Halpin v. City of Camden , 310 F. App'x 532 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2009 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    2-11-2009
    Halpin v. City of Camden
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 07-2711
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009
    Recommended Citation
    "Halpin v. City of Camden" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1883.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1883
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 07-2711
    _____________
    KIMBERLY HALPIN
    v.
    CITY OF CAMDEN; CAMDEN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT;
    MAURICE GIBSON, Detective; JOHN DOE, #1 and #2;
    ROGELIO PEREZ, Detective; EDWARD SPILLANE, Detective;
    JULIO RIOS, Detective
    Maurice Gibson,
    Appellant
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-02088)
    District Judge: Honorable Renee M. Bumb
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    February 5, 2009
    Before: RENDELL and ROTH, Circuit Judges,
    and PADOVA, District Judge.*
    (Filed: February 11, 2009)
    *Honorable John R. Padova, Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of
    Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
    Detective Maurice Gibson appeals the District Court’s denial of qualified
    immunity in this case arising out of his arrest of the plaintiff, Kimberly Halpin. On June
    18, 2004, after a concert at the Tweeter Center in Camden, New Jersey, Halpin was
    assaulted and robbed of her money, keys, and phone. Distressed and bleeding, she went
    to the Camden Police Administration Building to seek assistance. She pushed the buzzer
    at the window to get an officer’s attention. Detective Gibson approached the window and
    Halpin, crying, told him that she had just been mugged. Gibson told her to calm down
    and claims that Halpin started using foul language and racial slurs to describe her
    attackers. Gibson then arrested Halpin, handcuffed her, and put her into a cell. He
    charged her with disorderly conduct for her offensive language under N.J. Stat. Ann. §
    2C:33-2b, which prohibits “unreasonably loud and offensively coarse or abusive
    language” with “purpose to offend the sensibilities of a hearer.” She was released later
    that night with a summons. Halpin acknowledged that she was crying and upset, but
    denied using any foul language or racial slurs.
    Halpin filed an unlawful arrest complaint, and Gibson asserted a qualified
    immunity defense. In a qualified immunity analysis, the court must determine if the facts
    2
    alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the injured party, show a constitutional
    violation. Saucier v. Katz, 
    533 U.S. 194
    , 201 (2001). If there was such a violation, the
    court then determines whether there was a reasonable mistake of law or fact. If the
    constitutional right in question was clearly established at the time of the violation, such
    that an objectively reasonable officer could not be mistaken that his conduct violated that
    right, then there is no mistake of law. Butz v. Economou, 
    438 U.S. 478
    , 507 (1978).
    The District Court found that Gibson was not entitled to qualified immunity. The
    statute under which Halpin was charged is unconstitutional when applied to anything less
    than language that would incite the hearer to immediate violence or cause an immediate
    breach of the peace. That has been the state of the law for more than 20 years. In re
    H.D., 
    501 A.2d 1016
    , 1018 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985). The District Court found
    that it was unreasonable to believe that Halpin’s words in the police station would incite
    someone to violence.1 Therefore, Gibson lacked probable cause to arrest Halpin. The
    District Court then found that no officer could have an objectively reasonable belief that
    he could arrest someone simply for using foul language when the statute had been found
    unconstitutional more than 20 years before. The court concluded that, viewing the facts
    1
    The District Court analyzed the situation as though Halpin had used foul language:
    “[A]ccepting, as the Court must, that Plaintiff used foul language only and not racial slurs
    . . . .” (App. 16.) The District Court should have considered the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the plaintiff. Halpin denies using foul language, and her version of the
    events should have been credited in the qualified immunity analysis. However, the error
    does not affect the outcome of the case.
    3
    in the light most favorable to Halpin, there was no probable cause and no reasonable
    mistake of law or fact. Accordingly, Gibson was not entitled to qualified immunity.
    We agree with the reasoning of the District Court.
    Conclusion
    For the reasons set forth above, we will AFFIRM the Order of the District Court.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-2711

Citation Numbers: 310 F. App'x 532

Filed Date: 2/11/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023