Narinder Singh v. Matthew Whitaker , 914 F.3d 654 ( 2019 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    NARINDER P. SINGH, AKA Narinder                Nos. 16-70823
    Pal Singh                                           16-72285
    Petitioner,
    Agency No.
    v.                           A205-421-984
    MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting
    Attorney General,                                  OPINION
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted November 13, 2018
    San Francisco, California
    Filed January 24, 2019
    Before: RAYMOND C. FISHER and MILAN D. SMITH,
    JR., Circuit Judges, and ELAINE E. BUCKLO, * District
    Judge.
    Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.
    *
    The Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo, United States District Judge for
    the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.
    2                      SINGH V. WHITAKER
    SUMMARY **
    Immigration
    The panel granted in part and denied in part a petition for
    review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of
    asylum, humanitarian asylum, withholding of removal, and
    protection under the Convention Against Torture.
    The panel held that the Board erred in failing to conduct
    a reasoned analysis with respect to petitioner’s situation to
    determine whether, in light of the specific persons or entities
    that caused his past persecution, and the nature and extent of
    that persecution, there are one or more general or specific
    areas within his country of origin where he has no well-
    founded fear of persecution, and where it is reasonable for
    him to relocate pursuant to the factors set forth in 8 C.F.R.
    § 1208.13(b)(3).
    In so concluding, the panel held that based upon its plain
    language, § 1208.13(b)(3) does not require the government
    to propose a city, state, or other type of locality as the area
    of relocation, rather the Department of Homeland Security
    may properly propose a specific or a more general area as
    the place of safe relocation. The Board must then conduct
    its safe relocation analysis with respect to that proposed area,
    however specifically or generally defined.
    The panel also held that in considering the
    reasonableness of relocation, the Board erred in failing to
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
    has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    SINGH V. WHITAKER                        3
    analyze whether petitioner would be substantially safer in a
    new location if he were to continue expressing his political
    opinion, and erred by unlawfully assuming that petitioner
    could silence his political activity to avoid harm.
    The panel therefore granted the petition as to petitioner’s
    asylum and withholding of removal claims, and remanded
    for the Board to conduct a sufficiently individualized
    analysis of whether petitioner could safely and reasonably
    relocate outside Punjab, and for reconsideration of whether
    he qualified for withholding from removal.
    The panel denied the petition as to petitioner’s
    humanitarian asylum and CAT claims, holding that the
    threats and physical harm petitioner suffered did not rise to
    the requisite level to warrant humanitarian asylum, and that
    petitioner failed to establish that it was more likely than not
    he would be tortured if he returned to India.
    COUNSEL
    Robert B. Jobe (argued) and Morgan Russell, Law Office of
    Robert B. Jobe, San Francisco, California, for Petitioner.
    Alexander J. Lutz (argued), Trial Attorney; Anthony C.
    Payne, Assistant Director; Office of Immigration Litigation,
    Civil Division, United States Department of Justice,
    Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.
    4                   SINGH V. WHITAKER
    OPINION
    M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:
    Narinder Pal Singh, a citizen of India and a member of
    the political party Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar (Mann
    Party), petitions our court to review the Board of
    Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision denying his claims for
    asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
    Convention Against Torture (CAT).           After suffering
    multiple physical attacks at the hands of the Punjabi police
    and Congress Party members due to his participation in
    Mann Party events, Singh fled India. He initially entered the
    United States in January 2013. The Immigration Judge (IJ)
    denied all of Singh’s claims. The BIA also denied Singh all
    relief sought, and then denied his motion to reconsider.
    We hold that the BIA erred in failing to conduct a
    reasoned analysis with respect to Singh’s situation to
    determine whether, in light of the specific persons or entities
    that caused his past persecution, and the nature and extent of
    that persecution, there are one or more general or specific
    areas within his country of origin where he has no well-
    founded fear of persecution, and where it is reasonable for
    him to relocate pursuant to the factors set forth in 8 C.F.R.
    § 1208.13(b)(3). Because the BIA did not conduct a
    sufficiently individualized analysis of Singh’s ability to
    relocate within India outside of the state of Punjab, we grant
    the petition for review and remand the withholding of
    removal and asylum claims to the BIA. However, we deny
    review of Singh’s claims for humanitarian asylum and CAT
    protection.
    SINGH V. WHITAKER                         5
    BACKGROUND
    Narinder Pal Singh is a native and citizen of India. He
    entered the United States on or about January 27, 2013
    through the Nogales, Arizona port of entry, without
    possessing a valid entry document. An asylum officer later
    determined that Singh demonstrated a credible fear of
    persecution or torture.      Singh applied for asylum,
    withholding of removal, and protection under CAT.
    At a hearing before the IJ, Singh testified that he is a Sikh
    and a member of the Mann Party. The Mann Party advocates
    for Sikh rights and an independent Khalistan state. Singh
    attended and assisted at Mann Party rallies, and distributed
    leaflets.
    Singh experienced several threats and suffered physical
    harm due to his membership in the Mann Party. He received
    telephonic threats in May and June of 2008, and again in
    October 2012. In June 2008, the police arrested Singh while
    he was distributing Mann Party leaflets, and beat him for six
    days with a leather strap. In August 2010, the police arrested
    Singh and detained him for ten days after protesting India’s
    Independence Day. During Singh’s detention, the police
    beat him with their fists and sticks, demanding that he stop
    supporting Khalistan and the Mann Party. Finally, in
    January 2012, the police arrested Singh and took him to the
    police station, where they beat him. In addition, Congress
    Party members beat Singh in April 2012, when he was
    returning from a Mann Party blood drive, and again in
    September 2012, while he was returning from a Mann Party
    event. After almost all of these beatings, Singh required
    hospital treatment, including multiple-day hospitalizations.
    Singh eventually fled India in November 2012.
    6                   SINGH V. WHITAKER
    After Singh left India, the police continued going to his
    house in Punjab to ask where he was. In February 2014,
    police and Congress Party members went to his house in
    Punjab and attacked his father, breaking his father’s arm in
    the process.
    Singh testified that it was not possible for him to live
    outside Punjab in India because, as a Mann Party member,
    the police would look for him and might kill him. He also
    noted that the police never charged him with any crimes after
    his several arrests.
    The IJ denied all the relief sought by Singh. The IJ
    accorded Singh’s testimony and declaration “full evidentiary
    weight,” yet found the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS) rebutted the presumption of his well-founded fear of
    future persecution. Specifically, the IJ considered the
    submitted country-conditions evidence and found that Singh
    could safely and reasonably relocate outside Punjab within
    India. The IJ noted that low-level Mann Party members not
    wanted by the Indian central authorities were unlikely to be
    targeted outside of Punjab, and that there was no evidence
    the Congress Party members who harmed Singh could find
    him outside Punjab. The IJ also found relocation reasonable
    given Singh’s “good health and job skills” and the fact that
    Sikhs no longer face violence or legal obstacles when
    moving within India.
    Further, the IJ found that the threats and physical harm
    inflicted upon Singh did not rise to the requisite level to
    warrant humanitarian asylum, and that he had not shown it
    was more likely than not he would be tortured if he returned
    to India, as required for protection under CAT.
    Singh appealed the IJ’s decision, which the BIA
    affirmed. The BIA found that the evidence supported the
    SINGH V. WHITAKER                        7
    IJ’s determination that DHS carried its burden to show Singh
    could safely and reasonably relocate outside Punjab within
    India. The BIA also agreed with the IJ’s determination that
    Singh was not entitled to humanitarian asylum, and his
    conclusion that Singh did not qualify for CAT relief.
    In his motion to reconsider filed with the BIA, Singh
    argued that the evidence did not establish by a
    preponderance that he could engage in his political activities
    outside Punjab more safely than inside the state, and asserted
    that the IJ failed to identify a specific area of the country to
    which he could relocate as required by BIA precedent.
    Singh also argued that the BIA’s determination that he could
    reasonably relocate was based on unsubstantiated assertions
    regarding his employment prospects.             Finally, Singh
    contended that CAT relief was warranted based on his past
    torture and the current country conditions. The BIA denied
    the motion to reconsider, finding no legal or factual errors in
    its analysis and stating it need not identify a specific area of
    India suitable for relocation. Singh’s appeals from both the
    denial of the motion to reconsider and the BIA’s decision are
    now consolidated before us.
    JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We have jurisdiction over Singh’s petition pursuant to
    8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Where, as here, the BIA reviewed the
    IJ’s factual findings for clear error, and reviewed de novo all
    other issues, our review is “limited to the BIA’s decision,
    except to the extent the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted.”
    Hosseini v. Gonzales, 
    471 F.3d 953
    , 957 (9th Cir. 2006). We
    review the BIA’s determinations of purely legal questions de
    novo, and factual findings for substantial evidence. Ali v.
    Holder, 
    637 F.3d 1025
    , 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2011). Under the
    substantial evidence standard, we uphold the agency’s
    8                   SINGH V. WHITAKER
    determination unless “compelled to conclude to the
    contrary.” 
    Id. at 1029.
    ANALYSIS
    On appeal, Singh challenges the BIA’s denial of his
    claims for asylum, withholding of removal, humanitarian
    asylum, and protection under CAT, as well as its denial of
    his motion to reconsider. We grant the petition for review as
    to Singh’s withholding of removal and asylum claims
    because while the BIA afforded Singh the presumption of a
    well-founded fear of persecution, it failed to conduct a
    sufficiently individualized analysis of his ability to relocate
    within India. However, we find that substantial evidence
    supports the BIA’s conclusions regarding Singh’s
    humanitarian asylum and CAT claims, and we deny review
    of those claims.
    I. Asylum
    Past persecution “triggers a rebuttable presumption of a
    well-founded fear of future persecution.” Garcia-Martinez
    v. Ashcroft, 
    371 F.3d 1066
    , 1073 (9th Cir. 2004). When an
    asylum applicant has established that he suffered past
    persecution, the burden is on the government to show by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the applicant either no
    longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in the country
    of his nationality, or that he can reasonably relocate
    internally to an area of safety. Afriyie v. Holder, 
    613 F.3d 924
    , 934 (9th Cir. 2010); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i).
    Relocation analysis consists of two steps: (1) “whether
    an applicant could relocate safely,” and (2) “whether it
    would be reasonable to require the applicant to do so.”
    
    Afriyie, 613 F.3d at 934
    . For an applicant to be able to safely
    relocate internally, “there must be an area of the country
    SINGH V. WHITAKER                        9
    where he or she has no well-founded fear of persecution.”
    Matter of M-Z-M-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 28, 33 (B.I.A. 2012).
    To determine the reasonableness of relocation, factors to
    consider include potential harm in the suggested relocation
    area, ongoing civil strife in the country, and social and
    cultural constraints, among others.               8 C.F.R.
    § 1208.13(b)(3). The factors may not all be relevant in a
    specific case, and they “are not necessarily determinative of
    whether it would be reasonable for the applicant to relocate.”
    
    Id. Here, the
    BIA afforded Singh the presumption of past
    persecution due to his previous beatings at the hands of the
    police and Congress Party members, and therefore, the
    burden shifted to the government to show by a
    preponderance of the evidence that Singh could safely and
    reasonably relocate internally.
    A. Safe Relocation
    Singh first contends that the BIA erred in failing to
    identify a specific area within India to which Singh could
    safely relocate, as required by Matter of M-Z-M-R-. There,
    the BIA stated that where an applicant meets the refugee
    definition based on past persecution, “DHS must
    demonstrate that there is a specific area of the country where
    the risk of persecution to the respondent falls below the well-
    founded fear level.” 26 I. & N. Dec. at 33−34 (emphasis
    added). The BIA ultimately remanded the case to the IJ for
    further fact-finding on whether the risk of persecution to the
    applicant in the city of Hatton, “or another proposed area,”
    met the requisite standard. 
    Id. at 34.
    Here, similarly, Singh
    argues that the BIA was too vague when it defined his safe
    relocation area as “outside Punjab.”
    10                  SINGH V. WHITAKER
    We acknowledge the ambiguity within Matter of M-Z-
    M-R-, and the lack of controlling precedent on the level of
    specificity required of the government in identifying a
    proposed relocation area. In Matter of M-Z-M-R-, the BIA
    speaks of a “specific area” for relocation, yet cites a case in
    support of this proposition that upheld the BIA’s decision in
    which the safe area was defined as “outside” the applicant’s
    “very small home village.” 
    Id. at 33–34
    (quoting Tendean
    v. Gonzales, 
    503 F.3d 8
    , 11 (1st Cir. 2007)). Previously, we
    have observed in a non-precedential decision that “it is
    sufficient to define an area of relocation generally.” Singh
    v. Sessions, 743 F. App’x 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2018) (denying
    review where the BIA found the applicant could relocate
    outside Punjab, to another part of India). In numerous
    immigration cases however, DHS proposed specific cities or
    regions within the applicant’s country of origin. See, e.g.,
    Kaiser v. Ashcroft, 
    390 F.3d 653
    , 659–60 (9th Cir. 2004)
    (analyzing whether petitioners could relocate safely to two
    cities, a geographical region, or elsewhere in Pakistan).
    The immigration regulations require that the government
    prove relocation is possible only to “another part” of the
    applicant’s home country or country of last habitual
    residence. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), (b)(2)(ii). Based
    upon its plain language, the regulation does not require the
    government to propose a city, state, or other type of locality
    as the area of relocation. Accordingly, we hold that DHS
    may properly propose a specific or a more general area as
    the place of safe relocation. The BIA must then conduct its
    safe relocation analysis with respect to that proposed area,
    however specifically or generally defined. This holding
    affords DHS flexibility in determining a safe relocation area,
    but maintains the appropriate burden on the government to
    demonstrate that the proposed area is safe for the applicant.
    Commensurate with DHS’s burden, a more generally
    SINGH V. WHITAKER                              11
    defined area will likely require a more comprehensive
    showing of proof that the entirety of the area is safe for
    relocation, as compared to, for example, a specific city.
    Consequently, we reject Singh’s argument that a greater
    level of specificity than “outside Punjab” was required as his
    proposed area of relocation. Although general, “outside
    Punjab” can comply with the requirement that DHS propose
    “another part” of India for Singh’s relocation, so long as
    DHS meets its other obligations in the relocation analysis,
    such as considering the factors set forth in 8 C.F.R.
    § 1208.13(b)(3).
    B. Reasonable Relocation
    Singh also argues that the BIA erred in failing to analyze
    whether he would be substantially safer in a new location if
    he were to continue expressing his support for the Khalistan
    secession movement, and erred by unlawfully assuming that
    he could silence his political activity to avoid harm. 1 We
    agree, and grant the petition for review on this issue.
    1
    The government argues that Singh has not exhausted the argument
    concerning his silenced political opinion, and therefore it is not properly
    before the court. See Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 
    339 F.3d 814
    , 819 (9th
    Cir. 2003) (“Before a petitioner can raise an argument on appeal, the
    petitioner must first raise the issue before the BIA or IJ.”). However, the
    IJ addressed this issue, and Singh raised it in his motion for
    reconsideration before the BIA. Although the BIA did not explicitly
    consider this argument in its denial of reconsideration, we find it is
    nonetheless exhausted. See Garcia v. Lynch, 
    786 F.3d 789
    , 792–94 (9th
    Cir. 2015) (holding that an issue was exhausted where the petitioner
    raised it before the IJ, in his pro se notice of appeal to the BIA, and in
    specific terms in his motion to reconsider, and the BIA addressed it on
    the merits in denying the motion to reconsider).
    12                  SINGH V. WHITAKER
    The BIA considered whether a Mann Party member
    would face harm from the Punjabi police outside of Punjab.
    The BIA also noted the existence of tenant registration
    systems in certain parts of India, and that there is little
    information-sharing across Indian states outside of criminal
    defendant information. The Law Library of Congress 2012
    report (Law Library Report)—upon which the BIA relied—
    stated that the police may pursue “high-profile militants”
    outside of Punjab, yet acknowledged that the Punjabi police
    may wrongly place individuals involved in ordinary political
    activities on chronic offender lists. As the BIA decision
    notes, the Law Library Report also asserted that it is unlikely
    that an individual Mann Party member who “simply holds
    pro-Khalistani views” would be targeted.
    Although the BIA discussed the Law Library Report and
    its conclusion that the police will likely pursue only “high-
    profile militants” outside of Punjab, it erred by failing to
    address the potential harm Congress Party members, or other
    local authorities, might inflict upon Singh in a new state.
    Instead, the BIA’s analysis focused on whether the Punjabi
    police would follow Singh outside of Punjab, based on his
    past political activity, ultimately concluding that he was not
    sufficiently high-profile for them to do so. This analysis
    does not account for the persecution he may face outside
    Punjab from local authorities, or other actors, based on his
    future political activities. “[W]here the applicant has
    established a well-founded fear of future persecution at the
    hands of the government, a rebuttable presumption arises
    that the threat exists nationwide.” Melkonian v. Ashcroft,
    
    320 F.3d 1061
    , 1070 (9th Cir. 2003). The BIA failed to
    apply that nationwide presumption to Singh’s asylum claim,
    even though it correctly afforded him the presumption of a
    well-founded fear of persecution. Similarly, the BIA also
    failed to specifically address Singh’s stated intent to
    SINGH V. WHITAKER                             13
    continue proselytizing for his party wherever he went. Thus,
    the BIA’s analysis regarding whether Singh could
    reasonably relocate was inadequate. See Knezevic v.
    Ashcroft, 
    367 F.3d 1206
    , 1214–15 (9th Cir. 2004)
    (remanding to the BIA the issue of reasonableness of internal
    relocation due to its failure to account for several factors
    outlined in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)).
    We hold that the BIA must conduct a reasoned analysis
    with respect to a petitioner’s individualized situation to
    determine whether, in light of the persons or entities that
    caused the past persecution, and the nature and extent of the
    persecution, there are one or more general or specific areas
    within the petitioner’s country of origin where he has no
    well-founded fear of persecution and where it is reasonable
    to relocate, considering the factors set forth in 8 C.F.R.
    § 1208.13(b)(3). Here, in determining Singh could safely
    and reasonably relocate “outside Punjab,” the BIA failed to
    conduct such an individualized analysis, and we remand this
    claim to the BIA to determine anew whether relocation is
    appropriate for Singh. 2
    2
    To the extent that Singh also seeks withholding of removal, we
    remand this issue to the BIA. To warrant withholding of removal, an
    applicant must show that “it is more probable than not that they will face
    persecution on account of a protected ground upon their deportation.”
    
    Kaiser, 390 F.3d at 660
    . The BIA did not separate its analysis regarding
    Singh’s asylum claim from whether Singh warranted withholding of
    removal. Because the BIA’s denial of Singh’s claim for withholding of
    removal was based on its inadequate determination that Singh could
    safely and reasonably relocate, we remand to the BIA to reconsider
    whether Singh warrants withholding of removal.
    14                      SINGH V. WHITAKER
    II. Humanitarian Asylum
    Regardless of whether the government has rebutted the
    presumption of an asylum applicant’s well-founded fear of
    persecution, the BIA may still grant humanitarian asylum.
    Matter of M-Z-M-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 31. An applicant
    seeking humanitarian asylum must show either “compelling
    reasons for being unwilling or unable to return” to his
    country of nationality “arising out of the severity of the
    [applicant’s] past persecution,” or “a reasonable possibility
    that he or she may suffer other serious harm upon removal
    to that country.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii). The
    applicant bears the burden of proof to show that either form
    of humanitarian asylum is warranted. Matter of L-S-, 25 I.
    & N. Dec. 705, 710 (B.I.A. 2012). Humanitarian asylum
    based on past persecution may be granted where the
    petitioner has suffered “atrocious forms of persecution.”
    Kebede v. Ashcroft, 
    366 F.3d 808
    , 812 (9th Cir. 2004)
    (quoting Lopez-Galarza v. INS, 
    99 F.3d 954
    , 960 (9th Cir.
    1996)).
    Singh asserts that the BIA’s decision was too conclusory,
    and failed to consider all the relevant factors in determining
    where he qualified for humanitarian asylum under the
    “compelling reasons” prong. Singh did not previously raise
    the brevity of the IJ’s or BIA’s analysis, either in his appeal
    brief or in his motion to reconsider. Thus, the argument is
    unexhausted, and we lack jurisdiction to consider it. 3 See
    
    Rojas-Garcia, 339 F.3d at 819
    .
    3
    This argument also appears meritless. We have stated, “When
    nothing in the record or the BIA’s decision indicates a failure to consider
    all the evidence, a ‘general statement that the agency considered all the
    evidence before it’ may be sufficient.” Cole v. Holder, 
    659 F.3d 762
    ,
    SINGH V. WHITAKER                              15
    The BIA described the physical harm Singh suffered at
    the hands of the police and Congress Party members, and
    noted his multiple hospitalizations.        The BIA then
    determined that Singh’s previous persecution did not rise to
    the necessary level of atrociousness to warrant humanitarian
    asylum. We find the BIA’s denial of humanitarian asylum
    supported by substantial evidence.
    Our case law demonstrates that extremely severe
    persecution is required to warrant humanitarian relief. See,
    e.g., Lal v. INS, 
    255 F.3d 998
    , 1009–10 (9th Cir. 2001)
    (finding unsupported the BIA’s denial of humanitarian
    asylum where applicant was detained, beaten and tortured
    with knives and cigarettes, deprived of food and water,
    forced to watch sexual assault of wife, and had house and
    place of worship burned, among other harms). While
    undoubtedly troubling, Singh’s past persecution does not
    rise to the level of severity in some other cases in which we
    have denied petitions for review where the BIA has declined
    to extend humanitarian asylum. See, e.g., Hanna v. Keisler,
    
    506 F.3d 933
    , 936–37, 939 (9th Cir. 2007) (past persecution
    insufficient where applicant was arrested, detained, and
    tortured for over a month, jailed and beaten for fifteen days,
    and threatened if he did not join a paramilitary organization).
    In cases similar to Singh’s, we have consistently denied
    review. See Marcu v. INS, 
    147 F.3d 1078
    , 1080, 1083 (9th
    Cir. 1998) (holding BIA did not abuse its discretion in
    denying applicant humanitarian asylum where police had
    771 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Almaghzar v. Gonzales, 
    457 F.3d 915
    , 922
    (9th Cir. 2006)). The BIA’s decision records the Singh family’s past
    persecution at the outset, and notes that the “several threats and physical
    abuse” Singh suffered did not rise to the requisite level of harm. There
    is no evidence that the BIA “misstat[ed] the record” or “fail[ed] to
    mention highly probative or potentially dispositive evidence.” 
    Id. 16 SINGH
    V. WHITAKER
    detained and beaten applicant on several occasions,
    threatened to kill him, and gone to his house looking for him
    after he left the country). Accordingly, we deny the petition
    for review of this claim.
    III.   Convention Against Torture
    To obtain CAT relief, “a petitioner must show that
    torture would be ‘inflicted by or at the instigation of or with
    the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
    person acting in an official capacity.’” 
    Afriyie, 613 F.3d at 937
    (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)). The petitioner must
    show that he “more likely than not” will be tortured if he
    returns home. 
    Id. Torture is
    defined as
    any act by which severe pain or suffering,
    whether physical or mental, is intentionally
    inflicted on a person for such purposes as
    obtaining from him or her or a third person
    information or a confession, punishing him or
    her for an act he or she or a third person has
    committed or is suspected of having
    committed, or intimidating or coercing him
    or her or a third person, or for any reason
    based on discrimination of any kind.
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). Relevant considerations for a
    CAT claim include evidence of past torture inflicted upon
    the applicant, evidence of safe internal relocation, evidence
    of mass violations of human rights within the country of
    removal, and other pertinent country conditions. Nuru v.
    Gonzales, 
    404 F.3d 1207
    , 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)). Evidence that the applicant
    “could relocate to a part of the country of removal where he
    or she is not likely to be tortured” is also a relevant
    SINGH V. WHITAKER                              17
    consideration. Kamalthas v. INS, 
    251 F.3d 1279
    , 1282 (9th
    Cir. 2001).
    Although the BIA’s denial of Singh’s CAT claim relied
    in part on its determination that he could relocate, and we
    remand to the BIA for reconsideration of the latter
    determination in connection with his asylum and
    withholding of removal claims, we see no reason to do the
    same for his CAT claim. Singh points to the BIA’s “flawed”
    relocation analysis, but the BIA’s insufficient analysis of
    that issue does not establish that Singh carried his burden for
    his CAT claim. See Ahmed v. Keisler, 
    504 F.3d 1183
    , 1199,
    1201 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing IJ’s denial of asylum claim
    but finding substantial evidence supported denial of CAT
    relief). The ability to relocate is but one factor in the CAT
    analysis. To prevail on his CAT claim, Singh would need to
    prove that he “more likely than not” would be tortured if he
    returned home; the BIA did not need to disprove this
    contention.
    Singh argues that his political activity would result in his
    being tortured, noting that it has led to his torture in the past,
    and that there is widespread torture of activists by the Indian
    police. 4 We conclude, however, that there is substantial
    evidence supporting the denial of CAT protection. While
    Singh highlights general evidence that police across India
    are engaged in human rights violations, the evidence specific
    to Mann Party members is sparse. Notwithstanding Singh’s
    4
    Singh hinges much of his argument on the fact that it would not
    make sense for a pro-secession activist such as himself to relocate
    outside of Punjab. However, Singh did not previously raise the issue of
    whether it was illogical for him to live elsewhere, and therefore it is not
    exhausted. Accordingly, we consider only whether there is substantial
    evidence that Singh would more likely than not be tortured, or if instead
    we are “compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 
    Ali, 637 F.3d at 1029
    .
    18                   SINGH V. WHITAKER
    personal experiences, the evidence in the record suggests
    Mann Party members are targeted primarily when they are
    high-profile militants.       Despite Singh’s documentary
    evidence regarding human rights concerns in India, we are
    not compelled to conclude that Singh more likely than not
    would be the subject of torture should he return to India.
    That Singh suffered persecution in the past does not
    necessarily mean he will be tortured in the future. See
    
    Ahmed, 504 F.3d at 1201
    (finding substantial evidence
    supported denial of CAT relief where petitioner had been
    beaten four times by the police but otherwise did not
    demonstrate he would be tortured upon return to
    Bangladesh, because it was not clear that past persecution
    rose to the level of torture). Therefore, we deny the petition
    for review on Singh’s CAT claim.
    CONCLUSION
    We grant the petition for review of Singh’s asylum and
    withholding of removal claims, and remand for the BIA to
    conduct a sufficiently individualized analysis of whether
    Singh could safely and reasonably relocate outside Punjab,
    and for reconsideration of whether he qualified for
    withholding from removal. We deny the petition for Singh’s
    humanitarian asylum and CAT claims.
    Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
    PETITION GRANTED AND REMANDED IN
    PART, DENIED IN PART.