Ex Parte Dennis Munzy v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )


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  •                                         In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    ________________
    NO. 09-22-00147-CR
    ________________
    EX PARTE DENNIS MUNZY
    ________________________________________________________________________
    On Appeal from the 253rd District Court
    Liberty County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. 22DC-WR-00431
    ________________________________________________________________________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Dennis Munzy appeals the denial of his Application for Writ of Habeas
    Corpus after being charged with failure to comply with Sex Offender Requirement
    Registration. On appeal, Munzy raises one ground for relief. He challenges the
    constitutionality of the trial court’s decision to deny his bail, arguing the trial court
    acted without authority to deny bail pursuant to Article 1, Section 11 of the Texas
    Constitution. Munzy requests that this Court reverse the trial court’s denial of his
    writ and remand this case. In response, the State agrees, stating the trial court abused
    its discretion and acted without authority under the Texas Constitution to hold
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    Munzy without bail. The State also requests this Court to reverse the trial court’s
    denial of his writ and remand this case.
    Review of the Trial Court’s Setting of Bail
    We have jurisdiction over an appeal from a trial court’s merit-based denial of
    habeas proceedings. See Ex parte Hargett, 
    819 S.W.2d 866
    , 868-69 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1991). We review the denial of an application for writ of habeas corpus under
    an abuse of discretion standard. Kniatt v. State, 
    206 S.W.3d 657
    , 664 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2006); Ex parte Klem, 
    269 S.W.3d 711
    , 718 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet.
    ref’d). We consider the entire record and review the facts in the light most favorable
    to the trial court’s ruling. Kniatt, 
    206 S.W.3d at 664
    ; Klem, 
    269 S.W.3d at 718
    . We
    afford almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on the application of the law
    to fact questions when the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of
    credibility and demeanor. Klem, 
    269 S.W.3d at 718
    . If the trial court’s resolution of
    the ultimate issues turns on an application of legal standards, we review the
    determination de novo. 
    Id.
    Similarly, we review a trial court’s ruling on the setting of bail under an abuse
    of discretion standard of review. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15
    (affording a trial court discretion to set bail); Ex parte Rubac, 
    611 S.W.2d 848
    , 850
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The trial court’s ruling will not be disturbed if it is within
    the zone of reasonable disagreement. Clemons v. State, 
    220 S.W.3d 176
    , 178 (Tex.
    2
    App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.) (citing Montgomery v. State, 
    810 S.W.2d 372
    , 391
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g)).
    An appearance bond secures the presence of a defendant in court for trial. Ex
    parte Rodriguez, 
    595 S.W.2d 549
    , 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). The United States
    and Texas Constitutions prohibit excessive bail. U.S. CONST. amends. VIII, XIV;
    Tex. Const. art. I, §§ 11, 13; Ex parte Sabur-Smith, 
    73 S.W.3d 436
    , 439 (Tex. App.—
    Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (The right to reasonable bail is protected by the
    United States and Texas Constitutions.). The trial court should set bail sufficient to
    provide reasonable assurance the defendant will appear at trial, but not so high as to
    be oppressive. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15(a)(1), (2); Ex parte Ivey,
    
    594 S.W.2d 98
    , 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Bail is excessive if it is “set in an amount
    greater than [what] is reasonably necessary to satisfy the government’s legitimate
    interests.” Ex parte Beard, 
    92 S.W.3d 566
    , 573 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d)
    (citing United States v. Salerno, 
    481 U.S. 739
    , 753-54 (1987)). When setting the
    amount of bail, the trial court weighs the State’s interest in assuring the defendant’s
    appearance at trial against the defendant’s presumption of innocence. 
    Id.
     The amount
    of bail may be deemed oppressive when the trial court sets the bail at an amount “for
    the express purpose of forcing [a defendant] to remain incarcerated[.]” Ex parte
    Harris, 
    733 S.W.2d 712
    , 714 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no pet.).
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    Viewing the entire record in favor of the trial court’s ruling, we hold that the
    trial court abused its discretion by not setting bail in this case. Ex parte Gill, 
    413 S.W.3d 425
    , 428 (Tex. 2013); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.15. Accordingly,
    we sustain Munzy’s sole issue, reverse the trial court’s order, and remand the case
    for immediate further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    ________________________________
    JAY WRIGHT
    Justice
    Submitted on December 6, 2022
    Opinion Delivered April 26, 2023
    Do Not Publish
    Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.
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