The State of Texas v. Bryan Leonel Rodriguez Mejia ( 2023 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-22-00127-CR
The STATE of Texas,
Appellant
v.
Bryan Leonel Rodriguez MEJIA,
Appellee
From the County Court, Kinney County, Texas
Trial Court No. 10372CR
Honorable Tully Shahan, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Irene Rios, Justice
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: April 26, 2023
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Appellant the State of Texas challenges the trial court’s order denying its motion to amend
the information and granting appellee Bryan Leonel Rodriguez Mejia’s motion to quash and set
aside the complaint and the information 1 alleging Mejia committed the misdemeanor offense of
criminal trespass. 2 We reverse and remand.
1
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(a)(1).
2
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(a)(1).
04-22-00127-CR
BACKGROUND
Mejia was charged by information with the misdemeanor offense of criminal trespass. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(a)(1). Specifically, the State alleged in its original information on
September 27, 2021, that “on the 29th day of August 2021, in Kinney County, Texas, [Mejia], did
then and there intentionally or knowingly, with notice that entry was forbidden, enter a Critical
Infrastructure Facility without effective consent of the owner, to-wit: Union Pacific Railroad by
C. Scott Post, Agent.” On October 29, 2021, Mejia filed a motion to quash, set aside, and dismiss
the information. Mejia argued the information was defective because it failed to allege a location
of the property, the type of property, and how he had notice that entry was forbidden.
In response, on November 1, 2021, the State filed a motion requesting leave to amend the
information and provide Mejia with further notice of the name of the owner or agent of the property
and the location of the property within Kinney County, Texas. The State attached the proposed
amended information to its motion to amend.
On November 2, 2021, the trial court released Mejia from custody on a personal
recognizance bond. However, because Mejia is a noncitizen of the United States, Mejia was
immediately taken into federal custody and transferred to the Port Isabel Detention Facility. On
November 9, 2021, Mejia filed an objection to the State’s proposed amendment and in the
alternative, a motion to quash, set aside, and dismiss the amended information if the State was
permitted to file its proposed amended information. Mejia asserted that allowing the State to amend
its information would prejudice his substantial rights, as it would affect his ability to prepare a
defense. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10(c). Mejia contended that due to the State’s
delay in filing the original defective information, he was detained for more than sixty days “without
any plausible ability to prepare a defense as there was no way of knowing where the State alleged
he was trespassing.” Mejia added that even despite his release on a personal bond, his on-going
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federal custody “further imped[es] and prevent[s] his access to counsel and ability to prepare a
defense.” Nonetheless, Mejia also argued the proposed amended information was still defective
for failing to provide proper notice because it did not allege whether the “critical infrastructure
facility” was completely enclosed by a fence or other physical barrier that is obviously designed
to exclude intruders. Mejia further argued the proposed amended information failed to allege how
he had notice entry was forbidden.
The State in turn filed another motion for leave to amend the information, attaching the
proposed amended information alleging:
that on the 29th of August, 2021, in Kinney County, Texas, [Mejia], did then and
there intentionally or knowingly, with notice that entry was forbidden, enter a
Critical Infrastructure Facility, to-wit: Union Pacific Railroad switching yard, (GPS
Coordinates: 29.15564, -100.39993), without the effective consent of the owner,
to-wit: C. Scott Post, agent for Union Pacific Railroad.
The trial court conducted a hearing concerning the proposed amended information. The
majority of the hearing surrounded the testimony of Mejia’s immigration attorney who testified
regarding the difficulties counsel encounters when representing persons detained in federal
custody. Mejia argued he cannot assist his defense counsel in preparing his defense because
counsel is not allowed to visit him at the detention facility and this impediment affects his
substantial rights.
After the hearing, the trial court denied the State’s motion to amend the information and
granted Mejia’s motion to quash, set aside, and dismiss the complaint and information. In its order,
the trial court found:
1. The information does not provide defendant with notice as to how he
received notice indicating that entry [onto] the property was forbidden.
2. The information does not provide the defendant notice as to why he did not
have the effective consent of the owner.
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3. To grant the State’s motion and permit an amendment of the information
would affect the basic rights of the defendant.
In two issues, the State appeals arguing the trial court erred by refusing to allow the State
to amend the information and by dismissing the complaint and information. Both issues pertain to
whether the trial court erred by denying the State’s motion to amend the information while granting
Mejia’s motion to quash and set aside the information. The State did not stand by its originally-
filed information, but rather sought leave to file an amended information to cure any deficiency.
Thus, we will first address the sufficiency of the amended information as it relates to Mejia’s
motion to quash, set aside, and dismiss the complaint and information. Second, we will address
whether the trial court erred in denying the State’s request to file the amended information.
MOTION TO QUASH
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to quash a charging instrument de novo. State
v. Jarreau, 512 S.W.3d 352, 354 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“Jarreau II”); State v. Caves, 496
S.W.3d 153, 155 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, pet. ref’d). Our analysis is “‘contingent upon a
variety of factors, including, but not limited to, the statutory description of the prohibited conduct
and whether the notice deficiency complained of describes an act or omission by the accused.’”
Jarreau II, 512 S.W.3d at 354 (quoting DeVaughn v. State, 749 S.W.2d 62, 68 (Tex. Crim. App.
1988)).
B. Requirements of an Information
A charging instrument must convey sufficient notice to allow the accused to prepare a
defense. State v. Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d 248, 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see also TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.23 (“The rules with respect to allegations in an indictment and the
certainty required apply also to an information.”). In an information, the offense must be “set forth
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in plain and intelligible words[.]” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.21. The information should
include everything necessary to be proved. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 21.03, 21.23. An
information is sufficient if it
charges the commission of the offense in ordinary and concise language in such a
manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is meant, and
with that degree of certainty that will give the defendant notice of the particular
offense with which he is charged, and enable the court, on conviction, to pronounce
the proper judgment[.]
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 21.11, 21.23.
Generally, an information tracking the language of a statute gives sufficient notice. Jarreau
II, 512 S.W.3d at 354; Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d at 251. Definitions of statutorily defined terms and
elements are typically considered evidentiary and need not be further alleged in the information.
Barbernell, 257 S.W.3d at 251. Furthermore, to provide adequate notice to the defendant, the State
need not plead evidentiary matters nor the manner and means of the commission of the offense if
there is only one. State v. Jarreau, 563 S.W.3d 477, 483 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, pet.
ref’d) (“Jarreau III”) (citations omitted). The exceptions to this general rule apply when the statute
itself (1) uses an undefined term of indeterminate or variable meaning, or (2) defines the manner
or means of commission in several alternative ways. State v. Zuniga, 512 S.W.3d 902, 907 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2017). If either exception applies, the charging instrument will require more specific
pleading to notify the defendant of the nature of the charges against him. See State v. Ross, 573
S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019).
In Barbernell, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals prescribed a two-step analysis for
evaluating the adequacy of an information’s allegations. 257 S.W.3d at 255. “First, a court must
identify the elements of an offense.” Id. Second, if the Legislature has defined an element of the
offense describing an act or omission by the defendant a court must ask whether the statute
provides “alternative manners or means in which the act or omission can be committed.” Id. If so,
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then the pleading “will supply adequate notice only if, in addition to setting out the elements of an
offense, it also alleges the specific manner and means of commission that the State intends to rely
on at trial.” Id.; see also Jarreau II, 512 S.W.3d at 354–55.
Nonetheless,
[i]f a charging instrument omits specific reference to a word, term, or phrase that is
a constituent element of the offense but, from reading the [information] as a whole,
that element is supplied by necessary inclusion within an expressed word, term, or
phrase, then the failure to specifically plead the word, term, or phrase will not
render the charging instrument fundamentally defective.
Murphy v. State, 665 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Dennis v. State, 647 S.W.2d 275,
280–81 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). To add, in general, “if the word or term is defined by statute, it
need not be further clarified in the charging instrument, even where a motion to quash is the
mechanism used to challenge the word or term in the charging instrument.” Coleman v. State, 643
S.W.2d 124, 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 21.12.
C. Application
Under the amended information, the State alleged Mejia entered property belonging to
Union Pacific Railroad—specifically a Critical Infrastructure Facility, “to-wit: Union Pacific
Railroad switching yard, (GPS Coordinates: 29.15564, -100.39993), without the effective consent
of the owner, to-wit: C. Scott Post, agent for Union Pacific Railroad”—with notice that his entry
was forbidden. Mejia complained the information was insufficient because it failed to allege what
kind of notice he was provided under section 30.05(b)(2)(A–E) of the Texas Penal Code. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(b)(2)(A–E). The State maintains it is unnecessary to allege the specific
notice as it is only evidentiary. See Jarreau III, 563 S.W.3d at 483.
We agree with the State. We “are not aware of any authority, either case law construing
[section] 30.05, or provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which would categorically
require the State to allege the means of notice in order to sufficiently charge the accused.” Bobo v.
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State, 757 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d); see also Thompson
v. State, 12 S.W.3d 915, 924 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2000, pet. ref’d); Chunn v. State, 821 S.W.2d
718, 720 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet. ref’d). Mejia does not provide any authority
supporting his proposition.
Moreover, the amended information gives the GPS coordinates of the exact location curing
any deficiency as to which Union Pacific Railroad property the State contends Mejia criminally
trespassed upon. In addition, the State alleged he entered the railroad’s switchyard, a Critical
Infrastructure Facility, that by definition, requires the State to prove the facility is “completely
enclosed by a fence or other physical barrier that is obviously designed to exclude intruders[.]”
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(b)(7)(H). The information read as a whole, adequately informs
Mejia of how he had notice his entry was forbidden at Union Pacific Railroad’s switchyard, a
Critical Infrastructure Facility. See Murphy, 665 S.W.2d at 118; Dennis, 647 S.W.2d at 280–81;
Coleman, 643 S.W.2d at 125; Sandoval, 842 S.W.2d at 790; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 21.12.
Having determined the amended information sufficiently provides the requisite notice
required of a charging instrument, we now determine whether the trial court erred in denying the
State’s motion to amend the information.
MOTION TO AMEND INFORMATION
A. Standard of Review
A trial court bases its decision to deny the State’s motion to amend an information on the
trial court’s review of the proposed amended information, the State’s motion, and applicable law.
Jarreau III, 563 S.W.3d at 489. Because the trial court’s decision does not turn on an evaluation
of the witnesses’ credibility or demeanor, we apply a de novo standard of review. Id.
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B. Applicable Law
Article 28.10 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that after notice to the
defendant, the State may amend an information as to form or substance any time before the date
on which trial commences. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10(a). The information may not
be amended over a defendant’s objection as to form or substance if the amended information
“charges the defendant with an additional or different offense or if the substantial rights of the
defendant are prejudiced.” Id. art. 28.10(c).
A “different offense” in the context of article 28.10(c) means a different statutory offense.
Lebo v. State, 100 S.W.3d 417, 421 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. ref’d) (citing Flowers v.
State, 815 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). To determine whether a defendant’s
substantial rights are prejudiced, we “must look to whether the amendment would impair the
defendant’s ability to prepare a defense, i.e., defect is such that the defendant is not provided with
adequate notice so as to allow him to prepare a defense.” Jarreau III, 563 S.W.3d at 490 (citing
Flowers, 815 S.W.2d at 729; Hillin v. State, 808 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).
C. Application
The amendment proposed by the State and rejected by the trial court did not charge the
defendant with a different or additional offense. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10(c).
Rather, the amendment sought to name the owner or agent of the property and more clearly identify
the location of the property the State alleges Mejia criminally trespassed upon. Thus, it more fully
provides notice of the offense for which Mejia was charged.
Additionally, the proposed amendment did not prejudice Mejia’s substantial rights as he
claims. Mejia moved to quash the State’s original information asserting the property description
insufficiently apprised him of the property’s location where he allegedly criminally trespassed.
Furthermore, Mejia argued the original information also provided inadequate notice on how his
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entry was forbidden. As explained above, the State’s proposed amendment provided the exact
information Mejia requested—notice sufficient to allow him to prepare his defense. See Jarreau
III, 563 S.W.3d at 490. Moreover, Mejia’s arguments pertaining to issues surrounding his
continued federal custody are misplaced in proceedings involving challenges to the sufficiency of
a charging instrument. Prejudice that must be avoided in the context of amending an information
under article 28.10(c) concerns the defendant having adequate notice of the allegations to allow
the defendant to prepare a defense. See id.; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10(c).
Thus, we cannot conclude that allowing the State’s amendment would have prejudiced
Mejia’s substantial rights. See Jarreau III, 563 S.W.3d at 490; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 28.10(c).
Because the State’s motion to amend a pretrial amendment to the information neither
charged an additional or different offense nor prejudiced Mejia’s substantial rights, we hold the
trial court erred in denying the State’s motion to amend the information and granting Mejia’s
motion to quash, set aside, and dismiss the complaint and information. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 28.10(c).
We sustain the State’s issues on appeal.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s order denying the State’s motion to amend the information and
granting Mejia’s motion to quash and set aside the information. We remand the case to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Irene Rios, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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