Stephanie Celine Stewart v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services ( 2010 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NOS. 2-09-341-CV
2-09-343-CV
S.C.S. AND K.J.S. APPELLANTS
V.
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND APPELLEE
PROTECTIVE SERVICES
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FROM THE 158TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellants K.J.S. and S.C.S.2 appeal from the trial court’s denial of their
motions for disclosure of information from Child Protective Services (CPS)
1
… See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2
… Because minors are involved in this appeal, we identify all parties by
initials only. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 109.002(d) (Vernon 2008).
records.3 Appellants contend the trial court erred in finding that the disclosure
of the CPS records is not essential to the administration of justice. We will
affirm.
3
… The Texas Public Information Act (“TPIA”) requires public disclosure
of government documents and information upon request, with exceptions. Tex.
Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 552.101–.106 (Vernon 2004), §§ .107–.108 (Vernon
Supp. 2009), §§ .109–.115 (Vernon 2004), §§ .116–.1176 (Vernon Supp.
2009), § .118 (Vernon 2004), § .119 (Vernon Supp. 2009), §§ .120–.131
(Vernon 2004), § .132 (Vernon Supp. 2009), §§ .1325–.136 (Vernon 2004),
§§ .137–.142 (Vernon Supp. 2009), §§ 552.021, 552.221 (Vernon 2004). A
person seeking such documents and information may file suit for a writ of
mandamus or an action for a declaratory judgment against a governmental body
for violating the TPIA. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 552.321, 552.3215 (Vernon
2004).
Section 261.201 of the Texas Family Code excludes CPS documents and
information relating to an investigation of child abuse or neglect from public
release under the TPIA. Tex. Fam. Code § 261.201(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
This section establishes a specific procedure by which such documents and
information may be disclosed upon motion and specific findings by a trial court.
See Tex. Fam. Code § 261.201(b) (Vernon Supp. 2009). We find that, in this
case, this procedure was followed, and the trial court had jurisdiction to order
whether the confidential CPS documents and information Appellants requested
should, or should not, be disclosed.
In addition, an order which purports to dispose of all issues and all parties
is a final appealable order. State v. Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex.
1995); Normand v. Fox, 940 S.W.2d 401, 403 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no
writ); Jobe v. Lapidus, 874 S.W.2d 764, 765 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ
denied). In a final judgment, no further action by the trial court will be
necessary to settle and determine the entire controversy. Normand, 940
S.W.2d at 403; Retana v. Tanner, 869 S.W.2d 669, 670 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1994, no writ). Here, the trial court’s August 5, 2009 orders denying
Appellants’ motions appear to be final. Thus, we conclude that we have
jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.220
(Vernon Supp. 2009) (delineating the jurisdiction of appellate courts).
2
II. BACKGROUND
On June 17, 2009, K.J.S., a self-employed family physician, and his
fiancée, S.C.S., a self-employed, board-certified nurse practitioner, filed
separate motions for disclosure of information from a CPS investigation
conducted shortly after K.J.S. refused his former mother-in-law’s request to
shorten his 2008 Christmas visitation with his four-year-old daughter. The CPS
investigation concerned allegations of sexual abuse of K.J.S.’s daughter and
S.C.S.’s five-year-old son by Appellants, as well as allegations that S.C.S.
negligently supervised her son.4 CPS determined the allegations of abuse and
negligent supervision by Appellants to be “ruled out.”
CPS also conducted an investigation of Appellants in Carter County,
Oklahoma,5 in which the allegations were “ruled out.” Both investigations
occurred during K.J.S.’s extended visitations with his daughter.
At the July 29, 2009 hearing, Appellants testified that they sought the
release of confidential information to determine whether criminal action, civil
action, or both should be taken against the person making these “false reports.”
Both testified that if the allegations became public, it would damage their
4
… Appellants lived together at the time of the allegations and the CPS
investigation.
5
… Although the record is unclear, we assume that the Oklahoma child
welfare authorities conducted this investigation.
3
medical practices. Appellants also stated they believed the release of the
information was essential to the administration of justice and was not likely to
endanger anyone involved.
Following the hearing, the trial court conducted an in camera review of
the CPS records and denied both motions. The trial court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law included the following:
3. Disclosure of the report and the identity of the person making
report is not essential to the administration of justice. 6
4. Disclosure would not be likely to endanger the life or safety of
the children, the person who made the report, or any other person
participating in the investigation.
5. Disclosure would tend to stifle reports in the future in this case.
Appellants timely filed a notice of appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
In two points, Appellants contend that the trial court (1) erred by not
finding the disclosure of CPS records essential to the administration of justice
and, thereby, (2) abused its discretion by denying their motions.
A. Standard of Review
To determine whether a trial court abused its discretion, we must decide
whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or
principles; in other words, we must decide whether the act was arbitrary or
6
… This statement also appears as the trial court’s sole conclusion of law.
4
unreasonable. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Cire v.
Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004). An appellate court cannot
conclude that a trial court abused its discretion merely because the appellate
court would have ruled differently in the same circumstances. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex. 1995); see also Low,
221 S.W.3d at 620. An abuse of discretion does not occur when the trial court
bases its decisions on conflicting evidence. In re Barber, 982 S.W.2d 364, 366
(Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding). Furthermore, an abuse of discretion does not
occur as long as some evidence of substantive and probative character exists
to support the trial court’s decision. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d
198, 211 (Tex. 2002).
B. Trial Courts Have Limited Discretion to Order Disclosure of Records
of Alleged Child Abuse or Neglect
Section 261.201(a) of the Texas Family Code designates the following
information as confidential:
(1) a report of alleged or suspected abuse or neglect made under
this chapter and the identity of the person making the report; and
(2) except as otherwise provided in this section, the files, reports,
records, communications, audiotapes, videotapes, and working
papers used or developed in an investigation [of alleged abuse or
neglect].
Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 261.201(a).
5
Section 261.201(b) of the Texas Family Code provides that a court may
order the disclosure of confidential information if:
(1) a motion has been filed with the court requesting the release of
the information;
(2) a notice of hearing has been served on the investigating agency
and all other interested parties; and
(3) after hearing and an in camera review of the requested
information, the court determines that the disclosure of the
requested information is:
(A) essential to the administration of justice; 7 and
(B) not likely to endanger the life or safety of:
(i) a child who is the subject of the report of alleged or
suspected abuse or neglect;
(ii) a person who makes a report of alleged or
suspected abuse or neglect; or
(iii) any other person who participates in an
investigation of reported abuse or neglect or who
provides care for the child. 8
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 261.201(b).
The exception allowing the trial court to disclose confidential information
under section 261.201 is discretionary. In re Fulgium, 150 S.W.3d 252, 253
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, orig. proceeding). The word “may” creates
7
… This term is not defined by statute.
8
… Section 261.201(b) also requires that a motion is filed with the court
requesting the release of the information and that a notice of hearing is served
on the investigating agency and all other interested parties. Here, the parties
do not dispute that a motion was filed seeking the release of the CPS records,
that a proper notice was given to the investigating agency and all interested
parties, and that a hearing was held to determine whether or not, and to what
extent, the CPS records should be disclosed.
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discretionary authority. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.016 (Vernon 2005). If
a hearing determines that the disclosure of the information is essential to the
administration of justice and there is no danger to the child or another person,
a court may order the disclosure at its discretion. Fulgium, 150 S.W.3d at
255.
C. Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in finding that the disclosure
of the report and the identity of the person making the report is not essential
to the administration of justice. Specifically, Appellants contend that disclosure
is essential to determine if civil or criminal action should be taken against the
person who made these “false reports.” However, Appellants point us to no
case law or statute providing that dismissed or “ruled out” complaints of child
abuse are automatically deemed false and without merit. Plus, the family code
merely requires that suspected, not confirmed, child abuse be reported. See
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 261.101(a) (Vernon 2008) (“A person having cause to
believe that a child’s physical or mental health or welfare has been adversely
affected by abuse or neglect by any person shall immediately make a report as
provided by this subchapter.”).
7
Citing Frost v. State, 9 Appellants argue that this information should be
disclosed because this is a false report, making a false report is a crime, and
“CPS does not want to be used as a tool for false and vindictive actions.” 2
S.W.3d 625, 631 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). In Frost,
CPS conducted a thorough investigation, CPS concluded no basis for the report
existed, and a jury convicted appellant of making a false report. Id. at 626,
628. However, neither Frost nor the record supports Appellants’ contention
that this case involves a false report. CPS conducted an investigation and,
unlike in Frost, evidently determined that a basis for the report existed because
the record is devoid of evidence of pending criminal prosecution. Agreeing with
Appellants that CPS’s “resources are limited and they do not need or want to
spend their resources on false allegations,” we further note that the aggrieved
agency, CPS, saw no need to prosecute in this instance.
Confidentiality is central to the family code provisions governing the
reporting of child abuse, and the State has a compelling interest in protecting
the confidentiality of information used or obtained in an investigation of alleged
or suspected child abuse. Doe v. Tarrant County Dist. Attorney’s Office, 269
9
… We note that Appellant’s reliance on this case is questionable because
Frost does not even mention the release of confidential information under family
code section 261.201.
8
S.W.3d 147, 155 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.); see Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57, 107 S. Ct. 989, 1001 (1987) (describing compelling
interest in protecting child-abuse information).
After holding a hearing and conducting an in camera review of the
confidential information, as required by section 261.201(b) of the Texas Family
Code, the trial court made a finding of fact that “[d]isclosure of the report and
the identity of the person making the report is not essential to the
administration of justice.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 261.201(b)(3) (Vernon
Supp. 2009). Having reviewed the briefs, the record, and the materials from
the CPS investigation, we find that the trial court could have reasonably
determined that the disclosure of the CPS records was not essential to the
administration of justice. With the required due deference to the trial court’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law, as well as the restrictions on the
disclosure of the confidential information contained in the CPS records, we
decline to cite specific facts and find that the trial court did not err in
determining that the disclosure of the information is not essential to the
administration of justice.
Because we find no error in the trial court’s disclosure determination, we
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellants’
9
motion for disclosure of the CPS records under section 261.201 of the Texas
Family Code. Thus, we overrule Appellants’ two points.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Appellants’ two points, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
ANNE GARDNER
JUSTICE
PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.
WALKER, J. concurs without opinion.
DELIVERED: July 22, 2010
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