United States v. Ward , 253 F. App'x 257 ( 2007 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4279
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DAVID Q. WARD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Beaufort. Sol Blatt, Jr., Senior District
Judge. (9:06-cr-00831-SB)
Submitted: September 28, 2007 Decided: November 5, 2007
Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Sean Kittrell, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Without a plea agreement, David Q. Ward pled guilty to
possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (“crack”) and
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (West
1999 & Supp. 2007) (Count One), and using and carrying a firearm
during and in relation to, and possessing a firearm in furtherance
of, a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2007) (Count Three). The district
court sentenced Ward to 101 months in prison: forty-one months on
Count One and a consecutive sixty months on Count Three. Ward
appeals his convictions and sentence. His attorney has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
finding no meritorious grounds for appeal but challenging the
adequacy of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing and questioning whether
the sentence imposed by the district court was reasonable. Ward
was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but
he did not file one. We affirm.
Because Ward did not move in the district court to withdraw
his guilty plea, any error in the Rule 11 hearing is reviewed for
plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th
Cir. 2002) (discussing standard). Our careful review of the record
convinces us that the district court substantially complied with
the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting Ward’s guilty plea and ensured
that Ward entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily and that the
plea was supported by an independent factual basis. See United
States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
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Turning to Ward’s sentencing challenge, in imposing a sentence
after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a court still
must calculate the applicable guideline range after making the
appropriate findings of fact and consider the range in conjunction
with other relevant factors under the guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). United States v. Moreland, 437
F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006).
This court will affirm a post-Booker sentence if it “is within the
statutorily prescribed range and is reasonable.” Id. at 433(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] sentence
within the proper advisory [g]uidelines range is presumptively
reasonable.” United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 341 (4th Cir.
2006); see Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-69 (2007)
(upholding application of rebuttable presumption of reasonableness
to within-guidelines sentence).
The district court sentenced Ward only after considering and
examining the sentencing guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors, as
instructed by Booker. Ward’s 101-month sentence, consisting of
forty-one months for Count One and a consecutive sixty months for
Count Three, is within the properly calculated advisory guideline
range and well within the statutory maximum of twenty years and
life, set forth respectively in 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(C) for
Count One and 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(2) for Count Three. Neither
Ward nor the record suggests any information so compelling as to
rebut the presumption that the sentence is reasonable. We
therefore conclude that the sentence is reasonable.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record
for any meritorious issues and have found none. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that
counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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