In the Interest of R.F., K.F., and K.F. v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-22-00407-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF R.F., K.F., AND K.F.
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On Appeal from the 317th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. C-240,170
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her seven-
year-old daughter R.F., five-year-old son K.F., and four-year-old daughter K.F. 1 The
trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory grounds exist for
termination of Mother’s parental rights, and that termination of her parental rights
would be in the best interest of the children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §
161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (J), (P), (R), (2).2
1
To protect the identity of the children, we use pseudonyms to refer to the
children and the parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2
In a separate order, the trial court also terminated Father’s parental rights,
but Father is not a party to this appeal.
1
Mother’s appointed attorney submitted a brief in which she contends that there
are no meritorious issues for appeal and that the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 730-31 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination
cases). The brief presents the attorney’s professional evaluation of the record and
explains why no arguable grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s judgment. The
attorney represented to the Court that she gave Mother a copy of the Anders brief
she filed, notified Mother of her right to file a pro se brief, and provided Mother a
copy of the appellate record. The Court notified Mother of her right to file a pro se
response and of the deadline for doing so. Mother did not file a response with the
Court.
We have independently evaluated the appellate record and the brief filed by
Mother’s court-appointed attorney. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988)
(citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009,
no pet.). Based on our review we have found nothing that would arguably support
an appeal and we agree that the appeal is frivolous and lacks merit. See Bledsoe, 178
S.W.3d at 827-28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion
that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible
error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of
2
Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619. Therefore, we find it
unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief the appeal. Cf. Stafford
v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights. Should
Mother decide to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of Texas, her counsel’s
obligation can be met “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for
an Anders brief.” See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27-28 (Tex. 2016) (citations
omitted).
AFFIRMED.
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LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on May 2, 2023
Opinion Delivered May 11, 2023
Before Horton, Johnson and Wright, JJ.
3