Kristopher G. Richter v. Laurenz Place, LLC (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  •       MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FILED
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this                           Sep 28 2017, 8:10 am
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
    precedent or cited before any court except for the                         CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,                      Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    APPELLANT PRO SE                                          ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Kristopher G. Richter                                     Marcellus M. Lebbin
    South Bend, Indiana                                       Trevor Q. Gasper
    Hilary R. Johnson
    May Oberfell Lorber
    Mishawaka, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Kristopher G. Richter,                                   September 28, 2017
    Appellant-Plaintiff,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    71A04-1610-SC-2526
    v.                                               Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior
    Court.
    The Honorable Paul E. Singleton,
    Laurenz Place, LLC,                                      Magistrate.
    Appellee-Defendant.                                      Trial Court Cause No.
    71D02-1606-SC-5542
    Shepard, Senior Judge
    [1]   Appellant Kristopher G. Richter appeals the trial court’s judgment against him
    in his small claims action against his landlord, Laurenz Place, LLC.
    Concluding that Richter was a tenant under the landlord-tenant statutes, we
    reverse and remand with instructions to consider the costs he bore as a result of
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A04-1610-SC-2526 | September 28, 2017      Page 1 of 7
    his landlord’s failure to afford him the statutory protections to which he was
    entitled under Indiana law.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On April 28, 2012, Kaylie Sexton entered into a lease agreement for an
    apartment with Park Jefferson Realty, LLC, the predecessor of Laurenz Place,
    LLC. On April 30, 2013, a second lease was executed with Park Jefferson.
    This lease was signed and initialed by both Kaylie Sexton and Kristopher
    Richter.
    [3]   On January 1, 2016, the leasehold having expired, Sexton and Richter moved
    out. Thereafter, Laurenz Place conducted a routine inspection of the apartment
    to assess damages. Following the inspection, it sent an itemized bill for
    damages to Sexton, but not to Richter. Richter attempted to obtain an
    itemization of the damages, but Laurenz Place would not release the
    information to him. Unable to obtain a copy of the itemized charges, Richter
    hired counsel to do so.
    [4]   After receiving the notice of damages from Laurenz Place, Sexton sued Richter.
    She won a judgment against him for a portion of the amount. Sexton’s lawsuit
    prompted Richter to bring the current action against Laurenz Place, in which he
    (1) claimed that he was a tenant and therefore should have received notice of
    the alleged damages, (2) disputed some of the damages, and (3) asserted he was
    wrongly denied access to the apartment in December 2015. He requested
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A04-1610-SC-2526 | September 28, 2017   Page 2 of 7
    money damages, filing fee, attorney fees, and transcript fees. After a bench
    trial, the court entered judgment against Richter.
    Issue
    [5]   Richter enumerates six issues for our review. We consolidate and restate the
    dispositive issue as: whether the trial court erred by determining Richter was
    not a “tenant” within the meaning of the landlord-tenant provision of the
    Indiana Code.
    Discussion and Decision
    [6]   Implicit in the small claims court’s judgment, and the crux of this case, is the
    determination that Richter was not a tenant of Laurenz Place. Small claims
    court judgments are “subject to review as prescribed by relevant Indiana rules
    and statutes.” Ind. Small Claims Rule 11(A). Pursuant to Trial Rule 52(A), we
    review the facts determined in a bench trial under the clearly erroneous
    standard of review, with due regard given to the opportunity of the trial court to
    assess witness credibility. Hamilton v. Schaefer Lake Lot Owners Ass’n, Inc., 
    59 N.E.3d 1051
     (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This deferential standard of review is
    particularly important in small claims actions where trials are informal and
    where the sole objective is to dispense speedy justice between the parties
    according to the rules of substantive law. Morton v. Ivacic, 
    898 N.E.2d 1196
    (Ind. 2008); Ind. Small Claims Rule 8(A).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A04-1610-SC-2526 | September 28, 2017   Page 3 of 7
    [7]    For the purposes of landlord-tenant relations, Indiana Code section 32-31-3-10
    (2002) defines the term “tenant” as “an individual who occupies a rental unit:
    (1) for residential purposes; (2) with the landlord’s consent; and (3) for
    consideration that is agreed upon by both parties.”
    [8]    The evidence at trial showed that a one-year lease, executed on April 28, 2012,
    was signed and initialed only by Sexton. The first page of the lease designates
    Sexton as “Resident” and Richter as an authorized occupant. Ex. 1, p. 1. On
    the last page of the lease, Sexton signed as “Resident.” Id. at 3. On the
    Clubhouse Addendum to the lease, Sexton signed as “Leaseholder” and was
    noted as having been issued one club membership card. Id. at 4.
    [9]    A subsequent lease was executed on April 30, 2013, with the word “Renewal”
    handwritten at the top of the first page. Id. at 9. Although the first page of this
    lease also identifies Sexton as “Resident” and Richter as an authorized
    occupant, each page of the lease was initialed by both Sexton and Richter, and
    both of them signed the last page of the lease under the “Resident” column. Id.
    at 9-11. In addition, both Sexton and Richter signed the Clubhouse Addendum
    to the 2013 lease as “Leaseholder” and both received club membership cards.
    Id. at 12.
    [10]   In as much as Laurenz Place provided the contract for Richter to sign and
    initial, the lease terms and their meaning for purposes of resolving later disputes
    are strictly construed against the party who drafted and furnished the
    agreement. Vertucci v. NHP Mgmt. Co., 
    701 N.E.2d 604
     (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A04-1610-SC-2526 | September 28, 2017   Page 4 of 7
    [11]   Other evidence at trial reflected on whether Richter was a “tenant” under
    section 32-31-3-10.
    [12]   Richter testified that the previous management company with whom he signed
    the lease explained to him that he was indeed a leaseholder. He further testified
    that he paid rent, and he presented evidence of other payments to the landlord.
    For instance, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5 is a receipt from Laurenz Place with his name
    typewritten in both the “Bill To” and “Customer Name” lines. The receipt
    notes that on July 31, 2015, and August 26, 2015, Richter paid door
    replacement charges for the apartment.
    [13]   To be a “tenant” under the pertinent section of the Code, Richter must have
    occupied the premises “for residential purposes.” On that, there is no dispute.
    Second, he must have occupied with the landlord’s consent. It is plain that he
    did. Third, there must have been consideration for this occupancy agreed upon
    by both parties. Construing the leases between the parties strictly against
    Laurenz Place and doing so in the context of the other evidence at trial, it is
    apparent that there was an agreement on monthly rent and the like.
    Accordingly, it was clearly erroneous to determine that Richter was not a
    “tenant” as that term is defined in Indiana Code section 32-31-3-10. He was.
    [14]   The tenant rights Richter held as a tenant are set forth in Indiana Code sections
    32-31-3-12 and -14 (2002) and 32-31-5-6 (2007). Section 32-31-3-12 requires
    that, upon termination of a lease, the landlord must return to the tenant(s) the
    security deposit less any amount applied to the payment of accrued rent,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A04-1610-SC-2526 | September 28, 2017   Page 5 of 7
    damages, and unpaid utility charges. It further requires that any damages be
    specifically itemized in a written notice as mandated by section 14. If the
    landlord fails to comply with these requirements, the tenant(s) may recover all
    of the security deposit and a reasonable attorney fee. Section 32-31-3-14
    requires that, within forty-five days after termination of occupancy, a landlord
    must mail to the tenant(s) an itemized list of damages claimed.
    [15]   In addition, Indiana Code section 32-31-5-6 prohibits a landlord from
    interfering with a tenant’s access to or possession of the tenant’s apartment.
    [16]   Relying on its contention that Richter was merely an occupant and not a
    tenant, Laurenz Place does not dispute that it did not send him an itemized list
    of damages and that it denied him access to the apartment. See Appellee’s Br.
    p. 7, Tr. pp. 32-33, Ex. 3, 9; Appellee’s Br. pp. 6, 15, Tr. pp. 25-26. However,
    we conclude today that Richter was a tenant who should have been afforded all
    1
    of the corresponding rights.
    1
    In his brief to this Court, Richter also asserts a claim of negligence against Laurenz Place and alleges error
    with the trial court’s pre-trial denial of his motion to consolidate. The negligence claim was not included in
    Richter’s Notice of Claim, and neither of these claims were presented at trial; they are thus waived. See
    Commitment of T.S. v. Logansport State Hosp., 
    959 N.E.2d 855
     (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (stating long-held rule that
    party may not present argument or issue to appellate court that was not raised in trial court), trans. denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A04-1610-SC-2526 | September 28, 2017            Page 6 of 7
    Conclusion
    [17]   For the reasons stated, we conclude that under this lease Richter was a tenant,
    as that term is defined in Indiana Code section 32-31-3-10, yet he was not
    afforded the corresponding statutory rights.
    [18]   Reversed and remanded with instructions to consider the costs experienced by
    Richter as a result of Laurenz Place’s failure to afford him the rights to which
    he was entitled as a tenant, enter judgment against Laurenz Place for that
    amount, and determine the amount of attorney fees this failure cost Richter.
    Vaidik, C.J., and May, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A04-1610-SC-2526 | September 28, 2017   Page 7 of 7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 71A04-1610-SC-2526

Filed Date: 9/28/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/28/2017