United States v. Valles ( 2023 )


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  • Case: 19-50343        Document: 00516614756             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/18/2023
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    January 18, 2023
    No. 19-50343                             Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    United States of America,
    Plaintiff—Appellee,
    versus
    Elizabeth Valles,
    Defendant—Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 3:19-CV-58
    USDC No. 3:16-CR-960-1
    Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Jolly and Dennis, Circuit Judges.
    E. Grady Jolly, Circuit Judge:*
    In August of 2016, Elizabeth Valles, federal prisoner #72271-380,
    pleaded guilty to drug importation and was sentenced to 70 months of
    imprisonment. After sentencing, she failed to self-surrender to the Bureau of
    Prisons as ordered by the district court. Valles absconded, and while she was
    *
    This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
    Case: 19-50343      Document: 00516614756          Page: 2   Date Filed: 01/18/2023
    No. 19-50343
    a fugitive, her one-year period to file a 
    29 U.S.C. § 2255
     motion expired.
    Valles remained a fugitive until she was arrested in June of 2018.
    Eight months after her arrest, Valles filed this pro se § 2255 motion
    alleging that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. She requested an
    evidentiary hearing. In addition, Valles requested that the district court
    equitably toll the limitations period, asserting that she was “unavailable” to
    file a timely § 2255 motion because she had failed to self-surrender. The
    district court ordered Valles to show cause as to why it should not dismiss
    her motion as time barred. In response to the district court’s order, Valles
    explained that “she had a nervous breakdown after her sentencing and . . .
    eventually self-surrendered but not until 17 months after sentencing causing
    an extraordinary circumstance.” Additionally, she urged that when a
    defendant absconds, “the time of the absence . . . shall not be computed as
    any par[t] to the period within which the action must be brought.”
    The district court dismissed her § 2255 motion as time barred without
    holding an evidentiary hearing. The court held that the motion was not filed
    within one year of the date the judgment became final, nor had Valles
    demonstrated it was timely under any other statutory provision. The district
    court further declined to equitably toll the limitations period because, in its
    view, Valles’s nervous breakdown was not an extraordinary circumstance.
    The district court took special note that Valles failed to explain (1) how her
    mental illness prevented her from pursuing her legal rights or (2) why she
    waited over eight months after her arrest to file her § 2255 motion.
    Accordingly, the district court dismissed the motion with prejudice—and
    thereby denied Valles’s request for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
    equitable tolling.
    2
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    No. 19-50343
    This court, however, granted a certificate of appealability (COA).
    Thus, Valles now appeals that dismissal, contending that she was entitled to
    an evidentiary hearing with respect to her claim for equitable tolling.
    I
    The question today is not whether Valles is entitled to equitable tolling
    on the merits; instead, the precise question is whether the district court erred
    in denying Valles’s claim without an evidentiary hearing. We review the
    district court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cervantes, 
    132 F.3d 1006
    , 1110 (5th Cir. 1998).
    II
    We begin with the premise that not every petitioner who seeks relief
    pursuant to § 2255 is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. A hearing is
    unnecessary when “the motion and the files and records of the case
    conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    (b). This court has construed this provision to mean that an evidentiary
    hearing is not required when “either (1) the movant’s claims are clearly
    frivolous or based upon unsupported generalizations, or (2) the movant
    would not be entitled to relief as a matter of law, even if his factual assertions
    were true.” United States v. Harrison, 
    910 F.3d 824
    , 826–27 (5th Cir. 2018)
    (citing United States v. Guerra, 
    588 F.2d 519
    , 521 (5th Cir. 1979)). “A
    defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his § 2255 motion only if
    [he] presents ‘independent indicia of the likely merit of [his] allegations.’”
    United States v. Reed, 
    719 F.3d 369
    , 373 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States
    v. Cavitt, 
    550 F.3d 430
    , 442 (5th Cir. 2008)).
    Thus, to determine whether Valles was entitled to an evidentiary
    hearing, we must first consider the requirements applicable to the underlying
    relief sought, which, in her case, is equitable tolling. Valles was entitled to
    equitable tolling only if she showed that (1) she had been pursuing her rights
    3
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    No. 19-50343
    diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance outside of her
    control stood in her way and prevented timely filing. See United States v.
    Wheaten, 
    826 F.3d 843
    , 851 (5th Cir. 2016). The extraordinary-circumstance
    prong incorporates a causation requirement; the movant must show that the
    extraordinary circumstance caused the untimely filing. See, e.g., San Martin
    v. McNeil, 
    633 F.3d 1257
    , 1267 (11th Cir. 2011). This court has recognized
    that mental incompetency may qualify as an “extraordinary circumstance”
    that supports tolling of a limitations period. See Fisher v. Johnson, 
    174 F.3d 710
    , 715 (5th Cir. 1999).
    On appeal, Valles points to several facts supporting her request for an
    evidentiary hearing including: this court’s grant of a certificate of
    appealability and the district court ordering her to undergo mental health
    treatment. But, as the district court correctly recognized, Valles’s conclusory
    allegation of a nervous breakdown, without any detail regarding how that
    claimed condition affected her ability or caused her inability to file a timely §
    2255 motion, is insufficient to support equitable tolling or require an
    evidentiary hearing. Reed, 
    719 F.3d at 373
    . 1 Instead, her response contained
    only the “unsupported generalization” that her “nervous breakdown”
    constitutes an extraordinary circumstance that “should allow for equitable
    1
    The relevant portion of Valles’s response to the district court’s show-cause order
    reads as follows:
    The Court is correct that a Section 2255 motion is subject to a one-year limitations
    period. The Movant under Coleman v. Johnson, 
    184 F.3d 398
    , 402-3 (5th Cir.
    1999). There are circumstances that include situations in which a movant is
    prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting [her] rights. In the case of the
    Movant she had a nervous breakdown after her sentencing and called the Probation
    officer. The Movant eventually self-surrendered but not until 17 months after
    sentencing causing an extraordinary circumstance and this should allow for
    equitable tolling for the Movant to be able to bring her 2255 Motion.
    4
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    tolling.” 
    Id.
     (“Conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, do not
    support the request for an evidentiary hearing.”). Further, Valles’s
    contention that absconding tolls the limitations is meritless because delays of
    a petitioner’s own making do not qualify for equitable tolling. In re Wilson,
    
    442 F.3d 872
    , 875 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
    Further, Valles has not shown that she pursued her rights diligently,
    as required for equitable tolling. See Wheaten, 
    826 F.3d at 851
    . Thus, even if
    the alleged “extraordinary circumstance” of a nervous breakdown prevented
    Valles from filing until she was taken into custody, she has still failed to
    explain the nearly eight-month delay between her arrest and her filing,
    demonstrating that Valles did not act with reasonable diligence. See, e.g.,
    Stroman v. Thaler, 
    603 F.3d 299
    , 302–03 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (finding
    non-diligent a § 2254 petitioner who filed his petition seven weeks after
    learning that his state habeas application had been denied).
    Finally, Valles argues that the limitations period should not be applied
    too harshly because this effort was her first § 2255 motion and her pro se
    submissions in the district court are entitled to liberal construction. Bledsue
    v. Johnson, 
    188 F.3d 250
    , 255 (5th Cir. 1999). Although she correctly states
    both general principles, she is not convincing in demonstrating that they are
    sufficient to establish an entitlement to an evidentiary hearing.
    Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion
    in denying Valles’s § 2255 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing
    because Valles proffered purely conclusory assertions and unsupported
    generalizations regarding her entitlement to equitable tolling. Finding no
    error, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    5
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    No. 19-50343
    James L. Dennis, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
    Our court has long agreed with other courts and commentators that
    § 2255(b) must be construed literally, “to mean that a hearing must be held
    ‘(u)nless “the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that
    the prisoner is entitled to no relief.”’” Ferrara v. United States, 
    547 F.2d 861
    ,
    863 (5th Cir. 1977) (quoting § 2255(b)). To that effect, this court has
    instructed that, after reviewing the case’s record in its entirety, a hearing may
    only be denied when “(1) the movant’s claims are clearly frivolous or based
    upon unsupported generalizations, or (2) the movant would not be entitled
    to relief as a matter of law, even if h[er] factual assertions were true.” United
    States v. Allen, 
    918 F.3d 457
    , 460 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v.
    Harrison, 
    910 F.3d 824
    , 826-27 (5th Cir. 2018)). The majority, like the
    district court below, 1 fails to heed § 2255(b)’s command to review “the
    motion and files and records of the case,” instead deciding whether Valles’s
    has made a sufficient case for relief based on the assertions in her pro se
    motion alone. Had the majority reviewed the record, it could not conclude
    with the certainty required to deny an evidentiary hearing that Valles is not
    entitled to relief. Because I would vacate and remand for an evidentiary
    hearing, I dissent.
    The record discloses ample evidence that Valles may be entitled to
    equitable tolling. As the majority acknowledges, mental incompetency has
    been recognized as an “extraordinary circumstance” that supports tolling of
    a limitations period. Supra at 4 (citing Fisher v. Johnson, 
    174 F.3d 710
    , 715
    (5th Cir. 1999)). It also may satisfy equitable tolling’s second prong because
    a petitioner “simply cannot pursue [her] legal rights during such a period [of
    1
    The district court order denying Valles’s petition as time-barred stated that “it
    appears from the face of [Valles’s] § 2255 Motion that it is untimely and that she is not
    entitled to equitable tolling.”
    6
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    mental incompetency].” Fisher, 
    174 F.3d at 715
    . Thus, if the record contains
    minimal evidence of mental incompetence, Valles is entitled to an evidentiary
    hearing on her motion. And in fact, the record in Valles’s case shows that she
    suffered sustained and chronic mental illness that rose to a level that, in the
    eyes of both the district court and the Government, required intervention.
    Valles’s PSR noted that she had been experiencing “symptoms of depression
    and anxiety,” for which she voluntarily sought mental health counseling at
    the El Paso Behavioral Center (EPBC). At EPBC, Valles attended counseling
    sessions four times per week. She eventually stopped attending EPBC
    because she lacked childcare for her children, one of whom suffers from
    depression and has attempted suicide. During the presentence interview, she
    was encouraged to return to her counseling sessions. As part of Valles’s
    imprisonment, the district court recommended that she receive mental
    health treatment while in custody, and ordered as a special condition of
    Valles’s supervised release that she participate in a mental health treatment
    program. This is enough to establish that the record fails to “conclusively
    show” that Valles is not entitled to equitable tolling. § 2255(b). See United
    States v. Reed, 
    719 F.3d 369
    , 373 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that the movant’s
    burden of showing independent indicia of reliability “must be understood
    practically, in the context of the claim being presented”). The majority faults
    Valles for failing to prove, at this stage, that she is ultimately entitled to
    equitable tolling. But that is the wrong inquiry. The question is not whether
    Valles has established her entitlement to equitable tolling, but whether the
    record supports a prima facie case for relief thus warranting an evidentiary
    hearing, after which the fact-intensive question of equitable tolling may be
    properly decided. See United States v. Rivas-Lopez, 
    678 F.3d 353
    , 358 (5th Cir.
    2012) (“[W]e can neither credit nor refute Rivas’s allegation of ineffective
    assistance on this record. To determine [that], we would benefit from
    7
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    additional facts that should be determined at an evidentiary hearing in the
    district court.”).
    Under the statute, the district court should have held an evidentiary
    hearing on her claim. Because it failed to, I would vacate and remand for such
    a hearing. I respectfully dissent.
    8