In the Interest of C.D., a Child v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

Opinion filed May 11, 2023
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-22-00333-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF C.D., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 326th District Court
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 10662-CX
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated the parental
rights of the mother of the child at issue in this case, C.D., and appointed the father
as C.D.’s sole managing conservator. The mother filed this appeal. In her sole issue
on appeal, she challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support
the trial court’s finding that the termination of her parental rights is in the best interest
of C.D. We affirm the order of the trial court.
I. Termination Findings and Standards
The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West 2022). To terminate parental
rights, it must be shown by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has
committed one of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(U) and that
termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. In this case, the trial court found
that Appellant had committed three of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1)—
those found in subsections (D), (E), and (O). Appellant does not challenge these
findings on appeal.
The trial court also found, pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(2), that termination
of Appellant’s parental rights would be in the best interest of the child. See id.
§ 161.001(b)(2). It is this finding that Appellant challenges on appeal.
To determine if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case,
we review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine
whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its
finding was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the
evidence is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine
whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or
conviction about the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002). We note that the trial court is the sole arbiter of the credibility
and demeanor of witnesses. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (citing In
re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 86–87 (Tex. 2005)).
With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be
proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied).
But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis.
Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not
limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the
child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now
and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the
programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the
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child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking
custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or
omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent–child relationship
is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id.Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination
may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best
interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
II. Evidence Presented at Trial
The record shows that the Department of Family and Protective Services
became involved with C.D. when he was approximately ten months old. The reason
for the Department’s initial involvement was Appellant’s use of drugs. C.D. was in
Appellant’s care, and C.D.’s father was not part of his life at the time. During the
Department’s investigation of the allegations against Appellant, both she and C.D.
tested positive for methamphetamine. The Department subsequently removed C.D.
from Appellant’s care.
After the removal, the trial court ordered Appellant to comply with the
requirements set forth in her family service plan so that C.D. could be returned to
Appellant. The family service plan required that Appellant complete a variety of
services. Appellant failed to comply with the requirements set forth in her service
plan. She continued to use methamphetamine, testing positive in every hair follicle
test to which she submitted. Five weeks prior to the last day of trial, the level of
methamphetamine in Appellant’s hair follicle was 22,324 pg/mg. Furthermore, she
did not maintain contact with the Department, did not participate in outpatient
services, did not regularly visit C.D., and did not submit to random drug testing on
at least nine occasions when requested by the Department.
The Department initially placed C.D. with grandparents, but the trial court
eventually ordered that C.D. be placed with his father. At the time of trial, C.D. had
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been living with his father for eight months. The Department did not seek
termination of either parent’s rights at the hearing; rather, it sought to be appointed
permanent managing conservator of C.D. and requested a placement change. The
father opposed the Department’s request; he sought, and was granted, sole managing
conservatorship of C.D. and termination of Appellant’s parental rights.
The permanency supervisor for 2INgage suggested that “to the extent that
[Appellant] can straighten up,” C.D.’s best interest would be served by a continued
relationship with Appellant. However, nothing in the record suggested that
Appellant would “straighten up.” Except for the time that she spent in an inpatient
treatment facility, Appellant continued to use methamphetamine throughout the
pendency of the case below.
C.D.’s father testified that he believed it would be in C.D.’s best interest to
terminate Appellant’s rights. The father pointed to Appellant’s continued drug use
as a safety concern, stating that Appellant “doesn’t care enough [to] get clean and
sober.” He did not believe that Appellant would “get it together” anytime in the next
sixteen years. The father also noted that Appellant had missed numerous scheduled
visits with C.D., that her whereabouts were unknown, and that she did not even
bother to appear for trial in this case. The father testified that he was willing and
able to provide for C.D.’s needs and that C.D. was his “number one priority and
always will be.”
III. Analysis
In her sole issue, Appellant asserts that the evidence presented at trial was
legally and factually insufficient to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
termination of her parental rights would be in the best interest of C.D. The trial
court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility. A.B., 437
S.W.3d at 503. We are not at liberty to disturb the determinations of the trier of fact
as long as those determinations are not unreasonable. J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573.
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Giving due deference to the trial court, we hold that, based on the evidence presented
at trial and the Holley factors, the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm
belief or conviction that termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be in the
best interest of C.D. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
As set forth above, the evidence showed that Appellant endangered her child
by allowing him to be exposed to methamphetamine while in her care and that she
continued to use methamphetamine and continued to constitute a threat to C.D.’s
safety. Upon considering the record as it relates to Appellant’s use—and continued
use—of methamphetamine, C.D.’s exposure to methamphetamine while in
Appellant’s care, the emotional and physical danger to C.D. now and in the future,
the desires of C.D. (who was too young to express any desire), the emotional and
physical needs of C.D. now and in the future, the parental abilities of those involved,
and the father’s plans for C.D., we hold that the evidence is legally and factually
sufficient to support the finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in
the best interest of C.D. See id. We defer to the trial court’s finding as to the child’s
best interest, see C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27, and we cannot hold in this case that the trial
court’s finding as to best interest is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the order of the trial court.
W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE
May 11, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.
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