
away.
Eldridge stated that in the course of his investigation, he contacted Suza. Suza
denied touching D.C. in a sexual way and initially told Eldridge that he only touched
D.C. to make sure D.C. did not urinate in the bed. Elridrge obtained two statements
from Suza, and the State offered these statements into evidence and read them on
the record. In his first statement, Suza stated that D.C. slept with him at times and
sometimes D.C. wanted Suza to rub his stomach or his back. Suza stated, “if I
touched him I didn’t know. I was sleeping hard.” In his second statement, Suza
stated that D.C. pulled down his own pants exposing himself, saying it hurts. Suza
stated that the next night, D.C. touched Suza’s genitals. Suza further averred that he
“would never touch any kid like this sexually.” Eldridge testified that the case
eventually got dismissed. He did not know why.
D.C., who was 16 years old at the time, also testified at the hearing. He averred
that Suza lived with his family in 2010, when D.C. was nine years old, and Suza
slept in a bed in his room. D.C. stated that Suza would rub his stomach and make
him rub Suza’s, which made D.C. uncomfortable. One day, Suza began touching
D.C.’s genitals in a rubbing motion underneath his clothes. D.C. testified that this
occurred more than once, but he could not remember the exact number of times.
6
Suza’s counsel objected to the admission of evidence of these extraneous acts
on the ground that the State had not presented sufficient evidence to establish the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Counsel argued that the State had not met its
burden of establishing that the alleged contact was done “with intent to arouse and
gratify sexual desire,” an element of indecency with a child.
Overruling the objection, the trial court concluded that evidence of the
extraneous offense was admissible. The judge stated on the record that “the evidence
likely to be admitted will be adequate to support a finding by the jury that he
committed the separate offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Suza’s counsel also
objected to the presentation of the evidence on due process grounds, but the trial
court overruled his objection.
The trial court gave the following limiting instruction to the jury:
You are instructed that if there is any evidence before you
concerning alleged offenses against a child under 17 years
of age other than the Complainant alleged in the
indictment, such offense or offenses, if any, may only be
considered if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that
the Defendant committed such other offense or offenses,
if any, and then you may consider said evidence for any
bearing the evidence has on relevant matters, including the
character of the Defendant and acts performed in
conformity with the character of the evidence.
D.C. and Eldridge then reiterated their testimony before the jury. On cross-
examination before the jury, D.C. testified that charges against Suza concerning his
allegation were dropped after D.C. told his mother that the abuse did not happen.
7
The jury convicted Suza of aggravated sexual assault of a child and assessed
punishment at 45 years’ imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. Suza appeals, raising
three issues.
Discussion
Suza offers three arguments on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence
of an extraneous offense; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the
L.S.’s mother Christian to testify as the outcry witness because she was not the first
adult to whom the complainant reported the sexual assault. We address each in turn.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first issue, Suza asserts that insufficient evidence supports his
conviction. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review
We review the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict and then determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.
3d 621, 624–25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). This standard of review allows a jury to
resolve fact issues and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. Thomas v.
State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). The jury is the sole judge of witness
credibility and weight to be attached to witness testimony, and when the record
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supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved the conflicts in
favor of the verdict and we defer to that determination. Id.
In a sufficiency inquiry, direct and circumstantial evidence are equally
probative. Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Not every
fact presented must directly indicate the defendant is guilty, so long as the
cumulative force of the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt. Nowlin v.
State, 473 S.W.3d 312, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).
2. Applicable Law
A person commits aggravated sexual assault of a child if, among other things,
he intentionally or knowingly causes the sexual organ of a child to contact or
penetrate the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the actor.
TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii).
The testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for
sexual abuse. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07(a). Uncorroborated outcry
testimony regarding the child’s disclosure of the sexual assault also suffices to
support a conviction. Eubanks v. State, 326 S.W.3d 231, 241 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d).
3. Analysis
Suza contends that a rational trier of fact would not have found, beyond a
reasonable doubt, the essential elements of aggravated sexual assault of a child.
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Specifically, he contends that the following evidence overwhelmingly outweighs
any evidence of abuse: (1) Suza denied the molestation to Deputy Nichols, (2) L.S’s
mother was engaged in a custody battle that, he argues, “compromised L.S.’s
testimony,” and (3) because the charge concerning D.C.’s allegation was dismissed,
D.C.’s testimony was unreliable.
We disagree and conclude that sufficient evidence supported the conviction.
The jury, as the trier of fact, was the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses
and was free to accept or reject all or part of the witnesses’ testimony. See Diaz v.
State, 125 S.W.3d 739, 743–44 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003 pet. ref’d).
As explained above, the complainant, six-year-old L.S., testified that Suza
repeatedly touched his private part with Suza’s hand and mouth. This testimony
alone could have been sufficient to support Suza’s conviction. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 38.07(a); Gonzales v. State, 522 S.W.3d 48, 57 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (uncorroborated testimony of child victim alone was sufficient
to support conviction of aggravated sexual assault of child); Johnson v. State, 419
S.W.3d 665, 671–72 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (same).
And this case included other evidence as well. For instance, L.S.’s mother
Christian, who was designated as the outcry witness, testified that L.S. informed her
of the abuse, including “Grandpa likes to suck on his wee wee.” Her testimony also
10
supports the conviction. See Eubanks, 326 S.W.3d at 241 (outcry testimony
regarding child’s disclosure of the sexual assault suffices to support a conviction).
Moreover, Dr. Bachim testified that L.S. told her about the abuse (“My
grandpa sucked my wee wee” six times). She stated that the symptoms L.S. suffered
showed he was under a lot of stress, and she noted that the details L.S. provided were
clear and consistent. Evidence also came in on which the jury could have concluded
that Suza committed a similar offense against nine-year-old D.C.
Based on the evidence presented and viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict, as we must, we conclude that a rational jury could
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Suza committed the offense with which
he was charged. See, e.g., Gonzales, 522 S.W.3d at 57; Eubanks, 326 S.W.3d at 241.
We overrule Suza’s first issue.
B. Admissibility of Evidence of Extraneous Offense
In his second issue, Suza argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting D.C.’s testimony regarding Suza’s extraneous offense because, Suza
argues, the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
offense had occurred. We find no abuse of discretion.
1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse
of discretion standard. Torres v. State, 71 S.W.3d 758, 760 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
11
A trial court’s ruling will not be reversed unless it falls outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement. Id.
An extraneous offense is “any act of misconduct, whether resulting in
prosecution or not, that is not shown in the charging papers.” Rankin v. State, 953
S.W.2d 740, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (emphasis omitted). In general, extraneous
offense evidence may not be admitted “to prove a person’s character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” See
TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(1); Batiste v. State, 217 S.W.3d 74, 84 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
The Legislature has specifically carved out an exception to this general rule,
however, for certain crimes against children. Article 38.37 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure provides:
[n]otwithstanding Rules 404 and 405, Texas Rules of Evidence, and subject
to Section 2-a, evidence that the defendant has committed a separate offense
described by subsection (a)(1) or (2) may be admitted in the trial of an alleged
offense described by subsection (a)(1) or (2) for any bearing the evidence has
on relevant matters, including the character of the defendant and acts
performed in conformity with the character of the defendant.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37, § 2(b) (emphasis added). We interpret statutes
according to their plain language, and this provision expressly permits the
introduction of evidence—including the type of evidence at issue here—for any
bearing the evidence has on relevant matters, including to show that the defendant
acted in conformity with his character.
12
The statute also provides that, “[b]efore [such] evidence . . . may be
introduced, the trial judge must (1) determine that the evidence likely to be admitted
at trial will be adequate to support a finding by the jury that the defendant committed
the separate offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) conduct a hearing out of the
presence of the jury for that purpose.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37, § 2-a.
2. Analysis
Suza does not dispute that the trial judge held a hearing outside of the jury’s
presence and determined that the evidence was adequate to support a finding by the
jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Suza committed the separate offense against
D.C. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.37, § 2-a. Suza instead argues that the
evidence was insufficient to support the trial judge’s determination. In particular,
Suza contends that because D.C. at one point recanted his accusation against Suza,
the jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Suza committed the
extraneous offense.3 We disagree.
3
To the extent that Suza argues that evidence of the extraneous offense against D.C.
should not have been admitted because it was overly prejudicial, he does not provide
any reasoning or authority in support of this argument. The court may exclude
otherwise relevant and admissible evidence under Texas Rule of Evidence 403 if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 403; Alvarez v. State, 491 S.W.3d 362, 370
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref'd). A trial court is afforded discretion
in determining whether evidence is admissible under Rule 403, Alvarez, 491 S.W.3d
at 370; Burke v. State, 371 S.W.3d 252, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011,
pet. dism’d), and we presume that the probative value of this evidence outweighs
any prejudicial effect. Burke, 371 S.W.3d at 257. On this record and in light of
13
The testimony of a child victim—here, D.C.—is alone sufficient to support a
finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a person committed sexual abuse. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.07(a); see also Gonzales, 522 S.W.3d at 57; Johnson, 419
S.W.3d at 671–72. As detailed above, before the judge (and then jury), D.C. testified
that, when he was nine years old and living with Suza, Suza touched his genitals in
a rubbing motion underneath his clothes. D.C. affirmed that he had sworn under oath
to tell the truth, and he reiterated that Suza touched him inappropriately.
In addition to D.C.’s testimony about the extraneous offense, Scott Eldridge,
a former criminal investigator with the Chambers County Sheriff’s Office, testified
about his investigation. The judge (and then jury) were shown Suza’s statements, in
which Suza denied touching D.C. “sexually,” but asserted that D.C. exposed his
genitals to Suza and that D.C. touched Suza’s genitals.
Despite this evidence, Suza argues that a fact finder could not have concluded,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that he committed the offense because D.C. at one point
in the past offered a conflicting story of what happened (recanting his accusation).
But the judge and jury were presented with all facts, including D.C.’s current
testimony about the offense and the fact that he had previously recanted. They were
article 38.37, we cannot conclude that Suza has overcome this presumption. See
Alvarez, 491 S.W.3d at 370 (noting Rule 403 does not allow “a trial court to exclude
otherwise relevant evidence when that evidence is merely prejudicial” and rule
“should be used sparingly,” only when prejudicial effects substantially outweigh
probative nature of evidence).
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free to judge credibility and determine whether—taken in sum—adequate evidence
supported a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Suza committed the separate
offense against D.C. See, e.g., Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991) (child complainant’s recantation of earlier testimony that appellant had
sexually abused her did not destroy probative value of her earlier testimony; trier of
fact could choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by
parties).4
We overrule Suza’s second issue.
C. Designation of Outcry Witness
In his third issue, Suza contends that the trial court improperly designated
L.S’s mother Christian as the outcry witness because she was not the first person to
4
See also Flores v. State, No. 05–16–00576–CR, 2017 WL 3033414, at *10 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Jul. 18, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(rejecting sufficiency challenge to conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a
child because “[t]o the extent [the victim’s] testimony was inconsistent and/or vague
regarding the details surrounding the offense, this concerned her credibility as a
witness, which was a matter for the jury in its role as the sole judge of the weight
and credibility of the evidence”); Gregg v. State, No. 05–16–00557–CR, 2017 WL
2334239, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 26, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (Jury’s decision to believe child sexual assault victim
who recanted and then reasserted accusations during trial was not
unreasonable); Moody v. State, 545 S.W.3d 309, 314 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017,
pet. ref’d) (“[I]nconsistencies” in testimony of child sexual assault victim “do not
automatically lower evidence below the required standard”); Eubanks, 326 S.W.3d
at 241 (“[W]hen a witness recants prior testimony, it is up to the fact finder to
determine whether to believe the original statement or the recantation”).
15
whom L.S. reported the sexual assault. Because Suza did not object below, he did
not preserve this issue for our review.
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure 38.072, the outcry statute, provides that a
child abuse victim’s statement to another is not inadmissible hearsay if the statement
describes the alleged offense and the person to whom the statement is made is at
least 18 years old and is the first person the child informed about the offense. TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.072; see also Garcia v. State, 792 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990) (en banc); Carty v. State, 178 S.W.3d 297, 305 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d). In general, the proper outcry witness is the first
adult to whom the alleged victim relates the “how, when, and where” the abuse took
place. See Reyes v. State, 274 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, pet.
ref’d). There can be only one outcry witness per event. Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d
137, 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Broderick v. State, 35 S.W.3d 67, 73–74
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. ref’d)). But the Court of Criminal Appeals has
held that if the child offers only a “general allusion” of sexual abuse to a first person,
and he offers a more detailed account to a second person, the second person may be
the proper outcry witness. Garcia, 792 S.W.2d at 91 (“The statute demands more
than a general allusion of sexual abuse” so trial court did not abuse its discretion in
designating child protective specialist as outcry witness where record was devoid of
specific details of statement previously made to child’s teacher).
16
“When the State offers an out-of-court statement pursuant to article 38.072 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a defendant must object to the statement to
preserve error for appellate review.” Rosas v. State, 76 S.W.3d 771, 776–77 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (citing Holland v. State, 802 S.W.2d 696,
699–700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). Failure to object waives the complaint on appeal.
Id. at 777.
Because Suza did not object to the designation of Christian as the outcry
witness, he has not preserved this issue for appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Rojas,
76 S.W.3d at 776–77; see also Davis v. State, No. 14-08-00985-CR, 2010 WL
2573813, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 29, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (appellant’s reliability objection to witness’s
outcry testimony did not preserve error regarding whether witness was first adult to
whom outcry was made); Martinez v. State, 822 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1991, no pet.) (where appellant failed to complain at trial that outcry
witness was not first person over 18 to whom the child described the incident, issue
was not preserved for appeal).
Accordingly, we overrule Suza’s third issue.
17
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jennifer Caughey
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Bland, Lloyd, and Caughey.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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