Lewis v. Monthei CA1/5 ( 2016 )


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  • Filed 9/15/16 Lewis v. Monthei CA1/5
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
    publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
    or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FIVE
    KEITH ALLEN LEWIS, SR.,
    Plaintiff and Appellant,
    A143941
    v.
    E. MONTHEI ET AL.,                                                   (Marin County
    Super. Ct. No. CIV1401394)
    Defendants and Respondents.
    Plaintiff and appellant Keith Allen Lewis, Sr., appearing in propia persona,
    contends the trial court erred in sustaining respondents’ demurrer without leave to amend.
    We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Appellant is a California inmate housed at San Quentin State Prison. On April 1,
    2014, appellant filed a form complaint alleging a cause of action for general negligence
    against Kevin Chappell, E. Monthei, Paul Burton, and Sheila Dickson. A June 2014
    amended complaint indicates Chappell was sued in his capacity as Warden of San
    Quentin State Prison during the time at issue in this action; E. Monthei, Paul Burton, and
    Sheila Dickson were sued in their capacity as psychiatrists employed at San Quentin
    State Prison during the time at issue.
    Lewis’s April 2014 complaint alleged that, on September 22, 2013, Dr. Dickson
    issued a false “Serious Rules Violation Report” regarding appellant, in retaliation for a
    document authored by appellant that alleged wrongdoing by doctors at San Quentin. He
    also alleged that Dr. Dickson “sexually molested” him. In June 2014, respondents
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    demurred on the ground that appellant had failed to comply with the claim-presentation
    requirements of the Government Claims Act (“Claims Act”) (Govt. Code § 810 et seq.).
    Appellant filed a first amended complaint and the trial court gave appellant until August
    5 to “file his papers showing compliance with the Government Claims Act. . . .” Later in
    August, the trial court stayed the action for 60 days “to allow plaintiff to file an
    application with the Victim Compensation & Government Claims Board . . . to present a
    late claim, and to take any necessary procedural steps thereafter.”
    In November 2014, the trial court sustained respondents’ demurrer to appellant’s
    amended complaint without leave to amend. The court granted respondents’ request for
    judicial notice of certain records of the Victim Compensation & Government Claims
    Board. The court noted that, although appellant had been afforded additional time to
    demonstrate compliance with the claim-presentation requirements of the Claims Act,
    appellant had “provided the court with no information about any written late-claim
    application . . . .” The trial court found that, based on the documents that were the
    subject of respondents’ request for judicial notice, appellant could not amend his
    complaint to show he presented a timely claim. Additionally, the court found that
    appellant’s allegations failed to state a recognized cause of action. Among other things,
    the court noted that Dr. Dickson’s allegedly false report would be privileged under
    section 47 of the California Civil Code.
    The trial court denied appellant’s motion for reconsideration, and the present
    appeal followed.
    DISCUSSION
    “ ‘On appeal from an order of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer, our
    standard of review is de novo, i.e., we exercise our independent judgment about whether
    the complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law.’ ” (Los Altos El Granada
    Investors v. City of Capitola (2006) 
    139 Cal. App. 4th 629
    , 650.) Where the trial court has
    sustained a demurrer without leave to amend, “we decide whether there is a reasonable
    possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has
    abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we
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    affirm. [Citations.] The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the
    plaintiff.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 
    39 Cal. 3d 311
    , 318; accord Zelig v. County of Los
    Angeles (2002) 
    27 Cal. 4th 1112
    , 1126.)
    The “failure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the
    claim presentation requirement [of the Claims Act] subjects a claim against a public
    entity to a demurrer for failure to state a cause of action.” (State of California v. Superior
    Court (2004) 
    32 Cal. 4th 1234
    , 1239.) In that instance, neither can a claim be asserted
    against a public employee for injury resulting from an act in the scope of his or her
    employment. (Fisher v. Pickens (1990) 
    225 Cal. App. 3d 708
    , 718.) Appellant has not
    shown he can amend his complaint to allege compliance with the claim presentation
    requirements of the Claims Act, which requires that all claims for money or damages
    against a public entity be presented to the public entity and rejected before initiation of a
    lawsuit. (State of California, at p. 1239; Sofranek v. County of Merced (2007) 
    146 Cal. App. 4th 1238
    , 1246.)
    One requirement the trial court focused upon is the requirement that a claimant
    pay a fee or obtain a fee waiver before a claim can be considered presented. In particular,
    Government Code section 911.2, subdivision (b), provides, “[f]or purposes of
    determining whether a claim was commenced within the period provided by law, the date
    the claim was presented to the Department of General Services is” either the date the
    claim was submitted with a $25 filing fee; the date the claim was submitted with an
    affidavit requesting a fee waiver that is ultimately granted; or the date the claim was
    submitted with an affidavit requesting a fee waiver that is ultimately denied, if the fee is
    promptly paid thereafter. The trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer points out that
    the judicially noticed documents show appellant did not pay the $25 fee or obtain a
    waiver. Absent payment of the fee or grant of a waiver request, appellant’s claim was
    never “presented” within the meaning of the Claims Act and a lawsuit could not be
    initiated. On appeal, appellant does not contend he can amend his complaint to allege
    payment of the fee or grant of a fee waiver. Accordingly, the trial court properly
    sustained the demurrer.
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    Because appellant has not shown he can amend his complaint to allege his claim
    was “presented” within the meaning of the Claims Act, we need not address respondents’
    additional contentions that any claim presented was untimely and that appellant failed to
    await a decision on his claim before filing his lawsuit. Neither need we address the trial
    court’s additional ground that appellant’s allegations failed to state a cause of action.
    DISPOSITION
    The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to
    respondents.
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    SIMONS, Acting P.J.
    We concur.
    NEEDHAM, J.
    BRUINIERS, J.
    (A143941)
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Document Info

Docket Number: A143941

Filed Date: 9/15/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021