Evender Gene Jackson v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
06-15-00151-CR
SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
TEXARKANA, TEXAS
12/4/2015 10:01:44 AM
DEBBIE AUTREY
CLERK
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SIXTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT TEXARKANA
FILED IN
6th COURT OF APPEALS
TEXARKANA, TEXAS
EVENDER GENE JACKSON, JR. § 12/4/2015 10:01:44 AM
APPELLANT § DEBBIE AUTREY
Clerk
§
v. § No. 06-15-00151-CR
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
APPELLEE §
STATE'S REPLY BRIEF
FROM THE I 96TH DISTRICT COURT
HUNT COUNTY, TEXAS
TRIAL CAUSE NUMBER 30,536
THE HONORABLE ANDREW BENCH, JUDGE PRESIDING
NOBLE DAN WALKER, JR.
District Attorney
Hunt County, Texas
G CALVIN GROGAN V
Assistant District Attorney
P. 0. Box441
4th Floor Hunt County Courthouse
Greenville, TX 75403
(903) 408-4180
FAX (903) 408-4296
cgrogan@huntcounty.net
State Bar No. 24050695
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... 2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................... 3
STATEMENT OF CASE ........................................................................ 6
ISSUES PRESENTED ......................................................................... 6
SUMMARY OF THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS .................................................... 6
STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................... 7
STATE'S RESPONSE TO POINT OF ERROR ONE ............................................. 9
STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................. 9
EDDIE DEAN'S ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY ............................................ 11
NON-ACCOMPLICE CORROBORATING EVIDENCE ............................... 12
HARMLESS ERROR ...................................................................................... 13
STATE'S RESPONSE TO POINT OF ERROR TWO ........................................... 14
STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................ 14
TRIAL COUNSEL'S SOUND STRATEGY .................................................... 15
STATE'S RESPONSE TO POINT OF ERROR THREE ....................................... 18
STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................ 18
EVIDENCE LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO PROVE AG ROBBERY ............ 19
PRAYER .................................................................................................................. 20
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 21
2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 308 (1979) ............................................................ 18
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984) ......................... 15
Texas Cases
Aldrich v. State, 104 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) .......................... 17
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ......................... 11
Baylor v. State, 208 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948) ................................... 14
Brooks v. State, 580 S.W.2d 825, 831 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ........................... 19
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ........................... 18
Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ........................ 19
Cocke v. State, 201 S.W.3d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ............................ 10
Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ........................... 10
Gamez v. State, 737 S.W.2d 315, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ........................... 10
Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ............................ 18
Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) .................... 17
Hall v. State, 161 S.W.3d 142, 149-150 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, pet.
re:fd) ........................................................................................................... 12,13,18
Hall v. State, 937 S.W.2d 580, 586 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 1996, pet. re:fd) .... 12
Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ............................... 15
Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ........................ 11-14
Malikv. State, 953, S.W.2d 234,240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ............................ 18
Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ................................. 17
Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) ......................... 19
Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) .................. 13,14
Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ....................... 18
Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ......................... 17
Zepeda v. State, 819 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991, en bane) ............ 15
U.S. Const., Texas Const., Texas Rules of Evidence
TEX. PENAL CODE Sec. 1.07 (Vernon 2014) ......................................................... 14
TEX. PENAL CODE SEC. 7.02(A)-(B) (Vernon 2014) ............................................ 18
TEX. PEN. CODE Sec. 29.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2014) ................................................. 19
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 38.14 (Vernon 2014) .............................................. 10
3
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SIXTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT TEXARKANA
EVENDER GENE JACKSON, JR. §
APPELLANT §
§
v. § No. 06-15-00151-CR
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
APPELLEE §
STATE'S REPLY BRIEF
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
NOW COMES the State of Texas, Appellee, in this appeal from
Cause No. 30,536 in the 1961h District Court in and for Hunt County, Texas,
Honorable Andrew Bench, Presiding, now before the Sixth District Court of
Appeals, and respectfully submits this its brief to the Sixth District Court of
Appeals in support of the judgment of conviction and sentence in the court
below.
4
STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellant was indicted on June 26, 2015, for Aggravated Robbery.
CR Vol.l.p.14. Appellant was arraigned on July 10,2015. CR Vol.l.p.13.
A jury found Appellant guilty as charged on August 12, 2015, and
assessed his punishment at fifty (50) years in the Texas Department of
Corrections. CR Vol.1.pp. 77, 84. Appellant gave written notice of appeal on
August 14, 2015. CR Vol.l.p.97.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue 1. Did Trial Court commit error by not including an accomplice
witness instruction in the jury charge, and if so was it harmless error
based upon all the other non-accomplice evidence?
Issue 2. Was Trial Counsel ineffective for failing to request an
accomplice witness instruction in the jury charge?
Issue 3. Was the evidence legally sufficient to prove Appellant was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of Aggravated Robbery?
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1. While an accomplice witness instruction should have been included in
the jury instruction since Eddie Dean was an accomplice as a matter-of-
law, it was harmless error based upon all of the other non-accomplice
corroborating evidence presented by the State.
5
2. Although Trial Counsel failed to request a jury instruction for accomplice
witness testimony, a single instance does not show that Trial Counsel's
performance was deficient, and it did not affect the final outcome.
3. The victim's testimony alone was legally sufficient to prove Appellant
committed Aggravated Robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 15, 2015, Spencer Sweeden had fmished working his night
shift at the local Taco Bell and decided to walk over to a friend's apartment
to play video games. RR Vol.3.pp.27, 29. After playing video games,
Spencer decided to walk horne to his apartment. RR Vol.3.p.29. At some
point during the walk horne, Spencer noticed two African-American men
corning towards him in the street. RR Vol.3.pp.29, 32. Spencer had already
noticed one of the suspects because he was on a bicycle a few blocks before.
RR Vol.3 .p.31. Spencer was able to describe the other suspect's clothing:
wearing basketballs shorts and at-shirt. RR Vol.3.pp.32, 39. Spencer also
said the other suspect had com rolls in his hair. RR Vol.3.pp.39, 114.
As the two suspects approached Spencer, they began to make
threatening comments. RR Vol.3 .p.33. Both suspects then proceeded to
"rush" Spencer, with the Appellant doing the beating and the other suspect
6
holding a sawed-off shotgun. RR V ol.3 .p.34. As the assault continued,
Appellant kept asking Spencer for his personal property. RR Vol.3.p.35.
Eventually the suspects released Spencer, and he took off. RR Vol.3.p.37.
Appellant took Spencer's wallet, keys, hat, and a C02 pistol. RR Vol.3.p.35.
When Spencer got home, he called 911. RR Vol.3.p.38. Once
Commerce Police quickly responded to Spencer's home, he provided
descriptions ofboth suspects. RR Vol.3.p.38. Spencer described Appellant's
clothing as a black vest with lots of pockets. RR Vol.3.pp.38, 95. Spencer
also described the Appellant as being shorter than the suspect with com rolls
in his hair. RR Vol.3.pp.39, 97.
Commerce Police Officer Tyler Oakley met a very traumatized
Spencer at his home to obtain suspect identification information. RR
Vol.3.pp.73, 90. Spencer told Officer Oakley that one of the suspects was a
black male riding a bicycle wearing a vest, and provided the direction he last
saw the suspects. RR Vol.3 .p. 73. Within two minutes of speaking with
Spencer, Commerce Police Officers had detained a person matching the
Appellant's description a few blocks away. RR Vol.3.pp.76, 92, 95.
Sergeant Marcus Cantera had seen an individual riding a bicycle as he
was patrolling the area. RR Vol.3.pp.109-10. As Sgt. Cantera gave pursuit,
he came upon that same individual standing next to the bicycle in a
7
driveway. RR Vol.3.p.110. That person was later identified by Commerce
Police as the Appellant. RR Vol.3.p.90. Within arms-length distance of
where the Appellant was initially detained were most of Spencer's personal
property items, including his photo identification. RR Vol.3.pp.77, 93, 110.
Also within arms-length of Appellant was a bicycle and a vest. RR
Vol.3.pp.78, 93. Officer Oakley arrested Appellant and transported him to
the station. RR Vol.3.pp.71, 94. While waiting to be transported, Appellant
started talking to himself repeatedly. See State Exhibit No.7.
Spencer recovered most of his personal property at the Commerce
Police Department later that morning while providing a written affidavit. RR
Vol.3.pp.36, 39. A few days later Spencer went up to the Commerce Police
Department and participated in photo lineups of possible suspects. RR
Vol.3.p.40. Not only did Spencer identify both suspects in the photo
lineups, but he also testified in court that the Appellant was the suspect
riding the bicycle. RR Vol.3.p.41.
ARGUMENT
1. Accomplice Witness Testimony
a. Standard of Review
8
A conviction cannot stand on an accomplice witness's testimony
unless the testimony is corroborated by other, non-accomplice evidence that
tends to connect the accused to the offense. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art.
38.14 (Vernon 2014). An accomplice is a person who participates in the
offense before, during, or after its commission with the requisite mental
state. Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). A
State's witness may be an accomplice as a matter of law or as a matter of
fact. Cocke v. State, 201 S.W.3d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A
witness who is indicted for the same offense as the accused is an accomplice
as a matter of law. Id. At 748. When the evidence clearly shows that a
witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, the trial judge must instruct the
jury accordingly. Gamez v. State, 737 S.W.2d 315, 322 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987). Failure to provide such a charge is error. Id.
The State concedes that Eddie Dean was an accomplice as a matter of
law, and that a jury instruction on accomplice witness testimony was not
included in the charge. Trial Counsel did not object to the jury charge. RR
Vol.3 .p.126.
If a required accomplice witness instruction is omitted, and Appellant
did not object to the charge or request submission of the instruction, then the
appellate court looks at the record to determine if the error caused egregious
9
harm. Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002);
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on
reh'g).
Under the egregious harm standard, the omission of an
accomplice witness instruction is generally harmless unless the
corroborating (non-accomplice) evidence is 'so unconvincing in
fact as to render the State's overall case for conviction clearly
and significantly less persuasive.
Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632.
b. Eddie Dean's Testimony
Eddie Dean stood charged with committing the same crime as the
Defendant. RR Vol.3.p.50. Eddie, a convicted felon, testified that both
Appellant and he had committed this crime and identified the Appellant in
open court. RR Vol.3.pp.50, 58. Eddie and the Appellant had known each
other for quite some time, but had become really close in last few months.
RR Vol.3.p.57. Prior to the aggravated robbery, Appellant and Eddie had a
conversation about "jacking somebody." RR Vol.3.pp.52-3. Eddie testified
that Appellant confronted Spencer in the front of his driveway before he
came and joined the confrontation. RR Vol.3.p.55. Eddie testified that
Appellant started robbing Spencer before he arrived. RR Vol.3.p.64. Eddie
admitting to robbing Spencer on the night of June 15, 2015. RR Vol.3 .p.51.
Eddie admitted he was the suspect holding the shotgun during the robbery,
10
while Appellant did the actual stealing and beating. RR Vol.3 .pp.51-2.
Eddie also claimed that Appellant did not know he went to his house to grab
the shotgun during the robbery. RR Vol.3.p.62.
c. Non-Accomplice Evidence
In determining the sufficiency of corroborating evidence, the court
eliminates the testimony of the accomplice witness and examines all other
evidence and testimony looking for the reliability and believability as well as
the tendency to connect Appellant to the crime. Hall v. State, 161 S.W.3d
142, 149-150 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, pet. ref d). To determine
reliability, the courts look to see if there is non-accomplice evidence, and if
there is no rational and articulable basis for disregarding the non-accomplice
evidence. Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 633. Thus, non-accomplice evidence can
render harmless a failure to submit an accomplice witness instruction. !d. at
632. "If the evidence clearly warrants conviction independent of the
accomplice testimony, the court's failure to instruct on the law of
accomplice testimony is not reversible error." Hall v. State, 937 S.W.2d 580,
586 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 1996, pet. ref d).
Spencer's testimony alone proved all of the elements of aggravated
robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Spencer identified the Appellant as the
suspect who assaulted him while taking his personal property. RR
11
Vol.3.p.35. Spencer testified that both the Appellant and Eddie came
towards him in the street, and Eddie was holding a shotgun. RR Vol.3 .p.34.
There is no rational and articulable basis for disregarding Spencer's
testimony that linked Appellant to the crime. Unlike Hall and Saunders,
where the State's evidence was largely based upon weak circumstantial
evidence, there was direct evidence from the eyewitness/victim that
identified Appellant as a suspect. CfHall, 161 S.W.3d at 150; Saunders v.
State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Besides Spencer's testimony, there was other very strong non-accomplice
evidence. Appellant was initially detained arms-length distance from
Spencer's personal property that had just been stolen two minutes earlier.
RR Vol.3.pp.77, 93, 110. There is no reason to doubt the reliability of this
non-accomplice evidence that connected Appellant to the crime. See Herron,
86 S.W.3d at 633.
d. Harmless Error Analysis
Omission of an unrequested jury instruction applicable to the case
calls for a new trial only when the defendant was greatly disadvantaged
thereby. Saunders, 817 S.W.2d at 692. It is reversible error when the State's
case for conviction clearly and significantly less persuasive had they been
properly instructed. !d. At 693.
12
Instead of being disadvantaged by Eddie's testimony, the Appellant
was helped by his testimony. On the issue of Appellant's criminal intent,
Eddie may have possibly confused the jury. Although Appellant was
charged as a party to the offense, Eddie attempted to create a separate
criminal intent requirement for the use of a deadly weapon when the law did
not require it. See Baylor v. State, 208 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948).
A firearm such as a shotgun is considered a deadly weapon per se and there
is no separate criminal intent requirement. Id.; TEX. PENAL CODE Sec. 1.07
(Vernon 2014). Eddie's testimony that Appellant never knew he had a
shotgun during the robbery was helpful.
The State's case relied exclusively upon non-accomplice evidence.
Under an egregious harm analysis, this non-accomplice evidence was not
"so unconvincing in fact as to render the State's overall case for conviction
clearly and significantly less persuasive." Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632.
2. Trial Counsel's Performance was not Deficient under Strickland
Standard
a. Standard of Review
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness
of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. The court should recognize that counsel is
13
strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and
made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment."
Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984).
"The defendant must also show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 104 S. Ct. at
2068. Texas has adopted the Strickland standard. Hernandez v. State, 726
S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Counsel must make errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment. Zepeda v. State, 819 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991, en bane).
b. Sound Trial Strategy to Have Jury Focus on Eddie's
Testimony
There may have been a sound trial strategy for not requesting an
accomplice witness jury instruction- Eddie Dean's testimony was very
helpful to the Appellant on one crucial element. Eddie testified that the
Appellant never knew he grabbed a shotgun during the course of the
robbery. RR Vol.3.p.64. To highlight for the jury Eddie's credibility issues
may have undermined Trial Counsel's ability to argue that if his client was
guilty, he was only guilty of robbery based upon Eddie's testimony. RR
14
Vol.3.pp.144-47. Indeed, in Trial Counsel's closing argument he stressed
that his client if guilty, is only guilty of robbery. RR Vol.3.p.144.
Eddie Dean's testimony was only supposed to strengthen the State's case,
even though the State had no way of preparing for his testimony since he
had neither provided an interview or affidavit before arriving in court on the
day of trial. See RR Vol.3.p.61. Instead, Eddie's testimony gave hope to the
Appellant. In its closing argument, the State tried to minimize Eddie Dean's
testimony. RR Vol.3.p.142. The State emphasized in closing arguments that
the jury, as factfinder, could decide Eddie was only credible in part of his
testimony, and not credible in other parts. RR Vol.3.p.142.
Trial Counsel's strategy also involved impeaching Spencer with
inconsistent statements, and to show that he was the initial aggressor
because he was carrying a C02 pistol on him that night. RR Vol.3.p.144.
Trial Counsel attacked Spencer's credibility by suggesting he knew how
easy it was to make a complaint in person at the Commerce Police Station.
RR Vol.3.p.144.
Based upon Trial Counsel's strategy, his performance cannot be called
deficient. Normally, the record on direct appeal will not be sufficient to
show that counsel's representation was so deficient and so lacking in tactical
or strategic decision making as to overcome the presumption that counsel's
15
conduct was reasonable and professional. Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63
(Tex. Crim. App. 2001). "Appellate courts can rarely decide the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel because the record almost never speaks to
the strategic reasons trial counsel may have considered." Aldrich v. State,
104 S.W.3d 890, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The proper procedure for
raising this claim is therefore almost always habeas corpus. Id. at 896
c. Confidence in Outcome Not Undermined
For the same reasons as discussed supra, Trial Counsel's jury charge
omission did not undermine confidence in the outcome. See Section 1.d.
Any allegation of ineffectiveness of counsel must be firmly founded in the
record. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
The Appellant has the burden to prove ineffective assistance of counsel by a
preponderance of the evidence. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999). Based upon a single instance found in the record that
may have actually helped Appellant and been part of sound trial strategy, he
has failed to meet his burden of proof.
3. Evidence Was Legally Sufficient
a. Standard of Review
16
When reviewing legal sufficiency of the evidence, the Courts review
all the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict to determine
whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the
charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d
893,912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,319
(1987). The standard of review is the same for both direct evidence and
circumstantial evidence cases. Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991 ). "While each piece of evidence lacked strength in
isolation, the consistency of the evidence and the reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, provide the girders to strengthen the evidence and support
a rational jury's finding the elements beyond a reasonable doubt."
Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Although
the accomplice witness instruction was omitted, legal sufficiency review is
based upon the hypothetically correct jury charge. Hall, 161 S.W.3d at 148
citing Malik v. State, 953, S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
A person may be convicted as a party to an offense if the offense is
committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another for which he is
criminally responsible. TEX. PENAL CODE SEC. 7.02 (Vernon 2014). The
evidence will be held legally sufficient under the law of parties where the
defendant is physically present at the commission of the offense and
17
encourages its commission by words or other agreement. Ransom v. State,
920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Cordova v. State, 977 S.W.2d
791, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). For a conviction to be upheld, the
evidence must show at the time of the offense, the parties were acting
together, each contributing some part towards the execution of their common
purpose. Brooks v. State, 580 S.W.2d 825, 831 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
b. Spencer Sweeden's Testimony
To prove Aggravated Robbery with a Deadly Weapon, the State had
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant individually and acting
together with Eddie James Dean, Jr., did then and there while in the course
of committing theft and with intent to obtain and maintain control of said
property, intentionally or knowingly threaten or place Spencer Sweeden in
fear of imminent bodily injury or death, and did then and there use or exhibit
a shotgun. TEX. PEN. CODE Sec. 29.03(a)(2) (Vernon 2014). Spencer's
testimony alone was enough evidence for a rational juror to find Appellant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Aggravated Robbery. While being
attacked on cross-examination, having his credibility challenged, and
accused of initiating the incident, Spencer's response would be enough for
any rational juror to convict the Appellant of this crime- "Okay, I
understand that. But why would they take my things." RR Vol.3.p.46.
18
c. Commerce Police Officer Testimony
Commerce Police Officers testified that Spencer was still shaken up
about the robbery when they met with him. As Sgt. Cantera summarized
their decision that night to arrest the Appellant for aggravated robbery, "he
had all the matching descriptors involved and the victim's possessions in his
possession." RR Vol.3.p.ll2.
The evidence in this case is legally sufficient to prove Appellant guilty
of the offense as charged; therefore, his conviction should be affirmed.
PRAYER
Appellant's trial was without prejudicial error. The State prays
that Appellant's conviction and sentence be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
NOBLE DAN WALKER, JR.
District Attorney
Hunt County, Texas
./
/
G CALYIN GROGAN V
Assistant District Attorney
P. 0. Box 441
19
4thFloor, Hunt County
Courthouse
Greenville, TX 75403
State Bar No. 24050695
(903) 408-4180
FAX (903) 408-4296
cgrogan@h untcounty.net
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH T.R.A.P. 9.4(i)(3)
Relying on Microsoft Word's word count feature used to create the
State's Reply Brief, I certify that the number of words contained in this brief
is 3,766 and the typeface used is 14Font. ,",:; '::.. -
l ·' ' ~
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§
G CALVIN GROGAN V
Assistant District Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A true copy of the State's brief has been mailed via first-class mail to
Jessica Edwards, Appellant's attorney of record, today, December 4, 2015,
pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
'_" ,.-,. ~-, t_ ..
,-
/
G CALVIN GROGAN V
Assistant District Attorney
20