Oliva, Jose ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                         PD-0398-17
    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    AUSTIN, TEXAS
    Transmitted 3/5/2018 1:18 PM
    Accepted 3/7/2018 11:46 AM
    DEANA WILLIAMSON
    No. PD-0398-17                                       CLERK
    TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS            RECEIVED
    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    3/7/2018
    OF THE STATE OF TEXAS         DEANA WILLIAMSON, CLERK
    JOSE OLIVA,                                                 Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                          Appellee
    Appeal from Harris County
    * * * * *
    STATE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY’S
    SUBSEQUENT POST-SUBMISSION AMICUS BRIEF
    IN RESPONSE TO AMICI NCDD, DUIDLA, DCCDLA
    * * * * *
    STACEY M. SOULE
    State Prosecuting Attorney
    Bar I.D. No. 24031632
    P.O. Box 13046
    Austin, Texas 78711
    information@spa.texas.gov
    512-463-1660 (Telephone)
    512-463-5724 (Fax)
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
    ARGUMENT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5
    PRAYER FOR RELIEF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
    i
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    Cases
    Calton v. State, 
    176 S.W.3d 231
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (en banc). . . . . . . . . . 2-3
    Chase v. State, 
    448 S.W.3d 6
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
    Statutes
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 4.05. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    TEX. ELEC. CODE § 86.006(g). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5
    TEX. ELEC. CODE § 86.006(g), (g-1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    TEX. ELEC. CODE § 86.006(g-1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
    TEX. ELEC. CODE § 86.010(g), (i). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    TEX. ELEC. CODE § 86.010(i)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    TEX. PENAL CODE § 49.09(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
    TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 547.614(a-1), (a-2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 547.614(b), (c).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    Rule
    TEX. R. APP. P. 11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 n.1
    ii
    No. PD-0398-17
    TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
    JOSE OLIVA,                                                               Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                       Appellee
    Appeal from Harris County
    * * * * *
    STATE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY’S
    SUBSEQUENT POST-SUBMISSION AMICUS BRIEF1
    IN RESPONSE TO AMICI NCDD, DUIDLA, DCCDLA
    * * * * *
    TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
    The State Prosecuting Attorney submits this subsequent post-submission
    amicus brief in response to Amicus Curiae the National College for DUI Defense
    (NCDD), the DUI Defense Lawyer Association (DUIDLA), the Dallas Criminal
    1
    As the State Prosecuting Attorney, there is no fee attached to this filing. TEX.
    R. APP. P. 11.
    1
    Defense Lawyer Association (DCDLA), and the Denton County Criminal Defense
    Lawyer Association (DCCDLA).
    ARGUMENT
    Pointing to the State Prosecuting Attorney’s list of offenses using the phrase
    “if it shown on the trial of the offense,” Amici claim,
    The list can be broken down into three categories of statutes: (1) statutes
    where the fact that must be proven is jurisdictional [e.g. Tex. Transp.
    Code 521.457, Tex. Transp. Code 545.420, Tex. Transp. Code 644.151,
    Tex. Fam. Code 261.109], (2) statutes where the dollar amount in
    controversy determines the jurisdiction of the court and the punishment
    range for the offense [e.g. Tex. Gov’t Code 466.306, Tex. Gov’t Code
    466.307, Tex. Gov’t Code 466.308, Tex. Nat. Res. Code 151.052, Tex.
    Penal Code 33.023], and (3) statutes where an otherwise-non-criminal
    act is a fact of consequence providing for a higher punishment [e.g. Tex.
    Penal Code 15.031, Tex. Penal Code 20.05, Tex. Penal Code 32.31, Tex.
    Penal Code 15.031, Tex. Penal Code 35A.02].
    Notably absent is any other statute where a prior non-jurisdictional
    criminal offense is treated as an element of the greater offense. Not a
    single offense listed by the State makes a prior conviction an element of
    the offense unless the conviction effects both the jurisdiction of the
    court and the punishment range of the offense.
    Amicus Brief of NCDD, DUIDLA, DCCDLA, at 17-18 (emphasis in original).
    This is incorrect. All those weighing in on the issue concede that Calton v.
    State recognized the following guiding principle: “whether something is an element
    of an offense is a completely separate inquiry from whether it is jurisdictionally
    required. We have made clear that jurisdiction is not an element of an offense.” 176
    
    2 S.W.3d 231
    , 234-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (en banc). In line with this, Calton’s
    interpretation of the phrase “if it is shown at the trial” in the “Evading Arrest or
    Detention” statute supports the State Prosecuting Attorney’s argument. 
    Id. There, jurisdiction
    vested with the district court due to Calton’s use of a vehicle during the
    commission of the offense; his prior conviction was not a “jurisdictional element.”
    
    Id. Additionally, Amici’s
    distinction between offenses with (1) a jurisdictional
    requirement and a fact to be proven or a threshold value element and (2) jurisdiction
    and a prior offense element, is inconsequential. See Amicus Brief of NCDD,
    DUIDLA, DCCDLA, at 17-18. In Calton, this Court plainly recognized examples of
    offense-enhancing statutes that are non-jurisdictional and value-based or fact-
    dependent. The property-value-ladder for “Theft,” the Court explained, is not a
    jurisdictional requirement because jurisdiction vests when there is an allegation that
    the property reaches a certain threshold amount; the value of the property is then an
    element of the 
    offense. 176 S.W.3d at 235
    . Next, the Court pointed out that
    commission by a “public servant” is an element for first-degree “Aggravated
    Assault.” 
    Id. But the
    “public servant” element is not a jurisdictional requirement,
    however, because jurisdiction lies with the district court regardless of whether a
    “public servant” was involved. 
    Id. 3 Even
    if Amici’s distinction were a key point, criminal statutes with a non-
    jurisdictional prior offense enhancing element do exist (in addition to Evading Arrest
    or Detention). 
    Id. at 234-35.
    The offense “Restrictions on Airbags” provides, in part:
    (b) Except as provided by Subsections (c), (d), and (e), an offense under
    this section is a state jail felony.
    (c) An offense under this section is a felony of the third degree if it is
    shown on the trial of the offense that the defendant has been previously
    convicted of an offense under this section.
    TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 547.614(b), (c). A district court’s jurisdiction does not need
    to be invoked for a primary offense under TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 547.614(a-1), (a-2)
    to be elevated to a third degree felony with a prior conviction under the same
    provision. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 4.05 (“District courts and criminal district
    court shall have original jurisdiction in criminal cases of the grade felony”).
    The Election Code provides two more examples. Consider the offense of
    “Unlawfully Assisting Voter Voting Ballot By Mail.” TEX. ELEC. CODE § 86.010(g),
    (i). An offense under that provision is a state jail felony and is “increased to the next
    higher grade of offense if it is shown on the trial of an offense that: (1) the defendant
    was previously convicted of an offense under this code.” TEX. ELEC. CODE §
    86.010(i)(1).   The offense of “Method of Returning Marked Ballot” shares this
    feature as well, though the statute presents a more complicated scheme. TEX. ELEC.
    CODE § 86.006(g), (g-1). Subsection (g), states: “An offense under Subsection (f) is
    4
    a Class A misdemeanor unless the defendant possessed the ballot or carrier envelope
    without the request of the voter, in which case it is a felony of the third degree.”
    TEX. ELEC. CODE § 86.006(g). Subsection (g-1), effective December 31, 2017,
    provides: “An offense under Subsection (g) is increased to the next higher category
    of offense if it is shown on the trial of an offense under this section that: (1) the
    defendant was previously convicted of an offense under this code.” TEX. ELEC. CODE
    § 86.006(g-1). So a third-degree enhanced to a second-degree is non-jurisdictional.
    As the foregoing statutes demonstrate, a Class B misdemeanor DWI would not
    be the only offense where a prior conviction is an offense element that does not affect
    jurisdiction. The State Prosecuting Attorney’s statement that the “phrase ‘shown on
    the trial of an offense’ when paired with language directed at offense classification
    has acquired a technical meaning apart from punishment enhancement”2 has not been
    undermined in any way. Thus, Amici’s arguments under state law (the only law
    applicable) have been proven to be unpersuasive. See Chase v. State, 
    448 S.W.3d 6
    ,
    17-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (applicability of defensive issue to a single criminal
    provision (TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE CODE § 43.002) a reason to reject the State’s
    argument that TEX. PARKS & WILDLIFE CODE § 822.013 is purely a civil statute and
    not applicable to the Penal Code offense of “Cruelty to Non-Livestock Animals”).
    2
    State Prosecuting Attorney’s Post-Submission Amicus Brief, at 7.
    5
    PRAYER FOR RELIEF
    Again, the State Prosecuting Attorney prays that this Court hold that TEX.
    PENAL CODE § 49.09(a) is a habitual offense enhancer that, by statute in a bifurcated
    proceeding, must be proven to be the defendant’s beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Further, it is urged that the Court hold that the statutory error here, relating to only
    timing, not sufficiency, be declared harmless because the prior was established during
    punishment.
    Respectfully submitted,
    /s/ Stacey M. Soule
    State Prosecuting Attorney
    Bar I.D. No. 24031632
    P.O. Box 13046
    Austin, Texas 78711
    information@spa.texas.gov
    512-463-1660 (Telephone)
    512-463-5724 (Fax)
    6
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    The undersigned certifies that according to the WordPerfect word count tool
    this document contains 1,071 words, exclusive of the items excepted by TEX. R. APP.
    P. 9.4(i)(1).
    /s/ Stacey M. Soule
    State Prosecuting Attorney
    7
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    The undersigned certifies that a copy of the State Prosecuting Attorney’s
    Subsequent Post-Submission Amicus Brief in Response to Amici NCDD, DUIDLA,
    DCCDLA has been served on March 5, 2018, via email or certified electronic to:
    Hon. Patricia McLean
    1202 Franklin
    Suite 600
    Houston, Texas 77002
    mclean_patricia@dao.hctx.net
    Hon. Ted Wood
    1201 Franklin
    13th Floor
    Houston, Texas 77002
    ted.wood@pdo.hctx.net
    Hon. J. Edward Niehaus
    207 W. Hickory Street,
    Suite 309
    Denton, Texas 76201
    jason@bndlegal.com
    /s/ Stacey M. Soule
    State Prosecuting Attorney
    

Document Info

Docket Number: PD-0398-17

Filed Date: 3/7/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/12/2018