the State of Texas v. Taylor Ann Radke ( 2022 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-19-00263-CR
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellant
v.
TAYLOR ANN RADKE,
Appellee
From the County Court
Limestone County, Texas
Trial Court No. 39104
AND
No. 10-19-00265-CR
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellant
v.
JONATHAN ADAM RIVERA,
Appellee
From the County Court
Limestone County, Texas
Trial Court No. 39084
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The State appeals the trial court’s orders granting the motions to suppress filed
by Appellees Taylor Ann Radke and Jonathan Adam Rivera.1 We will reverse.
Factual and Procedural Background
Law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at the residence of Radke
and Rivera looking for a pair of cut and/or damaged Smith & Wesson handcuffs and a
set of bolt cutters. Officers were searching for evidence that Rivera had assisted an
inmate who had escaped from the Limestone County jail. While executing the warrant,
an officer discovered a prescription pill bottle on a dresser in the bedroom occupied by
Radke and Rivera. Half of the label on the bottle was scratched off, obliterating the
name of the prescription holder and part of the name of the medication. The officer
could see what he believed were hydrocodone pills inside the bottle and opened the pill
bottle to confirm his suspicion. Subsequent investigation confirmed that the pills were
hydrocodone, a level three narcotic requiring a prescription.
Officers executing the warrant seized additional drugs and drug paraphernalia
from other areas of the house. Officers discussed whether they would need a separate
search warrant for the drugs but were told by the district attorney that another warrant
was unnecessary. In addition to the drugs, the search uncovered a set of bolt cutters
that appeared to have been recently used. No handcuffs or pieces of handcuffs were
found.
1
Although Radke and Rivera were charged separately, one suppression hearing was held for both.
State v. Radke; State v. Rivera Page 2
Officers had executed a search warrant for narcotics at the residence a month
earlier. Radke and Rivera were living in the residence when the earlier search warrant
was executed.
An officer questioned Radke and Rivera, who both admitted knowing the
hydrocodone was in the bedroom but denied ownership. Both Radke and Rivera were
charged by information with possession of less than twenty-eight grams of
hydrocodone.
Radke filed both a motion to suppress physical evidence and a motion to
suppress statements. Rivera filed a motion to suppress all tangible evidence seized by
law enforcement. 2 The trial court granted the motions and subsequently made the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
That Groesbeck Police Department contacted the DA and asked for
another search warrant to include illegal drugs. The DA told them they
did not need another search warrant. That based on my interpretation of
the plain view law I did not believe a pill bottle in and of itself was illegal.
Since it is not practical for either handcuffs or bolt cutters would be in the
pill bottle I, therefore, determined the Officer exceeded the scope of the
warrant.
(Emphasis in original.)
The trial court made no specific findings of fact or conclusions of law regarding
the statements made by Radke and Rivera, and the State did not request that the trial
court make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law.
After the suppression hearing, the trial court made the following statements:
2
While Rivera’s motion to suppress did not specifically request suppression of any statements he made to
law enforcement, the issue regarding Rivera’s statements was raised at the suppression hearing.
State v. Radke; State v. Rivera Page 3
I will -- I think first and foremost, let me just say this: I was not
convinced that they had their rights read to them; I just was not convinced
of that. So I'm going to grant that motion to suppress those statements. I
think we all believe that in -- in -- when this is -- when something like this
is happening, you want to make sure that -- from what I know, that's
something that's very important that they do. So I'm going to go ahead
and grant that.
Now, let me just say this on the other: And I did quite a bit of
homework on this because as y'all know my background, I needed to bone
up on this a little bit. I originally was upset because of the fact that, sure,
they weren't just going to walk in there and start looking for -- in a pill box
to find bolt cutters or leg shackles or handcuffs, you know, I realize that.
And then I learned about plain view and -- but on this case right here, he's
having to take his previous experience to look for something he wasn't
looking for, and to just assume that just because that was scratched off
that then he shifted gears out of looking for what he was looking for into
trying to look for narcotics.
He testified that he did not know that there were any there, but had
previous, but that's not what they were going in there for. In looking at
this and hearing what I heard today, it sure would have been nice if they
would have King-X'd it and said, "Look, let's go back and get a separate
search warrant," in my opinion, because I think that would have made this
a lot more simpler. We wouldn't -- probably wouldn't even be here today,
frankly.
So I'm having to make a decision whether or not the pill bottle, it
being in plain view and him going over to look in it is justified, and I just
can't do that.
So I'm going to grant your Motion to Suppress, and we will go from
there.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence or statements
for an abuse of discretion and overturn the ruling only if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or
“outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Wexler v. State, 625 S.W.3d 162, 167
(Tex. Crim. App. 2021); State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We
conduct a bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference to a trial court’s
State v. Radke; State v. Rivera Page 4
findings of historical fact and reviewing the application of the law to those facts de novo.
Wexler, 625 S.W.3d at 167; Cole v. State, 490 S.W.3d 918, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).
When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, we determine whether the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports
those fact findings. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When the
trial court does not enter findings of fact, “we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the ruling and assume the trial court made implicit findings of fact that
support its ruling as long as those findings are supported by the record.” Wexler, 625
S.W.3d at 167; see also Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “The
party that prevailed in the trial court is afforded the strongest legitimate view of the
evidence, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” Wexler,
625 S.W.3d at 167. We will sustain a judge’s ruling “if the record reasonably supports
that ruling and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.” Cole, 490 S.W.3d
at 922; see also State v. Lujan, 634 S.W.3d 862, 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (“[T]he trial
court’s ruling must be upheld on any applicable legal theory.”).
The trial judge “’is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony’ when entertaining a motion to
suppress.” Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24–25 (quoting State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000)); Richardson v. State, 494 S.W.3d 302, 304 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, no
pet.). The trial court is entitled to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness's
testimony—even if that testimony is uncontroverted—because he is in the best position
State v. Radke; State v. Rivera Page 5
to observe the witness's demeanor and appearance. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442,
447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Issue Two 3
The State argues that the trial court erred in granting the motions to suppress
evidence because the pill bottle was in plain view.
AUTHORITY
The “plain view” doctrine permits a law enforcement officer to seize contraband
that is in plain sight or open view without the necessity of first obtaining a warrant.
State v. Betts, 397 S.W.3d 198, 206 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also Kentucky v. King, 563
U.S. 452, 463, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1858, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 (2011). “For a plain-view seizure to
be lawful, the officer must have had lawful authority to be in the location from which
he viewed the item, and the incriminating nature of the item must be immediately
apparent.” State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). “Immediately
apparent” simply means that “the viewing officers must have probable cause to believe
an item in plain view is contraband before seizing it.” State v. Dobbs, 323 S.W.3d 184,
189 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Actual knowledge of the incriminating evidence is not
required, but the officer must have probable cause to connect the item with criminal
activity. Goonan v. State, 334 S.W.3d 357, 361 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.); see
also Young v. State, 563 S.W.3d 325, 330 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d).
Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances known to law
enforcement officers are “sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
3
Because we find Issue Two dispositive, we will not address Issue One.
State v. Radke; State v. Rivera Page 6
caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Marcopoulos v.
State, 538 S.W.3d 596, 602 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citation omitted). To determine
whether an officer had probable cause, we consider the totality of the circumstances.
Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 25. Probable cause is viewed objectively. Id. at 27. In making a
probable cause determination, “[a]n officer may rely on his training and experience to
draw inferences and make deductions that might well elude an untrained person.”
Goonan, 334 S.W.3d at 361; see also Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 25 (“[T]he training, knowledge,
and experience of law enforcement officials is taken into consideration.”).
While a pill bottle in and of itself is not an object that is immediately identifiable
as contraband, it can become inherently suspicious under certain circumstances. See
Goonan, 334 S.W.3d at 361. “An officer may rely on training and experience to draw
inferences and make deductions as to the nature of the item seen.” Id.DISCUSSION
There is no question that the officers executing the search warrant in the present
case were legally present when the pill bottle was observed. The issue is whether the
incriminating character of the pill bottle was immediately apparent to the officer who
seized it.
Officer Matthew Kirk discovered the pill bottle in the bedroom shared by Radke
and Rivera. Kirk did not know who occupied the bedroom when he found the pills.
The scratched off label indicated to him that the pills were possessed by someone who
did not have a prescription, a circumstance he had seen many times in his training and
experience. Kirk testified that a “prudent individual wouldn’t take the label off their
State v. Radke; State v. Rivera Page 7
pill bottle if they were legally prescribed the medication.” Kirk could see that the bottle
contained pills that resembled hydrocodone. When Kirk picked up the pill bottle, he
could see that the imprint on the pills, in his training and experience, designated the
pills as hydrocodone. Kirk then opened the bottle and verified that the imprint he
observed was associated with hydrocodone. Kirk knew that hydrocodone is in a
penalty group requiring a prescription. Kirk gave the pills to Officer Blanco who
separately verified that the pills were in fact hydrocodone.
In this case, the trial court did not consider the totality of the circumstances or
the training and experience of Officer Kirk when concluding that the search of the pill
bottle did not fall within the parameters of the plain view doctrine. We sustain the
State’s second issue.
Issue Three
In its third issue, the State argues that the trial court erred in granting Radke’s
and Rivera’s motions to suppress statements because they were not subjected to a
custodial interrogation.
AUTHORITY
The Fifth Amendment protects a criminal defendant from being forced to bear
witness against himself. U.S. Const. amend V. The Miranda rule was intended to
protect a defendant against the coercive nature of police questioning and ensure that his
Fifth Amendment right is safeguarded. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct.
1880, 1883, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Miranda and Article 38.22 deem a defendant’s statement
State v. Radke; State v. Rivera Page 8
inadmissible unless the accused is first warned that he has the right to remain silent, his
statement may be used against him, and he has the right to hire a lawyer or have a
lawyer appointed. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602; TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art.
38.22. However, Miranda and Article 38.22 are applicable only when a defendant has
been subjected to custodial interrogation.
In determining whether the accused is in custody, the trial court must evaluate:
(1) the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and (2) whether a reasonable
person in those circumstances would have felt he was not free to leave. Wexler, 625
S.W.3d at 167; Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383(1995). In deciding whether an individual was in custody, the appellate court takes the
findings that are supported by the record and determines whether they constitute a
Miranda custody situation as a matter of law. State v. Saenz, 411 S.W.3d 488, 494 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013). “Once the scene is set and the players’ lines and actions are
reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test” to determine whether there was
restraint on freedom of movement of a degree associated with arrest. Wexler, 625
S.W.3d at 167 (quoting Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112, 116 S.Ct. 457). The ultimate inquiry is
whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that his
freedom of movement was restricted to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Id.(citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994); see
also Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
In Dowthitt, the Court of Criminal Appeals identified four situations that may
constitute custody: (1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action
State v. Radke; State v. Rivera Page 9
in any significant way; (2) when a law-enforcement officer tells the suspect that he
cannot leave; (3) when law-enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a
reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly
restricted; and (4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law-enforcement officers
do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave. Id., at 255. Regarding the first through
third situations, the restriction on the suspect's freedom of movement must be to the
degree associated with an arrest as opposed to an investigative detention. Id.When a search warrant is executed at a residence, a person who is an occupant of
the premises may be detained for the duration of the search. Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692, 703-4, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981); see also Babalola v. State, No. 10-09-
00234-CR, 2011 WL 1419752, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 13, 2011, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication).
DISCUSSION
Officer Blanco could not remember whether he advised Radke and Rivera of
their Miranda rights. As we imply all facts necessary to support the trial court’s ruling,
and there being no facts to the contrary, we conclude that Radke and Rivera were not
informed of their Miranda rights before being questioned about the presence of the
hydrocodone pills in the bedroom. The issue is whether, despite the lack of Miranda
warnings, a reasonable person in the situation faced by Radke and Rivera would have
felt that there was a restraint on his or her freedom to a degree associated with being
under arrest rather than detained.
State v. Radke; State v. Rivera Page 10
Based upon a totality of the circumstances, we cannot agree that Radke and
Rivera were subjected to a restriction on their movements to the degree associated with
an arrest. The record reflects that Radke and Rivera were merely detained while law
enforcement officers executed the search warrant on their residence. Neither Radke nor
Rivera was handcuffed, and neither was told they were not free to leave. As such, the
questions asked by law enforcement did not constitute a custodial interrogation, and
Miranda warnings were not required. We sustain the State’s third issue.
Conclusion
Having sustained the State’s second and third issues, we reverse the trial court’s
orders granting appellants’ motions to suppress. We remand this case to the trial court
for further proceedings.
MATT JOHNSON
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Johnson, and
Justice Smith
(Chief Justice Gray dissenting)
Reversed and remanded
Opinion delivered and filed April 13, 2022
Do not publish
[CR25]
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