Enriquisinger Garcia v. State ( 2020 )


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  • AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed December 4, 2020
    In the
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    No. 05-19-01378-CR
    ENRIQUISINGER GARCIA, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court
    Collin County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 296-80082-2018
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Myers, Osborne, and Carlyle
    Opinion by Justice Carlyle
    A jury convicted appellant Enriquisinger Garcia of two counts of indecency
    with a child by contact and assessed punishment at eighteen years’ imprisonment for
    each conviction. On appeal, Mr. Garcia contends the trial court abused its discretion
    by ordering that his sentences run consecutively. We affirm in this memorandum
    opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
    A trial judge generally has discretion to order sentences to run consecutively
    or concurrently. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.08(a); see Revels v. State, 
    334 S.W.3d 46
    , 54 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (citing Nicholas v. State, 
    56 S.W.3d 760
    , 764 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d)). “A trial court abuses
    its discretion when it applies an erroneous legal standard or when no reasonable view
    of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion under the correct law and facts
    viewed in the light most favorable to its legal conclusion.” 
    Nicholas, 56 S.W.3d at 764
    . “As a practical matter, however, an abuse of discretion [regarding sentence
    cumulation] generally will be found only if the trial court imposes consecutive
    sentences where the law requires concurrent sentences, where the court imposes
    concurrent sentences but the law requires consecutive ones, or where the court
    otherwise fails to observe the statutory requirements pertaining to sentencing.”
    Id. at 765.
    “In short, so long as the law authorizes the imposition of cumulative
    sentences, a trial judge has absolute discretion to stack sentences.” Id.; accord Byrd
    v. State, 
    499 S.W.3d 443
    , 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); see also Barrow v. State, 
    207 S.W.3d 377
    , 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“The Legislature has charged the trial
    court with the determination of whether to cumulate, and the trial court is free to
    make this determination so long as the individual sentences are not elevated beyond
    their respective statutory maximums.”).
    Here, both sentences were within the allowed statutory punishment range of
    two to twenty years. Mr. Garcia appropriately acknowledges in his appellate brief
    that “[t]he law does not require concurrent sentences” in this case. In his single issue
    on appeal, he asserts the trial court nevertheless abused its discretion by ordering his
    sentences to run consecutively because “the court offered no reason nor referred to
    –2–
    any principle of law” in rejecting his trial counsel’s objection that cumulating his
    sentences violated “the US Constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
    punishment” and constituted an inadequate “gauging” of “proportionality.”
    According to Mr. Garcia, the trial court’s decision to run the sentences consecutively
    was “arbitrary” in that it was “without explanation or justification” and left his
    arguments “unaddressed.”
    Mr. Garcia cites no authority requiring a trial court to provide an explanation
    or justification for cumulating sentences and we have found none. See Gomez v.
    State, No. 05-10-00574-CR, 
    2011 WL 209303
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 25,
    2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting contention that
    trial court abused discretion by not articulating reasons for cumulating sentences);
    see also 
    Barrow, 207 S.W.3d at 382
    (“We do not believe that the legislatively
    endowed, normative decision whether to cumulate sentences exceeds that level of
    discretion that the Supreme Court has always recognized as consistent with due
    process.”). We decide Mr. Garcia’s issue against him and affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    /Cory L. Carlyle/
    CORY L. CARLYLE
    JUSTICE
    Do Not Publish
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
    191378F.U05
    –3–
    Court of Appeals
    Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
    JUDGMENT
    ENRIQUISINGER GARCIA,                         On Appeal from the 296th Judicial
    Appellant                                     District Court, Collin County, Texas
    Trial Court Cause No. 296-80082-
    No. 05-19-01378-CR          V.                2018.
    Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  Justices Myers and Osborne
    participating.
    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
    AFFIRMED.
    Judgment entered this 4th day of December, 2020.
    –4–
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-19-01378-CR

Filed Date: 12/4/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/9/2020