Pond Security Service Gmbh v. United States ( 2021 )


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  •                               No. 17-1736C
    (Filed: May 28, 2021)
    (Re-Filed: June 16, 2021) 1
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    **********************
    POND SECURITY SERVICES, GmbH,                         Contracts; Contract
    Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C.
    Plaintiff,                       §§ 7101-7109 (2012);
    motions for partial
    v.                                                    summary judgment; CDA
    statute of limitations;
    THE UNITED STATES,                                    estimates in requirement
    contracts.
    Defendant.
    **********************
    OPINION
    On February 26, 2009, the United States Army (“the Army”) entered
    into a requirements contract with Pond Security Service GmbH (“Pond”)
    pursuant to which Pond would provide contract security guards (“CSG”) on
    American army bases in Germany. The contract was eventually performed,
    but Pond has filed suit pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act, 
    41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109
     (2012) (“CDA”), claiming that the Army breached the contract in
    by ordering far less services than estimated. The complaint contains three
    counts. In count I, plaintiff claims that the agency negligently prepared a
    quantity estimate to offerors; in count II, plaintiff asserts that that the
    government withheld superior knowledge regarding CSG requirements; and
    in count III, plaintiff claims that the government’s actual number of hours
    ordered constitutes a major change under the contract.
    1
    This opinion was originally issued under seal in order to afford the parties
    an opportunity to propose redactions of protected material. On June 16,
    2021, the parties notified the court that they have no proposed redactions for
    the opinion. We thus reissue this opinion unredacted.
    Pending are the parties’ motions for summary judgment. Pond moves
    for partial summary judgment on the issue of entitlement for all three counts;
    it does not address the issue of damages. Defendant cross-moves for
    summary judgment on counts I and II. Additionally, the government argues
    in the alternative that the court should bar Pond from recovering damages
    under counts I and II insofar as they are traceable to task order No. 2. The
    government also seeks partial summary judgment on “additional costs”
    claimed under count III, costs incurred while performing work under task
    order No. 2, and costs incurred due to the illness of Pond employees. The
    motions are fully briefed. Oral argument was held on May 26, 2021.
    Because material questions of fact remain, we deny both parties’ motions.
    BACKGROUND 2
    Pond was the incumbent contractor on the prior indefinite delivery,
    requirements contract to provide security guard services on American army
    bases in Germany since September 2003.
    1. The Army’s Changing Requirements Prior to this 2009 Contract
    During that contract, the Army was in the middle of a
    “transformation” or a “restationing” in Europe. A transformation includes
    any change that affects “the command both operationally and
    organizationally.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 2 at 114 (Association of the United States
    Army Journal). 3 This process involved “a large increase in manning, and
    then later a decrease in manning.” 
    Id. at 168
     (Geier Dep.). Pond’s proposal
    for the present contract recognized that “fluctuations in the requirements [for
    the 2003 contract] were immense.” 
    Id. at 117
     (Pond’s Proposal).
    In 2007, as part of this transformation, USAREUR announced
    reductions of Army personnel in Germany “of approximately 1,720 Soldiers,
    3,300 family members, 480 U.S. civilians and 530 local national civilians.”
    
    Id. at 106
     (USAREUR News Release). These plans changed, however, when
    the Army announced a temporary delay in the reduction of troop levels in
    2
    The facts are drawn from plaintiff’s complaint and from attachments to both
    parties’ briefs. The vast majority of the recitations of the background section
    are undisputed, nevertheless, there are disputed issues of fact that the court
    will attempt to isolate.
    3
    The parties presented multiple documents within each exhibit. We have
    identified the document’s name after the exhibit number to provide clarity.
    2
    Europe in December of 2007, “essentially undoing previous orders to reduce
    Army forces in the region.” 
    Id. at 115
    .
    A series of events took place prior to contract award related to the use
    of CSG’s. On March 14, 2008, the agency received a memorandum from the
    Army Office of the Provost Marshall General (“OPMG”) with the subject
    line “Department of the Army Guidance on the Use of Contract Security
    Guards (CSG) in the United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army
    (USAREUR) Area of Responsibility (AOR).” Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 4 at 134 (March
    2008 Memo). The memorandum stated that its purpose was “to provide
    guidance to USAREUR and IMCOM-Europe on the use of CSG for access
    control in the USAREUR AOR.” 
    Id.
     The document also stated that “CSG
    costs have steadily risen and funding is insufficient given costs of the Global
    War on Terrorism, Army Transformation and USAREUR Restationing.” 
    Id.
    The primary purpose of the memorandum was:
    . . . . to standardize operations and to control costs for centrally
    funded CSG in the USAREUR AOR as follows:
    a. DA civilians, military police and CSG will not fill the same
    IACP requirement.
    ....
    c. OPMG will only fund CSG for IACP as justified by
    installation pedestrian and traffic flow.
    d. USAREUR and IMCOM-E will conduct traffic studies to
    determine access lane manpower requirements. . . . .
    e. Installation commanders who determine the need for
    additional CSG personnel for IACP (those personnel not
    justified by traffic flow) and other installation security missions
    will submit a request for exception to policy through their chain
    of command to the Provost Marshal General.
    
    Id. at 134-35
    . Pond did not receive the memorandum until June 9, 2009,
    more than three months after it was awarded the contract on February 26,
    2009.
    Then on August 13, 2008, the Security Operations Branch presented
    an internal agency PowerPoint. 
    Id. at 20-21
     (Wojtyna Dep.). Mr. Edward
    Wojtyna, the CO’s representative, was responsible for preparing estimates
    for the 2009 contract. Mr. Wojtyna testified regarding the PowerPoint:
    Q. Okay. And this appears to be showing the difference
    between the USAREUR manning standards as they currently
    existed, contrasted with the Department of the Army guidance
    on the use of CSGs. Do you see that?
    3
    A. Yes, sir.
    Q. And that right-hand column, the DA guidance, is that
    essentially referring to the March 2008 Army policy?
    A. Without matching, I’m assuming it is, correct. That's what
    it would have been used.
    Q. At this point in time it’s reasonable to assume that that’s
    what it was referring to?
    A. Correct. Yes.
    Q. And does this show that a reduced number of guard
    positions would be forthcoming?
    A. By a strict application of the DA guidance, yes.
    Q. . . . The USAREUR manning standards were two guards up
    to 200 -- is that persons per hour?
    A. Correct.
    Q. And the new standard would be one guard per access lane
    per every 300 vehicles per hour or less?
    A. Correct.
    Q. And that average number of vehicles as referenced here in
    the DA guidance, would that be determined by the traffic
    studies?
    A. Yes.
    
    Id. at 21
    .
    Next, the Army’s August 25, 2008 Acquisition Strategy, which was
    not made available to plaintiff prior to award, stated that “the various
    dynamics of transformation, installation closures, funding constraints, and
    unforeseen, unplanned force protection needs . . . make it virtually impossible
    to predict future requirements with any degree of certainty.” Def.’s Mot. Ex.
    2 at 16 (Acquisition Strategy). It recited that “a realistic ceiling amount to
    capture all unknown, unforeseen requirements would put the contract ceiling
    so high that it would be become unrealistic and misleading.” 
    Id. at 16
    . It
    also stated that, “Although USAREUR transformation could reduce contract
    requirements during the total performance period, specific reductions have
    not been considered in this estimated dollar value based on possible changes
    to the current plan.” 
    Id. at 15
    .
    The Acquisition Strategy reflects that Army planners believed that
    USAREUR could have an increase in CSG requirements during the 2009
    contract because of “unplanned force protection needs.” 
    Id. at 16
    . Thus,
    because of potential increases or decreases in CSG requirements, the Army
    chose to use a requirements contract for this solicitation, as it found that it
    4
    would be impossible to determine a specific minimum or maximum quantity
    needed for the 2009 contract. 
    Id. at 16
    .
    At deposition, Mr. Wojtyna was asked whether the March 2008
    memorandum contained directives. In response to the question, “you’d have
    to implement what was being required of you, correct, from the Pentagon?”,
    he stated, “Life is more complicated than OPMG issues an e-mail or issues a
    policy memorandum, it’s up to the Army commanders to execute the
    programs, but not execute the -- based on the requirements within their
    command.” Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 2 at 16 (Wojtyna Dep.). Mr. Wojtyna was then
    asked whether “the policy required you to conduct traffic studies . . .?”. In
    response, he stated, “Correct.” 
    Id. at 17
     (Wojtyna Dep.). In August of 2009,
    after award of the contract, the Army completed the traffic studies
    contemplated in the 2008 documents.
    Plaintiff asserts that the agency knew it would not meet the new
    manning standard provided in the March 2008 memorandum and delayed
    implementation of the traffic studies by five months. To support this
    argument, Pond presents more of Mr. Wojtyna’s testimony:
    Q. Do you know when these traffic studies were planned on
    being conducted?
    A. I wasn’t planning to do them at all, but we ultimately did
    them, I think, in August of 2008, I think -- or August of 2009
    we ultimately did them.
    Q. Okay. When you say you were not planning on doing them
    at all, what's the basis of that statement?
    A. Because they were -- in my mind they were a waste of time.
    . . . We knew that they were not going to – we could not meet
    the traffic flow standards as established in their memo, so --
    and I told them at the time and they knew that at the time. So –
    but they wanted to standardize how -- the contract guard
    program throughout the Army. So I -- again, I didn’t see a point
    -- it was pointless to do that because I already knew we were
    not going to meet their standards.
    Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 4 at 10 (Wojtyna Dep.)
    Between 2006 and 2009, prior to the contract award, the Army Audit
    Agency (“AAA”) completed a series of audits for the purpose of reviewing
    the Army’s use of CSGs in Germany. On June 6, 2007, the AAA issued a
    report identifying a possible reduction of $39.7 million in CSG costs. This
    was followed on April 28, 2008, by a report identifying an additional $12.4
    5
    million in possible reductions, and on November 14, 2008, with a report
    identifying another $2.8 million in possible reductions. Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1 at
    138, 140, 147. Mr. Chad Geier, Pond’s contract manager, testified in a
    deposition regarding Pond’s awareness of the AAA audits:
    Q. While performing . . . that 2003 Contract, Pond became
    aware of U.S. Army audits that were ongoing?
    A. In conjunction with the USAREUR transformation, there
    were audits being conducted, yes.
    ...
    Q. . . . Did Pond have an understanding as to whether any cuts
    were implemented in response to the audits that were
    conducted during the 2003 Contract?
    A. Yes, there was cuts conducted after audits that were
    conducted in the 2003 Contract, but what their relevance to the
    2009 Contract is, I cannot make that connection.
    Q. Did you -- had you ever seen any audit reports issued by the
    U.S. Army Audit Agency before this litigation started?
    A. I -- I may have seen abbreviated audit reports. I don’t think
    I ever saw the full audit reports. I did see information come out
    of these, but I don’t know if that was directly from the audit
    agency or if it was from another government office that just
    produced information from that. I do not know who produced
    it.
    Def.’s Mot. Ex. 2 at 177-78.
    After the AAA audits were completed, USAREUR took action to
    reduce manning at installations identified by the AAA. Mr. Wojtyna testified
    that the AAA identified specific potential reductions between the issuance of
    the March 2008 memorandum and award of the 2009 contract. Def.’s Mot.
    Ex. 2 at 134 (Wojtyna Dep.). In an agency email reporting on the manning
    standards in USAREUR, the Army stated that the review program reduced
    CSG positions by 33% (from 1,288 positions to 891) from 2006 to the date
    of the report, May 13, 2009. Def.’s Mot. Ex. 2 at 97. Mr. Wojtyna explained
    that, by 2008, USAREUR had sufficiently “adopted . . . the manning
    standards, to the level” required by the AAA audit reports. Def.’s Mot. Ex.
    2 at 134. Thus, after the conclusion of these audits, both USAREUR and the
    AAA believed that, going forward, USAREUR had adopted appropriate
    manning standards. 
    Id.
     Mr. Wojtyna also testified that he incorporated the
    AAA’s reductions into the estimates for this solicitation:
    6
    Q. So was that yes, you did factor in these revised standards
    into the solicitation estimates?
    A. I factored in the results of the AAA audits that had been
    conducted of the program, who used -- partially what they used
    in their assessment in the audit was the 2008 manning
    standards, but not a strict application of the standards.
    Pl’s Mot. Ex. 4 at 21 (Wojtyna Dep.). Mr. Wojtyna gave further testimony
    regarding the Army’s estimates:
    Q. Okay. I mean, and so whether it was from the 2008 memo
    or whether it was from transformation, in any event, there were
    reductions that were anticipated presolicitation that were not
    accounted for in the estimates. Is that a fair statement? . . . .
    [A.] Correct. True statement. Ultimately there were reductions
    to both -- because of both, not to both – because of both factors
    [the March 2008 Memorandum and the transformation].
    
    Id. at 33
    .
    2. The Solicitation
    On October 10, 2008, the Army issued the solicitation for the 2009
    contract at issue here, requesting offers for the provision of CSG services at
    various garrisons throughout Germany. The Army elected to pursue a
    “requirements contract for the supplies or services specified” under Federal
    Acquisition Regulations (“FAR”) 52.216-21, but reserved the right, in the
    event of “planned or unforeseen operational requirements,” to modify “the
    function, location, and operating hours of security posts and/or patrols to
    meet both permanent, immediate and temporary (on short-notice) changes in
    security operational requirements.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 14 (Solicitation).
    The solicitation instructed that the quantities of requirements provided
    in the solicitation “are estimates only and are not purchased by this contract.”
    
    Id. at 13
    . Further the solicitation states that, if the Army’s “requirements do
    not result in orders in the quantities described as ‘estimated’ or ‘maximum’
    in the Schedule, that fact shall not constitute the basis for an equitable price
    adjustment.” 
    Id.
    The Solicitation contained a pricing template for each Garrison based
    upon an estimated number of hours that would be required. Initially, the
    solicitation estimated that 6,371,678 hours would be needed annually.
    Between the time when the solicitation was issued on October 10, 2008, and
    7
    the time when the contract was awarded to Pond on February 26, 2009, the
    Army issued six amendments to the solicitation that had the effect of
    adjusting CSG estimates. Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 4 at 492. The final contract
    estimated that 5,530,083 hours would be required annually. Def.’s Mot. Ex.
    2 at 142 (Wojtyna Dep.). Mr. Wojtyna testified at deposition that these
    “estimates were based on where the guards were currently at, which included
    any changes that were going to be – that had been listed under the tiger team
    audits and the existing closures, any of the existing information we had on
    closures.” 
    Id. at 138
    .
    The solicitation stated that such estimates were “based on historical
    information and on the best information available to the Government at the
    time of solicitation issue.” Pl’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 234. It also stated that each
    quantity provided by the government “is an estimate of the number of hours
    that may be ordered for a given location; however, actual quantities ordered
    may be greater or lesser than the estimated quantities.” 
    Id.
     Further, the
    solicitation warned:
    The quantities of supplies or services specified in the Schedule
    are estimates only and are not purchased by this contract.
    Except as this contract may otherwise provide, if the
    Government’s requirements do not result in orders in the
    quantities described as “estimated” or “maximum” in the
    Schedule, that fact shall not constitute the basis for an equitable
    price adjustment.
    Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 10 (Solicitation).
    Section 1.1.2 of the solicitation, entitled Performance Work Statement
    (“PWS”), allowed the contractor to recover “additional costs” resulting from
    changes in “guard functions, locations, and operating hours.” 
    Id. at 17
    . As
    for any minor changes “in guard force functions, locations, and operating
    hours,” however, the solicitation provided that these changes “will be at no
    extra costs to the U.S. Government provided such changes do not impose
    additional costs on the contractor.” 
    Id. at 14
    . It further provided that
    “examples of minor changes are, temporary location changes within a small
    geographic area and temporary shift changes of less than 4 hours.” 
    Id.
    The solicitation further explained that any “[m]ajor changes in guard
    force functions, locations, and operating hours will be at no extra cost to the
    U.S. Government provided such changes do not impose additional costs on
    the Contractor,” and that “[e]xamples of major changes are the elimination
    within one Site (the area of responsibility of one Site Manager) of the annual
    8
    hourly equivalent of two or more 24 hours per day, 7 days per week guard
    positions (total: 17,520 hours annually).” 
    Id. at 4
    . 4
    3. Pond’s Proposal
    Pond submitted a proposal to the Army on November 24, 2008. It
    contained a “basis of estimate” that set forth pricing. The basis for estimate
    contained a “fully burdened labor rate” for each contract line item number
    (“CLIN”) identified in the solicitation.
    4. Contract Performance
    Pond was awarded the Contract on February 26, 2009. The Contract
    provided for one base year and three one-year options, each of which was
    exercised by the Army. Performance commenced on May 30, 2009, and
    extended until May 28, 2014.
    To place orders under the 2009 contract, the Army periodically sent
    task orders to the awardee that set forth what CSG services the Army would
    require. See 
    Id. at 12-13
     (“Any supplies and services to be furnished under
    this contract shall be ordered by issuance of delivery orders or task orders by
    the Wiesbaden Contracting Center.”). Additionally, the solicitation notes
    that “delivery orders or task orders are subject to the terms and conditions of
    this contract.” 
    Id. at 13
    .
    The Army’s task orders were modified bilaterally in 2009 and in 2010,
    to decrease the previously ordered amounts. The parties completed another
    bilateral modification of a task order on March 22, 2013, in modification
    (“Mod.”) 04 of Task Order No. 2 to “deobligate the remaining unused hours
    and funds” covering work performed between May 30, 2012 and May 29,
    2013. Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 23 (Mod. 04). Mod. 04 contains the following
    contractor’s release: “[Pond] having received all payments due under
    contract W912CM-09-D-0015-0002, hereby releases and discharges the
    Government from all liabilities and claims, including interest and related
    costs, which it now has or hereafter may have, arising under this task order.”
    
    Id. at 23
    . At the time Pond received Mod. 04, it had already submitted a
    4
    Unlike “minor changes,” “[t]he Contractor shall normally receive formal
    notification from the COR 90 days prior to the effective date of major
    changes except in those cases where the Contractor informs the Government
    that the reductions can be implemented at an earlier date as a result of the
    Contractor’s ability to avoid costs by the attrition of personnel.” Def.’s Mot.
    Ex. 1 at 4 (Solicitation).
    9
    request for equitable adjustment (“REA”) and was discussing the REA with
    the government. Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 1 at 3 (Geier Decl.).
    Pond attached a declaration to its motion from Mr. Geier, which states
    that while the contract was being performed, from May 30, 2009 to May 28,
    2014, the Army decreased its ordered hours “by nearly 30%.” Pl.’s Mot. Ex.
    1 at 4 (Geier Decl.). The point of his comparison, however, is not a decrease
    from awarded hours in prior task orders, but from the original solicitation
    estimate. 5 Instead of the approximately 21 million hours estimated in
    Amendment No. 5 of the of the Solicitation, the Government only ordered
    approximately 15 million hours.” Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 4 (Geier Decl.). It
    appears that the government does not dispute this assertion.
    Mr. Geier’s declaration also includes a statement regarding the effect
    of the Army’s estimates upon plaintiff’s costs:
    In order to quantify the various direct costs related to contract
    performance, Pond calculated a mark-up rate, referred to as the
    “load factor” in the Complaint. . . . The calculation of the “load
    factor” (“LF”) resulted from two variables, specifically
    variable x, which is the summation of all direct costs contained
    in the [basis of estimate] direct cost pools for a contract year
    and variable y, which is the total number of CSG hours,
    meaning LF = x + y. As this formula indicates, a decrease in
    the number of CSG hours ordered (variable y) with constant
    direct costs (variable x), results in a higher load factor (LF).
    Pl’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 3. On this point, Mr. Geier also stated, “Pond relied on
    the hours and positions provided by the Army as the basis for determining
    the loaded hourly rates it presented in its price proposal.” 
    Id.
    On February 12, 2012, Pond submitted a REA to the Army in the
    amount of €6,558,416.15 euros. The basis for this REA was that the Army
    undertook “post award efforts to save money on the security guard contracts
    and to use the funds allocated for security guard costs for other purposes.”
    Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 4 at 1064 (REA). On December 17, 2013, the contracting
    officer (“CO”), Mr. Roberto J. Gotay, denied the REA.
    5. Plaintiff’s CDA Claim
    5
    Plaintiff’s counsel represented during oral argument that the government
    issued two task orders during the life of this contract.
    10
    Pond submitted its certified claim to the CO on May 24, 2016. The
    claim sought €9,990,930.93 euros plus CDA interest as a result of Army
    changes to the contract, “result[ing] in 31.98% less of the guard services than
    indicated in the Contract quantity estimate.” Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 4 at 1213
    (Certified Claim). The certified claim argued that the reduction in guard
    services was the result of a negligent estimate made by the Army.
    In its certified claim, Pond attached a graph depicting the price
    differential between the contract price and the re-determined price for the
    reduced hours ordered during the contract period. Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 4 at 1231.
    Period        Estimated Hours        Amount            Re-determined     Difference
    Hours     Provided/I   Invoiced for      price for hours   (w/o Special
    n voiced     Hours Provided    provided (w/o     Event Hours)
    (w/o Sp. Event    Sp. Event
    Hours)            Hours)
    05/09 - 05/10 5,533,203 4,367,793    106,971,405.45    109,777,348.93 € 2,805,943.48 €
    Base year                                   €
    05/10-05/11   5,533,203 4,071,297    99,773,697.55     102,445,811.26 € 2,672,113.71 €
    1st Option                                 €
    05/11-05/12   5,533,203 3,529,178    90,235,370.18 €   92,634,646.99 €   2,399,276.81
    2nd Option                                                                     €
    05/12-05/13   5,533,203 3,077,539    80,802,791.35     82,916,388.28 €   2,113, 596.93 €
    3rd Option                                 €
    Total                                                                    9.990.930,93
    €
    Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 4 at 1231.
    Pond argued in its claim that the Army’s estimates were negligent
    because it had information prior to award, not shared with Pond, that should
    have alerted the Army to the likelihood of more reductions. The CO’s final
    decision (“COFD”) denied Pond’s claim on November 29, 2016, finding that
    Pond had received “a realistic estimated total quantity for CSG manpower
    requirements in the solicitation and resulting contract based on the most
    current information available” at the time and “adequate information to
    understand the Government’s estimates and what would be required to
    successfully perform the contract.” Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 4 at 1330-31 (COFD).
    The decision further explained that the March 2008 memorandum relied
    upon by Pond in its claim “contained no directive to reduce or relax
    standards,” but instead “provided guidance to calculate an objective
    requirement, and the means to deviate from the objective requirement.” 
    Id. at 1332
    .
    The COFD invited Pond to provide clarification in the event Pond
    believed the Contracting Officer misunderstood the claim. Pond responded
    11
    with a letter on January 13, 2017. On February 27, 2017, the CO confirmed
    its November 29, 2016 COFD. Pl.’s Resp. Ex. 2 at 26 (CO Letter). The
    confirmation explained that “[a]ny differences in actual ACP manning
    quantities ordered were not major changes” under the contract because the
    “applicability of ‘major changes’ [is] only in relation to changes in and to the
    individual task orders issued under the contract, and not to differing order
    quantities over the life of the contract from estimated quantities.” 
    Id.
     With
    respect to the March 2008 memorandum, the confirmation reiterated that it
    contained no directive to reduce standards and that directives to reduce
    manning levels were not issued until after the contract was awarded. The
    confirmation noted that it was a final decision and explained how Pond could
    appeal the decision. On November 6, 2017, Pond filed a complaint, initiating
    an action in this court challenging that decision.
    DISCUSSION
    Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on all three
    counts of its complaint, and defendant filed motions for summary judgment
    on counts I and II of plaintiff’s complaint and a partial summary judgment
    motion on count III of plaintiff’s complaint.
    A. The Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment Based on the
    Statute of Limitations.
    The government asserts that, because Pond filed its certified claim on
    May 24, 2016, any claim that accrued prior to May 24, 2010, would be barred
    by the 6-year CDA statute of limitations. 
    41 U.S.C. § 7103
     (a)(4)(A). 6 The
    government argues that counts I and II are barred by the statute of limitations
    and also argues that because count III seeks additional costs under Section
    1.1.2 of the solicitation, to the extent that Pond incurred these costs before
    May 24, 2010, it is barred from recovering such costs.
    Pond obtained a copy of the March 2008 memorandum on June 9,
    2009. Defendant argues that counts I and II accrued on that date, because
    both counts argue that had Pond been informed of the relaxed manning
    standards at the time of the March 2008 memorandum and Pond would have
    6
    The government acknowledges that it did not plead this affirmative defense
    in its answer, but adds that while “an affirmative defense may be waived if
    not pled as prescribed,” “the waiver is not effective absent unfair surprise or
    prejudice.” First Annapolis Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 
    75 Fed. Cl. 280
    ,
    288 (2007).
    12
    been able to apply a “higher ‘load factor’ to the wage costs, which would
    have resulted in higher CLIN prices [of] 9,990,930.93 euros.” Compl. ¶ 47.
    Thus, according to defendant, when Pond learned of the memorandum, it
    knew of the events that “fix the alleged liability of . . . the Government . . .
    and permit assertion of the claim,” and it had knowledge that “some injury
    [has] occurred.” Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 
    773 F.3d 1315
    , 1320 (Fed. Cir.
    2014).
    In its opposition, Pond argues that the government failed to assert this
    affirmative defense in its answer, and thus, the government’s defense is
    untimely. It is unnecessary, however, for the court to decide whether
    defendant has waived its statute of limitations defense, as we do not find that
    plaintiff’s counts I and II accrued on June 9, 2009, when Pond received the
    March 2008 memorandum.
    Pond argues that its claims did not accrue on June 9, 2009, because
    the memorandum did not make clear that it would impact the current
    contract. 7 We agree. The language in the memorandum does not include
    any clear statement that the volumes under the 2009 contract would be
    impacted. It would have been impossible for Pond to know whether it was
    injured at that time. See FAR § 33.201 (defining “accrual of a claim” as “the
    date when all events, that fix the alleged liability of either the Government
    or the contractor and permit assertion of the claim, were known or should
    have been known. For liability to be fixed, some injury must have
    occurred.”) 8 The memorandum does not present anything from which the
    plaintiff could have calculated an injury, and thus, the memorandum could
    not have fixed the government’s alleged liability.
    It is unnecessary for the court to find the precise date of when the
    statute of limitations could have been triggered, as the government only
    7
    Defendant argues in the alternative that, if Pond had no idea what the
    implications of the memorandum would be, the memorandum could not have
    provided Pond with any meaningful information about the Army’s
    requirements, and thus, the government could not have withheld superior
    knowledge. We deal with that assertion below.
    8
    The government argues that Pond’s claim accrued when “some injury . . .
    occurred,” not when Pond could determine the amount of its claim. Under
    48 C.F.R. 33.201, the date of a claim’s accrual is determined by the events
    fixing the “alleged liability” of the government. However, we disagree that
    Pond was aware of any injury at the time that it received the memorandum.
    13
    offers one date as the triggering event. Because we find that plaintiff’s claims
    did not accrue on June 9, 2009, we deny the government’s motion for
    summary judgment on counts I and II and its motion for partial summary
    judgment on count III based upon the statute of limitations.
    B. Count I: The Government Negligently Estimated the Number of CSG
    Hours in the Solicitation.
    A requirements contract obligates “the government to fill all its actual
    requirements for specified supplies or services during the contract period by
    purchasing from the awardee, who agrees to provide them at the agreed
    price.” Medart, Inc. v. Austin, 
    967 F.2d 579
    , 581 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing 
    48 CFR § 16.503
    (a) (1991)). This type of contract “is useful when the
    government anticipates recurring needs but cannot predetermine the precise
    quantities or future demands at the time of the award. The very nature and
    use of a requirements contract presupposes uncertainty about actual
    purchases.” 
    Id.
     (Citing 
    48 CFR §§ 16.501
    (a), 16.503(b) (1991)).
    FAR 16.503(a)(1) dictates how the CO must provide estimates in a
    solicitation for a requirements contract:
    [T]he contracting officer shall state a realistic estimated total
    quantity in the solicitation and resulting contract. This estimate
    is not a representation to an offeror or contractor that the
    estimated quantity will be required or ordered, or that
    conditions affecting requirements will be stable or normal. The
    contracting officer may obtain the estimate from records of
    previous requirements and consumption, or by other means,
    and should base the estimate on the most current information
    available.
    
    48 C.F.R. § 16.503
    (a)(1). Additionally, the Federal Circuit teaches in
    Rumsfeld v. Applied Cos., Inc., that the government has an “implied
    obligation” when it utilizes a requirements contract “to act in good faith and
    use reasonable care in computing its estimated needs.” 
    325 F.3d 1328
    , 1334-
    35 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
    Therefore, under a negligent estimate theory of breach, a contractor
    must “show by preponderant evidence that the government’s estimates were
    inadequately or negligently prepared, not in good faith, or grossly or
    unreasonably inadequate at the time the estimate was made.” Agility Def. &
    Gov’t Servs., Inc. v. United States, 
    847 F.3d 1345
    , 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
    14
    (citing Medart Inc., 
    967 F.2d at 581
    ). Without showing “negligence or bad
    faith, the contractor bears the risk of variance between the estimated and
    actual contract quantities.” Medart, Inc., 
    967 F.2d at 581
    .
    Pond argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because the
    Army’s estimates were negligently prepared. The government asks the court
    to grant its motion for partial summary judgment on count I because plaintiff
    has failed “to show by preponderant evidence that the government’s
    estimates were inadequately or negligently prepared, not in good faith, or
    grossly or unreasonably inadequate at the time the estimate was made.”
    Agility Def. & Gov’t Servs., Inc., 847 F.3d at 1350 (citing Medart, Inc., 
    967 F.2d at 581
    ). The parties rely on the same documents and deposition
    testimony to reach different conclusions. For the reasons given below, we
    deny both motions.
    First, Pond argues that agency officials knew that the historical data
    on which the estimates were based did not accurately reflect anticipated
    reductions under the transformation process. Plaintiff points to the
    deposition testimony of Mr. Wojtyna:
    Q. [S]o whether it was from the 2008 memo or whether it was
    from transformation, in any event, there were reductions that
    were anticipated presolicitation that were not accounted for in
    the estimates. Is that a fair statement?
    [A] Correct. True statement. Ultimately there were reductions
    to both -- because of both, not to both – because of both factors.
    Pl’s Mot. Ex. 4 at 33. From this plaintiff concludes that the agency had notice
    of future reductions which were not reflected in the solicitation.
    The government responds that the question presented to Mr. Wojtyna
    conflated reductions resulting from the transformation with reductions
    resulting from the March 2008 memorandum. It is unclear whether Mr.
    Wojtyna understood the question, as his response rephrased the question,
    answering that reductions occurred because of the transformation and the
    March 2008 memorandum. Thus, the court is unable to determine, based
    upon his response alone, whether the Army had knowledge about future
    reductions that it withheld from Pond.
    Pond also argues that the agency had other contemporaneous
    knowledge of anticipated changes to workload requirements. It cites the
    traffic study and argues that the agency knew that the studies would result in
    a reduction in guard positions during the contract period. Pond points to
    testimony from Mr. Wojtyna in response to the following question, “did the
    15
    traffic studies reveal that there was insufficient funding to continue
    maintaining the current levels of CSGs in USAREUR?” Id. at 17. His
    answer:
    I believe the traffic studies resulted in what we knew they were
    going to result in. The traffic studies, using them would have
    resulted in higher manning than OPMG thought we needed
    based on the traffic studies. . . . But we knew . . . what the traffic
    studies would show is that there were more guards at the gates
    than OPMG thought we were -- we should be using because in
    their opinion we were supposed to just use the traffic studies
    for the manning standards.
    Id.
    Pond further asserts that, instead of complying with the mandate to
    perform traffic studies to adjust guarding levels, defendant delayed the traffic
    studies for five months. Plaintiff urges that the agency knew it would not
    meet the new manning standard and would have to reduce its guard services
    to meet the guidelines, and thus it waited until after contract award to begin
    the traffic studies. Pond argues that this delay injured plaintiff because the
    estimates were not based on current information available to the Army. To
    support this argument, Pond presents the following from Mr. Wojtyna’s
    testimony:
    Q. Do you know when these traffic studies were planned on
    being conducted?
    A. I wasn’t planning to do them at all, but we ultimately did
    them, I think, in August of 2008, I think -- or August of 2009
    we ultimately did them.
    Q. Okay. When you say you were not planning on doing them
    at all, what's the basis of that statement?
    A. Because they were -- in my mind they were a waste of time.
    . . . We knew that they were not going to – we could not meet
    the traffic flow standards as established in their memo, so --
    and I told them at the time and they knew that at the time. So –
    but they wanted to standardize how -- the contract guard
    program throughout the Army. So I -- again, I didn’t see a point
    -- it was pointless to do that because I already knew we were
    not going to meet their standards.
    Id. at 10.
    16
    The government disagrees with plaintiff’s asserted inferences,
    arguing the fact that the Army anticipated that using the traffic studies
    “would have resulted in higher manning than OPMG thought we needed,”
    does not mean that the Army anticipated that it would have to reduce
    manning standards because of limited funding. Id. at 17. The Army could
    rely on other sources of funding, defendant asserts, as Mr. Wojtyna testified:
    Q. Well, at this point in time this is August 2008. You had not
    yet conducted traffic studies, correct?
    A. Correct.
    Q. So you didn’t know the results of those traffic studies, what
    they were going to show; is that correct?
    A. I was confident I knew what they were going to show.
    Q. Okay. They were going to show reduced guard positions?
    A. Correct. . . . by a strict application of those standards. . . .
    Caveat that by meaning -- they also meant that we would
    maybe have to resort to alternate funding sources for our
    requirements. When you say “reductions,” it would be a --
    reductions in what DA would fund, not necessarily meaning
    that it would be reductions in guard requirements themselves
    because there were alternate sources of funding that we could
    apply.
    Id. at 22.
    While the parties agree on the relevant documents and testimony,
    there remains disputed inferences from those materials. Plaintiff has put
    forward some evidence, supported by Mr. Wojtyna’s statements, that the
    government knew at the time of the solicitation that the traffic studies would
    result in reduced CSG requirements. Whether this constitutes negligence,
    however, requires the court to draw disputed inferences.
    Finally, Pond asserts that Mr. Wojtyna admitted that the March 2008
    memorandum’s effect would be to reduce CSG requirements for this 2009
    contract, meaning that the government’s estimates were negligently
    prepared. Mr. Wojtyna testified regarding the effect of the memorandum on
    the Army’s requirements, “[W]e did have to reduce the number of guards,
    but not to the level that that memo would take us. That was the
    disagreement.” Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 2 at 7 (Wojtyna Dep.). In a follow up
    question, he was asked, “Q. Okay. Just so I understand this, you agreed that
    there would be reductions. The disagreement would be over the number of
    those reductions; is that correct? . . . [A.] Correct.” Id. at 7.
    17
    Mr. Wojtyna further clarified the Army’s view of the memorandum’s
    effect, “even though OPMG . . . said they would not fund beyond what . . .
    was in that memo, . . . there were other funding sources that if we went
    forward with our requirements, . . . we would either get funding from OPMG
    or it would be funded through other channels.” Id. at 12. Pond contends that
    Mr. Wojtyna’s statement, “we did have to reduce the number of guards, but
    not to the level that that memo would take us,” demonstrates the Army knew
    that reductions were forthcoming due to the memorandum. 9 Id. at 7.
    The question of the Army’s knowledge at the time of the solicitation
    regarding future reductions to CSG requirements is material to plaintiff’s
    negligent estimate claim, as the reasonableness of the agency’s estimates are
    determined by the information available to it at the time of solicitation.
    Plaintiff presents evidence, supported by Mr. Wojtyna’s testimony and the
    March 2008 memorandum, that the memorandum provided the Army with
    information that should have been used in making its estimates.
    The government asserts that the Army provided realistic estimates
    with information that was reasonably available, as the Army had conflicting
    considerations causing substantial uncertainties with CSG manning
    requirements at the time of the solicitation. First, defendant offers evidence
    that the Army’s cost reduction efforts were the subject of disagreement
    between OPMG and USAREUR. After the AAA audits were completed, the
    government asserts that the USAREUR took action to reduce manning at
    installations identified by the AAA, and by 2008 the USAREUR sufficiently
    “adopted . . . the manning standards, to the level” required by the AAA.
    Def.’s Mot. Ex. 2 at 134 (Wojtyna Dep.). Thus, after the conclusion of these
    audits, defendant contends both USAREUR and the AAA believed that
    USAREUR had adopted appropriate manning standards. Id.
    Second, defendant relies on the Army’s December 2007
    announcement, which stated that that transformation plans would be
    temporarily delayed, thereby highlighting the unpredictability of the
    transformation process. Def.’s Mot. Ex. 2 at 115. Finally, the government
    argues that the Army also believed that the USAREUR could have an
    increase in CSG requirements because of “unplanned force protection
    needs.” Acquisition Strategy, Def.’s Mot. Ex. 2 at 16.
    9
    Mr. Wojtyna agreed that the disagreement between OPMG and USAREUR
    was “over the number of those reductions.” Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 2 at 7 (Wojtyna
    Dep.).
    18
    It is unclear to the court from this evidence alone, however, whether
    the agency knew that the Army’s CSG requirements would inevitably be
    affected during this contract, and thus, prepared its estimates negligently.
    Because this is a disputed question of material fact, the issue of the agency’s
    knowledge must be resolved at trial. As discussed above, the extent of the
    agency’s knowledge is a disputed fact. Even though the Army presents
    countervailing considerations that it had at the time of the solicitation, there
    is still a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Army prepared its
    estimates with the most current information available to it, or whether it
    prepared its estimates negligently. Thus, neither movant is entitled to
    summary judgment as to count I. See RCFC 56(a) (summary judgment will
    be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
    movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).
    C. Count II: The Government Withheld Superior Knowledge Regarding
    Anticipated CSG Requirements.
    The Federal Circuit has held that the government has a duty to disclose
    its superior knowledge where:
    (1) a contractor undertakes to perform without vital knowledge
    of a fact that affects performance costs or duration; (2) the
    government was aware the contractor had no knowledge of and
    had no reason to obtain such information (3) any contract
    specification supplied misled the contractor or did not put it on
    notice to inquire; and (4) the government failed to provide the
    relevant information.
    Giesler v. United States, 
    232 F.3d 864
    , 876 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing Hercules,
    Inc. v. United States, 
    24 F.3d 188
    , 196 (Fed. Cir. 1994)); see also Miller
    Elevator Co., Inc., 
    30 Fed. Cl. 662
    , 675 (1994) (a superior knowledge claim
    can only be brought with respect to vital facts that “the contractor neither
    knows nor should have known of . . . by contract specification or otherwise”
    and where “the Government knew or should have known of the contractor’s
    ignorance of the facts.”).
    The superior knowledge which plaintiff attributes to the Army is that
    it knew reductions in guard services were forthcoming but did not disclose
    this information to plaintiff. Pond claims that it did not know of this fact and
    relied on the government’s estimates, and thus, the Army had a duty to
    disclose its superior knowledge. It asks for summary judgment on this count.
    19
    The government seeks summary judgment with respect to count two
    because plaintiff was aware that reductions were possible during the contract
    and because the Army had no knowledge of vital facts at the time of the
    solicitation that it withheld from Pond. For the reasons stated below, we
    deny both motions.
    Plaintiff asserts that the March 2008 memorandum informed the
    Army of anticipated reductions for this contract because it contained a
    mandatory order to reduce costs within USAREUR. Pond argues that Mr.
    Wojtyna’s testimony shows the Army knew that reductions would be
    forthcoming as it had an awareness of what the OPMG mandated traffic
    studies would likely show even before the studies were performed:
    I believe the traffic studies resulted in what we knew they were
    going to result in. The traffic studies, using them would have
    resulted in higher manning than OPMG thought we needed
    based on the traffic studies. . . . But we knew. . . . what the
    traffic studies would show is that there were more guards at the
    gates than OPMG thought we were -- we should be using
    because in their opinion we were supposed to just use the
    traffic studies for the manning standards.
    Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 4 at 17 (Wojtyna Dep.).
    The government responds that the March 2008 memorandum was not
    an order with clear instructions to reduce costs for this contract in Germany.
    It points out that the memorandum itself merely “provides guidance to
    USAREUR on the use of CSG for access control in the USAREUR AOR,”
    and does not mandate any response. Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 4 at 134 (March 2008
    Memo.). Further, defendant argues, the memorandum merely sets forth
    conditions for funding controlled by OPMG based upon future traffic
    studies—“OPMG will only fund CSG for IACP as justified by installation
    pedestrian and traffic flow.” 
    Id. at 135
    . Finally, the government argues that
    the memorandum gave commanders “who determine the need for additional
    CSG personnel for IACP” the ability to seek an exception to OPMG’s
    funding policy, allowing the commander to have additional CSG personnel,
    which may not be justified by traffic flow. 
    Id. at 134-35
    .
    Plaintiff replies that Mr. Wojtyna’s testimony regarding base closures
    shows that the Army anticipated reductions which it did not disclose. The
    testimony that plaintiff refers to concerns the following statement in the
    Acquisition Strategy: “Although USAREUR transformation could reduce
    contract requirements during the total performance period, specific
    20
    reductions have not been considered in this estimated dollar value based on
    possible changes to the current plan.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 2 at 15. Mr. Wojtyna
    was asked about this language:
    Q. And so the government recognized that reduced contract
    requirements were a reasonable possibility . . . or were in fact
    anticipated for the upcoming contract?
    [A.] “USAREUR transformation could reduce.” We knew
    there were additional reductions coming because of the
    USAREUR transformation process, but because it was
    classified -- I guess, hence that statement could reduce contract
    requirements, because everybody knew more reductions were
    coming.
    ...
    Q. And those reductions had been input in place as a result of
    the prior audits; is that right? . . .
    A. No, it was due to both. Partially due to the closure of
    garrisons. Primarily caused by the DA-mandated standards for
    manning.
    Q. Okay. And so bases had closed because of force drawdown
    and then in addition you had DA mandated standards that were
    looking to reduce costs. Are those the two factors you’re
    talking about?
    A. Correct. Correct.
    Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 4 at 19-20.
    Finally, plaintiff presents evidence of an internal agency PowerPoint
    slide that USAREUR and the Military Police prepared in August 2008 which,
    it argues, shows plans for compliance with the March 2008 Memorandum’s
    new manning standards. Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 4 at 148-163. Plaintiff asserts that
    the slide depicts the difference between the current USAREUR manning
    standards and the reduced manning standards under the memorandum,
    stating that the new standards would require one guard per every 300 vehicles
    entering the control point rather than the old standard of 2 guards per every
    200 persons per hour. 
    Id. at 150
    . Plaintiff also presents testimony from Mr.
    Wojtna regarding the PowerPoint:
    Q. Okay. And this appears to be showing the difference
    between the USAREUR manning standards as they currently
    existed, contrasted with the Department of the Army guidance
    on the use of CSGs. Do you see that?
    A. Yes, sir.
    21
    Q. And that right-hand column, the DA guidance, is that
    essentially referring to the March 2008 Army policy?
    A. Without matching, I’m assuming it is, correct. That’s what
    it would have been used.
    Q. At this point in time it’s reasonable to assume that that’s
    what it was referring to?
    A. Correct. Yes.
    Q. And does this show that a reduced number of guard
    positions would be forthcoming?
    A. By a strict application of the DA guidance, yes.
    Q. . . . The USAREUR manning standards were two guards up
    to 200 -- is that persons per hour?
    A. Correct.
    Q. And the new standard would be one guard per access lane
    per every 300 vehicles per hour or less?
    A. Correct.
    Q. And that average number of vehicles as referenced here in
    the DA guidance, would that be determined by the traffic
    studies?
    A. Yes.
    Pl.’s Mem. Ex. 4 at 21. Pond contends that this PowerPoint slide shows that
    the agency knew the traffic studies would demonstrate that a significant
    reduction in CSGs would be necessary.
    The government has an additional argument, however, that Pond was
    aware of the possibility of reductions at the time of the solicitation, as Pond
    was the incumbent on the 2003 contract, and it knew that the Army’s CSG
    requirements fluctuated dramatically during the 2003 contract, thus making
    defendant’s level of knowledge immaterial. See Giesler, 
    232 F.3d at 877
    (rejecting superior knowledge claim where contractor had “equal, if not
    greater, access to” the information that formed the basis of the claim).
    Defendant asserts that Pond’s proposal noted that “the fluctuations in
    the requirements [for the 2003 contract] were immense.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1
    at 117 (Pond’s Proposal). Additionally, the government points out that
    Pond’s proposal made statements regarding the Army’s changing
    requirements:
    These facts, contained in all volumes of this proposal, stem
    from over 25 years[’] experience serving USAREUR. In the
    recent years of constantly changing USAREUR requirements
    resulting from GWOT deployments and USAREUR
    22
    restructuring and re-stationing, Pond Security has successfully
    met both planned and emergency changes, additions,
    reductions, and relocations of our guarding services.
    USAREUR will continue to undergo reductions and
    restationing during the contract period. Pond Security has
    clearly demonstrated its capability to understand and to rapidly
    respond to USAREUR’s changing organization, missions, and
    geography.
    Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 110 (Pond’s proposal).
    The offered evidence leaves unresolved the Army’s level of certainty
    regarding coming reductions and plaintiff’s own expectation of them. It is
    improper at this juncture for the court to weigh or draw inferences from any
    piece of evidence without examining witnesses about the relevant documents
    and their expectations. Thus, the parties’ motions must be denied.
    D. Count III: The Government’s Actual Number of Hours Ordered
    Constitutes a Major Change Under the Contract.
    Pond’s count III is an alternative argument that it is entitled to an
    equitable price adjustment in accordance with the contract PWS, found in
    Section 1.1.2 of the solicitation:
    Major changes in guard force functions, locations, and
    operating hours will be at no extra cost to the U.S. Government
    provided such changes do not impose additional costs on the
    Contractor. Examples of major changes are the elimination
    within one Site (the area of responsibility of one Site Manager)
    of the annual hourly equivalent of two or more 24 hours per
    day, 7 day per week guard positions (total: 17, 520 hours
    annually).
    Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 7.
    Plaintiff argues that Section 1.1.2 permits Pond to recover for cost
    impacts due to major changes in the quantities ordered. 10 Pond contends that,
    10
    Plaintiff also asserts that Mr. Wojtyna admitted on behalf of the
    government that Section 1.1.2, and in particular the language about major
    changes, was included in the contract because the agency expected
    reductions in estimated hours and positions during the course of the
    contract’s performance period, including the option years.
    23
    because actual hours were more than 30% below the estimated hours
    provided by the solicitation, the reduction in hours constitutes a major change
    under the clause. 11 Pond asserts that it incurred substantial additional costs
    because of these reductions and asks the court to grant it partial summary
    judgment as to entitlement.
    The government does not contest that Pond is entitled to recover any
    “additional costs” resulting from changes in “guard force functions,
    locations, and operating hours” under the contract. Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 7
    (Solicitation). Defendant argues first that the major changes language refers
    to reductions from prior task orders, not from the solicitation estimates. 12
    Second, it argues that Pond’s motion fails to explain what specific
    “additional costs” to which it is entitled or how those “additional costs”
    resulted from the Army’s changes in “guard force functions, locations, and
    operating hours.” 
    Id.
    A material question of fact exists as to whether the costs Pond has
    attributed to changes in “guard force functions, locations, and operating
    hours” are qualifying costs under the contract, and thus, we cannot grant
    plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to count III.
    Defendant has a cross motion for partial summary judgment as to
    count III. It asks the court to grant its motion pertaining to damages Pond
    seeks in count III for (1) claimed “sick costs” in the amount of €4,067,269.46
    euros allegedly incurred between May 30, 2009, and February 29, 2012, and
    €847,955.98 euros allegedly incurred between March 1, 2012, and December
    31, 2013; and (2) claimed damages arising under Task Order No. 2, which
    included all work between May 30, 2012, and May 29, 2013, because it has
    been released from liability. For the reasons given below, we deny
    defendant’s motion.
    First, the government asserts that Pond can only recover damages
    under Section 1.1.2 if there are changes in “guard force functions, locations,
    and operating hours” that “impose additional costs” on Pond, and not costs
    11
    Pond attached a declaration to its motion from Mr. Geier, which states that
    while the contract was being performed, the Army decreased its ordered
    hours “by nearly 30%. Instead of the approximately 21 million hours
    estimated in Amendment No. 5 of the of the Solicitation, the Government
    only ordered approximately 15 million hours.” Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 4.
    12
    This argument only became clear during oral argument; it was not clearly
    briefed.
    24
    that were Pond’s responsibility. Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 17 (Solicitation). Pond,
    in effect, claims that these sick costs resulted from changes in “guard force
    functions, locations, and operating hours” effected by the Army, and not
    from illness. The government responds that Pond presented testimony that,
    in all instances of illness, employees were required by German law to obtain
    a note from a doctor and provide it to Pond, and that each employee who took
    sick leave had provided such a note. Def.’s Mot. Ex. 2 at 180 (Geier Dep.).
    Thus, defendant argues that Mr. Geier’s deposition suggests that the evidence
    would show that the sick costs were due to employee illness and not due to
    the Army’s changes in “guard force functions, locations, and operating
    hours.”
    Plaintiff argues that its claim for sick costs is analogous to a claim for
    lost productivity in a construction or manufacturing context. See Pl.’s Opp’n
    33-34 (discussing Batteast Constr, Co., 
    ASBCA No. 35818
    , 
    92-1 BCA ¶ 24,697
    ). In Batteast, the government changed the requirements for masonry
    work, and, as a result, the masons were less productive. Plaintiff asserts that
    the Board awarded the contractor damages because it found that the lost
    productivity was caused by the change in requirements. 
    Id. at 123, 215
    .
    Plaintiff avers that, here, Mr. Geier’s calculations found that the sick leave at
    garrisons where CSG positions and hours were reduced or eliminated
    increased significantly compared to what Pond had expected, and thus, it
    argues that it can recover these costs. Plaintiff contends that CSG employees
    took time off to look for other positions because of the uncertainty caused by
    the Army’s reductions.
    In response, the government argues that Batteast is not analogous
    because the employees here were not less productive due to a change in
    requirements. Rather, the employees here took time off work because they
    were ill, not unproductive, the government argues. Additionally, the
    government argues that the cost at issue is not one that must be borne by the
    Army under the contract. 13
    Again, there is a genuine dispute as to whether the CSG employees
    took of time due to the government’s reductions in GSG positions. This issue
    is material because it will determine whether plaintiff can recover for the
    costs of the employee’s sick leave. Thus, we deny defendant’s motion for
    The government argues that Pond’s proposal stated that its CSG contracts
    13
    would “provide for vacation time, training, and absences due to illness.”
    Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 78 (Pond’s Proposal).
    25
    partial summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claim for damages due to its
    employee’s sick leave.
    Next, the government argues that the court should grant it summary
    judgment as to the claimed damages arising under Task Order No. 2, which
    includes all work completed between May 30, 2012, and May 29, 2013,
    because Pond executed a release for these damages. Defendant contends that
    any of Pond’s claims arising out of Task Order No. 2 are encompassed by
    the language of the release contained in Mod. 04: “[Pond] having received
    all payments due under contract W912CM-09-D-0015-0002, hereby releases
    and discharges the Government from all liabilities and claims, including
    interest and related costs, which it now has or hereafter may have, arising
    under this task order.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1 at 23.
    Pond disputes the government’s assertion that plaintiff released the
    Army from liability associated with Task Order No. 2. It argues that
    plaintiff’s signature on the bilateral modification merely indicated an
    administrative acknowledgment of the government’s action and not a
    contract release. Pond asserts that defendant’s argument fails because the
    parties did not have a meeting of the minds and the modification lacked the
    required consideration, as Pond received no payment for the modification.
    To support this argument, plaintiff present Mr. Geier’s declaration:
    Pond did not release its claim for costs involved in the litigation
    when it signed Mod 4. Pond understood that Mod 4, as an
    administrative Mod for deobligation of funds. At that time,
    Pond had only recently submitted its REA and was actively
    discussing the REA with the Government and supplementing
    the REA as requested by the Government. Mod 4 made no
    reference to the REA or and changes to the Contract. Pond did
    not receive any compensation or other consideration for Mod
    4. Notably, the Contracting Officer did not find in his Final
    Decision and in his Reconsidered Final Decision that Pond had
    released its claim by executing Mod 4.
    Pl.’s Opp. Ex. 1 at 3 (Geier Decl.).
    Defendant disagrees with plaintiff’s assertion that the statement of
    release in Modification 04 lacked a meeting of the minds because the plain
    meaning of the modification is unambiguous, and Pond’s subjective
    understanding of the agreement is irrelevant, it argues. “If the terms of a
    contract are clear and unambiguous, they must be given their plain
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    meaning—extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to interpret them.” Barron
    Bancshares, Inc., 366 F.3d at 1375.
    On the issue of consideration, the government argues that the parties
    created a bilateral modification pursuant to the authority set forth in the
    “changes” clause of FAR 52.212-4.             The government argues that
    consideration does not require payment, but “‘[c]onsideration is generally a
    bargained for exchange consisting of an act, forbearance, or return promise.’”
    Carter v. United States, 
    102 Fed. Cl. 61
    , 66 (2011).
    Because plaintiff has presented evidence showing a genuine dispute
    of material fact regarding whether the release language in Modification 04
    should be viewed as binding, the issue must be resolved at trial. Thus, we
    deny defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment as to the claimed
    damages arising under Task Order No. 2.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons given above, we deny plaintiff’s motion for partial
    summary judgment and the government’s cross-motions for summary
    judgment and partial summary judgment. The parties are directed to
    communicate and propose a schedule for pretrial proceedings in a joint status
    report on or before June 11, 2021.
    s/Eric G. Bruggink
    ERIC G. BRUGGINK
    Senior Judge
    27