Jeffery Joe Hampton v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )


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  •                                   NO. 12-22-00128-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
    TYLER, TEXAS
    JEFFERY JOE HAMPTON,                             §      APPEAL FROM THE 114TH
    APPELLANT
    V.                                               §      JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    APPELLEE                                         §      SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Jeffery Joe Hampton appeals his conviction for manslaughter. In two issues, Appellant
    argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a photograph, which depicts the
    victim’s injuries, during his trial on punishment and that certain court costs assessed against him
    are improper. We modify and affirm as modified.
    BACKGROUND
    On the afternoon of June 2, 2019, fourteen-year-old R.B. and his younger sister were
    playing in the shallow water near a pier and next to the shoreline of Lake Palestine in Smith
    County, Texas. Appellant, who was intoxicated, drove his bass boat at high speed through the
    pier, striking R.B. R.B. was killed on impact; the top of his skull partially was severed by the
    boat’s propeller. Bystanders pulled his body from the water and laid it on what remained of the
    pier.   Despite one of his passengers alerting him to the fact that someone had been hurt,
    Appellant fled the scene. Another of his passengers later contacted authorities, and Appellant
    was arrested.
    Appellant was charged by indictment with manslaughter. The indictment further alleged
    that Appellant used a watercraft as a deadly weapon. Moreover, the indictment alleged that
    Appellant had two, prior, felony convictions––aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and
    robbery. Appellant pleaded “guilty” as charged. He pleaded “true” to the felony enhancements
    and “not true” to the deadly-weapon allegation.
    The matter proceeded to a jury trial on punishment. Ultimately, the jury found the
    enhancement allegations and deadly weapon allegation to be “true” and assessed Appellant’s
    punishment at imprisonment for life. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly, and this
    appeal followed.
    ADMISSIBILITY OF PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE - PUNISHMENT PHASE
    In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting a
    photograph depicting R.B.’s head injuries because the danger of undue prejudice from the jury’s
    seeing this photograph in addition to other, similar photographs of R.B.’s head injuries
    substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
    Standard of Review and Governing Law
    We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. See
    Prystash v. State, 
    3 S.W.3d 522
    , 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Montgomery v. State, 
    810 S.W.2d 372
    , 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g). As long as the trial court’s ruling was at least
    within the zone of reasonable disagreement, the appellate court will not intercede.               See
    Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391. Furthermore, if the trial court’s evidentiary ruling is correct
    on any theory of law applicable to that ruling, it will not be disturbed, even if the trial judge gave
    the wrong reason for a correct ruling. See De La Paz v. State, 
    279 S.W.3d 336
    , 344 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2009).
    “Relevant evidence” ordinarily means evidence having any tendency to make the
    existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
    less probable than it would be without the evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 401. But during the
    punishment phase of trial in a non-capital case, the determination of relevance is a question of
    what is helpful to the jury in determining the appropriate sentence for a particular defendant in a
    particular case. See Rogers v. State, 
    991 S.W.2d 263
    , 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also TEX.
    CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 § 3(a) (West Supp. 2022) (at punishment, evidence may be
    offered by state and defendant as to any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing).
    Evidence that is not relevant is inadmissible. See TEX. R. EVID. 402.
    2
    With respect to the relevance of photographic evidence, the court of criminal appeals
    further instructs as follows:
    A photograph should add something that is relevant, legitimate, and logical to the testimony that
    accompanies it and that assists the jury in its decision-making duties. Sometimes this will,
    incidentally, include elements that are emotional and prejudicial. Our case law is clear on this
    point: If there are elements of a photograph that are genuinely helpful to the jury in making its
    decision, the photograph is inadmissible only if the emotional and prejudicial aspects substantially
    outweigh the helpful aspects.
    Erazo v. State, 
    144 S.W.3d 487
    , 491–92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
    Under Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, even relevant “evidence may be
    excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
    . . . .”   TEX. R. EVID. 403.           “Rule 403 favors admissibility of relevant evidence, and the
    presumption is that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial.” Montgomery,
    810 S.W.2d at 389. Rule 403 requires both trial and reviewing courts to analyze and balance
    (1) the probative value of the evidence (2) the potential to impress the jury in some irrational, yet
    indelible, way, (3) the time needed to develop the evidence, and (4) the proponent’s need for the
    evidence. See Erazo, 114 S.W.3d at 489. In making this determination, we consider factors
    including (1) the number of exhibits offered, (2) their gruesomeness, (3) their detail, (4) their
    size, (5) whether they are black and white or color, (6) whether they are close up shots,
    (7) whether the body is naked or clothed, (8) the availability of other means of proof, and
    (9) other circumstances unique to the individual case. Santellan v. State, 
    939 S.W.2d 155
    , 172
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Generally, a photograph is admissible if verbal testimony as to matters
    depicted in the photographs also is admissible. See Williams v. State, 
    958 S.W.2d 186
    , 195
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
    Discussion
    In the instant case, the State offered multiple crime-scene photographs of R.B.’s body
    lying on the pier after the accident. Appellant objected only to the admission of State’s Exhibit
    20, which depicts R.B.’s head injuries from a viewpoint above the body’s longitudinal axis and
    at an angle relatively parallel to the pier upon which his body was laid. In the photograph, the
    detached portion of R.B.’s skull is visible.
    The relevance of this photograph is apparent––it allowed the jury to better understand the
    manner and means of R.B.’s death as well as the apparent force of the impact which resulted in
    3
    such an injury. See, e.g., 
    id.
     (crime scene photos are relevant because they “aid the jury in
    determining many things including the manner and means of the death of the victim, the force
    used, and sometimes even the identity of the perpetrator”). Exhibit 20 is a color photograph of
    approximately 8.5” x 11” in size. 1 The picture appears to have been taken from a few feet away;
    it is a picture of R.B.’s whole body, not just the head injury alone. R.B. is clothed in the picture.
    Two other exhibits, to which Appellant did not object, depict the same scene as Exhibit 20 but do
    so from different viewpoints, angles, and distances, and depict only a portion of R.B.’s head
    injuries. See Bacey v. State, 
    990 S.W.2d 319
    , 326 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d) (when
    two or more pictures depict same thing but from different perspectives, they are not cumulative
    and jury can gain information it might not otherwise have when viewing other pictures from
    other perspectives).
    Exhibit 20 undoubtedly is troubling to view, as are the other two photographic exhibits.
    But Exhibit 20 is the only photograph of the three clearly to show the full extent of R.B.’s head
    injuries. See Gallo v. State, 
    239 S.W.3d 757
    , 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (photographs which
    showed full extent of injuries appellant inflicted on the victim were highly probative);
    Desormeaux v. State, 
    362 S.W.3d 233
    , 237 (Tex. App.–Beaumont 2012, no pet.) (“Though
    gruesome, the photographs are probative of the full extent of the internal and external injuries
    inflicted”). Further still, the testimonies of the medical examiner and other witnesses, which
    were admitted without objection, consist of the same information about R.B.’s injuries as Exhibit
    20 depicts. And while the injuries depicted in Exhibit 20 truly are disturbing, we cannot
    conclude that they are gruesome. 2 But even if reasonable minds could differ on that conclusion,
    any disturbing attribute depicted resulted directly from the injuries caused by Appellant. See
    Williams v. State, 
    301 S.W.3d 675
    , 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Sonnier v. State, 
    913 S.W.2d 511
    , 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (“[W]hen the power of the visible evidence emanates from
    1
    The record on appeal contains black and white copies of the exhibit. The State notes in its brief that the
    exhibit, in fact, consists of a color photograph.
    2
    In reaching this conclusion, we do not intend to lessen the gravity of the injuries depicted or the
    circumstances from which they arose. But in declining to conclude that the image in Exhibit 20 is “gruesome,” we
    have observed the picture as a whole, rather than only viewing the injuries depicted. In so doing, we have
    considered whether, in that light, the picture may have been likely to impress the jury in some irrational, yet
    indelible, way. See Santellan v. State, 
    939 S.W.2d 155
    , 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Based on our observations,
    we note that, of the three photographs, Exhibit 20 is the only one which, in depicting R.B.’s head injuries, does not
    also show his face. In that respect, we also conclude that Exhibit 20 is, to some small degree, less troubling than the
    other two photographic exhibits admitted without objection.
    4
    nothing more than what the defendant has himself done, we cannot hold that the trial court has
    abused its discretion merely because it admitted the evidence”).
    Having considered the aforementioned factors in light of the evidence of record, we note
    that the probative value of the evidence, i.e., whether it is helpful to the jury in determining the
    appropriate sentence in this particular case, was high.        See Williams, 958 S.W.2d at195.
    Moreover, its potential to impress the jury in some irrational, yet indelible, way, given the nature
    of the exhibits depicting R.B.’s body from different angles and the testimonies of the medical
    examiner and other witnesses on the subject matter depicted in Exhibit 20, was low. The State
    did not take much time to develop the photographic evidence, and its need for the evidence was
    high since it enabled the jury better to understand the manner and means of R.B.’s death as well
    as the apparent force of the impact which resulted in such an injury in a way verbal testimony
    simply cannot convey. See 
    id.
     Thus, we conclude that Exhibit 20’s relevance at Appellant’s trial
    on punishment was not substantially outweighed by the danger of its unfair prejudice. See TEX.
    R. EVID. 403. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
    the State’s Exhibit 20 in Appellant’s trial on punishment. Appellant’s first issue is overruled.
    COURT COSTS
    In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly assessed the fees
    comprising the “Local Consolidated Fee on Conviction of Felony” against him as represented in
    the bill of costs. The State concedes that these fees were assessed erroneously. We agree.
    The commission date of the offense for which Appellant was convicted is June 2, 2019.
    The Local Consolidated Fee on Conviction of Felony applies only to defendants who are
    convicted of offenses committed on or after January 1, 2020.            See Hayes v. State, No.
    12˗20˗00222-CR, 
    2021 WL 1418400
    , at *2 (Tex. App.–Tyler Apr. 14, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.,
    not designated for publication) (citing TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 134.101 (West 2021)).
    Section 134.101 assesses an additional $105 fee for a person who is convicted of a felony. See
    TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 134.101(a). That fee is to be allocated to the following specific
    accounts and funds: the clerk of the court account, the county records management and
    preservation fund, the county jury fund, the courthouse security fund, the county and district
    court technology fund, and the county specialty court account. See id. § 134.101(b).
    5
    In the instant case, the judgment reflects that the trial court assessed $251.50 in court
    costs. The judgment includes a document identified as “Attachment A Order to Withdraw
    Funds,” which states that Appellant has incurred “[c]ourt costs, fees and/or fines and/or
    restitution” in the amount of $251.50. The certified bill of costs includes the following costs
    assessed pursuant to Section 134.101: $40.00 Clerk of the Court; $4.00 County and District
    Court Technology Fund; $1.00 County Jury Fund; $25.00 County Records Management and
    Preservation; $25.00 County Specialty Court Account; and $10.00 Courthouse Security Fund.
    See id. The sum of these costs is $105.00. Because the offense in this case was committed
    before January 1, 2020, Appellant is not obligated to pay the “Local Consolidated Fee on
    Conviction of Felony.” See Hayes, 
    2021 WL 1418400
    , at*2. Accordingly, we will modify the
    bill of costs, as well as the trial court’s judgment and Order to Withdraw to reflect the removal of
    these fees. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Reyes v. State, 
    324 S.W.3d 865
    , 868 (Tex. App.–
    Amarillo 2010, no pet.). Appellant’s second issue is sustained.
    CONCLUSION
    We have overruled Appellant’s first issue and sustained his second issue. Having done
    so, we modify the bill of costs by deleting the following fees: $40.00 Clerk of the Court; $4.00
    County and District Court Technology Fund; $1.00 County Jury Fund; $25.00 County Records
    Management and Preservation; $25.00 County Specialty Court Account; and $10.00 Courthouse
    Security Fund. We further modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect that the amount of court
    costs is $146.50. We also modify Attachment A Order to Withdraw Funds to state that the total
    amount of “court costs, fees and/or fines and/or restitution” is $146.50. We affirm the trial
    court’s judgment as modified.
    BRIAN HOYLE
    Justice
    Opinion delivered April 19, 2023.
    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
    (DO NOT PUBLISH)
    6
    COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    JUDGMENT
    APRIL 19, 2023
    NO. 12-22-00128-CR
    JEFFERY JOE HAMPTON,
    Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    Appeal from the 114th District Court
    of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 114-1155-19)
    THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and the briefs filed
    herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that the bill of costs,
    Attachment A Order to Withdraw Funds, and judgment of the court below should be modified
    and as modified, there being no other error in the judgment, affirmed.
    It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the bill of
    costs of the court below be modified to delete the following fees: $40.00 Clerk of the Court;
    $4.00 County and District Court Technology Fund; $1.00 County Jury Fund; $25.00 County
    Records Management and Preservation; $25.00 County Specialty Court Account; and $10.00
    Courthouse Security Fund.
    It is therefore further ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the
    judgment and the Attachment A Order to Withdraw Funds of the court below be modified to
    state that the total amount of “court costs, fees and/or fines and/or restitution” is $146.50. in all
    other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed; and that this decision be certified to the
    court below for observance.
    Brian Hoyle, Justice.
    Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.