Com. v. Lowry, D. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S38015-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                 :
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    DESCHAE LOWRY                              :
    :
    Appellant                :       No. 1338 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 30, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0007108-2014
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                 :
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    DE-SCHAE M. LOWRY                          :
    :
    Appellant                :       No. 1342 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 30, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0007099-2014
    BEFORE:      GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:                              FILED JULY 25, 2017
    Appellant, Deschae Lowry,1 appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury
    ____________________________________________
    1
    The captions illustrate the alternative spellings for Appellant’s first name as
    Deschae and De-Schae.
    ___________________________
    *Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S38015-17
    trial convictions for first-degree murder and theft, arising from the events
    which occurred on August 1, 2014, when Appellant fatally strangled Victim in
    her home and then drove Victim’s car from her home to Florida.2 We affirm.
    The trial court opinion fully and accurately sets forth the relevant facts
    and procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no need to restate
    them.      Procedurally, this Court consolidated Appellant’s two notices of
    appeal on June 2, 2016.
    Appellant raises one issue for our review:
    WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE
    COMMONWEALTH TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF ALLEGED
    PRIOR BAD ACTS OR OTHER WRONGS FOR WHICH
    [APPELLANT] WAS NOT ON TRIAL SINCE THE PROBATIVE
    VALUE OF THAT EVIDENCE DID NOT OUTWEIGH THE
    POTENTIAL FOR UNFAIR PREJUDICE THAT FLOWED FROM
    ALL THE EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO PROTECTION FROM
    ABUSE MATTERS, AS WELL AS ALL OF THE TESTIMONY
    SUPPLIED BY THE FIRST THREE COMMONWEALTH
    WITNESSES[?]
    (Appellant’s Brief at 7).
    The standard of review for admission of evidence is as follows: “The
    admissibility of evidence is at the discretion of the trial court and only a
    showing of an abuse of that discretion, and resulting prejudice, constitutes
    reversible error.”     Commonwealth v. Ballard, 
    622 Pa. 177
    , 197-98, 
    80 A.3d 380
    , 392 (2013), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
    134 S.Ct. 2842
    , 
    189 L.Ed.2d 824
     (2014).
    ____________________________________________
    2
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 3921(a), respectively.
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    J-S38015-17
    The term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment,
    wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion,
    within the framework of the law, and is not exercised for
    the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge.
    Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason,
    as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or
    arbitrary actions. Discretion is abused when the course
    pursued represents not merely an error of judgment, but
    where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where
    the law is not applied or where the record shows that the
    action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
    Commonwealth v. Goldman, 
    70 A.3d 874
    , 878-79 (Pa.Super. 2013),
    appeal denied, 
    624 Pa. 672
    , 
    85 A.3d 482
     (2014). “To constitute reversible
    error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or
    prejudicial to the complaining party.” Commonwealth v. Lopez, 
    57 A.3d 74
    , 81 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 
    619 Pa. 678
    , 
    62 A.3d 379
     (2013).
    Admissibility depends on relevance and probative value.
    Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a
    material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue
    more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference
    or presumption regarding a material fact.
    Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 
    570 Pa. 117
    , 135, 
    808 A.2d 893
    , 904
    (2002), cert. denied, 
    539 U.S. 919
    , 
    123 S.Ct. 2284
    , 
    156 L.Ed.2d 137
     (2003)
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Stallworth, 
    566 Pa. 349
    , 363, 
    781 A.2d 110
    ,
    117-18 (2001)).
    The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of prior
    crimes, wrongs, or acts evidence as follows:
    Rule 404. Character evidence; Crimes or Other Acts
    *    *    *
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    J-S38015-17
    (b)   Crimes, Wrongs or Other Acts.
    (1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other
    act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order
    to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
    accordance with the character.
    (2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for
    another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity,
    intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
    mistake, or lack of accident. In a criminal case this
    evidence is admissible only if the probative value of the
    evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice.
    (3) Notice in a Criminal Case. In a criminal case the
    prosecutor must provide reasonable notice in advance of
    trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on
    good cause shown, of the general nature of any such
    evidence the prosecutor intends to introduce at trial.
    Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(3).
    “Evidence of crimes other than the one in question is not admissible
    solely to show the defendant’s bad character or propensity to commit
    crime.”    Commonwealth v. Collins, 
    550 Pa. 46
    , 55, 
    703 A.2d 418
    , 422
    (1997), cert. denied, 
    525 U.S. 1015
    , 
    119 S.Ct. 538
    , 
    142 L.Ed.2d 447
    (1998). Nevertheless:
    [E]vidence of other crimes is admissible to demonstrate
    (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident;
    (4) a common scheme, plan or design embracing the
    commission of two or more crimes so related to each other
    that proof of one tends to prove the others; or (5) the
    identity of the person charged with the commission of the
    crime on trial. Additionally, evidence of other crimes may
    be admitted where such evidence is part of the history of
    the case and forms part of the natural development of the
    facts.
    Id.   at   55,   
    703 A.2d at 422-23
    ;   Pa.R.E.   404(b)(2).      See   also
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    J-S38015-17
    Commonwealth          v.    Melendez-Rodriguez,        
    856 A.2d 1278
    ,   1283
    (Pa.Super.    2004)   (en    banc)   (reiterating   “other   crimes”   evidence   is
    admissible to show motive, intent, absence of mistake or accident, common
    scheme or plan, and identity).         “Factors to be considered to establish
    similarity are the elapsed time between the crimes, the geographical
    proximity of the crime scenes, and the manner in which the crimes were
    committed.”    Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
    671 A.2d 235
    , 247 (Pa.Super.
    1996), appeal denied, 
    546 Pa. 642
    , 
    683 A.2d 881
     (1996).                  See also
    Commonwealth v. Andrulewicz, 
    911 A.2d 162
    , 169 (Pa.Super. 2006),
    appeal denied, 
    592 Pa. 778
    , 
    926 A.2d 972
     (2007) (upholding consolidation
    of three cases against defendant for sexual assault of three minor females
    because cases demonstrated defendant’s common scheme, and jury could
    separate evidence for each case).
    After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
    applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Kevin F.
    Kelly, we conclude Appellant’s issue merits no relief. The trial court opinion
    fully discusses and properly disposes of the question presented. (See Trial
    Court Opinion, filed December 2, 2016, at 10-34) (finding: court permitted
    Commonwealth to introduce only prior acts evidence Commonwealth
    proposed in its Rule 404(b) motion, which related to events which occurred
    within three years preceding Victim’s death; court allowed Commonwealth to
    offer prior acts evidence to establish Appellant’s malice, ill will, motive,
    -5-
    J-S38015-17
    and/or requisite intent, including troublesome nature of relationship between
    Victim and Appellant; court also permitted Commonwealth to present prior
    acts evidence to show chain and sequence of events on which Appellant’s
    offenses are grounded; Commonwealth’s prior acts evidence bore logical
    connection to Victim’s death; court allowed Commonwealth to elicit
    testimony from Tyeria Sanders concerning tumultuous nature of relationship
    between Victim and Appellant, including specific arguments, Appellant’s theft
    of money from Victim, and Appellant’s assaultive and menacing conduct
    toward Victim; Ms. Sanders also testified as to murderous threats Appellant
    made toward Victim; court permitted Commonwealth to elicit testimony from
    Caren Tribble about nature of relationship Victim had with Appellant and
    incidents of domestic violence between Victim and Appellant, which occurred
    in two years preceding Victim’s death; Ms. Tribble testified that she saw
    marks and bruises on Victim and observed domestic violence incident
    between Victim and Appellant that occurred outside Ms. Tribble’s workplace
    ten months prior to Victim’s death; court allowed Commonwealth to elicit
    testimony from Cindy Void regarding nature of Victim’s relationship with
    Appellant   and   incidences   when   Appellant   took   Victim’s   car   without
    permission; court permitted Commonwealth to present testimony of Sandra
    Robinson, court clerk services employee, regarding protection from abuse
    (“PFA”) petitions Victim had completed and PFA orders Victim had obtained
    against Appellant; court permitted Commonwealth to present testimony of
    -6-
    J-S38015-17
    Officer Michael DeHoratius about his encounter with Victim three weeks prior
    to Victim’s death when Appellant violated PFA order by appearing at
    Appellant’s home; additionally, court provided jurors with cautionary
    instructions, as to limited purposes for which jury could have considered
    Commonwealth’s prior acts, immediately following testimony of Ms. Sanders,
    Ms. Tribble, Ms. Void, Officer DeHoratius, and Ms. Robinson; court instructed
    jury to consider prior acts evidence only for purposes of Appellant’s malice,
    ill will, intent, and motive, and to show chain and sequence of events leading
    to Victim’s death; court specifically instructed jury not to consider prior acts
    as evidence that Appellant had bad character or criminal propensities;
    prejudicial effect of Commonwealth’s prior acts evidence did not outweigh
    probative effect of evidence). The record supports the trial court’s rationale,
    and we see no reason to disturb it.       See Ballard, 
    supra;
     Drumheller,
    
    supra;
     Collins, 
    supra.
     Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court
    opinion.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/25/2017
    -7-
    Circulated 06/29/2017 02:33 PM