Danny Lee Shead v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                  ACCEPTED
    07-15-00165-CV
    SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    AMARILLO, TEXAS
    7/1/2015 12:53:33 PM
    Vivian Long, Clerk
    NO. 07-15-00165-CV
    IN THE                            FILED IN
    7th COURT OF APPEALS
    COURT OF APPEALS                  AMARILLO, TEXAS
    SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT           7/1/2015 12:53:33 PM
    AMARILLO, TEXAS                      VIVIAN LONG
    CLERK
    DANNY LEE SHEAD,
    Appellant
    VS.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    APPEAL IN CAUSE NO 8461-B
    IN THE 181ST DISTRICT COURT
    OF RANDALL COUNTY, TEXAS
    BRIEF OF APPELLEE
    JAMES A. FARREN
    Randall County Criminal District Att’y
    WARREN L. CLARK
    wclark@randallcounty.org
    clarkwl3@gmail.com
    Assistant Criminal District Attorney
    SBN 04300500
    2309 Russell Long Boulevard, Suite 120
    Canyon, Texas 79015
    Tel. (806) 468-5570
    Fax (806) 468-5566
    Attorney for Appellee
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
    PARTIES TO TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT:
    The State of Texas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (Appellee)
    Danny Lee Shead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defendant (Appellant)
    TRIAL AND APPELLATE COUNSEL:
    Danny Lee Shead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pro Se Defendant / Appellant
    TDCJ # 1484832
    Tulia Transfer Unit
    4000 Hwy 86 West
    Tulia, Texas 79088
    Warren L. Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appellate Counsel for Appellee
    Appellate Chief
    Assistant Criminal District Attorney
    Randall County Criminal District Attorney’s Office
    2309 Russell Long Blvd., Suite 120
    Canyon, Texas 79015
    ii
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
    TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
    Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
    Constitutions And Statutes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
    Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
    A.       Nature Of The Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
    B.       Course Of Proceedings and Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
    ISSUE PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
    STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
    ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
    Issue:            Whether there is error apparent on the face of the record. . . . . . . . . . 5
    PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
    iii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    CASES:
    Andrews v. Koch, 
    702 S.W.2d 584
    (Tex. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
    Barton v. Gillespie, 
    178 S.W.3d 121
          (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
    Butler v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 
    31 S.W.3d 642
          (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
    Escobar v. Escobar, 
    711 S.W.2d 230
    (Tex. 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
    Harrell v. State, 
    286 S.W.3d 315
    (Tex. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7
    Mathews v. Eldridge, 
    424 U.S. 319
    (1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
    Riner v. Briargrove Park Prop. Owners, Inc., 
    976 S.W.2d 680
          (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
    Shead v. State, No. 07-15-00084-CV
    (Tex.App.-Amarillo March 24, 2015, no pet.) (unpublished) . . . . . . . . . . 1-2
    Sorsby v. State, 
    624 S.W.2d 227
          (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-8
    CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES
    TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 103.009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
    TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.014(e) (Vernon Supp. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
    RULES
    TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
    iv
    TEX. R. APP. PROC. 38.2(a)(1)(B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
    v
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    A.    NATURE OF THE CASE
    This is a restricted appeal arising from an order to withdraw inmate funds under
    Government Code section 501.014(e).
    B.    COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
    Appellant was convicted of Sexual Assault in Cause Number 8461-B on April
    1, 1996. (C.R. 1: 5-7). In February 2010, the trial court entered an order to withdraw
    funds from Appellant’s inmate trust account pursuant to Government Code section
    501.014(e). TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.014(e) (Vernon Supp. 2009). (C.R. 1: 8)
    A Nunc Pro Tunc Order To Withdraw Funds was entered and filed of record by the
    trial court on May 22, 2014. (C.R. 1:14-15) On July 21, 2014, Appellant filed his
    Objection to Nunc Pro Tunc Order to Withdraw Funds. (C.R. 1:16-19) Appellant filed
    an additional motion styled Motion To Rescind Order to Withdraw Inmate Funds and
    Return All Monies Garnished Back to Inmate on September 23, 2014. (C.R. 1:21-24)
    On January 8, 2015, the trial court entered its Order Denying Defendant’s Objections
    to Nunc Pro Tunc Order to Withdraw Funds and Motion To Rescind Order to
    Withdraw Inmate Funds. (C.R. 1:26) Appellant attempted to appeal this order but it
    was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. See Shead v. State, No. 07-15-00085-CV
    1
    (Tex.App.-Amarillo March 24, 2015) (not designated for publication). Subsequently,
    less than one month later, Appellant gave notice of his restricted appeal in this cause.
    ISSUE PRESENTED
    Based on TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2(a)(1)(B), Appellee asserts that the following is
    a correct statement of the issue presented:
    Whether there is error apparent on the face of the record as it pertains to the trial
    court’s order withdrawing inmate funds.
    2
    NO. 07-15-00165-CV
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS
    SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    AMARILLO, TEXAS
    DANNY LEE SHEAD,
    Appellant
    VS.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    APPEAL IN CAUSE NO. 8461-B
    IN THE 181ST DISTRICT COURT
    OF RANDALL COUNTY, TEXAS
    BRIEF OF APPELLEE
    TO THE HONORABLE JUSTICES OF THE SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS:
    Based on TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2, Appellee, The State of Texas (“Appellee”) files
    its brief in the above-entitled and numbered cause.
    3
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    The facts necessary to adequately address the issue are contained in the
    Statement of the Case.
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
    Appellant claims that his due process rights were violated when the trial court
    signed and entered a nunc pro tunc order to withdraw funds from his inmate trust
    account. (Appellant’s Brief at p. 10) He argues that the trial court was without plenary
    power to do so. However, a trial court may, at any time, correct a clerical error by
    entering the appropriate nunc pro tunc judgment or order. As long as the correction
    pertains to a discrepancy between the judgment or order entered and actual record, and
    does not arise from judicial reasoning or determination, the trial court is not prohibited
    from entering the nunc pro tunc ruling once the trial court’s plenary power has
    expired. Here, the trial court merely corrected the amount due under a certified bill
    of cost pertaining to the judgment of conviction entered against Appellant. In fact, the
    corrected amount inured to the benefit of Appellant since it authorized withdrawal of
    a lesser sum, giving due credit to payments already received and deleting court-
    appointed attorney’s fees. A facial review of the record reveals no error, save and
    except for the inclusion of a fine of $1,000.00 which should be deleted since it was not
    imposed by the trial court when Appellant was sentenced on April 1, 1996.
    4
    ARGUMENT
    Issue:         Whether there is error apparent on the face of the record
    as it pertains to the trial court’s order withdrawing inmate
    funds.
    Appellant was not deprived of procedural due process
    Appellant’s due process concerns were addressed by the Supreme Court in
    Harrell v. State, 
    286 S.W.3d 315
    (Tex. 2009). Although the court held that an inmate
    is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding an order like the one here
    at issue, it also held that neither need occur before funds are actually withdrawn.
    Harrell v. 
    State, 286 S.W.3d at 321
    . As for the amount of process due, the Harrell
    court balanced three factors: 1) the privacy interest affected; 2) the risk of erroneous
    deprivation of that interest through the procedures used and the probable value of
    additional or substitute procedural safeguards and 3) the government’s interest,
    including fiscal and administrative burdens, that the substitute or additional procedure
    would entail. 
    Id., at 320-21
    (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 
    424 U.S. 319
    , 335 (1976)).
    In both Harrell and the present case, the interest affected is the money in the inmate’s
    trust account. Harrell v. 
    State, 286 S.W.3d at 319
    .
    As for the second factor, the Harrell court stated that any risk of an erroneous
    deprivation was modest because the defendant was notified of the costs assessed when
    he was sentenced and was free at that time to contest them. 
    Id., at 320.
    Here, unlike
    5
    the judgment in Harrell, the amount of costs was not written into Appellant’s
    judgment. Appellant nonetheless had a chance, and in fact took advantage of that
    chance, to question the costs when he filed his motions to rescind the withholding
    orders. Although Appellant could have assailed the type of costs assessed, he has only
    claimed, in a multifarious point, that the costs were assessed too late. (Appellant’s
    Brief at 8-10).
    The District Clerk is required to keep a record of each fee or item of cost
    charged for a service rendered in a criminal case. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
    103.009 (Vernon 2006). A statement of an item of cost in a fee record is prima facie
    evidence that the statement is correct. 
    Id., at art.
    103.009(c). A cost is payable by a
    defendant when a written bill is produced, or is ready to be produced, containing the
    items of cost. 
    Id., at art.
    103.001 (Vernon 2006). Appellant was specifically ordered
    in the judgments to pay costs of court. (C.R. 1:6) Thus, regardless of whether the
    amount of costs were written vel non on Appellant’s judgment, he was ordered to pay
    them at the time he was convicted and they became due when the Bill of Costs was
    produced. Even though Appellant may not have learned of the amount and type of
    costs as early as Harrell did, he still had an opportunity to contest them, which he did.
    Accordingly, as in Harrell, any risk of an erroneous deprivation of rights was modest.
    Harrell v. 
    State, 286 S.W.3d at 320
    . (Of course, the same cannot be said regarding the
    6
    actual fine assessed against Appellant. He was informed of same at the time of his
    sentencing in open court and remained aware of his obligation, regardless of the
    duration of time which had passed from the time of his formal sentencing to the trial
    court’s entry of the nunc pro tunc order withdrawing inmate funds.)
    Regarding the third factor, the Harrell court noted that the State’s interest is in
    the efficient recoupment of court costs. 
    Id. In balancing
    all three factors together, the
    court determined that an inmate is entitled to notice, which Harrell received through
    a copy of the notification of withdrawal of funds, and an opportunity to be heard,
    which Harrell received via his motion to rescind the withdrawal notification. 
    Id. Harrell’s motion
    to rescind was considered, and denied, by the trial court. According
    to the Supreme Court, no other process was due. 
    Id. Likewise, Appellant
    received a
    copy of the orders to withdraw funds and his contest of those orders was considered
    and denied by the trial court. He thus has received all that due process requires.
    As for Appellant’s claim that the State is prevented from collecting the court
    costs at issue since it waited fourteen years to do so, this argument has no merit.
    Essentially, Appellant is suggesting that theories such as adverse possession, estoppel
    or laches somehow apply to the State and prevent it from collecting these fees. The
    suggestion has no merit. See Sorsby v. State, 
    624 S.W.2d 227
    , 236 (Tex.App.-Houston
    7
    [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ). Delay in seeking recoupment from the inmate’s trust account
    poses no bar to it.
    The trial court was permitted to enter an order on the
    nunc pro tunc order to withdraw inmate funds
    Pursuant to Rule 329(b) of the Texas Rules of Procedure, the trial court has
    plenary power for 30 days after a judgment or appealable order is signed to grant a
    new trial or to vacate, modify, correct or reform same. TEX. R. APP. PROC. 329b(d).
    Once the trial court’s plenary power expires, it cannot set its judgment aside except
    by a bill of review for sufficient cause. TEX. R. APP. PROC. 329b(f); Escobar v.
    Escobar, 
    711 S.W.2d 230
    , 231 (Tex. 1986); Barton v. Gillespie, 
    178 S.W.3d 121
    , 126
    (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). A clerical error is a discrepancy between
    the entry of the judgment, order or supporting document in the record and the
    judgment, order or document actually rendered or entered. It does not arise from
    judicial reasoning or determination. 
    Barton, 178 S.W.3d at 126
    (citing to Andrews v.
    Koch, 
    702 S.W.2d 584
    , 585 (Tex. 1986)).
    On the flip side, a judicial error occurs in the rendering, as opposed to the
    entering, of a judgment or order. 
    Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231
    . It arises from a mistake
    of law or fact that requires judicial reasoning to correct. Butler v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc.,
    
    31 S.W.3d 642
    , 647 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). The record must
    8
    be clear and convincing that a clerical error has been made. See Riner v. Briargrove
    Park Prop. Owners, Inc., 
    976 S.W.2d 680
    , 683 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997,
    no writ). Evidence in support of the entry of a nunc pro tunc order may be supported
    by reference to oral testimony given by witnesses, written documents, previous
    judgments, docket entries or the trial judge’s personal recollection. 
    Riner, 976 S.W.2d at 683
    .
    In the case at bar, the discrepancy corrected is simply the amount of court costs,
    fees and fine owed by Appellant as a direct result of his conviction for Sexual Assault
    after having given him due credit for amounts he had paid from the date of entry of
    original judgment, as well as deleting court appointed attorney’s fees. (C.R. 1:13) The
    fact that Appellant may have discharged the actual sentence imposed back in 1996 did
    not eliminate his liability for those amounts assessed as court costs and mandatory
    fees. However, the inclusion of the $1,000.00 fine does not constitute a discrepancy
    which is amenable to correction by way of a nunc pro tunc order since it was not
    imposed by the trial court as part of Appellant’s sentence back on April 1, 1996. To
    the extent that the order to withdraw funds commanded the withdrawal of a minimal
    amount of court costs and the totality of the court-imposed fine, to the exclusion of
    court-appointed attorney’s fees and fine, there is no plain error in the enforcement of
    said order.
    9
    PRAYER
    WHEREFORE, Appellee, the State of Texas, respectfully requests that this
    Court affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.
    Respectfully submitted,
    James A. Farren
    Randall County Criminal
    District Attorney
    Warren L. Clark
    Warren L. Clark
    Appellate Chief
    clarkwl3@gmail.com
    wclark@randallcounty.org
    Assistant Criminal District Att’y
    SBN 04300500
    2309 Russell Long Boulevard, Suite 120
    Canyon, Texas 79015
    Tel. (806) 468-5570
    Fax (806) 468-5566
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    I hereby certify that the foregoing brief consists of a total of 2,377 words,
    prepared with WordPerfect software, 14 point Times New Roman font.
    Warren L. Clark
    Warren L. Clark
    10
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing brief was served
    upon Appellant by mailing a copy to Danny Lee Shead, TDCJ # 1484832, Tulia
    Transfer Unit, 4000 Hwy 86 West, Tulia, Texas on this the 1st day of July, 2015.
    Warren L. Clark
    Warren L. Clark
    11