Kiewit Infrastructure West Co. v. United States ( 2018 )


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  •           In the United States Court of Federal Claims
    No. 18-76C
    (Filed: April 25, 2018)*
    *Opinion Originally Filed Under Seal on April 17, 2018
    )
    KIEWIT INFRASTRUCTURE                   )
    WEST CO.,                               )
    )
    Plaintiff,          )
    )
    v.                                      )      Post-Award Bid Protest; Best-Value
    )      Tradeoff Analysis; Technical Evaluation
    THE UNITED STATES,                      )
    )
    Defendant,          )
    )
    FLATIRON│DRAGADOS │SUKUT                )
    JOINT VENTURE,                          )
    )
    Defendant-Intervenor.         )
    )
    Douglas L. Patin, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff. Aron C. Beezley and Lisa A.
    Markman, Washington, D.C., of counsel.
    James W. Poirier, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., with
    whom were Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Robert E. Kirschman,
    Jr., Director, and Steven J. Gillingham, Assistant Director, for defendant. Amanda R.
    Fuller, Deputy District Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Sacramento, CA, of
    counsel.
    Joseph G. Martinez, Denver, CO, for defendant-intervenor. K. Tyler Thomas and Tess E.
    Gosda, Denver, CO, of counsel.
    OPINION
    FIRESTONE, Senior Judge
    Pending before the court are cross motions for judgment on the administrative
    record in this bid protest action challenging the award of Contract No. W91238-17-C-
    0025 (“Contract”) to repair Lake Isabella Dam in central California to Flatiron | Dragados
    | Sukut Joint Venture (“FDS”). Contract Award, Tab 111 at AR 30277. Plaintiff, Kiewit
    Infrastructure West Co. (“Kiewit”), challenges the decision of the United States Army
    Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”) to award the repair Contract to FDS. For the reasons
    set forth below, the court finds that the Corps’ decision to award the Contract to FDS was
    in accordance with law and was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court
    GRANTS the motions of the United States and FDS for judgment on the administrative
    record and DENIES the motion of Kiewit.
    I.     BACKGROUND FACTS
    A.     The Lake Isabella Dam Project—The Solicitation
    The Lake Isabella Dam was constructed to “provide flood risk management
    benefits to the town of Lake Isabella, CA and Bakersfield, CA.” Isabella Dam Safety
    Mod. Rep., Tab 1 at AR 44. In 2012, the Corps determined that the dam required
    significant repairs. 
    Id. at AR
    1, 3. The repairs are necessary for flood control. 
    Id. at AR
    13, 45-46. Specifically, the Corps has determined that addressing the condition of Lake
    Isabella Dam is critical to prevent dam failure. 
    Id. at AR
    13.
    On March 30, 2017, the Corps issued Solicitation No. W91238-17-R-0006
    (“Solicitation”) requesting proposals for construction services to repair Lake Isabella
    Dam. Solicitation, Tab 23 at AR 1391. 1 The Solicitation provided that proposals would
    1
    A total of eight solicitation amendments were issued: Amendment 0001 (April 3, 2017),
    Tab 40; Amendment 0002 (April 7, 2017), Tab 42; Amendment 0003 (April 14, 2017), Tab 43;
    Amendment 0004 (April 21, 2017), Tab 44; Amendment 0005 (April 28, 2017), Tab 45;
    2
    be evaluated using the best-value tradeoff process pursuant to section 15.101-1 of the
    Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”). 
    Id. at AR
    1462 (¶ 1.2, 1.3). This process
    permits tradeoff among price and non-price factors and allows the government to accept a
    proposal other than the lowest-priced one. See FAR § 15.101-1. In this connection, the
    Solicitation stated that the non-price factors specified were significantly more important
    than price. Solicitation, Tab 23 at AR 1475-76. The six non-price factors are listed in the
    Solicitation in descending order of importance: technical plan for excavation and
    earthwork; management approach; experience and capability; technical plan for concrete
    production and placement; past performance; and small business participation
    commitment document. 
    Id. (¶ 7).
    The Solicitation included a description for each evaluation rating: Outstanding;
    Good; Acceptable; Marginal; and Unacceptable (from highest rating to lowest rating). 
    Id. at AR
    1472-73 (¶ 5.9). An “Outstanding” rating meant the proposal provides “an
    exceptional approach and understanding of the requirements and contains multiple
    strengths, [while the] risk of unsuccessful performance is low.” 
    Id. at AR
    1472 (¶ 5.9).
    A “Good” rating meant the proposal provides “a thorough approach and understanding of
    the requirements and contains at least one strength, [while the] risk of unsuccessful
    performance is low to moderate.” 
    Id. An “Acceptable”
    rating meant the proposal “meets
    [the] requirements and indicates an adequate approach and understanding of the
    requirements, [while the] risk of unsuccessful performance is no worse than moderate.”
    Amendment 0006 (May 1, 2017), Tab 46; Amendment 0007 (June 28, 2017), Tab 89; and
    Amendment 0008 (July 6, 2017), Tab 95.
    3
    
    Id. at AR
    1473 (¶ 5.9). A “Marginal” rating meant the proposal “has not demonstrated an
    adequate approach and understanding of the requirements, and/or [the] risk of
    unsuccessful performance is high.” 
    Id. Finally, an
    “Unacceptable” rating meant the
    proposal “does not meet [the] requirements of the solicitation, and thus, contains one or
    more deficiencies, and/or [the] risk of unsuccessful performance is unacceptable.” 
    Id. Under the
    Solicitation, each offeror’s past performance would also be evaluated
    and assigned an adjectival rating based on the relevancy of the offeror’s past projects and
    the reviewers’ overall confidence. 
    Id. at AR
    1473-74 (¶ 5.10). Relevancy was rated as
    Not Relevant, Somewhat Relevant, Relevant, or Very Relevant (from lowest rating to
    highest rating). 
    Id. at AR
    1473 (¶ 5.10). The overall confidence of the Corps based on
    the past performance of a given offeror was rated as No Confidence, Limited Confidence,
    Neutral Confidence, Satisfactory Confidence, or Substantial Confidence (from lowest
    rating to highest rating). 
    Id. at AR
    1474 (¶ 5.10). Finally, each offeror’s small business
    participation would be evaluated and assigned an adjectival rating of Unacceptable,
    Marginal, Acceptable, Good, or Outstanding (from lowest rating to highest rating). 
    Id. (¶ 5.11).
    B.    Evaluation and Award
    To perform the source selection, the Corps established a multi-tier Source
    Selection Evaluation Board (“SSEB”) made up of boards selected for their expertise and
    professional judgment that included a technical factor evaluation board, a past
    performance board, a small business evaluation board, and a price evaluation board.
    Source Selection Plan, Tab 21 at AR 1228; Rev. SSAC Rep., Tab 107 at AR 30226. To
    4
    maintain the integrity of the evaluation process, the various technical boards were not
    given any price information. Rev. SSAC Rep., Tab 107 at AR 30226-27. The price
    evaluation was kept separate. 
    Id. The findings
    and judgments of the technical evaluation boards were reviewed by a
    Source Selection Advisory Council (“SSAC”). Rev. SSAC Rep., Tab 107. An SSAC is
    required for Department of Defense procurements exceeding $100 million. Final
    Acquisition Plan, Tab 20 at AR 1051. The SSAC was tasked with ensuring that the
    evaluation criteria set forth in the Solicitation were followed. Initial SSAC Report, Tab
    73 at AR 28055. The SSAC compared the evaluations and ranked the technical merit of
    each offeror. 
    Id. The SSAC
    determined that FDS had the highest rated technical
    proposal based on it receiving an “Outstanding” rating for the second and fourth technical
    factors. 
    Id. The reports
    of the SSEB and SSAC were then sent to the Source Selection
    Authority (“SSA”) for decision. Competitive Range Determination, Tab 74.
    The SSA’s first task was to establish the competitive range. 
    Id. at AR
    28066. Six
    offerors submitted proposals in response to the Solicitation: Kiewit; OHL USA/Lane
    Construction Joint Venture; Fisher Industries; FDS; Granite Construction Company; and
    Barnard/Ames Construction Company Joint Venture. 
    Id. at AR
    28059. Kiewit, FDS,
    Granite, and Barnard/Ames were selected for the competitive range. 
    Id. at AR
    28061.
    Each offeror in the competitive range submitted revised proposals after having
    discussions with the Corps. 2 Based on the revisions, the Corps conducted another round
    2
    FDS Evaluation Notice, Tab 76 and Kiewit Evaluation Notice, Tab 78 of the
    Administrative Record.
    5
    of evaluations. Rev. SSAC Rep., Tab 107 at AR 30228-38. The SSAC also made its
    recommendation as to best value. While acknowledging that Kiewit had a lower price,
    the SSAC recommended that the award go to FDS based on its conclusion that FDS had
    vast technical superiority. 
    Id. at AR
    30230-38. Kiewit’s and FDS’s final evaluation
    ratings and prices are summarized below:
    Factor 4 –
    Factor 1 –     Factor 2 –
    Factor 3 –     Technical
    Factor 5 –     Factor 6 –
    Experience      Plan for                        Small
    Offeror     Technical     Management                                      Past                          Price**
    &          Concrete                        Business
    Plan         Approach                                   Performance
    Capability      Plan &                       Participation
    Participation
    Substantial
    Kiewit         Good       Outstanding     Good        Outstanding                       Good         $231,567,079.50
    Confidence
    Satisfactory
    FDS        Outstanding   Outstanding   Outstanding   Outstanding                     Acceptable     $241,751,065.00
    Confidence*
    *Changed by the SSA. **The independent government estimate (“IGE”) was $300 million.
    SSDD, Tab 109 at AR 30271.
    Having concluded that the competition was between FDS and Kiewit, the SSA
    engaged in a best-value tradeoff decision to determine whether FDS’s offer justified the
    4.4 percent price premium. 
    Id. at AR
    30262-71. In the ten-page best-value tradeoff
    decision included in the Source Selection Decision Document (“SSDD”), the SSA
    documented his decision that the added value and benefits the government would receive
    from awarding the contract to FDS justified FDS’s higher price. 
    Id. at AR
    30262-72. He
    focused his review on the technical factors for which FDS’s ratings were superior to
    those of Kiewit. In general, FDS earned twice the number of “significant strengths” and
    “strengths” earned by Kiewit. See FDS Rev. Proposal, Tab 99; Kiewit Rev. Proposal,
    6
    Tab 98. The two major factors that differentiated the two proposals were technical
    factors 1 and 3.
    In comparing FDS and Kiewit under technical factor 1, i.e., the most important
    factor, the SSA explained that the SSAC had found FDS to be superior in every major
    aspect of said factor. Rev. SSAC Rep., Tab 107 at AR 30231-33. The SSA noted that
    the SSEB’s final ratings of Kiewit (Rev. SSEB Rep., Tab 106 at AR 30145-48) and FDS
    on technical factor 1 (Rev. SSEB Rep., Tab 106 at AR 30148-52) also demonstrated that
    FDS had a superior proposal.
    The SSA, in his evaluation of technical factor 1, reviewed the basis for Kiewit’s
    “Good” rating and noted that FDS’s proposal for technical factor 1 was “superior” to
    Kiewit’s because FDS had “demonstrated a better understanding of the existing site
    conditions and project requirements.” SSDD, Tab 109 at AR 30263. The SSA noted that
    FDS’s “exceptional approach . . . resulted in a lower risk of unsuccessful performance.”
    
    Id. In this
    connection, the SSA noted that the “detailed analysis” in FDS’s plans would
    “minimize disruptions and delays to the project” and this “provide[d] added value to the
    Government.” 
    Id. The SSA
    found that FDS’s proposed use of a geologist compared with
    Kiewit’s use of a geotechnical engineer would “optimize the use of” the materials
    available and “minimize the risk of costly quantity overruns to the Government for
    processed materials.” 
    Id. The SSA
    further noted that FDS had “a superior understanding
    of the geologic and hydrogeologic site conditions” associated with the Auxiliary Dam
    and that FDS’s superior knowledge of site conditions in connection with dewatering
    added significant value. 
    Id. at AR
    30264. In this connection, the SSA noted that
    7
    Kiewit’s assumption that the Auxiliary Dam site had low permeable soil was questioned
    by the SSAC. 
    Id. The SSA
    also determined that FDS provided extra value to the government based
    on FDS’s past experience under technical factor 3—the other factor for which FDS
    received an “Outstanding” rating, as compared to Kiewit’s “Good” rating. 
    Id. at AR
    30265-66. The record shows that the Corps was especially interested in prior projects
    “that demonstrate experience with a zoned embankment dam combined with a concrete
    spillway” like Lake Isabella Dam. Solicitation, Tab 23 at AR 1471. FDS provided three
    examples of prior projects with this feature. FDS Rev. Proposal, Tab 99 at AR 28822-23,
    28828-30, 28831-33 (Portugues Dam, L’Albages Dam, and Villalba de los Barros Dam).
    Based on this experience, as well as the fact that FDS submitted six prior projects,
    exceeding the three required projects, FDS received a significant strength. Rev. SSEB
    Rep., Tab 106 at AR 30180; SSDD, Tab 109 at AR 30265. FDS was the only offeror that
    had done more than one project on the same type of dam as Lake Isabella Dam. FDS
    also received a significant strength based on its prior experience working on a dewatering
    project with a partial reservoir pool, the Villalba de los Barros Dam. FDS Rev. Proposal,
    Tab 99 at AR 28831-33; Rev. SSEB Rep., Tab 106 at AR 30180. See also SSDD, Tab
    109 at AR 30265. The SSA noted that the SSAC had determined that this dewatering
    experience warranted a significant strength. SSDD, Tab 109 at AR 30261. The SSA
    agreed that FDS’s proposal warranted an “Outstanding” rating for technical factor 3 on
    the grounds that its experience was unmatched by any other offeror. 
    Id. at AR
    30266.
    The SSA stated that FDS’s “experience in earth and rockfill embankment dam and
    8
    spillway construction, seismic dam remediation, and dewatering with a partial pool
    reservoir are a significant added value to the Government and are expected to greatly
    reduce risk for timely project completion.” 
    Id. In deciding
    to select FDS, the SSA also reviewed whether Kiewit’s and FDS’s
    price proposals were “fair and reasonable[.]” Solicitation, Tab 23 at AR 1472. The
    Solicitation provided that the “[p]rice analysis may involve comparison with other
    proposed prices received in response to this solicitation” and identified the techniques
    mentioned in section 15.401-1(b)(2) of the FAR. 
    Id. The SSA
    noted that there could be
    a 15 percent quantity overrun with respect to the Emergency Spillway Excavation, which
    would make Kiewit’s proposal more expensive. SSDD, Tab 109 at AR 30270. The SSA
    also noted that there were some uncertainties in Kiewit’s price regarding stockpiling
    materials. 
    Id. The SSA
    also noted that FDS’s price proposal was reviewed to ensure it
    was not unbalanced and that it was ultimately determined to be balanced. 
    Id. Finally, the
    SSA concluded that the 4.4 percent or $10,183,985.50 million price difference between
    Kiewit’s and FDS’s proposals was “not significant.” 
    Id. The SSA
    also reviewed each of the remaining factors and concluded in the
    summary that FDS “provided a far superior technical proposal albeit at a slightly higher
    price.” 
    Id. at AR
    30271. The SSA stated that the 4.4 percent price difference between
    FDS and Kiewit was “not significant” and that there were “potential cost risks”
    associated with Kiewit’s proposal that could result in Kiewit’s proposal costing more. 
    Id. at AR
    30270. The SSA also noted that FDS’s proposal would likely provide significant
    cost savings to the Corps because FDS was likely to finish the project early, thus
    9
    minimizing the Corps’ costs of oversight. 3 
    Id. at AR
    30265. The SSA explained his
    conclusion that FDS’s proposal offered the best value to the Corps as follows: FDS
    “demonstrated a better understanding of existing site conditions and challenges, a
    superior identification of risks and associated mitigation strategies, and superior expertise
    and relevant experience that [it] will bring to accomplish the work.” 
    Id. at AR
    30271.
    The SSA explained that due to FDS’s “Outstanding” rating for technical factor 1, i.e., the
    most important factor, FDS “immediately set themselves apart from the other Offerors as
    extremely knowledgeable of the project requirements, site conditions, project risks and
    overall technical approach.” 
    Id. The SSA
    noted that the Corps had “determined [FDS’s]
    strategies are expected to provide significant cost savings to the Government which will
    exceed the 4.4% price proposal difference by minimizing change orders, rework, delays,
    and associated Government oversight costs.” 
    Id. With regard
    to technical factor 2, the
    SSA noted the benefit of FDS’s likely ability to complete the project early constituted “an
    additional benefit to the Government[.]” 
    Id. Regarding technical
    factor 3, the SSA noted
    that FDS’s “worldwide” experience in building dams similar to the Isabella Lake Dam
    gave the Corps added assurance that the project would be successfully completed. 
    Id. The SSA
    concluded that this additional experience gave FDS a “better understanding of
    the [project] requirements and site conditions[,]” including FDS’s better dewatering plan,
    FDS’s plan to use a full-time on-site geologist, and FDS’s projected faster time schedule.
    3
    FDS proposed to finish the project *** days early. The Corps determined this would
    reduce its overall costs by approximately $1 million and was an important benefit to the
    government. SSDD, Tab 109 at AR 30265.
    10
    
    Id. For all
    of these reasons, and those stated in the ten-page best-value tradeoff decision,
    the SSA determined that FDS “represents the overall best value to the Government for
    this solicitation.” 
    Id. On September
    18, 2017, the Corps awarded the Contract to FDS and informed
    Kiewit that it was not the successful offeror. Contract Award, Tab 111 at AR 30277-78.
    C.      Post-Award Proceedings
    Kiewit received the required FAR § 15.506 debriefing on September 26, 2017.
    Kiewit Debrief. Memo, Tab 117 at AR 30416. Thereafter, on October 2, 2017, Kiewit
    protested the award to FDS before the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) and
    submitted a supplemental protest on November 13, 2017. Kiewit Protest, Tab 122;
    Protestor’s Comments to Agency Rep. & Supp. Protest Grounds, Tab 137 at AR 30773-
    809. After consideration of the agency report, Kiewit’s comments, and FDS’s comments,
    the GAO denied Kiewit’s protest and supplemental protest. Kiewit Infrastructure West
    Co., B-415421; B-415421.2 (December 28, 2017) at 1, Tab 142 at AR 30940.
    Kiewit filed the present action in this court on January 16, 2018. Kiewit’s Compl.
    Declaratory & Inj. Relief (ECF No. 1). In its cross motion for judgment on the
    administrative record, Kiewit raises the following basic objections to the Corps’ decision
    to award the Contract to FDS. First, Kiewit argues that the Corps conducted an improper
    best-value tradeoff decision by allegedly conducting a cost realism or price realism
    analysis regarding Kiewit’s pricing of certain materials. Kiewit’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Inj.
    Relief, Declaratory Relief, & J. on Admin. R. (“Kiewit’s MJAR”), ECF No. 34-1, at 12-
    20. Second, Kiewit argues that the Corps failed to explain why Kiewit did not get an
    11
    “Outstanding” but only a “Good” rating for technical factor 1. 
    Id. at 20-4.
    Third, Kiewit
    argues that the technical discriminators the Corps applied to evaluate FDS’s and Kiewit’s
    proposals were irrational. 
    Id. at 24-32.
    Fourth, Kiewit argues that the Corps engaged in
    disparate treatment in its evaluation of Kiewit’s and FDS’s proposals. 
    Id. at 32-53.
    Fifth,
    Kiewit argues that the Corps’ evaluation of Kiewit’s and FDS’s proposals for technical
    factors 3 and 5 was unreasonable and arbitrary and capricious. 
    Id. at 53-60.
    The government and FDS have responded to each of Kiewit’s arguments and
    contend that Kiewit has not demonstrated that the Corps’ award decision should be set
    aside. Def.’s Mot. J. on Admin. R. (“Def.’s MJAR”), ECF No. 35, at 36-61; FDS Mem.
    Supp. Mot. J. on Admin. R. (“FDS’s MJAR”), ECF No. 33, at 16-47. Briefing is
    complete and oral argument was held on March 23, 2018.
    II.    DISCUSSION
    A.     Standards of Review
    This court hears bid protests under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). Under section
    1491(b)(4), the court reviews the agency’s procurement decision to determine whether it
    was arbitrary or capricious or not in accordance with law. Impresa Construzioni Geom.
    Domenico Garufi v. United States, 
    238 F.3d 1324
    , 1332 & n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
    Examples of arbitrary and capricious action include situations where the agency
    ‘“entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
    for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or [the decision] is so
    implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
    expertise.”’ Alabama Aircraft Indus., Inc.-Birmingham v. United States, 
    586 F.3d 1372
    ,
    12
    1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
    Co., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 43 (1983)). In evaluating whether a procurement official’s actions
    were rational, “the disappointed offeror bears a heavy burden[.]” 
    Impressa, 238 F.3d at 1333
    . De minimis errors in the procurement process do not justify relief. Grumman
    Data Sys. Corp. v. Dalton, 
    88 F.3d 990
    , 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In addition, even if the
    court concludes that the agency erred in its selection decision, the protestor must also
    establish that it was prejudiced by the government’s error. Advanced Data Concepts, Inc.
    v. United States, 
    216 F.3d 1054
    , 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In order to establish the requisite
    prejudice, a protestor must show that but for the error ‘“there was a reasonable likelihood
    that [it] . . . would have been awarded the contract.”’ 
    Id. (quoting Data
    General Corp. v.
    Johnson, 
    78 F.3d 1556
    , 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). This “standard reflects a reasonable
    balance between the importance of (1) averting unwarranted interruptions of and
    interferences with the procurement process and (2) ensuring that protesters who have
    been adversely affected by allegedly significant error in the procurement process have a
    forum available to vent their grievances.” Data General 
    Corp., 78 F.3d at 1563
    . In
    reviewing best-value determinations, like the one at issue in this case, the agency has
    significant discretion. Galen Medical Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 
    369 F.3d 1324
    , 1330
    (Fed. Cir. 2004); E.W. Bliss Co. v. United States, 
    77 F.3d 445
    , 449 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
    B.     The SSA’s Best-Value Tradeoff Decision Was Rational and in
    Accordance with Law
    Kiewit’s principal legal objection to the Corps’ selection of FDS is that the Corps
    acted outside the scope of the Solicitation’s evaluation criteria and the FAR when the
    13
    SSAC in its best-value analysis and subsequent recommendation identified certain cost
    risks in Kiewit’s proposal and credited FDS with certain cost savings to the government,
    which were then adopted by the SSA in his best-value tradeoff decision. Kiewit’s MJAR
    at 12-20. Kiewit contends that once the SSA had determined that Kiewit’s price was “fair
    and reasonable,” the SSA should have ended his price analysis at that point, i.e., the SSA
    should not have considered possible cost risks and/or savings. Kiewit’s MJAR at 14.
    Kiewit contends that the Corps’ consideration of cost risks with regard to Kiewit’s
    proposal constituted an unlawful “cost realism” analysis. Kiewit’s MJAR at 13-14 (citing
    FAR § 15.404-1(d)(1)).4, 5 Kiewit also argues that the SSA’s conclusion that FDS’s
    proposal would likely lead to potential cost savings to the government that would “exceed
    the 4.4% price difference” was not supported and should not have been considered in the
    best-value tradeoff decision. 
    Id. at 15.
    1. The SSA’s Consideration of Cost Risks in the Best-Value Tradeoff
    Decision
    With regard to Kiewit’s argument concerning the SSA’s consideration of potential
    cost risks in Kiewit’s proposal, the court finds, first, that the Corps’ evaluation of prices
    4
    FAR § 15.404-1(d)(1) provides: “Cost realism analysis is the process of independently
    reviewing and evaluating specific elements of each offeror’s proposed cost estimate to determine
    whether the estimated proposed cost elements are realistic for the work to be performed; reflect a
    clear understanding of the requirements; and are consistent with the unique methods of
    performance and materials described in the offeror’s technical proposal.”
    5
    In essence, Kiewit argues that by using cost realism concepts like “cost risk” and “uncertain
    cost risks,” which are not “fair and reasonable” price concepts in the SSDD, the SSAC and SSA
    effectively conducted an “additional price analysis” that went further than the $10 million price
    difference between the two proposals, concluding that there would be no cost advantage in an
    award made to Kiewit despite said difference. Kiewit’s MJAR at 4-5 (citing Rev. SSAC Rep.,
    Tab 107 at AR 30236, 30238; SSDD, Tab 109 at AR 30270-71).
    14
    was consistent with the terms of the Solicitation. Contrary to Kiewit’s contentions, the
    Solicitation did not limit the Corps’ review to total price. The Solicitation required all
    offerors to organize their bid prices by contract line item number (“CLIN”). Solicitation,
    Tab 23 at AR 1464. Each CLIN was divided into sub-CLINs and each sub-CLIN had its
    own unit price. 
    Id. For example,
    the offerors were required to provide a specific dollar
    amount to be charged per cubic yard of material removed. Under the Solicitation, the
    SSEB price board was required to review each proposal based both on the total price and
    the price of the individual CLINs. Initial Price Analysis, Tab 71 at AR 27939. More
    specifically, the SSEB price board was required to review each CLIN’s price to determine
    whether it was “fair and reasonable” based on the price falling either “within one standard
    of deviation or 25% of the average of all offerors (excluding the IGE).” 
    Id. In view
    of the
    foregoing, the SSA’s consideration of the unit prices of individual CLINs was not
    inconsistent with the terms of the Solicitation.
    Second, the court finds that the SSA’s consideration of potential cost risks based on
    Kiewit’s unit pricing as set forth in its CLINs did not amount to an unlawful cost realism
    analysis. In its price board report, the SSEB provided an analysis of aspects of eight
    CLINs in Kiewit’s proposal. Initial Price Analysis, Tab 71 at AR 27943-45. For instance,
    the SSEB noted that Kiewit’s proposed price of *** per cubic yard for the emergency
    spillway rock excavation (CLIN 007AB) was much higher than FDS’s proposed price of
    *** per cubic yard. See Kiewit Rev. Proposal, Tab 98 at AR 28515; FDS Rev. Proposal,
    Tab 99 at AR 29020. When the SSAC undertook its review, it noted this disparity and
    asked the SSEB price board to assess how the difference in unit price might affect overall
    15
    price if the number of cubic yards to be excavated under CLIN 007AB exceeded 2.5
    million cubic yards, i.e., the fixed quantity set in the Solicitation. Rev. SSAC Rep., Tab
    107 at AR 30236. The SSEB price board did an analysis assuming a 15 percent increase
    in the volume of material to be excavated under CLIN 007AB based on previous historical
    data of similar projects. 
    Id. Due to
    Kiewit’s higher unit price, the SSAC noted that if
    there were a 15 percent increase in cubic yards to be excavated, the difference between
    Kiewit’s price and FDS’s price would narrow significantly. 
    Id. Kiewit argues
    that the use
    of an “undocumented, unsupported hypothetical overrun[,]” here the 15 percent increase,
    was arbitrary and thus the SSA erred in considering Kiewit’s potential cost increase in the
    best-value tradeoff decision under this Solicitation. Kiewit’s MJAR at 4-5.
    The SSAC also examined Kiewit’s *** per cubic yard price under CLINs 0009AB-
    AJ for stockpiling sand. Rev. SSAC Rep., Tab 107 at AR 30236. The SSAC chose to
    examine the price of CLINs 0009AB-AJ because Kiewit included a different price for
    stockpiling sand in other CLINs that was higher. 
    Id. The SSAC
    noted that if there were
    variations in quantity or if the project (i.e., the Auxiliary Dam) was not executed within
    the first option year, Kiewit’s price would be higher. 
    Id. Kiewit challenges
    the
    consideration of this cost risk by the SSA in the best-value tradeoff decision. Kiewit’s
    MJAR at 19; see also SSDD, Tab 109 at 30270.
    The court agrees with the government and FDS that the review of cost risks as part
    of the best-value tradeoff decision was not an unlawful cost realism analysis or otherwise
    unlawful. Def.’s MJAR at 45-46; FDS’s MJAR at 30-32. Cost realism, as the
    government and FDS explain, is a systematic analysis of cost estimates conducted when a
    16
    cost reimbursement contract is contemplated in order to assure that the offeror does not
    understate likely costs, thereby misleading the proposal evaluator. See FAR § 15.404-
    1(d)(1)-(2). Where the agency determines that a proposal has understated likely costs, the
    agency’s estimate of those likely costs (“probable costs”) is substituted for the offeror’s
    price and used for the purposes of proposal evaluation. FAR § 15.404-1(d)(2)(i)-(ii).
    Here, the SSA did not substitute Kiewit’s prices with prices noted by the SSAC. Rather,
    the SSA simply stated that Kiewit’s price could be higher under certain contingencies.
    Describing a cost risk in the best-value tradeoff decision was not unlawful. Based on the
    court’s review of the record and the SSA’s best-value tradeoff decision, it is clear that the
    SSA did not engage in a cost realism analysis and, further, the SSA’s identification of
    potential cost risks presented by Kiewit’s proposal under certain contingencies was in
    accordance with law.
    2. The SSA’s Consideration of Cost Savings in the Best-Value Tradeoff
    Decision
    With regard to Kiewit’s contention that the SSA improperly considered anticipated
    cost savings by selecting FDS’s proposal, the court finds as follows. In his ten-page best-
    value tradeoff decision, the SSA included, as discussed in detail above in the Background
    Facts, a head-to-head comparison between Kiewit’s and FDS’s proposals concerning the
    six technical factors, with factor 1 being the most important and factor 6 being the least
    important. SSDD, Tab 109 at AR 30262-72. At the end of that analysis, the SSA
    expressly found that FDS’s proposal was “far superior” and worth the “slightly higher [4.4
    percent] price.” SSDD, Tab 109 at AR 30271. As discussed below, because of the SSA’s
    17
    extensive review of the proposals, his conclusions regarding the benefits of FDS’s
    proposal are not undermined by his failure to provide detailed support for his conclusions
    regarding the cost savings he anticipated the Corps will also receive from selecting FDS’s
    superior technical proposal. The comments on cost savings, following his thorough
    comparison, were extraneous to his ultimate decision to select FDS’s proposal and do not
    undermine the SSA’s best-value tradeoff decision.
    For technical factor 1 (technical plan for excavation and earthwork), the SSA rated
    Kiewit’s proposal as “Good” based on the two significant strengths and the five strengths
    assigned to it by the SSEB and the SSAC. SSDD, Tab 109 at AR 30262-63. The
    significant strengths included a cofferdam and Kiewit’s consideration of three dewatering
    systems before execution, while the strengths included “Just-In-Time production of
    material, use of a geotechnical engineer on site, emphasis on blasting and excavation
    safety, [and] specialized equipment to accomplish narrow fills and [its] approach to
    vertical placement.” 
    Id. The SSA
    noted, however, that “there remained one uncertainty in
    [Kiewit’s] plan regarding stockpiling material” based on the SSEB’s “concern that the
    large quantity of Zone 4B material may not fit in the designated location,” which could
    ultimately “cause double handling, contractor/production inefficiencies and risks to
    schedule.” 
    Id. at AR
    30263. FDS, on the other hand was rated as “Outstanding” by the
    SSA because it was assigned four significant strengths and eight strengths by the SSEB
    and the SSAC. 
    Id. The significant
    strengths included an upstream berm, excellent
    understanding of the existing project geology and inclusion of an on-site geologist to
    “assess the quality of materials available for processing and placement which will
    18
    optimize excavation and efficient material usage,” mitigation strategies for material
    processing to account for losses, and an “excellent” dewatering plan that addressed both
    site conditions and the effects of drought on the site, which Kiewit had not addressed. 
    Id. The eight
    strengths assigned to FDS included a “comprehensive plan to protect and
    manage stockpiles, a QC plan for material gradations, a plan to direct haul common
    material to avoid stockpiling, [and] a detailed and well thought out haul road map and
    management plan for transporting materials.” 
    Id. In view
    of the foregoing significant
    strengths and strengths, the SSA concluded that because “[technical] factor 1 was the most
    important factor, [FDS] immediately set themselves apart from the other Offerors as
    extremely knowledgeable of the project requirements, site conditions, project risks and
    overall technical approach.” 
    Id. at AR
    30271. The SSA found that FDS’s proposal was
    “superior” to Kiewit’s because it “demonstrated a better understanding of the existing site
    conditions and the project requirements. . . . [FDS’s] exceptional approach and
    understanding of the requirements and the many strengths in [its] proposal resulted in a
    lower risk of unsuccessful performance to the Government compared to [Kiewit’s]
    approach.” 
    Id. at AR
    30263. In addition, the SSA stated that FDS’s analysis was “more
    comprehensive” than Kiewit’s in terms of risk mitigation, explaining that “[FDS’s]
    detailed analysis [would] minimize disruptions and delays to the project and ultimately
    provide[] added value to the Government.” 
    Id. In view
    of the foregoing, the SSA’s
    conclusion that FDS’s proposal was worth more than Kiewit’s is fully explained for
    technical factor 1.
    19
    Regarding technical factor 2 (management approach), both FDS and Kiewit
    received an “Outstanding” rating, with Kiewit being awarded four significant strengths
    and 12 strengths and FDS being awarded six significant strengths and 16 strengths. 
    Id. at AR
    30264-65. The SSA explained that both Kiewit and FDS “demonstrated an
    exceptional management approach and understanding of the requirements for Factor 2.”
    
    Id. at AR
    30265. Nevertheless, the SSA noted that there was added value in FDS’s
    proposal based on FDS proposing to finish the entire project *** days earlier, thus putting
    FDS ahead of Kiewit by *** days. 6 
    Id. The SSA
    therefore concluded that FDS’s “earlier
    finish date is an added value and benefit, because it represents a tangible cost savings to
    the Government,” amounting to approximately $1 million. 
    Id. For technical
    factor 3 (experience and capability), Kiewit was rated as “Good” and
    awarded one significant strength because it submitted six projects that exceeded the
    required three projects, and six strengths, which included “experience at remote site
    locations . . . and experience with a dewatering system similar to [Kiewit’s] proposed
    system for [Lake] Isabella Dam.” 
    Id. FDS, on
    the other hand, was rated as
    “Outstanding,” receiving two significant strengths, one of which was attributed to FDS’s
    submission of six projects which exceeded the required three projects, while the other was
    awarded because of FDS’s dewatering experience. 
    Id. FDS also
    received four strengths,
    including “experience at a remote site [and] experience with rockfill and zone[d]
    6
    In its revised proposal, Kiewit went from a completion date of *** days early to ***
    days early, which the SSA noted was “most likely due to an original weakness about proposing
    double shifts.” SSDD, Tab 109 at AR 30265.
    20
    embankments.” 
    Id. The SSA
    found that FDS’s proposal was “superior” to Kiewit’s
    proposal because it “demonstrated more experience and capability than [Kiewit] on
    projects similar to [Lake] Isabella [Dam].” 
    Id. at AR
    30266. The SSA concluded that
    FDS’s “worldwide expertise and experience in dam and spillway construction,” as well as
    its experience in “seismic dam remediation, and dewatering with a partial pool reservoir[,]
    [were] a significant added value to the Government and [were] expected to greatly reduce
    risk for timely project completion.” 
    Id. For technical
    factor 4 (technical plan for concrete production and placement), both
    FDS and Kiewit received an “Outstanding” rating. 
    Id. at AR
    30266. Kiewit was awarded
    three significant strengths, which included “providing a preliminary mix design and
    thermal analysis for [its] concrete production,” and ten strengths, including the insertion of
    “a thorough discussion on concrete cooling and demonstrated experience in multiple
    methods of cooling concrete . . . discuss[ing] hazardous material considerations at the
    Main Dam Control Tower and propos[ing] the use of a tent system to be utilized for
    physical protection of their aggregate stockpiles.” 
    Id. FDS was
    awarded seven significant
    strengths, which included “an extensive rationale and arguments for [its] selected method
    of pumping concrete instead of utilizing buckets or other methods [and] a well-thought out
    approach to rebar and formwork across all concrete features,” and 13 strengths, including
    “multiple hot weather concrete placement mitigation strategies and multiple means of
    cooling concrete, planning for an onsite lab to control concrete production . . . and a
    thorough plan for controlling joint offset for all concrete structures.” 
    Id. at AR
    30266-67.
    Although both Kiewit’s and FDS’s proposals were rated as “Outstanding” for technical
    21
    factor 4, the SSA nevertheless concluded that FDS’s design of the “concrete mix for a
    maximum of 130 degree Fahrenheit (F) internal temperature versus the specification
    maximum of 158 degrees F [would] significantly reduce[] the risk of exceeding maximum
    concrete temperatures during construction and subsequently having to reject or tear out
    concrete.” 
    Id. at AR
    30267. Moreover, the SSA concluded that FDS’s “plan to leave the
    formwork on for 7 days versus 5 days is also a significant benefit to the project by
    allowing recently placed concrete to cure and gain additional strength before exposure to
    the elements.” 
    Id. The SSA
    concluded that these benefits, which were only attributed to
    FDS’s proposal, are “an added value to the Government and a risk reduction measure due
    to the project’s location in an arid and windy climate.” 
    Id. For technical
    factor 5 (past performance), the SSAC gave both Kiewit and FDS a
    rating of “Substantial Confidence” after discussions with the Corps concerning their
    revised proposals. 
    Id. at AR
    30268. Nevertheless, the SSA changed FDS’s rating to
    “Satisfactory Confidence” in the SSDD. 
    Id. FDS submitted
    five projects for
    consideration, one of which was considered “Very Relevant,” two “Relevant,” and two
    “Somewhat Relevant,” with “performance ratings ranging from Satisfactory to Very
    Good.” 
    Id. at AR
    30268 (emphasis in the original). However, because FDS submitted
    only five projects instead of the required six, the SSA determined that FDS’s proposal
    warranted the lower rating of “Satisfactory Confidence” instead of “Substantial
    Confidence.” 
    Id. Kiewit, on
    the hand, received a rating of “Substantial Confidence”
    because of the six projects submitted. 
    Id. Kiewit had
    one “Very Relevant”, three
    “Relevant, and two “Somewhat Relevant” projects, with “performance ratings ranging
    22
    from Satisfactory to Exceptional.” 
    Id. at AR
    30267-68 (emphasis in the original).
    However, despite the lower rating given to FDS, the SSA concluded that said rating did
    “not change the quality of [FDS’s] overall proposal’s strengths and weaknesses.” 
    Id. at AR
    30268.
    Finally, for technical factor 6 (small business participation commitment document),
    i.e., the least important of all the technical factors, Kiewit was rated as “Good,” whereas
    FDS was rated as “Acceptable.” 
    Id. Kiewit met
    the overall small business goal of 15
    percent and “exceeded the goals in two” of the five sub goals, but failed to meet the goals
    in two other sub goals. 
    Id. at AR
    30269. Moreover, Kiewit “provided a letter of
    commitment with Jensen Drilling[,]” a sub-contractor. 
    Id. Although it
    surpassed the
    overall small business goal, FDS “did not meet the small business sub goals and did not
    include letters of commitment,” which is why it was rated lower than Kiewit. 
    Id. Nevertheless, the
    SSA agreed with the SSAC that there was no “significant difference in
    value between [Kiewit and FDS] for this factor,” and that FDS had “included small
    business pricing in [its] proposal.” 
    Id. In view
    of the foregoing, it is clear that the SSA’s conclusion that FDS’s proposal
    was far superior to Kiewit’s and worth the slightly higher 4.4 percent price tag was based
    on his extremely thorough head-to-head comparison of Kiewit’s and FDS’s proposals and
    not on any improper factors. The court finds that his comments on the specific cost
    savings the SSA expected the Corps would receive if FDS was selected were extraneous
    to his best-value tradeoff analysis. The SSA’s final best-value tradeoff decision was
    properly focused on FDS’s vastly superior technical proposal, which the SSA fully
    23
    supported with specific details. In such circumstances, the fact that the SSA did not
    identify in the record the basis for the savings he calculated that the government would
    receive by selecting FDS’s proposal does not undermine the integrity of the SSA’s best-
    value tradeoff decision.
    C.     Kiewit’s “Good” Rating on Technical Factor 1
    Kiewit next argues that the Corps erred in awarding the Contract to FDS because
    the Corps failed to explain why Kiewit received a final rating of “Good” instead of
    “Outstanding” on technical factor 1. Kiewit’s MJAR at 20-24. Kiewit does not contend
    that its proposal was inconsistent with a “Good” rating under the criteria set forth in the
    Solicitation. Rather, Kiewit contends that the Corps failed to explain why it did not
    receive an “Outstanding” rating for technical factor 1 after Kiewit successfully addressed
    the two significant weaknesses, four weaknesses, and three of the four uncertainties
    assigned to it under said factor before discussions with the Corps. 
    Id. Kiewit explains
    that because it had a “Good” rating with those weaknesses and uncertainties, the Corps
    should have to explain why its rating did not improve once it removed those weaknesses
    and uncertainties in its revisions. 
    Id. at 20-21.
    The government and FDS argue that
    Kiewit is not entitled to an explanation so long as the “Good” rating it received is
    justified. Def.’s Reply at 13-16; FDS’s Resp. Opp. Pl.’s Mot. J. on Admin. R. (“Resp.”),
    ECF No. 38, at 13; see also Rev. SSEB Rep., Tab 106 at AR 30148. They argue that
    because Kiewit’s “Good” rating for technical factor 1 is adequately explained, the Corps
    does not need to provide any additional explanation.
    24
    It is well settled that “technical rating decisions are the ‘minutiae of the
    procurement process . . . which involve discretionary determinations of procurement
    officials that a court will not second guess.” T & S Prod., Inc. v. United States, 48 Fed.
    Cl. 100, 104 (2000) (quoting E.W. 
    Bliss, 77 F.3d at 449
    ). Here, the Solicitation expressly
    stated that in order to receive the rating of “Good” an offeror’s proposal needed to
    provide “a through approach and understanding of the requirements[,] . . . contain[] at
    least one strength,” and present a “low to moderate” risk of unsuccessful performance.
    Solicitation, Tab 23 at AR 1472 (¶ 5.9). To receive a rating of “Outstanding” the
    proposal had to provide “an exceptional approach and understanding of the
    requirements[,] . . . contain[] multiple strengths,” and present a “low” risk of unsuccessful
    performance. 
    Id. The difference
    between the two ratings therefore largely turned on
    whether the Corps found the proposed offeror’s technical approach to be “thorough” and
    thus “Good” or “exceptional” and thus “Outstanding.” 
    Id. The court
    will not second-
    guess the Corps’ judgment that Kiewit’s proposal was “thorough” but not “exceptional.”
    This is a matter of technical and scientific expertise to which the Corps is afforded the
    greatest deference. E.W. 
    Bliss, 77 F.3d at 449
    .
    In addition, the court agrees with the government and FDS that the cases Kiewit
    relies on to support its position, BayFirst Solutions, LLC v. United States, 
    102 Fed. Cl. 677
    (2012), Caddell Construction Co. v. United States, 
    111 Fed. Cl. 49
    (2013), and TRESP
    Associates, Inc., B-258322.5 (March 9, 1995), 96-1 CPD ¶ 8, are distinguishable from the
    present case and do not provide a basis for requiring additional agency review.
    25
    First, in BayFirst the Solicitation expressly required the agency to base a top rating
    of “Excellent” on the number of strengths and weaknesses assigned to an offeror.
    
    BayFirst, 102 Fed. Cl. at 686
    . As such, the agency’s failure to explain the basis for a
    “weakness,” which determined the rating, required a remand to the agency for an
    explanation. 
    Id. Here, in
    contrast, the Solicitation did not provide that ratings would be
    based solely on the number of strengths and weaknesses. Rather, ratings would be based
    on the technical judgments of the SSEB and the SSAC. An “Outstanding” rating would
    be based on providing “an exceptional approach and understanding of the
    requirements[,]” whereas a “Good” rating would be based on providing “a thorough
    approach and understanding of the requirements[.]” Solicitation, Tab 23 at AR 1472 (¶
    5.9). The bases for FDS’s “Outstanding” and Kiewit’s “Good” ratings for technical factor
    1 are set forth in a narrative contained in the record. The narrative clearly explains why
    FDS was given a higher rating than Kiewit. Nothing in the Solicitation required the SSA
    to also explain why Kiewit was not deserving of an “Outstanding” rating.
    Second, nothing in Caddell, requires a different result. Caddell concerned the
    level of discussion needed in a best-value tradeoff 
    decision. 111 Fed. Cl. at 109-11
    . The
    court held that a source selection decision required more than conclusory statements,
    without any record support. 
    Id. (citing Standard
    Commc’ns, Inc. v. United States, 
    101 Fed. Cl. 723
    , 733 (citing Serco Inc. v. United States, 
    81 Fed. Cl. 463
    , 497 (‘“Conclusory
    statements, devoid of any substantive content . . . fall short of the [FAR]
    requirement[.]”’)). 
    Id. Here, as
    discussed above, the reasons for finding FDS’s proposal
    26
    superior to Kiewit’s proposal were clearly articulated in the record. No further
    explanation was required.
    Third, TRESP is also distinguishable from the present case. In TRESP, a rating
    system was employed under which number values were assigned based on the offeror’s
    satisfaction of various factors and subfactors. TRESP, B-258322.5 at 2-4. Under that
    system, the GAO decided it was irrational not to add points to TRESP’s rating after it had
    addressed certain failures following discussions. 
    Id. at 4-5.
    The GAO determined that
    under the rating system devised, the agency needed to explain the basis for the final
    evaluation. 
    Id. In the
    present case, however, the connection between the evaluation
    made by the Corps and the rating standard for “Good” in the Solicitation is rational and
    well documented.
    For these reasons, the court finds that Kiewit has not met its burden of showing
    that the Corps erred when it failed to explain why Kiewit did not receive an
    “Outstanding” rating for technical factor 1. The Corps provided a rational explanation as
    to why Kiewit received a “Good” rating and given the explanation provided for FDS’s
    “Outstanding” rating, as well as the extensive comparison of the proposals set forth in the
    record, the court finds that the Corps adequately explained its technical judgment and that
    Kiewit is not entitled to an additional explanation as to why it did not receive an
    “Outstanding” rating for technical factor 1.
    D.     The Discriminators the SSA Used for Finding that FDS Provided the
    Corps with a Superior Proposal Under Technical Factor 1 Were
    Rational
    27
    Kiewit argues that three of the bases for the Corps’ finding of FDS’s proposal
    superior to Kiewit’s for technical factor 1 were unreasonable or irrational. Kiewit’s
    MJAR at 24-32. Each is addressed, in turn, below.
    1.     The Corps Rationally Determined that FDS’s Proposed Use of a
    Geologist Was a Significant Strength
    Kiewit states it was unreasonable for the Corps to evaluate FDS’s proposal for
    technical factor 1 as providing a significant strength based on FDS’s proposed use of a
    geologist. Kiewit’s MJAR at 24-27. Kiewit argues that by providing a geologist instead
    of a geotechnical engineer, FDS’s proposal did not comply with the Solicitation’s
    requirements. 
    Id. Kiewit’s argument
    is premised on its contention that FDS has
    proposed a geologist instead of a geotechnical engineer. For the reasons that follow, the
    court finds that argument is without merit.
    The court has reviewed FDS’s proposal and agrees with FDS that its proposal
    requires FDS to provide a geotechnical engineer as well as a geologist. FDS Rev.
    Proposal, Tab 99 at AR 28753. In its proposal, FDS has certified that it will be providing
    a geotechnical engineer for the project, FDS Rev. Proposal, Tab 99 at AR 28951, as
    required by the specifications. Specs., Tab 12 at AR 993. The court finds that the Corps
    may reasonably rely upon FDS’s certification to conclude that FDS will provide the
    required geotechnical engineer in order to meet the specifications in addition to the
    proposed geologist that the Corps identified as the basis for FDS’s significant strength.
    In Allied Tech. Grp., the Federal Circuit held that “[w]here an offeror has certified that it
    meets the technical requirements of a proposal, the Contracting Officer is entitled to rely
    28
    on such certification in determining whether to accept a bid, and the offeror’s potential
    failure to comply with the proposal requirements is ordinarily ‘a matter of contract
    administration,’ which does not go to the propriety of accepting the bid.” Allied Tech.
    Grp., Inc. v. United States, 
    649 F.3d 1320
    , 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Centech Grp.,
    Inc. v. United States, 
    554 F.3d 1029
    , 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted)).
    Because FDS has certified that it will provide a geotechnical engineer, as required by the
    Solicitation, and a geologist for this project, Kiewit’s argument must be rejected.
    2.     The Corps Rationally Gave FDS a Strength for its Superior
    Understanding of Soil Conditions
    Kiewit asserts that it was unreasonable for the Corps to distinguish between
    Kiewit’s and FDS’s proposals for technical factor 1 based on FDS’s recognition that
    ‘“the Auxiliary Dam site is alluvial in nature,”’ whereas Kiewit ‘“assumed a low
    permeable soil which the SSAC did not consider accurate.”’ Kiewit’s MJAR at 29-30
    (quoting Rev. SSAC Rep., Tab 107 at AR 30232; SSDD, Tab 109 at AR 30264)
    (emphasis removed). Kiewit argues that “alluvial” and “low permeability” mean the
    same thing and, therefore, the difference in ratings had no technical merit. 
    Id. at 29-32.
    Kiewit also argues that the Corps erroneously took exception to Kiewit’s description of
    the soil condition at the Auxiliary Dam as “low permeability.” 
    Id. For the
    reasons that
    follow, this court will not second-guess the Corps on either of these technical judgments.
    First, accepting the definition of “alluvial” provided by FDS, the court understands
    that it refers to soil that was deposited by flowing water. FDS’s MJAR at 25 (citing J.L.
    Boettinger, Encyclopedia of Soils in the Environment, Alluvium and Alluvial Soils, 45
    29
    (Daniel Hillel ed., Elsevier Ltd. 2005). The term does not mean “low permeability.”
    Kiewit’s citation to dictionary.com’s definition of “alluvium” is consistent with this
    conclusion, because the site also provides an example of the usage of “alluvial” as
    meaning “unconsolidated soil.” See http://www.dictionary.com/browse/alluvial?s=t.
    Thus, the Corps’ criticism is supported.
    Kiewit’s claims regarding the low permeability of the soil are also unsupported.
    Kiewit’s support for its position that the soils at issue have “low permeability” is a 1948
    pre-construction report of site conditions before the Lake Isabella Dam was constructed.
    Kiewit’s MJAR at 32 (citing Original Construction Doc. Part IV, Tab 33B at AR 14291).
    According to the government and FDS, however, geotechnical data provided in the
    Solicitation that post-date the 1948 report show the soil is permeable. Def.’s MJAR at
    41, n.26; FDS’s Resp. at 16; see generally Geotechnical Lab Results, Tab 29(c)-(l);
    Solicitation Attach. 05, Tab 37 at AR 17537. The Corps’ Agency Report before the GAO
    also explained that the more recent materials confirm the soil is permeable. Agency
    Response to Prot.’s Comments & Supp. Protest Grounds, Tab 139 at AR 30858 (the
    borings and lab test data included in the Geotechnical Data Report indicate that the
    foundation of the Auxiliary Dam does not consist of low permeable soil). In such
    circumstances, Kiewit’s understanding of the soils is not necessarily correct.
    Accordingly, Kiewit has not shown that the Corps was not rational when it questioned
    Kiewit’s understanding of soil conditions. 7
    7
    Kiewit suggests that the Corps’ judgment is irrational because it received a significant
    strength for its dewatering plan which it states was based on its assumption that the soils had low
    30
    3.      The Corps’ Decision to Give FDS’s Dewatering Plan a
    Significant Strength Is Rational and Supported
    Kiewit contends the Corps’ decision to give FDS a significant strength under
    technical factor 1 for its dewatering plan was irrational. Kiewit’s MJAR at 27-29. The
    court disagrees. First, the court agrees with FDS that Kiewit’s contention that FDS did
    not provide a dewatering plan is wrong. FDS’s Resp. at 16. FDS did provide a plan.
    FDS Rev. Proposal, Tab 99 at AR 28766-69. Second, the court finds that Kiewit’s
    criticism of FDS’s dewatering plan on the grounds that FDS did not consider 2011
    groundwater data is not supported. The Corps gave FDS a significant strength because
    FDS expressly stated that it would “utilize historical data, in addition to monitoring data
    collected throughout 2018 in preparation for [its] dewatering plan.” 
    Id. at AR
    28766; see
    also SSDD, Tab 109 at AR 30263-64. Kiewit has not shown that the Corps’ decision to
    assign FDS a significant strength for its dewatering plan was irrational.
    E.      Kiewit’s Disparate Treatment Claim Is Not Supported
    Kiewit argues that the Corps failed to treat Kiewit the same as FDS in its
    evaluation of technical factor 1. Kiewit’s MJAR at 32-53. Kiewit claims it was not fairly
    evaluated on: (a) stockpiling location; (b) quality control (“QC”) plan; (c) stockpile
    protection; (d) material processing; (e) haul roads and cofferdam; and (f) groundwater
    monitoring. 
    Id. In considering
    Kiewit’s objections, the court is mindful that it does not
    permeability. This contention does not establish that the Corps’ statements regarding soils were
    in error. The record indicates that the significant strength Kiewit received for its dewatering plan
    was based on its willingness to perform additional testing on “existing wells and piezometers to
    validate [its] dewatering plan” and not because it properly understood soil conditions. See, e.g.,
    Rev. SSEB Rep., Tab 106 at AR 30145.
    31
    have the authority to re-evaluate proposals. “[T]he court must be mindful that it may not
    substitute its judgment for that of the agency, but rather must confine its review to
    determining whether the agency’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. The court must
    avoid ‘undue judicial interference with the lawful discretion given to agencies.”’
    Eskridge Research Corp. v. United States, 
    92 Fed. Cl. 88
    , 97 (2010) (quoting Axiom Res.
    Mgmt., v. United States, 
    564 F.3d 1374
    , 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2009)) (other internal citations
    omitted). This need for mindfulness is especially true with regard to evaluations of an
    offeror’s technical approach. Atl. Diving Supply Inc. v. United States, 
    107 Fed. Cl. 244
    ,
    250 (2012) (‘“The evaluation of proposals for their technical excellence or quality is a
    process that often requires the special expertise of procurement officials, and thus
    reviewing courts give the greatest deference possible to these determinations.”’) (internal
    quotations omitted). Given the expertise necessary to evaluate proposals, it appears to
    the court that Kiewit’s objections relate to the manner in which the Corps exercised its
    judgment in evaluating the proposals and do not support a finding that the Corps engaged
    in disparate treatment.
    Kiewit objects to the Corps’ evaluation of the stockpiling location. Kiewit’s
    MJAR at 33-37. Kiewit argues it designated a stockpiling location but did not receive the
    same credit as FDS. 
    Id. The court
    has looked at the proposals and it is clear from a
    review of the proposals that FDS identified the location of its stockpile in a more specific
    and detailed manner than Kiewit. Kiewit designated its Zone 4B stockpile area within
    another larger area identified as “waste” without any detail as to the specific location,
    whereas FDS provided a more specific and detailed identification of the location of its
    32
    Zone 4B stockpile. Compare Kiewit Rev. Proposal, Tab 98 at AR 28268 with FDS Rev.
    Proposal, Tab 99 at AR 28750. FDS also addressed the Corps’ concerns regarding the
    potential risk of the stockpile becoming too large by “scal[ing] down production in the
    excavation to match [the] processing needs.” See FDS Rev. Proposal, Tab 99 at AR
    28755-56. Kiewit apparently did not do so. Rather, Kiewit merely alleged that the
    material would fit without providing a specific location and made no mention of potential
    efforts to mitigate risks. Kiewit Rev. Proposal, Tab 98 at AR 28268. In such
    circumstances, Kiewit has failed to show that the difference in ratings was not based on
    the application of the Corps’ technical judgment but on disparate treatment.
    The court finds the same is true with regard to the QC plans. FDS provided
    additional QC in material placement by offering disking and by having FDS personnel
    working on the embankment who could check the grade using GPS equipment. FDS
    Rev. Proposal, Tab 99 at AR 28765. Further, FDS identified numerous techniques it will
    use for QC purposes, such as separating the various crushing stages to “allow[] the
    excavation operations and production at the primary crushing to be completely
    independent of the secondary and tertiary crushings . . . [to] provide[] more flexibility
    and reliability to the plant and independence of all operations, thereby reducing
    associated schedule risk.” 
    Id. at AR
    28763. FDS is also planning to transport finished
    material using “a belt conveyor to a two-deck vibrating screen. The opening of the
    meshes in this screen will be adjusted depending on the final products to be produced.”
    
    Id. FDS will
    also design the processing plant “to be highly flexible, giving [FDS the]
    opportunity to change the final materials and proportions being produced, based on
    33
    scheduled embankment needs” and will include “a water network with water bars at
    required locations to avoid dust generation, in addition to the network for aggregate
    washing,” thereby helping to “minimize the need for additional water, including a
    clarifier and decantation ponds.” 
    Id. This additional
    QC was the basis of the evaluation
    strength. See SSDD, Tab 109 at AR 30263-64; Rev. SSEB Rep., Tab 106 at AR 30149.
    The difference in ratings is therefore supported by facts in the record. The court has no
    basis for second-guessing the Corps’ technical conclusion.
    Next, the Corps compared FDS’s proposal with Kiewit’s proposal regarding the
    protection of stockpiles. The Corps found that FDS’s proposal was technically superior.
    SSDD, Tab 109 at AR 30263. FDS’s proposal was more detailed than that of Kiewit and
    included a discussion of risk mitigation that involved drop height from conveyors and the
    use of clean trucks. Compare FDS Rev. Proposal, Tab 99 at AR 28764 with Kiewit Rev.
    Proposal, Tab 98 at AR 28284. The court does not have a basis for questioning the
    Corps’ finding on the basis of its judgment that FDS’s proposal was superior.
    Regarding Kiewit’s final contention that it addressed the same issues regarding the
    protection of stockpiles, as addressed by FDS in its proposal, elsewhere in its proposal,
    the court agrees with FDS that the Corps was not obligated to look for that information
    elsewhere in the proposal. FDS’s Resp. at 23. The Solicitation stated that “the
    Government is not obligated to search for or to consider information that is not located in
    the specified location.” Solicitation, Tab 23 at AR 1463 (¶ 3.3). If Kiewit failed to put
    the information in the correct place, it cannot blame the Corps if the information was not
    found. A review of FDS’s proposal confirms that it provided a highly detailed proposal
    34
    with regard to material processing. See FDS Rev. Proposal, Tab 99 at AR 28761-63.
    The record shows that this same level of detail was not provided by Kiewit. The
    Solicitation called for “detailed technical narrative” that must be “comprehensive,”
    urging offerors to “elaborate on other features of the work that [were] considered relevant
    or where a high degree of risk [was] involved that may adversely affect the planned
    performance period.” Solicitation, Tab 23 at AR 1465. Consistent with this, the Corps
    expressly provided that “[t]he more detailed, logical, realistic or achievable the technical
    approach the more favorable the rating.” 
    Id. at AR
    1471. The court will not second-
    guess the Corps’ technical judgment.
    The court also finds that the difference in FDS’s and Kiewit’s level of detail with
    regard to hauling supports their different ratings. Compare FDS Rev. Proposal, Tab 99 at
    AR 28750, 28753, 28755 with Kiewit Rev. Proposal, Tab 98 at AR 28268. Specifically,
    the difference in Kiewit’s and FDS’s level of detail is identified with figures and
    descriptions. 
    Id. (See, e.g.,
    FDS Rev. Proposal, Tab 99 at AR 28753 (“sacrificial fills
    will create improved access to the work areas, better haul roads, and an additional staging
    area for the concrete weir work. These strategic fills placed in this location will also
    serve as an additional protective berm for the weir and spillway work in case of
    unexpected high water.”)). The court simply has no basis for questioning the Corps’
    decision to assign two strengths to FDS’s proposal for a cofferdam and haul roads and to
    not assign Kiewit the same strengths.
    Finally, the court finds that the Corps’ decision to give FDS a strength for its
    groundwater monitoring, citing specifically to page 21 of FDS’s proposal for including
    35
    monitoring to verify the fulfillment of environmental requirements, was rational. See
    Rev. SSEB Rep., Tab 106 at AR 30150 (Strength 10); FDS Rev. Proposal, Tab 99 at AR
    28768. The Corps also noted that FDS’s groundwater monitoring will “assist in [the]
    development of [FDS’s] dewatering plan.” Rev. SSEB Rep., Tab 106 at AR 30150; FDS
    Rev. Proposal, Tab 99 at AR 28766-67. The court finds that because FDS’s plan was
    more detailed and provided other benefits that were not provided by Kiewit in its
    proposal, 8 the difference in ratings was based on technical judgments and was not
    irrational.
    F.       The Corps Properly Evaluated Kiewit Under Technical Factor 3
    Kiewit asserts that the Corps’ decision under technical factor 3 (Experience and
    Capability) to assign FDS a significant strength for dewatering experience, while it
    assigned Kiewit only a strength for dewatering experience, was irrational and not
    supported. Kiewit’s MJAR at 53-56. The evaluation criteria for technical factor 3
    provided that an offeror would be evaluated more favorably for submitting prior projects
    that are similar to the Lake Isabella Dam project. Solicitation, Tab 23 at AR 1471 (¶ 5.3).
    The SSAC’s evaluation explained that Kiewit received a strength because one of its prior
    projects used a dewatering system similar to that proposed by Kiewit. Rev. SSAC Rep.,
    Tab 107 at 30233. FDS, however, received a significant strength for its dewatering
    experience because FDS “included four projects that had foundation dewatering
    requirements on embankment dams with partial pool reservoirs.” 
    Id. at AR
    30233-34.
    8
    See Kiewit Rev. Proposal, Tab 98 at AR 28295.
    36
    This explanation supports the difference in the evaluations. The Corps determined that
    FDS’s more extensive experience with dewatering in the same conditions as those at
    Lake Isabella Dam was more of an advantage to the agency than Kiewit’s single
    experience with a similar dewatering method in dissimilar conditions. The Corps’
    conclusion was well within its discretion and will not be second-guessed.
    G.     The Corps Properly Evaluated FDS Under Technical Factors 3 and 5
    Kiewit challenges the Corps’ evaluation of FDS under technical factors 3
    (Experience and Capability) and 5 (Past Performance). Kiewit’s MJAR at 56-60. Kiewit
    asserts that it is per se unreasonable or irrational for the Corps to evaluate FDS as
    “Outstanding” under technical factor 3 but to have only given FDS a “Satisfactory
    Confidence” rating, the second highest rating, under technical factor 5. The court
    disagrees.
    Technical factor 3 of the Solicitation provided that each offeror must submit at
    least three, but no more than six, prior projects for evaluation. Solicitation, Tab 23 at AR
    1468 (¶ 4.3). At least one project was required to include work on a zoned embankment
    dam (at least 50 feet high) and at least one project was required to include work on a
    spillway (at least 5,000 cubic yards). 
    Id. For technical
    factor 5, the Solicitation provided
    that each offeror was required to submit past performance information for the prior
    projects submitted under technical factor 3. 
    Id. at AR
    1469 (¶ 4.5). These projects would
    be evaluated based on their relevancy, including whether the project had a similar “dollar
    value, contract type . . . subcontract/teaming” arrangement, etc. 
    Id. at AR
    1471-2 (¶5.5).
    Although FDS’s proposal was rated “Outstanding” for technical factor 3, it received a
    37
    “Satisfactory Confidence” rating for technical factor 5. SSDD, Tab 109 at AR 30268.
    This does not however render FDS’s “Outstanding” rating for technical factor 3 arbitrary.
    Rather, FDS received the lower rating for technical factor 5 because it only submitted
    past performance information for five of the six projects submitted under technical factor
    3. 
    Id. FDS was
    downgraded because of its omission. The Corps’ decision on technical
    factor 5 was supported on the basis of the evaluation criteria for technical factor 5. The
    rating on technical factor 5 did not, however, make the Corps’ conclusions regarding
    technical factor 3 irrational as discussed below.
    Kiewit argues that the Corps’ evaluation of FDS’s proposal as “Outstanding”
    under technical factor 3 and as “Satisfactory Confidence” under technical factor 5 is
    arbitrary and capricious because the ratings are “inconsistent.” Kiewit’s MJAR at 58.
    The court disagrees. As the GAO stated when it denied Kiewit’s protest, “Kiewit seems
    to simply ignore the fact that the experience and capability factor and past performance
    factor were evaluated under different criteria . . . Our review of the record confirms the
    reasonableness of the agency’s evaluation in this regard.” Kiewit Infrastructure at 7, Tab
    142 at AR 30946. The court agrees with the GAO. There is no inconsistency between
    the Corps’ evaluation of FDS under technical factors 3 and 5 regarding FDS’s experience
    and past performance. Past performance was downgraded to address FDS’s omission in
    not submitting a sixth project, not because the Corps questioned FDS’s past performance.
    The court finds that the difference in ratings for technical factors 3 and 5 are adequately
    explained and that there is no irrational inconsistency between the Corps’ evaluation of
    FDS under technical factors 3 and 5.
    38
    CONCLUSION
    For all of the above-stated reasons, Kiewit’s Motion for Judgment on the
    Administrative Record is DENIED and the government’s and FDS’s Motions for
    Judgment on the Administrative Record are GRANTED. 9 The Clerk is directed to enter
    judgment accordingly. No costs.
    IT IS SO ORDERED.
    s/Nancy B. Firestone
    NANCY B. FIRESTONE
    Senior Judge
    9
    The court finds that all of Kiewit’s other objections to the procurement decision are
    without merit and having determined that Kiewit has not succeeded on the merits of its motion,
    the court has no occasion to rule on its request for injunctive relief.
    39