Ex Parte D.K. ( 2021 )


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  •              In the
    Court of Appeals
    Second Appellate District of Texas
    at Fort Worth
    ___________________________
    No. 02-20-00304-CV
    ___________________________
    EX PARTE D.K.
    On Appeal from the 213th District Court
    Tarrant County, Texas
    Trial Court No. D213-E-16934-20
    Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    I. Introduction
    Appellant D.K., appearing pro se, appeals from the trial court’s expunction
    order. Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her a
    hearing and by granting only a partial expunction because the expunction order
    drafted by the State allegedly omitted two respondents—the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation and Local News Only.        We hold that the trial court followed the
    statutory directives for notifying the FBI to return all records and files subject to the
    expunction order. As to the expunction order’s omission of Local News Only, the
    State concedes, and we hold that the expunction statute mandates that, under the facts
    presented here, Appellant should have been granted a hearing to determine whether
    Local News Only is an agency that should have been included as a respondent in the
    expunction order.      Appellant’s remaining arguments, which raise claims of
    discrimination and ineffective assistance of counsel, are not relevant to establish the
    statutory bases for expunction. Based on these holdings, we affirm the trial court’s
    expunction order except with respect to its failure to hold a hearing on the
    unchallenged request that Local News Only be included in the expunction order; as to
    that issue only, we reverse and remand for the trial court to hold a hearing solely to
    determine whether Local News Only should be included among the respondents
    listed in the expunction order.
    2
    II. Background
    In 2017, Appellant was arrested in Grapevine and charged with the offense of
    criminal trespass.    Appellant’s charge was quashed or dismissed because she
    completed a pretrial intervention program authorized by Texas Government Code
    Section 76.011. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 76.001(4), 76.011.
    In 2020, Appellant filed a petition for expunction of her criminal records.
    Later that same year, Appellant filed an amended petition for expunction in which she
    listed law enforcement agencies and public entities that she had reason to believe had
    files or records related to her arrest and that were subject to expunction. Among the
    agencies and entities that she listed, Appellant included the FBI and Local News Only.
    The record does not contain an answer filed by the State.1
    The trial court set a pretrial conference for October 29, 2020, but before that
    conference could occur, the trial court signed an order granting the expunction on
    September 10, 2020. The order sets forth a chart listing the respondents, but that
    chart does not list Local News Only or the FBI. However, the paragraph following
    the chart listing the respondents sets forth the following related to the FBI:
    PETITIONER HAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT BY INPUT
    INTO THE NATIONAL CRIME INDEX COMPUTER[,] THE
    FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION MAY HAVE
    STORED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE ARREST FOR
    WHICH THIS PETITION IS BEING BROUGHT. WHILE THESE
    FEDERAL AGENCIES ARE NOT “RESPONDENTS” IN THE
    STATE PROCEEDINGS, PURSUANT TO TEX. CODE CRIM.
    1
    The State’s brief notes, “The State did not oppose the expunction request.”
    3
    PROC. ANN. ART. 55.02, § 3(a), THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF
    PUBLIC SAFETY SHALL FORWARD THE FINAL ORDER
    EMANATING FROM THE STATE PROCEEDINGS TO THE FBI.
    Nowhere in the expunction order is Local News Only mentioned.
    Following the entry of the expunction order, Appellant perfected this appeal.
    III. Analysis
    In her amended brief, Appellant does not set forth a list of numbered issues. 2
    Throughout her brief, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
    omitting the FBI and Local News Only from the expunction order’s list of
    respondents and that she was denied a hearing at which she could have had the
    opportunity to explain how Local News Only had discriminated against her on the
    basis of race and sex. She also briefly notes how appointed counsel failed to provide
    her with effective assistance of counsel.      We will address each of Appellant’s
    arguments in turn.
    A.     Standard of Review
    We have recently set forth the standard of review for expunction orders as
    follows:
    2
    On multiple dates, Appellant attempted to file a reply brief but failed to serve
    her reply brief on the Tarrant County District Attorney’s Office. We notified
    Appellant multiple times that she had not properly served her reply brief on the
    Tarrant County District Attorney’s Office, and we gave her an opportunity to comply
    with our orders, warning that her failure to comply would result in striking her reply
    briefs and proceeding without a reply brief from her. Appellant did not comply, so
    we proceed solely on her amended brief.
    4
    We review a trial court’s expunction ruling for an abuse of discretion.
    [Ex parte] Green, 373 S.W.3d [111,] 113 [(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012,
    no pet.)]. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to
    any guiding rules or principles. Id. To the extent an expunction ruling
    turns on a question of law, we review the ruling de novo because a trial
    court has no discretion in determining what the law is or in applying the
    law to the facts. Id. Thus, if a trial court misapplies or misinterprets the
    law, it abuses its discretion. Id.
    Ex parte C.A., No. 02-19-00434-CV, 
    2021 WL 832649
    , at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
    Mar. 4, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.).
    B.     Applicable Law
    The Dallas Court of Appeals has succinctly summarized the applicable law on
    when expunction hearings are required:
    Article 55.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure governs the
    procedural requirements related to an expunction of criminal records.
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. [Ann.] art. 55.02. Expunction is a civil matter
    even though the statutory authority for it is in the code of criminal
    procedure. Ex parte E.H., 
    602 S.W.3d 486
    , 489 (Tex. 2020) (“Although
    the expunction statute appears within the code of criminal procedure, an
    expunction proceeding is civil in nature.” [(]citing State v. T.S.N., 
    547 S.W.3d 617
    , 619 (Tex. 2018))[)]. “Because an expunction proceeding is
    civil rather than criminal in nature, the petitioner bears the burden to
    prove all statutory requirements have been satisfied.” Ex [p]arte Enger,
    
    512 S.W.3d 912
    , 914 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.)
    (citing Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. J.H.J., 
    274 S.W.3d 803
    , 806 (Tex.
    App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.)). To provide a petitioner an
    opportunity to meet his burden of proof, the expunction statute
    explicitly requires the trial court to set a hearing and to give reasonable
    notice to each official, agency, or government entity which was named in
    the petition seeking an expunction of criminal records. See [Tex. Code
    Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.02,] § 2(c). Section 2(c) specifically provides[,]
    The court shall set a hearing on the matter no sooner than
    thirty days from the filing of the petition and shall give to
    each official or agency or other governmental entity named
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    in the petition reasonable notice of the hearing by:
    (1) certified mail, return receipt requested; or (2) secure
    electronic mail, electronic transmission, or facsimile
    transmission.
    Id. (emphasis added). When construing this provision, courts have held
    that an evidentiary hearing is not necessarily required if the petition
    seeking expunction can be decided on the paper record alone. See Ex
    parte Wilson, 
    224 S.W.3d 860
    , 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.)
    (“For example, a trial court may rule on an expunction petition without
    conducting a formal hearing and without the consideration of live
    testimony, if it has at its disposal all the information it needs to resolve
    the issues raised by the petition. Presumably, that information might be
    available by what is in the pleadings, by summary[-]judgment proof, or
    by judicially noticing court records.”[ (internal citations omitted))].
    In re Ross, No. 05-19-00769-CV, 
    2020 WL 4815050
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 19,
    2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). Additionally, the procedures for expunging records held by
    a federal depository are specifically spelled out in Article 55.02:
    (c) When the order of expunction is final, the clerk of the court shall
    send a certified copy of the order to the Crime Records Service of the
    Department of Public Safety and to each official or agency or other
    governmental entity of this state or of any political subdivision of this
    state named in the order. The certified copy of the order must be sent
    by secure electronic mail, electronic transmission, or facsimile
    transmission or otherwise by certified mail, return receipt requested. In
    sending the order to a governmental entity named in the order, the clerk
    may elect to substitute hand delivery for certified mail under this
    subsection, but the clerk must receive a receipt for that hand-delivered
    order.
    (c–1) The Department of Public Safety shall notify any central federal
    depository of criminal records by any means, including secure electronic
    mail, electronic transmission, or facsimile transmission, of the order with
    an explanation of the effect of the order and a request that the
    depository, as appropriate, either:
    6
    (1) destroy or return to the court the records in possession of the
    depository that are subject to the order, including any information
    with respect to the order; or
    (2) comply with Section 5(f) pertaining to information contained
    in records and files of a person entitled to expunction under
    Article 55.01(d).
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 55.02, § 3(c), (c–1).
    C.     Alleged Omission of the FBI from the Expunction Order
    Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by omitting the
    FBI from the expunction order’s list of respondents. As set forth above, although the
    expunction order did not include the FBI among the respondents, the order included
    an entire paragraph directing the Texas Department of Public Safety to forward the
    expunction order to the FBI. The expunction order thus tracks with the expunction
    procedures outlined in Article 55.02, Section 3(c–1). See id. art. 55.02, § 3(c–1). We
    therefore cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to list the FBI
    among the expunction order’s respondents when the same outcome was
    accomplished through another paragraph in the order. Accordingly, we overrule
    Appellant’s argument challenging the expunction order’s alleged omission of the FBI.
    D.     Omission of Local News Only from the Expunction Order
    Appellant’s main argument on appeal is that the expunction order omits Local
    News Only despite her petition specifically requesting that Local News Only be
    included in the expunction order. Here, there is nothing in the record—no general
    denial or special exception—that would have alerted the trial court to the fact that the
    7
    State was opposed to Appellant’s request that Local News Only be included in the
    expunction order’s list of respondents. The trial court thus proceeded as if the State
    was not opposed to Appellant’s amended petition for expunction. Without any
    apparent opposition from the State, the trial court implicitly concluded that an
    evidentiary hearing was not required because the petition seeking expunction could be
    decided on the paper record alone. The trial court then signed an expunction order
    prepared by the State.
    Yet the State admits in its appellate brief that it “did not include Local News
    Only among the agencies and entities in the proposed order it submitted to the
    [d]istrict [c]ourt.”   The State’s brief includes two footnotes with the following
    explanations for its purposeful omission:
    The State presented the trial court with a proposed order of expunction.
    The State did not style the document as a “proposed” order[] but
    concedes the order signed by Judge Cofer was, in fact, the order
    proposed by the State. While the State did not oppose the issuance of
    an order of expunction, it intentionally did not include Local News Only
    as an “agency” in its proposed order. The [d]istrict [c]ourt thereafter
    signed the State’s proposed order, meaning Local News Only was not
    listed in the order and was not instructed to destroy or remove and
    return Appellant’s arrest records. [Record citations omitted.]
    The State did not (and does not now) believe Local News Only is
    an “agency” or “entity” that is eligible to be included in [and] subject to
    an expunction order. But as set forth in the “Argument” section of this
    amended brief, on further reflection[,] the State now believes Appellant
    should have been given an opportunity to present evidence in the
    [d]istrict [c]ourt to support her claim that Local News Only should have
    been listed in the expunction order.
    8
    The State’s argument reveals that although it did not file a general denial or
    except to Appellant’s request to include Local News Only in the expunction order,
    the State maneuvered around this procedural default on its part by drafting an
    expunction order that specifically omitted that entity because it was opposed to its
    inclusion in the expunction order. The effect of this tactical maneuver is that the
    State usurped the trial court’s decision-making process and thwarted Appellant’s right
    to due process.
    The State has now recognized (and we commend its candor) that Appellant
    was deprived of the opportunity to respond to the State’s unspoken opposition to
    including Local News Only in the expunction order, and the State has conceded that
    Appellant is entitled to a hearing to present evidence to support her claim that Local
    News Only is an agency eligible to be included in the expunction order. We agree
    that the expunction statute requires a hearing under these facts. See id. art. 55.02,
    § 2(c); cf. Ross, 
    2020 WL 4815050
    , at *2 (holding that trial court abused its discretion
    by rendering an expunction order on contested pleadings without holding a hearing);
    In re C.G., 
    594 S.W.3d 708
    , 712–13 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (same).
    Accordingly, we sustain Appellant’s argument related to Local News Only and hold
    that she is entitled to a hearing solely to determine whether Local News Only qualifies
    as an agency that should be added to the expunction order.
    9
    E.    Alleged Discrimination and Ineffective Assistance Claims
    Appellant’s remaining arguments complain that she “was denied a hearing by
    the judge to explain unfair treatment and discrimination.” Appellant notes in her
    brief that her court-appointed attorney stated that Local News Only received
    preferential treatment from the Tarrant County District Attorney’s Office because the
    agency had friends at the DA’s Office.          Appellant argues that this constituted
    discrimination towards her and that she was discriminated against because of her race,
    color, sex, and national origin. Appellant further states that Local News Only “is
    owned by a white male” who solicited her police report primarily to prevent her from
    gaining employment by publishing derogatory information. Appellant also complains
    that her court-appointed attorney failed to add Local News Only to the list of
    respondents in the petition that he filed and that she had to correct his mistake by
    submitting her own pro se petition to the trial court.
    Appellant’s discrimination arguments appear to be based on hearsay.
    Additionally, she points to no place in the record, and we have found none, showing
    that she raised her discrimination arguments in the trial court.             Appellant’s
    discrimination arguments are therefore not preserved for appeal. See Tex. R. App. P.
    33.1(a).
    To the extent that Appellant’s brief can be read as asserting an ineffective-
    assistance claim, that claim fails. As set forth above, expunction cases are civil cases.
    See E.H., 602 S.W.3d at 489 (citing T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d at 619). And the doctrine of
    10
    ineffective assistance does not extend to civil cases of this kind. See Culver v. Culver,
    
    360 S.W.3d 526
    , 535 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (“The
    doctrine of ineffective assistance of counsel does not apply to civil cases where there
    is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel.” (footnote omitted)); see also Turner v.
    Rogers, 
    564 U.S. 431
    , 441, 
    131 S. Ct. 2507
    , 2516 (2011) (“This Court has long held that
    the Sixth Amendment grants an indigent defendant the right to state-appointed
    counsel in a criminal case[,] . . . [b]ut the Sixth Amendment does not govern civil
    cases.”).
    Furthermore, none of Appellant’s alleged evidence of discrimination and
    ineffective assistance of counsel is directed at facts that would be relevant to a
    statutory basis for expunction. See Addicks v. State, No. 03-06-00114-CV, 
    2007 WL 844872
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 21, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.). Accordingly,
    we overrule Appellant’s alleged discrimination and ineffective-assistance claims.
    F.     Unique Disposition due to the Unchallenged Entities
    We recognize that when an appellate court holds that the trial court should
    have conducted a hearing on a petition for expunction, the proper remedy is to set
    aside the expunction order and remand for a hearing. See, e.g., C.G., 594 S.W.3d at
    713. Here, however, the State does not contest the entities listed in the expunction
    petition, with the exception of its implicit challenge to Local News Only, which the
    State purposely omitted from the expunction order that it drafted. Under the facts
    presented here, it would not provide Appellant with any relief, much less “full and
    11
    effective relief” to set aside the current expunction order, which is providing her with
    much of the relief she requested in her amended petition. See generally Ex parte Elliot,
    
    815 S.W.2d 251
    , 252 (Tex. 1991) (stating that reversal of an entire judgment is
    appropriate when necessary to provide appellant with “full and effective relief”).
    Because the State has not challenged the entities listed in the current expunction order
    and because the only remaining issue is whether a single entity—Local News Only—
    should be added, we therefore decline to set aside the expunction order.
    IV. Conclusion
    Having overruled Appellant’s arguments pertaining to the order’s alleged
    exclusion of the FBI and her discrimination and ineffective-assistance claims but
    having sustained Appellant’s argument as to the expunction order’s omission of Local
    News Only, we affirm the trial court’s expunction order except with respect to its
    failure to hold a hearing on the unchallenged request that Local News Only be
    included in the expunction order; as to that issue only, we reverse and remand for the
    trial court to hold a hearing solely to determine whether Local News Only qualifies as
    an agency that should be added to the expunction order and, if so, to enter an
    amended expunction order. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.3(a).
    /s/ Dabney Bassel
    Dabney Bassel
    Justice
    Delivered: July 29, 2021
    12