Mark Dunning Industries, Inc. v. United States ( 2019 )


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  •            In the United States Court of Federal Claims
    No. 18-1803C
    (Filed Under Seal: April 19, 2019)
    (Reissued: April 29, 2019)
    )
    MARK DUNNING INDUSTRIES, INC., )
    )                    Post-award bid protest; compliance with
    Plaintiff,            )                    amended solicitation; reasonableness of
    )                    awardee’s bid; responsibility
    v.                         )                    determination; equal treatment of
    )                    offerors
    UNITED STATES,                  )
    )
    Defendant,            )
    )
    and                        )
    )
    ZERO WASTE SOLUTIONS, INC.,     )
    )
    Defendant-Intervenor. )
    )
    Nicholas T. Solosky, Fox Rothschild LLP, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff. Of counsel
    was Doug Hibshman, Fox Rothschild LLP, Washington, D.C.
    Joseph A. Pixley, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United
    States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant. With him on the briefs were
    Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, and Robert E. Kirschman, Jr.,
    Director, and Franklin E. White, Jr., Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil
    Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. Of counsel was Harry Parent,
    Trial Attorney, Contract & Fiscal Law Division, U.S. Army Legal Services Agency, Fort
    Belvoir, Virginia.
    Julia Di Vito, PilieroMazza PLLC, Washington, D.C., for defendant-intervenor.
    OPINION AND ORDER1
    LETTOW, Senior Judge.
    1
    Because of the protective order entered in this case, this opinion was initially filed under
    seal. The parties were requested to review this decision and provide proposed redactions of any
    confidential or proprietary information. After the parties’ proposals were received, a hearing on
    redactions was held April 29, 2019. The resulting redactions are shown by asterisks enclosed
    within brackets, e.g., “[***].”
    Plaintiff Mark Dunning Industries, Inc. (“Dunning”) protests the decision of the U.S.
    Army Contracting Command Fort Benning (the “Army”) to award a solid waste disposal
    contract to Zero Waste Solutions, Inc. (“Zero Waste”). The procurement involves disposal of
    solid waste at Fort Benning, Georgia, and was made to the lowest priced responsible bidder.
    Dunning is the incumbent service provider and one of two bidders for the contract.
    Dunning contends that the Army committed procurement error by: (1) accepting Zero
    Waste’s bid despite Zero Waste’s supposed failure to accept one amendment to the solicitation,
    Compl. ¶¶ 29-39; (2) awarding the contract to Zero Waste despite an unrealistic bid 31% below
    the government’s cost estimate and one that omitted key scopes of work, Compl. ¶¶ 40-80; (3)
    finding Zero Waste as a responsible bidder despite a lack of experience, equipment, or
    infrastructure, Compl. ¶¶ 81-88; and (4) providing Zero Waste with different information about
    government furnished resources to the detriment of Dunning’s bid, Compl. ¶¶ 89-93. Dunning
    asks that the court declare the Army’s award decision to be arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious,
    an abuse of discretion, and inconsistent with the solicitation’s terms. Compl. at 26. Dunning
    further requests that the court enjoin performance by Zero Waste and award the contract to
    Dunning. Compl. at 26.
    The United States (the “government”) produced the administrative record on December
    11, 2018, ECF No. 20, and subsequently corrected it three times, first on February 25, 2019,
    Def.’s Unopposed Mot. to Amend/Correct Admin. R., ECF No. 24; Order of Feb. 26, 2019, ECF
    No. 25, second on March 12, 2019, Def.’s Second Unopposed Mot. to Amend/Correct Admin.
    R., ECF No. 31; Order of Mar. 13, 2019, ECF No. 32, and finally on March 29, 2019, Def.’s
    Third Mot. to Amend/Correct Admin. R. ECF No. 37, Order of Mar. 29, 2019, ECF No. 38.2
    Dunning filed a motion for judgment on the administrative record on January 11, 2019.
    Pl.’s Mot. for Judgment on the Admin. R. (“Pl.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 21. The government
    responded to Dunning’s motion and also cross-moved for judgment on the administrative record
    on February 26, 2019, Def.’s Opp’n to [Pl.’s Mot.] & Def.’s Cross-Mot. for Judgment on the
    Admin. R. (“Def.’s Cross-Mot.”), ECF No. 27. Dunning replied to the Army’s response and
    cross-motion on March 14, 2019. Reply Mem. in Further Support of [Pl.’s Mot.] & Mot. to
    Suppl. the Admin. R. (“Pl.’s Reply”), ECF No. 34.3 Due to the extensive nature of the
    government’s third correction to the administrative record, which belatedly added over 400
    pages to the record bearing directly on issues pending before the court, the court permitted
    Dunning to file a supplemental reply, see Revised Scheduling Order (Mar. 25, 2019), ECF No.
    36, which Dunning filed on April 5, 2019, Suppl. to Reply Mem. in Further Supp. of [Pl.’s Mot.]
    (“Pl.’s Suppl. Reply”), ECF No. 41. Dunning also requested costs for having to prepare a
    supplemental reply. See Pl.’s Mot. for Atty’s’ Fees Under [RCFC 54] (“Pl.’s Fees Mot.”), ECF
    No. 42. The government filed its response on April 11, 2019, see Def.’s Reply to [Pl.’s Suppl.
    2
    The administrative record is consecutively paginated and divided into 77 tabs. Citations
    to the record cite to the tab and page, as “AR [tab]-[page]” (e.g., AR 36-1770).
    3
    In light of the Army’s third correction to the record, Dunning’s motion accompanying its
    reply to correct the record is moot. The e-mails it sought to include in the record are embraced
    by the third correction and contained within AR Tab 68. Compare Pl.’s Reply Attach. 1 at 1-6
    (denoted SuppAR 000001-06), with AR 68-2267 to 72.
    2
    Reply] (“Def.’s Suppl. Br.”), ECF No. 43, and the court held a hearing on the outstanding
    motions on April 12, 2019.
    The court concludes that Dunning’s contentions of error lack merit. Accordingly,
    Dunning’s motion for judgment on the administrative record is denied, and the government’s
    cross-motion for judgment is granted.
    FACTS4
    A. The Army’s Solicitation for Waste Removal Services
    On July 29, 2016, the Army issued a solicitation for solid waste disposal services for Fort
    Benning, Georgia (the “solicitation”). AR 25-1212. The solicitation invoked the sealed bidding
    procedures of 48 C.F.R. (“FAR”) Part 14. See AR 25-1212 (specifying invitation for bids), 1278
    (incorporating by reference FAR sealed bidding clauses); see also FAR §§ 14.000, 14.101
    (discussing sealed bidding).
    The solicitation, as amended, specified the various waste removal services required and
    the estimated annual quantity of services, each with a specific contract line item number. E.g.,
    AR 25-1214 (CLIN 0002, estimating 19,200 tons of trash annually), 25-1216 (CLIN 0005,
    estimating collection of sixteen 35-cubic-yard solid waste compactors each month).5 Offerors
    would bid a firm-fixed-price for the unit in each line item, while the Army would pay for actual
    services used based on the firm-fixed-price bid per unit. AR 12-474 (invitation for bid,
    specifying a “[r]equirements contract with Firm-Fixed Price Task Orders”). The award would
    consist of a one-month phase-in period, a 10-month base period, four one-year option periods,
    and a one-month phase-out period. AR 25-1313 to 14. Bids were due by June 14, 2018. AR 25-
    1212.6
    The solicitation provided that the government had no obligation to provide any materials,
    property, equipment, items, or services, AR 25-1351; see also AR 25-1312, but had the right to
    provide any of the materials, property, or equipment that was to be furnished by the contractor,
    AR 25-1352. The solicitation specified that the contractor must “remove all vehicles, trailers and
    equipment from the installation at the end of each workday, unless otherwise directed by the
    [contracting officer].” AR 25-1352.
    4
    The recitations that follow constitute findings of fact by the court from the
    administrative record of the procurement filed pursuant to Rule 52.1(a) of the Rules of the Court
    of Federal Claims (“RCFC”). See Bannum, Inc. v. United States, 
    404 F.3d 1346
    , 1356 (Fed. Cir.
    2005) (specifying that bid protest proceedings “provide for trial on a paper record, allowing fact-
    finding by the trial court”).
    5
    The solicitation was amended 12 times. See AR 25-1214 (conformed solicitation,
    reflecting amendment 12). References to the solicitation refer to the solicitation after the twelfth
    amendment unless otherwise noted.
    6
    Bids were originally due by August 29, 2016, AR 12-446, but the deadline was extended
    by several amendments.
    3
    The solicitation would make the award “to the responsible bidder whose bid represents
    the lowest price for the required services per FAR [§] 52.214-10.” AR 25-1308; see also FAR
    §§ 14.103-2(d), 14.408-1(a), 14.408-2(a), 52.214-10(a). “Responsible” meant compliance with
    FAR § 9.104-1, namely: having adequate financial resources or the ability to obtain them; being
    able to comply with the delivery and performance schedule considering any preexisting
    obligations; having a satisfactory record of performance, integrity, and business ethics; and
    possessing, or able to obtain, the necessary organization, experience, management, and technical
    resources to perform the contract. See AR 25-1308; see also FAR § 9.104-1. Past performance
    would be considered when determining responsibility. AR 16-942; see also FAR § 9.104-3.
    B. Dunning’s Protest of the Solicitation & the Army’s Corrective Action
    The solicitation was amended 12 times in response to extensive questions by bidders and
    protests before the Army and Government Accountability Office (“GAO”). Shortly after the
    Army posted the solicitation in July 2016, Dunning sent the Army a list of 13 issues that would
    inhibit accurate bidding. AR 45-1922. Amendment 0001 extended indefinitely the bid deadline
    to allow the Army to respond to these issues. AR 13-549. Amendment 0002 issued June 29,
    2017, was intended to address the issues Dunning had raised by adjusting the quantities for some
    services, increasing the option years from one to three, and answering 105 industry questions,
    AR 14-551, 844 to 857. One answer provided that the tipping fee for 2016 “was approximately
    $26.50 per ton” and that the contractor was not allowed to profit from tipping fees. AR 14-856.
    Amendment 0002 also established a new bid deadline of August 1, 2017. AR 14-551.
    Dunning responded the next day, June 30, 2017, with a list of 10 additional concerns.
    AR 44-1919 to 20. Subsequently, with the bid deadline approaching, Dunning twice reiterated
    these concerns. AR 45-1921 (July 13 inquiry); AR 46-1989 (July 20 inquiry). In the absence of
    a response, on July 21, 2017, Dunning filed a protest of the solicitation with the Army. AR 51-
    2028 to 31. Amendment 0003 of July 28, 2017, extended the deadline indefinitely to allow for
    the Army to respond to Dunning’s agency protest. AR 15-858.
    The Army responded by issuing Amendment 0004 on December 4, 2017. AR 16-860.
    Amendment 0004 provided the incumbent contractor’s (i.e., Dunning’s) current collective
    bargaining agreement, modified the quantities for many line items, revised the statement of
    work, and answered 62 additional questions. AR 16-860 to 945.7 Two answers informed
    contractors that they could lease an on-site laydown area from the Army in which to store trucks
    and equipment when not in use. AR 16-938 to 39 (questions 19 and 24). The amendment also
    extended the bid deadline to December 12, 2017. AR 16-860.
    Dunning filed a second protest of the solicitation with the Army on December 5, 2017.
    AR 51-2015; see also AR 51-2024 to 25 (supplemental protest). Dunning alleged, among other
    things, that the amended solicitation did not align contract line item descriptions to the technical
    exhibits, did not state an estimated number of extra, unscheduled containers that would be
    necessary, and called for services at locations where no collection would actually be required.
    AR 51-2016 to 18. Amendments 0005 and 0006 extended the bid deadline to December 27,
    Dunning’s collective bargaining agreement, as provided to the Army in August 2016, is
    7
    embedded within AR Tab 45, beginning on AR 45-1946.
    4
    2017, and then to January 9, 2018, to allow time for the Army to respond to Dunning’s second
    agency protest. AR 17-946; AR 18-948.
    The Army decided to take corrective action on December 15, 2017, consisting of
    “reviewing both the locations and quantities” for containers. AR 47-1991. When the Army had
    not amended the solicitation by January 5, 2018, Dunning filed a third protest of the solicitation,
    this time with GAO. AR 52-2035. The Army issued Amendments 0007 and 0008 to further
    extend the bid deadline to January 22, 2018, and then to February 15, 2018. AR 19-950
    (Amendment 0007); AR 20-952 (Amendment 0008). GAO, in light of the Army’s promise to
    take corrective action, dismissed the protest, and the Army subsequently began to implement its
    corrective action, see AR 57-2074 to 75, culminating with the issuance of a revised solicitation
    on May 22, 2018, as Amendment 0009, AR 21-954. The new bid deadline was set for June 14,
    2018. AR 21-954. Amendment 0009 provided new technical exhibits that superseded the old
    exhibits, AR 21-954, specifying, among other things, work capability levels and providing
    minimum distances for placement of waste containers from buildings. AR 21-956 to 62.
    On May 23, 2018, Dunning submitted 17 questions about the revised solicitation. AR
    62-2235 to 38. The Army responded on June 1, 2018, with Amendment 0010, which changed
    the quantity or description for various contract line items and removed the technical exhibit that
    specified work capability levels. AR 22-1103 to 06.8 Dunning sent more follow-up questions on
    June 5, 2018, AR 63-2241, to which the Army responded by Amendment 0011 on June 7 by
    adding five new contract line items and changing descriptions for several others. AR 23-1149 to
    68.
    The Army received two further questions, which it addressed by Amendment 0012 on
    June 8, 2018. AR 24-1210. Amendment 0012, the acceptance of which is at particular issue in
    this case, contained two terms. First, it changed the unit description for contract line item 2005
    from “Job” to “Months,” although all other details including the service and quantity remained
    unchanged. AR 24-1210; compare AR 25-1238, with AR 21-988. Second, in response to a
    question about whether “the [g]overnment [will] add additional funding to the contract to cover
    pickups needed” if “the amounts in the [a]dditional pickup [contract line items] are exceeded,”
    the Army advised: “[t]hese numbers are estimates, please follow the instructions provided in the
    solicitation – the [g]overnment will make adjustments as they become necessary.” AR 24-1210.
    Each amendment contained a requirement that it be acknowledged by each offeror prior
    to the close of bidding or by returning a completed copy of the amendment with the proposal
    submission, by acknowledging receipt on each copy of the offer submitted, or by separate
    communication to the government. See, e.g., AR 24-1210 (block 11). The solicitation also
    specified that all amendments must be acknowledged “per FAR [c]lause 52.214-3.” AR 25-
    1307.
    8
    Specific industry questions corresponding to Dunning’s questions of May 23 are
    contained in AR Tab 62. The Army’s answers do not appear in the record, except that answers
    to questions 3 and 12 appear in follow-up questions by Dunning. See AR 63-2241 to 42.
    5
    C. Proposals Received
    The two bids received were opened on June 14, 2018. AR 3-413; AR 25-1307. A
    representative from Dunning was present at the opening. AR 3-413. Zero Waste’s bid totaled
    $8,940,875, cumulative of the base year and the four option years. AR 38-1791. Zero Waste
    estimated $1,587,825 for the 10 months of the base year. AR 38-1791. Significant cost
    components included: (1) $26.50 per ton for tipping fees, amounting to $508,800 for the
    solicitation’s estimate of 19,200 tons per month; (2) $65,500 per month to provide and collect
    weekly 609 eight-cubic-yard containers, amounting to $655,000; (3) $10,000 per month to
    provide and collect weekly 49 twenty-cubic-yard containers, totaling $100,000; (4) $13,000 per
    month to provide and collect weekly 16 thirty-five-cubic-yard waste compactors, totaling
    $130,000; and (5) $10,000 per month to provide and collect weekly 20 forty-cubic-yard
    containers, totaling $100,000. AR 38-1792 to 98 (contract line items 0002-0006). Remaining
    costs included: $15,000 for phase-in activities; $120 and $140 for each additional 20- and 40-
    cubic-yard container provided and collected, respectively, totaling $52,000 for 200 additional
    requests for each; $185 for each additional 35-cubic-yard compactor provided and collected,
    totaling $14,800 for 80 additional requests; $15 for each additional 8-cubic-yard container
    provided and collected, totaling $1,200 for 80 additional requests; $10,775 to clean and maintain
    the appearance of containers; and $250 for manpower reporting. AR 38-1792 to 98.
    Zero Waste’s tipping fees, manpower reporting costs, and container cleaning costs
    remained constant for all five years. AR 38-1792 to 1842. Monthly fees for providing and
    collecting weekly the 8-, 20-, 35-, and 40- cubic-yard containers each increased by
    approximately 1.5% per year. AR 38-1791 to 1842. The per unit cost for each additional request
    of an 8-, 20-, 35-, or 40- cubic-yard container increased up to 7% annually, though the increase
    represented no more than an annual difference of $2 per request depending on the container size.
    AR 38-1791 to 1842. Container maintenance costs increased by $1,000 per year, from $1,000
    (base year) to $5,000 (option year 4). AR 38-1791 to 1842. Based on the solicitation’s scope of
    work estimates, Zero Waste’s total estimated price increased by approximately 1% per year. AR
    38-1791.9
    Zero Waste’s proposal included signed copies of Amendments 0001 through 0011. AR
    38-1778 to 89. Zero Waste’s proposal also used “Months” instead of “Jobs” for the unit in line
    item 2005, as changed by Amendment 0012. AR 38-1816; see also AR 38-1792 to 1847
    (showing “0012” in the header on each page of the contract line items). Further, Zero Waste’s
    proposal represented that it “agrees with all the terms, conditions, and attachments included in
    the solicitations,” and “takes no exceptions to the terms and conditions contained in the
    solicitation.” AR 38-1777.
    Dunning’s total estimated price was $10,389,759, inclusive of the base year and the four
    option years. AR 33-1511. Significant cost components of the $1,795,595 estimated for the 10
    months of the base year included: (1) $29.50 per ton for tipping fees, amounting to $566,400; (2)
    9
    The approximate annual price increase of 1% adjusts the total cost of the base year to
    align with the quantities of the option years, i.e., applies the base year’s unit costs to the
    quantities of the option years. The base year required two fewer months of service for the
    standard weekly collection services and estimated 20% fewer additional requests for the 20-, 35-,
    and 40- cubic-yard containers.
    6
    $48,872 per month to provide and collect weekly 609 eight-cubic-yard containers, amounting to
    $488,720; (3) $23,893 per month to provide and collect weekly 49 twenty-cubic-yard containers,
    totaling $238,930; (4) $19,549 per month to provide and collect weekly 16 thirty-five-cubic-yard
    waste compactors, totaling $195,490; and (5) $16,291 per month to provide and collect weekly
    20 forty-cubic-yard containers, totaling $162,910. AR 33-1512 to 14 (contract line items 0002-
    0006). Remaining costs included: $1,500 for phase-in activities; $300 for each additional 20-
    and 40- cubic-yard container provided and collected, totaling $120,000 for 200 additional
    requests for each; $200 for each additional 35-cubic-yard compactor provided and collected,
    totaling $16,000 for 80 additional requests; $15 for each additional 8-cubic-yard container
    provided and collected, totaling $1,200 for 80 additional requests; $4,345 to clean and maintain
    containers; and $100 for manpower reporting. AR 33-1512 to 18.
    Dunning’s tipping fees increased approximately 4% each year, from $29.50 (base year) to
    $34.25 (option year 4). E.g., AR 33-1556. Monthly fees for servicing weekly the 8-, 20-, 35-,
    and 40-cubic-yard containers also each increased 1% to 2% each year. AR 33-1512 to 66.
    Manpower reporting costs, container cleaning and maintenance costs, and the price for additional
    8-, 20-, 35-, and 40- cubic-yard containers remained constant. AR 33-1512 to 66. Based on the
    government’s estimates of the scope of services required, Dunning’s total estimated price
    increased by approximately 2% per year. AR 33-1511.10 Dunning’s proposal included signed
    copies of all 12 amendments. AR 33-1570 to 81.
    The Independent Government Cost Estimate (“Government Estimate”) calculated a
    constant annual cost of $2,574,206.64, or $12,871,033.20 cumulative of the base and option
    years. AR 1-24 to 26.11 Zero Waste’s estimated five-year price was 29% below the cumulative
    Government Estimate while Dunning’s estimated five-year price was 17% below.12
    Zero Waste’s Unit        Dunning’s Unit               Independent
    Contract Line Item
    Price                   Price                 Government Cost
    Number & Service
    (base year total)         (base year)                 Estimate*
    0001 – phase-in            $15,000 total          $1,500 total            $0
    10
    Here also, the total cost of the base year has been adjusted to align with the quantities of
    the option years, i.e., applies the base year’s unit costs to the quantities of the option years.
    11
    Neither the actual Government Estimate nor its assumptions are contained within the
    record. Instead, the annual estimate for each contract line item appears in a “Price Abstract,” an
    exhibit filed in a protest by Dunning before the GAO in August 2018. E.g., AR 1-24. The
    figures as set out in the estimate appear to neither account for fewer services requested for the
    base year nor phase-in or out services. The government, however, appears to accept the figures.
    See Def.’s Cross-Mot. at 17.
    12
    Given the constant estimate across all five years, the court assumes that the Government
    Estimate’s base year reflects a full year of service, mirroring the amounts in the solicitation’s
    option years, i.e., two additional months of service and 20% more additional containers.
    Adjusting the Government Estimate to account for the lower service for the base year called for
    by the solicitation, the base year would cost $2,237,204.20 and the cumulative cost would be
    $12,534,030.76.
    7
    0002 – tipping fees        $26.50 per ton        $29.50 per ton         $29.00 per ton
    (for 19,200 tons)          ($508,800 total)      ($566,400 total)       ($556,800 total)
    0003 – provide /
    $65,500 per month $48,872 per month $148,176.22 per month
    collect weekly 609
    ($655,000 total)      ($488,720 total)       ($1,481,762.20 total)
    8 CY containers
    0004 – provide /
    $10,000 per month $23,893 per month $3,600 per month
    collect weekly 49
    ($100,000 total)      ($238,930 total)       ($36,000 total)
    20 CY containers
    0005 – provide /
    $13,000 per month $19,549 per month $4,000 per month
    collect weekly 16
    ($130,000 total)      ($195,490 total)       ($40,000 total)
    35 CY compactors
    0006 – provide /
    $10,000 per month $16,291 per month $5,100 per month
    collect weekly 20
    ($100,000 total)      ($162,910 total)       ($51,000 total)
    40 CY containers
    0007 – provide /
    $120 per container    $300 per container     $60 per container
    collect 200 20 CY
    ($24,000 total)       ($60,000 total)        ($12,000 total)
    containers as ordered
    0008 – provide /
    $140 per container    $300 per container     $85 per container
    collect 200 40 CY
    ($28,000 total)       ($60,000 total)        ($17,000 total)
    containers as ordered
    0009 – provide /
    $185 per compactor $200 per compactor $400 per compactor
    collect 80 35 CY
    ($14,800 total)       ($16,000 total)        ($32,000 total)
    compactors as ordered
    0010 – maintain
    $1,000 per year       $500 per year          $5,000 per year
    container appearance
    0011 – clean 609 8CY $15 each                    $5 each                $4.98 each
    containers                ($9,135 total)        ($3,045 total)         ($3,030 total)
    0012 – clean 16 35CY $40 each                    $50 each               $7 each
    compactors                ($640 total)          ($800 total)           ($112 total)
    0013 – manpower
    $250 per year         $100 per year          $500 per year
    reporting
    0014 - provide / collect
    $15 per container     $15 per container      $25 per container
    80 8CY containers as
    ($1,200 total)        ($1,200 total)         ($2,000 total)
    ordered
    Total Base Year
    $1,587,835.00         $1,795,595.00          $2,237,204.20*
    Estimated Price
    *The court assumes the Government Estimate reflects a full year of service. The base year has
    accordingly been adjusted downward to reflect the reduced service requested by the
    solicitation for the base year period of ten months. See 
    also supra, at 6-7
    nn. 9 & 12.
    D. The Army’s Award & Responsibility Decision
    The Army notified Zero Waste that it was “the apparent low bidder” on June 15, 2018,
    the day after bids were opened, and it requested information to verify Zero Waste’s
    responsibility for award. AR 65-2249 to 51. Zero Waste responded the same day with financial
    information and three references involving government waste disposal contracts. AR 66-2252 to
    58.
    8
    Also on June 15, 2018, Dunning requested a summary of Zero Waste’s prices per
    contract line item. AR 67-2259. The Army provided a price abstract on June 18, 2018. AR 67-
    2259, 2262.13 Later that day, Dunning provided to the Army “a short list of issues that are
    grounds to file a protest,” including Zero Waste’s failure to accept all amendments, “[a] massive
    bid miss [that means] there is no way [Zero Waste] could perform the work,” and lack of
    equipment and experience necessary to perform the contract. AR 68-2267 to 68.
    On June 19, 2018, the Army notified both Zero Waste and Dunning, using virtually
    identical terms, that it suspected a mistake in each bid and asked both bidders to “verify by
    [contract line item number] the differences in some of [their] pricing in comparison to the other
    bids or the [Government Estimate].” AR 39-1904; AR 41-1914.14
    Zero Waste responded on June 20, 2018, having “carefully reviewed its prices and
    confirm[ing] [its] price is fair and reasonable.” AR 42-1915. Zero Waste explained that a
    “major reason[]” for its lower price was that it “utilized [***]” to “finance the equipment costs at
    a very good rate and [***].” AR 42-1915. Zero Waste also explained it possessed some
    required trucks. AR 42-1915. Zero Waste briefly defended each line item, e.g., by stating that
    its quote for tipping fees “was obtained from a local landfill” and that maintenance costs would
    be low since it would purchase “all new equipment for this contract.” AR 42-1916. Zero Waste
    also noted that all containers “will already be onsite,” to include the possible additional requests
    for 8-cubic-yard containers as separate from those slated for weekly collection. AR 42-1916 to
    17. Zero Waste did not specify whether it planned to store extra containers on-site, either for
    free or by leasing space on-site as indicated by the Army in Amendment 0004.
    Dunning also confirmed its bid as accurate on June 21, 2018, and explained that it could
    bid below the Government Estimate for two reasons: (1) it had first-hand knowledge of what the
    contract entails given its performance of the contract for nearly 25 years, and (2) the Government
    Estimate assumed the need to purchase new equipment and make new logistical arrangements
    whereas Dunning had the necessary infrastructure in place. AR 40-1905 to 06.15 Dunning noted
    that it “has the best [tipping fee] rate in town” and had “confirmed that anyone else searching for
    a rate [for a landfill that could accommodate the contract] would be in the $36.00 per ton range
    plus annual increases of approximately 4%.” AR 40-1906. Dunning’s response also included a
    critique of Zero Waste’s pricing and the Government Estimate. AR 40-1907, 1909, 1912.
    Dunning specifically challenged Zero Waste’s phase-in cost, tipping fee, and lack of equipment,
    13
    The price abstract compared Dunning’s and Zero Waste’s prices for each contract line
    item, but did not include a comparison to the Government Estimate. AR 67-2262; see 
    also supra, at 7
    & n.11.
    14
    The Army’s e-mail notification also states that an “abstract of the solicitation” is
    attached, but the attachment does not appear in the record. AR 39-1904; AR 41-1914. It is not
    apparent whether this abstract contained the Government Estimate, or, if, like the abstract
    provided to Dunning the previous day, only disclosed each bid. 
    See supra, at 7
    n.11.
    15
    Dunning claims elsewhere to have been the incumbent for 30 of the last 31 years. E.g.,
    AR 1-27. Either way, Dunning has extensive experience with waste disposal at Fort Benning.
    9
    asserting Zero Waste’s bid would result in a loss of $1.5 million over the life of the contract and
    would lead to default. AR 40-1912. 16
    On July 18, 2018, the Army requested additional information from Zero Waste regarding
    its finances, noting that the account it provided had a $[***] balance and inquiring how Zero
    Waste could meet financial obligations. AR 71-2289. Zero Waste responded later that day,
    explaining that the account was an [***] and that it maintained separate accounts for operating
    expenses, payroll, and an additional [***]. AR 71-2289. Zero Waste then provided contact
    information for two operating accounts of undisclosed balances with Citibank and Bank of
    America, a line of credit with Merrill Lynch with $[***] available as of June 2018, a $[***] line
    of credit with Citibank dated April 2017, and a $[***] equipment line of credit with Bank of
    America dated July 2018. AR 72-2291 to 93.
    On August 2, 2018, the Army found Zero Waste to be responsible in accord with the
    criteria of FAR § 9.104. AR 73-2294 to 96. The determination stated that the Army had
    confirmed financial resources with the financial institutions provided by Zero Waste. AR 73-
    2294; see also AR 73-2295 (contacting Bank of America); AR 71-2289 (contacting Merrill
    Lynch). The Army also found that Zero Waste had or could obtain the skills and equipment
    necessary to perform the contract. AR 73-2295 (contacting Bank of America). Additionally, the
    Army obtained favorable past performance results from government representatives regarding
    two waste disposal contracts and found a satisfactory record of performance and integrity after
    consulting applicable government procurement databases. AR 73-2294; see also AR 73-2302 to
    17 (showing five Contractor Performance Assessment Reports (“CPARs”) relating to three
    government waste disposal contracts totaling between $4.8 and $6.0 million, all of which were
    favorably evaluated).
    The Army awarded the contract to Zero Waste on August 10, 2018. AR 27-1372. The
    Army formally notified Dunning by e-mail the same day that Zero Waste was awarded the
    contract. AR 74-2323 to 25.
    E. Dunning’s Post-Award Protest
    Dunning filed a post-award protest with GAO on August 17, 2018, AR 1-1 to 23, and the
    Army issued a stop-work order on August 20, 2018, AR 76-2330. Dunning’s GAO protest
    alleged three procurement errors. AR 1-2 to 3, 10. First, Dunning contended that Zero Waste
    failed to accept Amendment 0012, rendering Zero Waste’s bid non-responsive. AR 1-11 to 12.
    Second, Dunning argued that Zero Waste’s bid was unrealistically low and omitted some of the
    required work. AR 1-12 to 20. Specifically, Dunning alleged that Zero Waste “fail[ed] to
    consider the cost of obtaining the required [equipment],” AR 1-13 to 14, failed to account for the
    costs of a laydown yard, extra containers, phase-in activities, and requirements imposed by the
    collective bargaining agreement, AR 1-17 to 19, and relied on tipping fees well below what was
    16
    Dunning also initiated a post-bid, pre-award protest with the Small Business
    Administration on June 21, 2018, challenging Zero Waste’s status as a small business. AR 69-
    2278. The solicitation specified a 100% set-aside for small businesses. AR 25-1212. The Small
    Business Administration found that Zero Waste met the small-business criteria for its industry at
    the time of bid submission. See AR 70-2281 to 88 (Small Business Administration size
    determination).
    10
    presently available, which would result in a loss of $700,000 over the life of the contract. AR 1-
    14 to 15.17 Third, Dunning contended that Zero Waste was not a responsible bidder because it
    lacked the necessary equipment and had always relied on an experienced subcontractor to handle
    its other waste disposal contracts. AR 1-20 to 21. Dunning filed a supplemental protest on
    August 24, 2018, AR 2-33, alleging that Zero Waste has engaged in a “serial pattern of
    underbidding . . . work, which it has no capability to perform.” AR 2-36. Support for Dunning’s
    contentions consisted primarily of two affidavits from Dunning’s Chief Operating Officer. See
    generally AR 1-12 to 21 (citing to the first affidavit, appearing at AR 1-27 to 31).
    On September 17, 2018, GAO dismissed Dunning’s second and third allegations, i.e., the
    price realism claim and the responsibility claim. AR 7-430. As GAO later explained, Dunning’s
    “argument about the realism of the awardee’s price overlooks the inapplicability of price realism
    concepts to a sealed bid procurement,” and it is not illegal for an offeror to bid, or the
    government to accept, a low or below-cost bid. Mark Dunning Indus., Inc., B-415890.2, 2018
    CPD ¶ 382, 
    2018 WL 5881660
    , at *3 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 5, 2018). While a low bid may
    implicate a bidder’s responsibility, the Army found Zero Waste responsible and GAO “will
    generally not review affirmative determinations of responsibility” unless the contracting officer
    “unreasonably failed to consider available relevant information.” AR 30-1497 to 98 (citations
    omitted).
    On November 5, 2018, GAO dismissed the claim regarding Amendment 0012, finding
    that Zero Waste “constructively acknowledged” Amendment 0012 when it changed line item
    2005 in its bid to reflect the Amendment. AR 30-1496. GAO also rejected the materiality of the
    question and answer of Amendment 0012, finding formal acknowledgment unnecessary because
    it represented guidance to bidders “to follow the terms of the solicitation.” Mark Dunning Indus.,
    
    2018 WL 5881660
    , at *2.18
    Dunning filed its complaint in this court on November 21, 2018. Compl. at 1.
    JURISDICTION & STANDING
    This court has jurisdiction over bid protests pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §
    1491. The Tucker Act vests this court with jurisdiction to “to render judgment on an action by an
    interested party objecting to a . . . proposed contract or to a proposed award or the award of a
    contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in connection with a procurement or a
    proposed procurement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1).
    A threshold issue is whether Dunning has standing to challenge the award decision, a
    burden it bears as plaintiff. See Myers Investigative & Sec. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 
    275 F.3d 17
             Dunning also alleged that Zero Waste acquired its $26.50 tipping fee figure from an
    improper disclosure of Dunning’s actual fee from 2015. AR 1-14 to 15. There was no
    impropriety, however. The Army had disclosed in Amendment 0002 that the per ton tipping fee
    for 2016 was $26.50. AR 14-856.
    18
    GAO dismissed Dunning’s supplemental protest because it merely furnished additional
    information to support the original protest. See Mark Dunning Indus., 
    2018 WL 5881660
    , at *3
    n.4.
    11
    1366, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 561
    (1992)). To demonstrate standing under 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1), Dunning must be an “interested
    party” who suffered prejudice from a significant procurement error. CliniComp Int’l, Inc. v.
    United States, 
    904 F.3d 1353
    , 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2018). An interested party is an actual bidder who
    had a substantial chance at award of the contract. Id.; see also Hyperion, Inc. v. United States,
    
    115 Fed. Cl. 541
    , 550 (2014) (quoting Orion Tech., Inc. v. United States, 
    704 F.3d 1344
    , 1348
    (Fed. Cir. 2013)). An interested party suffers prejudice from a significant procurement error
    when “but for the error, it would have had a substantial chance of securing the contract.”
    
    CliniComp, 904 F.3d at 1358
    (emphasis in original).
    Dunning’s allegations and the administrative record indicate that Dunning is an interested
    party who has sufficiently alleged prejudice. Dunning was one of two actual bidders. It
    challenges the responsiveness of Zero Waste’s bid and Zero Waste’s responsibility. These
    challenges, if accepted, would leave Dunning as the only responsible and responsive bidder.
    Therefore, Dunning has standing and the court has jurisdiction.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    A. Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record
    The standards of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706, govern the
    court’s review of a protest of the government’s decisions regarding award of a contract. See 28
    U.S.C. § 1491(b)(4) (“In any action under this subsection, the courts shall review the agency’s
    decision pursuant to the standards set forth in section 706 of title 5.”). Under the APA, the court
    may set aside a government procurement decision that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
    discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), subject to the
    traditional balancing test applicable to a grant of equitable relief. See PGBA, LLC v. United
    States, 
    389 F.3d 1219
    , 1224-28 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 
    Hyperion, 115 Fed. Cl. at 550
    .
    The court may not “substitute its judgment for that of the agency,” Hyperion, 115 Fed.
    Cl. at 550 (quoting Keeton Corrs., Inc. v. United States, 
    59 Fed. Cl. 753
    , 755 (2004) (in turn
    quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 
    401 U.S. 402
    , 416 (1971), abrogated
    on other grounds as recognized in Califano v. Sanders, 
    430 U.S. 99
    , 105 (1977))), but “must
    uphold an agency’s decision against a challenge if the ‘contracting agency provided a coherent
    and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion,’” 
    Id. (citing Axiom
    Res. Mgmt., Inc. v.
    United States, 
    564 F.3d 1374
    , 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). The court may overturn the government’s
    procurement decision only “if ‘(1) the procurement official’s decision lacked a rational basis; or
    (2) the procurement procedure involved a violation of regulation or procedure.’” Centech Grp.,
    Inc. v. United States, 
    554 F.3d 1029
    , 1037 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Impresa Construzioni
    Geom. Domenico Garufi v. United States, 
    238 F.3d 1324
    , 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). In conducting
    the rational basis analysis, the court looks to whether the “the contracting agency provided a
    coherent and reasonable explanation of its exercise of discretion,” 
    Axiom, 564 F.3d at 1381
    (quoting Impresa 
    Construzioni, 238 F.3d at 1333
    ), and affords “contracting officers . . .
    discretion upon a broad range of issues,” AgustaWestland N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 
    880 F.3d 1326
    , 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (quoting Impresa 
    Construzioni, 238 F.3d at 1332-33
    ). Accordingly,
    “the disappointed bidder bears a heavy burden of showing that the award decision had no
    rational basis.” 
    Centech, 554 F.3d at 1037
    (quoting Impresa 
    Construzioni, 238 F.3d at 1332-33
    ).
    12
    Protests alleging a violation of regulation or procedure “must show a clear and prejudicial
    violation.” 
    Axiom, 564 F.3d at 1381
    (quoting Impresa 
    Construzioni, 238 F.3d at 1333
    ).
    ANALYSIS
    A. The Compliance of Zero Waste’s Bid
    Dunning contends that Zero Waste submitted a defective bid, and thus was ineligible for
    consideration, because Zero Waste did not accept Amendment 0012. Pl.’s Mot. at 11-13.
    Dunning contends that even if Zero Waste constructively accepted the change in units for
    contract line item 2005, Amendment 0012 also contained material information regarding future
    price adjustments, which required Zero Waste’s formal acceptance. 
    Id. at 12-13.
    The government counters that Zero Waste constructively acknowledged the entirety of
    Amendment 0012 by incorporating the change to contract line item 2005 in its bid. Def.’s Cross-
    Mot. at 11-14. Additionally, the government contends that under the sealed bidding procedures
    of FAR Part 14, if there is evidence that a bidder received the amendment, the bidder is bound to
    perform even absent express acknowledgment of the amendment, and the government may
    waive formal acceptance. 
    Id. at 13-14.
    The government also dismisses the materiality of the
    question answered by Amendment 0012, as it “merely advised offerors to follow the terms of the
    solicitation.” 
    Id. at 15
    (quoting AR 30-1496 to 97, GAO’s dismissal decision of Nov. 5, 2018).
    “Any bid that fails to conform to the essential requirements of the invitation for bids shall
    be rejected.” FAR § 14.404-2(a) (emphasis added). The solicitation required bidders to
    “acknowledge receipt of any amendment” by five enumerated methods: “signing and returning
    the amendment,” “identifying the amendment number and date in space provided for this
    purpose on the form for submitting a bid,” “letter,” or, if authorized by the solicitation, by
    facsimile or e-mail. FAR § 52.214-3; see also AR 25-1278 (incorporating by reference FAR §
    52.214-3). Each amendment contained similar language. See, e.g., AR 24-1210 (block 11).
    Procurement regulations for sealed bidding allow the offeror to cure or the government to
    waive “[a] minor informality or irregularity” if “to the advantage of the [g]overnment.” FAR §
    14.405; accord FAR § 52.214-10(b) (incorporated by reference at AR 25-1308). “A minor
    informality or irregularity is one that is merely a matter of form and not of substance” or that has
    negligible “effect on price, quantity, quality, or delivery.” FAR § 14.405. Thus, in sealed
    bidding, failure to acknowledge receipt of an amendment is “a minor informality or irregularity”
    when the “bid received clearly indicates that the bidder received the amendment, such as where
    the amendment added another item . . . and the bidder submitted a bid on the item.” FAR §
    14.405(d)(1). Amendment 0012 changed the units in line item 2005, a change that Zero Waste
    incorporated into its bid submission. That Zero Waste incorporated this change shows it
    received the Amendment, including the brief question and answer immediately below the change
    to contract line item 2005.
    Additionally, in sealed bidding, failure to acknowledge receipt of an amendment is also
    “a minor informality or irregularity” when the “amendment involves only a matter of form or has
    either no effect or merely a negligible effect on price, quantity, quality, or delivery.” FAR §
    14.405(d)(2).
    13
    The court finds that Zero Waste constructively accepted the change to contract line item
    2005. Regardless of whether the change of units for line item 2005 from “Job” to “Month” was
    a material change or as confusing as Dunning alleges given the context of the description, e.g.,
    Pl.’s Reply at 5-6, Zero Waste’s bid used the correct unit, see AR 38-1816 (contract line item
    2005 reflecting 12 months). As it is evident that Zero Waste bid on the correct quantity of the
    correct units for the correct description, the Army did not commit error by finding the bid
    compliant.
    Apparently anticipating this outcome, Dunning instead focuses its argument on the
    question answered in Amendment 0012 regarding the “[a]dditional pickup [contract line items],”
    i.e., line items 0007, 0008, 0009, and 0014, and the corresponding requests in the option years.
    Pl.’s Mot. at 11-13; see also AR 24-1210 (Amendment 0012); AR 25-1217 to 18, 1220 (line
    items in the final amended solicitation for the extra pick-ups). These line items request an
    estimated annual number of extra, unscheduled containers of each size. E.g., AR 25-1217 to 18,
    1220 (base year).
    Dunning’s attempt to parse the Army’s answer to find some aspect of materiality is
    unavailing. Quantities for additional pick-ups were already identified by the solicitation as
    “estimates” and the descriptions explain that the contractor must provide and collect “as
    ordered.” E.g., AR 25-1227 (showing line item 1006, additional pick-ups for 20-cubic-yard
    containers). The project work statement included provisions for special tasks, special events, and
    other work, AR 25-1332 to 34 (subsections 3.4.6 - 3.4.8), and where work was “within the scope
    of the contract, but [] not expressly specified,” the Army would negotiate with the contractor for
    a firm-fixed-price, AR 25-1334 (paragraphs 3.4.8.1 and 3.4.8.3). The solicitation identified itself
    as a “Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity [] contract with Firm-Fixed Price [] task orders.”
    AR 25-1298 (incorporating FAR § 52.216-1). Accordingly, provisions allowing for the Army to
    make adjustments already existed in the solicitation, and, as the Army noted in Amendment
    0012, bidders should “please follow the instructions.” AR 24-1210. The government was free to
    waive formal acceptance if in its interest, e.g., AR 25-1308 (incorporating by reference FAR §
    52.214-10(b)), which in this instance would allow it to award to the lowest bidder, Zero Waste.
    B. Zero Waste’s Low Price
    Dunning next argues that Zero Waste’s bid is “unrealistically low,” Pl.’s Mot. at 14, in
    part a result of having “failed to bid key requirements of the [w]ork,” 
    id. at 20.
    Dunning
    supports its claim of a “drastic underbid” by arguing that Zero Waste failed to include the cost to
    obtain the necessary equipment and underestimated tipping fees by $700,000 over the life of the
    contract, “putting it at “near-certain risk of default.” 
    Id. at 14-18;
    see also Pl.’s Suppl. Reply at
    14-16. Dunning also argues that Zero Waste’s underbidding “is part of an intentional pattern of
    extreme underbidding aimed at obtaining contracts under false pretenses,” and briefly lists Zero
    Waste’s bids on five other government waste disposal contracts as evidence. Pl.’s Mot. at 19-20.
    Dunning further specifies three examples of work excluded from Zero Waste’s bid: (1) not
    accounting for the cost of a laydown yard, (2) failing to include the cost to purchase 65 extra
    containers for unscheduled events and the cost to service these containers 50 to 80 times per
    month, and (3) not bidding all phase-in activities. E.g., 
    id. at 21-23.
    Dunning further alleges that
    Zero Waste will violate the collective bargaining agreement by using its contract manager as a
    driver. 
    Id. at 23-24.
    Dunning presented its concerns to the Army pre-award, but after bid
    14
    opening, and it argues that despite the Army suspecting a mistake in the bid, the Army “failed to
    perform anything close to reasonable due diligence.” Pl.’s Suppl. Reply at 16.
    The government counters that the Army had no obligation under the solicitation to
    conduct a price realism analysis and that in a fixed-price procurement, there is nothing inherently
    problematic with an offeror bidding below cost. Def.’s Cross-Mot. at 17-18. The government
    also rejects Dunning’s proffered factual contentions as after-the-fact “conjecture,” noting the
    frequency with which Dunning relies on the affidavits of its Chief Operating Officer for support.
    
    Id. at 19-20
    & nn. 7, 8. The government relies on the fact that the solicitation did not include
    contract line items “for a laydown yard, unscheduled pickups, or phase-in activities,” and bidders
    consequently were not required to price those items. 
    Id. at 19
    n.7.
    Sealed bidding procedures required the Army to “evaluate the bids . . . without
    discussion” and to “award a contract to the to the responsible bidder whose [conforming] bid will
    be most advantageous to the [g]overnment considering only price and the price-related factors
    specified in the solicitation.” FAR § 52.214-10(a); see also AR 25-1278 (incorporating by
    reference FAR § 52.214-10); FAR §§ 14.103-2(d), 14.408-1(a). Per the solicitation, price was
    the only evaluative criterion; the Army would award the contract to “the responsible bidder
    whose bid represent[ed] the lowest price for the required services per FAR [§] 52.214-10.” AR
    25-1308. Here, Zero Waste offered the lowest bid. E.g., AR 65-2249.
    Contrary to the government’s assertion, however, the Army may not just accept the
    lowest priced offer. Rather, the Army must award the contract to the “responsible bidder whose
    bid, conforming to the solicitation, [is] most advantageous to the [g]overnment,” and “may . . .
    accept other than the lowest bid.” FAR §§ 52.214-10(a), (b). Relatedly, when considering price,
    the contracting officer “shall determine . . . that the prices offered are reasonable . . . in light of
    all prevailing circumstances” and “shall consider whether bids are materially unbalanced.” FAR
    §§ 14.408-2(a), (b); see also FAR § 52.214-10(e). The contracting officer may reject any bid
    that is (1) “unreasonable as to price” or (2) where “prices for any line items or subline items are
    materially unbalanced [per FAR § 15.404-1(g)].” FAR § 14.404-2(f), (g); see also FAR §
    52.214-10(e). The contracting officer “[may use the] price analysis techniques in [FAR §]
    15.404-1(b) [] as guidelines,” FAR § 14.408-2(a), to include comparisons with “proposed prices
    received in response to the solicitation,” “historical prices paid” for similar services,
    “independent [g]overnment cost estimates,” or “prices obtained through market research for the
    same or similar items.” FAR § 15.404-1(b)(2).
    1. Reasonableness of Zero Waste’s low bid.
    Dunning, as the incumbent for more than 25 years, put forward a bid that constitutes a
    reasonable comparison point. See FAR § 15.404-1(b)(2) (stating that acceptable price analysis
    techniques include comparison with “proposed prices received in response to the solicitation” or
    with “historical prices paid” for similar services). Zero Waste’s aggregate bid was
    approximately 14% below Dunning’s, with four of the five contract line items constituting the
    bulk of the bid below Dunning’s, and those four partially offset by the one item above.19
    19
    Overall, line items for the tipping fees and the weekly regular service for the 8-, 20-, 35-
    and 40- cubic-yard containers represented 94% of Zero Waste’s total bid and 92% of Dunning’s.
    15
    Further, Zero Waste’s bid is 29% below the Government Estimate. See FAR § 15.404-1(b)(2)
    (permitting comparison with an independent government estimate).20 Accordingly, Zero Waste’s
    price does not appear unreasonably high or low.
    For a fixed-price contract, entering a bid with a low profit margin, or even bidding below
    cost, has no bearing upon price reasonableness. See UnitedHealth Military & Veterans Servs.,
    LLC v. United States, 
    132 Fed. Cl. 529
    , 554 (2017) (“[A] price reasonableness analysis [as
    opposed to a price realism analysis] considers whether an offerors’ price is too high.”); Munilla
    Constr. Mgmt., LLC v. United States, 
    130 Fed. Cl. 635
    , 649 (2017) (same); EMTA Isaat, A.S. v.
    United States, 
    123 Fed. Cl. 330
    , 338 n.9 (2015) (same); Patriot Taxiway Indus., Inc. v. United
    States, 
    98 Fed. Cl. 575
    , 587 (2011) (same); DMS All-Star Joint Venture v. United States, 90 Fed.
    Cl. 653, 657 n.5, 663 n.11 (2010) (same); see also KWR Constr., Inc. v. United States, 124 Fed.
    Cl. 345, 358 n. 15 (2015) (“[B]elow-cost offers, also known as ‘buy-in’ offers, are not
    prohibited.”) (citation omitted); CRAssociates, Inc. v. United States; 
    95 Fed. Cl. 357
    , 380-81 &
    n. 24 (2010) (finding below-cost pricing permissible); CC Distrib., Inc. v. United States, 69 Fed.
    Cl. 277, 284 (2006) (finding that in a fixed-price contract, below-cost pricing is permissible and
    by itself does not justify finding a contractor not responsible); Triple H. Servs., B-298248, 2006
    CPD ¶ 115, 
    2006 WL 2136705
    , at *2 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 1, 2006).
    Contrastingly, a price realism or cost realism analysis would allow an agency to “verif[y]
    that the offeror’s price is not overly optimistic and impractically low.” DMS All-Star, 90 Fed.
    Cl. at 663 (citing Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., B-310372.3, 2008 CPD ¶ 126, 
    2008 WL 2684841
    , at *5
    (Comp. Gen. June 13, 2008)). But such an analysis is normally not required in fixed-price
    contracts, and if the agency intends to conduct one, it must be expressly stated in the solicitation.
    
    Id. at 663-664;
    see also 
    UnitedHealth, 132 Fed. Cl. at 561
    (“In accordance with the well-
    established principle that an agency must evaluate proposals in accordance with the solicitation
    terms, it is improper for an agency to conduct a price realism analysis in a fixed-price
    procurement when the solicitation does not expressly or implicitly require a price realism
    analysis because such an analysis would employ unstated evaluation criteria.”); see also, e.g.,
    FAR § 14.103-2 (“An award is made . . . considering only the price and price-related factors
    included in the [solicitation], as provided in [the sealed bidding award procedures of FAR]
    subpart 14.4.”). The solicitation in this case lacked an express or implied requirement to conduct
    a realism analysis.
    A low price may, however, be evidence of a mistaken or defective bid. To be eligible for
    award, a bid must “conform to the essential requirements of the invitation for bids” and may
    neither “modify requirements . . . or limit the bidder’s liability to the [g]overnment.” FAR §
    14.404-2(a) to (d). For example, in Hyperion, the highest priced offeror suggested that the lower
    prices of the other three proposals indicated that none would comply with the limitations on
    subcontracting. 
    Hyperion, 115 Fed. Cl. at 550
    -52. The court concurred, despite the
    government’s assertion that “by submitting proposals, all offerors agreed to comply.” 
    Id. at 551-
    52. The court found labor costs to be “suspiciously low,” which upon examination, revealed “an
    20
    While the Army ostensibly prepared an Independent Government Cost Estimate and
    FAR § 15.404-1(b)(2) permits its use as a point of comparison, details of the estimate are absent
    from the record. 
    See supra, at 7
    n.11 and accompanying text. For purposes of price
    reasonableness, the court compares only the aggregate estimated price.
    16
    apparent mis-characterization of labor as a [cost for] material” that if corrected would make
    proposals non-compliant with subcontracting requirements of the solicitation. 
    Id. at 552-53.
    Dunning’s low-price allegation contrasts with that in Hyperion. Zero Waste’s prices do
    not indicate that it will violate a technical requirement. Zero Waste bid all line items, see AR 38-
    1791 to 1842, the technical requirements are to perform specified waste disposals services,
    which Zero Waste’s proposal confirmed that it will perform, and the individual services required
    are straightforward. For example, line item 0002 requests the price per ton to dispose of waste.
    AR 38-1792. Line item 0003 requests bidders to price by month the cost to “[p]rovide and
    [c]ollect (609) eight[-]cubic[-]yard [] bulk waste containers, service & transport to disposal
    facility [and] [e]mpty containers at least once a week [if 85% full].” AR 38-1793. Line item
    0011 requests the price to keep clean each of the 609 8-cubic-yard containers. AR 38-1797. The
    performance work statement provides similar details. See, e.g., AR 25-1313 (requiring weekly
    service and when containers are 85% full), 1324 to 25 (specifying manpower reporting
    requirements), 1329 to 30 (specifying inventory, maintenance, and cleaning requirements). To
    sum, in Hyperion, low price indicated a likely inability to comply with a technical requirement.
    In this instance, by contrast, low price indicates low price. To the extent Zero Waste’s prices are
    low, the low prices implicate its financial ability to perform, not the technically acceptability of
    the proposal.
    Dunning’s specific allegations that work was excluded from Zero Waste’s bid lacks
    support. Although Dunning asserts that Zero Waste’s bid did not account for a laydown yard,
    Pl.’s Mot. at 21, no such line item existed for Zero Waste to bid. Presumably, a bidder would
    apportion the cost of a yard among other line items. But Zero Waste had neither an obligation
    nor opportunity to break out such costs. See AR 25-1214 to 64 (not including a laydown yard
    among the list of line items upon which Zero Waste had to bid). Also, Zero Waste did bid on
    phase-in activities. AR 38-1792 (bidding $500 per day for 30 days). Perhaps it did bid below
    cost, as Dunning alleged. See Pl.’s Mot at 22-23 (alleging Zero Waste underbid phase-in
    activities by $85,000). Yet, so long as Zero Waste intended to complete the required phase-in
    work, Zero Waste’s bid did not exclude this key scope of work regardless of whether it will
    perform the work below cost. Then too, Dunning’s only support for its allegations that Zero
    Waste’s bid did not conform to the collective bargaining agreement appears in a post-award
    affidavit of Dunning’s Chief Operating Officer, and that affidavit provides no specific details
    upon which to assess the accuracy of his asseverations. AR 1-30 (¶ 20).
    Additionally, there is no contractual requirement to “purchase . . . the 60 or so
    unscheduled roll-off [i.e., the 20- and 40- cubic-yard] containers needed for unscheduled pickups
    [or the] 5 thirty-five cubic yard compactors” as alleged by Dunning. Pl.’s Mot. at 22; see also
    AR 1-27, 29-30 (affidavit ¶¶ 5, 18, 19). Dunning may have projected or surmised such a
    requirement based on its extensive first-hand knowledge of actual requirements from decades of
    incumbency. E.g., 1-27 (affidavit ¶¶ 3, 4, 7, 8). But Zero Waste must bid on the solicitation, not
    on Dunning’s knowledge. What the solicitation requires is the ability to provide additional 8-,
    20-, 35-, and 40- cubic-yard containers as ordered, up to 80, 250, 100, and 250 additional orders
    of each per year, respectively, AR 25-1227 to 28, 31 (using full-year estimates of the option
    years), and to provide containers as needed for special tasks, unscheduled clean-ups, or other
    similar but unspecified waste disposal services, AR 25-1332 to 34. There is neither a fixed
    number of extra containers to have on hand nor a requirement that they be purchased. Zero
    17
    Waste could, for example, rent them as needed. And, Zero Waste indicated when confirming its
    bid that it had factored into price the purchase of extra containers. AR 42-1916 to 17 (“Zero
    Waste factored additional purchase of 10% of [20-cubic-yard] containers . . . [,] 30% of [40-
    cubic-yard containers . . . [, and] 40% of [35-cubic-yard] containers.”). Finally, if Zero Waste
    assumed it could store equipment on-site for free and if this is in error, such a mistake is Zero
    Waste’s to bear.21 So too are other alleged unilateral mistakes, especially after Zero Waste
    confirmed the accuracy of its bid.
    In any event, the Army informed Zero Waste that it suspected errors in the low bid,
    ostensibly after receiving a challenging e-mail from Dunning, and requested Zero Waste to
    confirm the price of each line item. AR 41-1914. Zero Waste confirmed its bid for each line
    item and provided a brief justification for each. AR 42-1915 to 17. Zero Waste explained that it
    had obtained favorable financing terms, already had some trucks, and “obtained [its tipping fee]
    from a local landfill.” AR 42-1915. With Zero Waste’s bid 14% lower than that of the
    incumbent, Dunning, the Army did not act unreasonably by accepting Zero Waste’s confirmation
    and explanation. See, e.g., Patriot 
    Taxiway, 98 Fed. Cl. at 587
    (“To the extent [plaintiff] alleges
    that [the successful bidder’s] price was unreasonably low,” “[plaintiff] has not established that
    the [award] to the low-priced, technically acceptable contractor was arbitrary or capricious”
    when “the [agency] entered into discussions to ensure that offerors’ prices were accurate [and]
    confirm[ed] prices [before awarding to the lowest bidder].”).
    To the extent that Zero Waste intended to bid low and the end result is that Zero Waste
    performs at or below costs, it would bear only upon Zero Waste’s responsibility, but not upon the
    reasonableness of its price. See, e.g., 
    CRAssociates, 95 Fed. Cl. at 380-81
    & n. 24 (evaluating
    below-cost price for impact on a responsibility determination); CC 
    Distrib., 69 Fed. Cl. at 283-84
    (same).
    2. Balance among contract line items.
    “Unbalanced pricing exists when, despite an acceptable total price, the price of one or
    more line items is significantly over or understated as indicated by the application of . . . price
    analysis techniques.” FAR § 15.404-1(g)(1). The contracting officer must analyze “[a]ll offers
    with separately priced line items . . . to determine if the prices are unbalanced,” must consider
    whether award “will result in paying unreasonably high prices for contract performance,” and
    may reject an offer whose “lack of balance poses an unacceptable risk to the [g]overnment.”
    FAR § 15.404-1(g)(2); see also FAR §§ 14.404-2(g), 14.408-2(b).
    Dunning’s bid presents a reasonable comparison point. See FAR § 15.404-1(b)(2).22
    Zero Waste underbid Dunning in all but one of the high-value line items, namely tipping fees
    21
    The solicitation does not indicate that the Army would fail to provide a free laydown
    yard. While the solicitation does require the contractor to furnish anything required to execute
    the contract and to remove all equipment each day, AR 25-1352, the Army could furnish any
    material, equipment, or supplies, AR 25-1352, and it also indicated a willingness to lease an on-
    site laydown yard, AR 16-938 to 39.
    22
    The Government Estimate may not be as appropriate for comparison. 
    See supra, at 7
    n.11 and 16 n.20 and accompanying text. For many line items, the Government Estimate
    18
    and weekly service of the 8-, 20-, 35-, and 40- cubic-yard containers. See, e.g., AR 67-2262 (bid
    price abstract).23 These line items, while presented as estimates, are stable. The quantity of
    containers to service weekly is fixed. See AR 25-1215 to 16 (609 8-cubic-yard containers, 49
    20-cubic-yard containers, 16 35-cubic-yard compactors, and 20 40-cubic-yard containers). The
    unit price is based on the number of months, AR 25-1215 to 16, a constant 12. Bidders cannot
    profit from tipping fees. See AR 14-856. These line items are therefore not susceptible to
    manipulation or error in estimation that would cause the lowest bid to generate “unreasonably
    high prices for contract performance.” Thus, Zero Waste’s bid appears balanced, and the Army
    did not act unreasonably by accepting it.
    C. The Army’s Responsibility Determination
    Dunning alleges that the Army erred in its determination of Zero Waste’s responsibility
    because Zero Waste “has never performed the core functions of a solid waste collections
    contract,” but has instead relied on “another experienced subcontractor.” Pl.’s Mot. at 25, 26.
    Further, Dunning alleges that Zero Waste lacks any of the necessary equipment, and to the extent
    Zero Waste could procure the equipment, it is evidence of Zero Waste’s unrealistically low bid.
    
    Id. at 25,
    27. Further, Dunning argues that it advised the Army pre-award that Zero Waste
    “‘would have to purchase $2,600,000.00 in new equipment’ to perform,” but Zero Waste only
    had a $[***] equipment financing line of credit while actively pursuing other waste management
    contracts. Pl.’s Suppl. Reply at 18 (quoting AR 40-1912) (Dunning’s letter confirming the
    accuracy of its bid); see also Pl.’s Mot. at 14 (suggesting [***]). Dunning’s source of
    information for the stated allegations is either not disclosed or identified as “industry sources.”
    See AR 1-27, 29-30 (first affidavit ¶¶ 5, 18, 19); AR 40-1907 (Dunning’s bid verification); Pl.’s
    Mot. at Attach. 2 (third affidavit ¶¶ 6, 7). Nevertheless, Zero Waste did indicate that apart from
    several trucks, it would purchase all new equipment for the contract. See AR 42-1915 to 17.
    Overall, Dunning asserts that had the Army properly considered the circumstances and evaluated
    the adequacy of Zero Waste’s finances, it would not have found Zero Waste to be responsible.
    See Pl.’s Mot. at 27; Pl.’s Suppl. Reply at 18-19. The government counters that Dunning’s
    challenge rests on “wholly speculative and unsupported” post-award “conjecture” of Dunning’s
    Chief Operating Officer. Def.’s Cross-Mot. at 19-20.
    The contracting officer may only award contracts to responsible offerors. E.g., FAR §§
    9.103, 14.408-2. To find a prospective awardee responsible, the Contracting Officer must find
    that the bidder has adequate financial resources; adequate management, experience, and
    productive capacity to perform; and a satisfactory record of performance, ethics, and integrity.
    See FAR § 9.104-1. A contracting officer must obtain sufficient information to make a
    responsibility determination, see FAR § 9.105-1, has “wide discretion” regarding the
    determination, and “is the arbiter of what, and how much, information he [or she] needs,” John
    C. Grimberg Co. v. United States, 
    185 F.3d 1297
    , 1303 (Fed. Cir. 1999); accord Bender
    appears inexplicably high or low compared to the bids. See AR 1-24 (listing estimated prices
    two to three times higher for weekly service of the 8-cubic-yard containers, two to seven times
    lower for the other weekly container services, two to five times lower for each additional 20- or
    40- cubic-yard container, and two times higher for each additional 35-cubic-yard container).
    23
    See 
    discussion supra, at 17
    .
    19
    Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. United States, 
    297 F.3d 1358
    , 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting
    Impresa 
    Construzioni, 238 F.3d at 1334-35
    ). That discretion may not be overturned if exercised
    reasonably and in conformance with law and regulation. See, e.g., PAI Corp. v. United States,
    
    614 F.3d 1347
    , 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
    Axiom, 564 F.3d at 1381
    -82 (citing Impresa 
    Construzioni, 238 F.3d at 1334
    ).
    The Army checked Zero Waste’s financial resources and, when the Army had further
    questions about financial resources, it sought additional information from Zero Waste. See, e.g.,
    AR 71-2289 to 90. Zero Waste provided evidence that it had nearly $[***] in two lines of credit
    for operating expenses and a $[***] line of credit for equipment. AR 72-2291 to 93. Two of
    these lines of credit, totaling $[***], were dated within six weeks of the responsibility
    determination. AR 72-2292 to 93 (showing that Merrill Lynch confirmed $[***] available as of
    June 20, 2018, and Bank of America confirmed $[***] available through July 3, 2019). In
    verification, the Army also contacted representatives of Bank of America and Merrill Lynch, see
    AR 71-2289 to 90; AR 73-2294 to 95; see also AR 72-2291 to 92 (points of contacts for Zero
    Waste’s financial institutions).
    While Dunning contends that Zero Waste’s lines of credit will not suffice for the needed
    equipment, the Army’s contrary finding was rational based upon its review of Zero Waste’s
    financial information. The $2.6 million equipment cost cited by Dunning, while presented to the
    Army pre-award, is without support and the Army need not accept Dunning’s assumptions about
    Zero Waste’s equipment costs, especially when those assumptions were provided after Dunning
    learned that it was underbid by Zero Waste. Even accepting this figure does not imperil the
    Army’s determination. It knew that Zero Waste already had some equipment, see AR 42-1915,
    and Bank of America and Merrill Lynch confirmed sufficient financial backing, see AR 73-2294
    to 95. Zero Waste’s $[***] operating lines of credit also appear sufficient to cover losses that
    could result from below-cost pricing, if Zero Waste’s bid is indeed below cost, on a contract
    valued up to $13 million. See AR 1-26 (showing the Government Estimate for five years).
    Perhaps most importantly, the Army also obtained past performance information from
    Zero Waste. The Army confirmed past performance by contacting two other military facilities
    where Zero Waste had performed, obtaining favorable references. AR 73-2294 to 95. The Army
    also reviewed five CPARs covering three government waste disposal contracts, all of which
    showed favorable evaluations. AR 73-2302 to 17. Even if Zero Waste had relied upon
    subcontractors in the past, it is not unreasonable for the Army to find that Zero Waste could
    perform the contract when considering its successful past performance in managing similar
    contracts and the experience it would have gained in that process.
    The government also defends Zero Waste’s price by pointing to cases where prices up to
    60% below an Independent Government Cost Estimate were deemed realistic. See Def.’s Cross-
    Mot. at 18 (quoting Rotech Healthcare, Inc. v. United States, 
    121 Fed. Cl. 387
    , 405 n.9 (2015)
    (citing Preferred Sys. Solutions, Inc. v. United States, 
    110 Fed. Cl. 48
    (2013)). Dunning
    contends that Preferred Systems actually demonstrates that the agency could accept such a low
    bid “only based upon the steps taken to verify the veracity of the bid [and] the offeror’s ability to
    perform.” Pl.’s Reply at 9-10 (citing Preferred 
    Sys., 110 Fed. Cl. at 61
    ) (emphasis omitted).
    But, as discussed, price realism principles are inapplicable to this solicitation. And in any event,
    the Army investigated Zero Waste’s ability to perform by asking Zero Waste to verify its bid and
    then by examining financial resources and past performance.
    20
    The Army used a standard form to document its responsibility determination, but that use
    is not contrary to procurement regulations. A contracting officer does not need to formally state
    the basis of a determination when finding the bidder responsible. Impresa 
    Construzioni, 238 F.3d at 1337-38
    (citing FAR § 9.105-2(a)). To the contrary, he or she need only append the
    supporting materials to the contract file, FAR § 9.105-2(b)(1), as was done here. Given the
    presumption of regularity afforded to contracting officials, see, e.g., Glenn Def. Marine (Asia),
    PTE Ltd. v. United States, 
    105 Fed. Cl. 541
    , 568-69 (2012), aff’d, 
    720 F.3d 901
    (Fed. Cir. 2013),
    the court cannot find that the Army failed to investigate responsibility in any material way,
    absent evidence to the contrary. The Army’s responsibility determination, while using standard
    language, was tailored when applicable, such as by naming the past performance ratings or the
    financial references that the contracting officer contacted. See AR 73-2294 to 95. Accordingly,
    the Army’s responsibility decision appears rational.
    D. The Army’s Treatment of Bidders
    Dunning’s last contention of procurement error is that the Army advised Dunning that it
    would no longer provide a laydown yard for use, but had told Zero Waste that the Army “would
    provide the laydown yard at no cost at the pre-award meeting.” Pl.’s Mot. at 27. Dunning
    further alleges that the Army’s contracting officer’s representative “later confirmed to [Dunning]
    that [Zero Waste’s] bid was based on [Zero Waste’s] intent to utilize the laydown yard at no
    cost.” Pl.’s Mot. at 27. Dunning contends this informational asymmetry helped Zero Waste
    underbid Dunning. Pl.’s Mot. at 27-28. The government rejects Dunning’s contention as lacking
    any supporting evidence. Def.’s Cross-Mot. at 19 n.7.
    The solicitation required that “[a]ny information given a prospective bidder concerning a
    solicitation will be furnished promptly to all other prospective bidders as an amendment to the
    solicitation,” while pre-award oral explanations or instructions “will not be binding.” AR 25-
    1278 (incorporating by reference FAR § 52.214-6). Government procurement regulations
    further prohibit conduct that “[f]avors one offeror over another,” FAR § 15.306(e)(1), which
    would include “giving materially disparate information to bidders on matters that could easily
    affect their decisions about important aspects [of their bids],” Raytheon Co. v. United States.,
    
    809 F.3d 590
    , 596 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also PGBA, LLC v. United States, 
    60 Fed. Cl. 196
    , 207
    (2004) (“[U]neven treatment goes against the standard of equality and fair play that is a
    necessary underpinning of the government’s procurement process.”), aff’d, 
    389 F.3d 1219
    (Fed.
    Cir. 2004).
    It would be procurement error if the Army pre-bid told one bidder that a laydown yard
    was available without charge while telling the other bidder that the laydown yard was the
    bidder’s responsibility. A laydown yard arguably would represent a non-trivial cost that could
    affect prices. Although the solicitation did not contain a separate line item for a laydown yard, a
    bidder could be expected to factor the cost for a yard into its pricing for other services. Dunning,
    however, provides no evidence to support its allegation. See Compl. ¶¶ 89-93; Pl.’s Mot. at 27-
    28; Pl.’s Reply at 18-19; Pl.’s Suppl. Reply at 19-20. Dunning makes a single reference to the
    record, citing to an e-mail from its Chief Operating Officer to the Army. Pl.’s Suppl. Reply at 19
    (citing AR 68-2267 to 68). But pertinent to the laydown yard, the e-mail only alleges that
    Dunning believes Zero Waste underbid the contract by in part failing to account for a laydown
    yard. See AR 68-2267 to 68. This e-mail does not actually state or indicate what information the
    Army provided to either bidder or who provided any such information, or if it was provided pre-
    21
    bid. Dunning’s Chief Operating Officer states that Zero Waste “prepared its bid based on the
    mistaken understanding that [the Army would provide a laydown yard],” Pl.’s Mot. Attach. 2 ¶ 8
    (third affidavit) (emphasis added), and “relied on [an] inaccurate belief that the [Army] would
    provide a no cost laydown yard,” AR 1-29 (first affidavit, at ¶ 17). Even if true, Zero Waste’s
    unilateral mistake would have no bearing whether the Army disseminated unequal material
    information prior to the bid deadline. Absent any evidence either in the record or otherwise
    produced by Dunning, Dunning’s claim of unequal information, and prejudice from it, must fail.
    The solicitation specified that the Army had no obligation to provide any materials,
    property, equipment, items, or services, AR 25-1351; see also AR 25-1312, and that the
    contractor must “remove all vehicles, trailers and equipment from the installation at the end of
    each workday.” AR 25-1352. But the solicitation also specified that the contracting officer
    could allow equipment to remain onsite, AR 25-1352, and that the Army had the right to provide
    any of the materials, property, or equipment that was to be furnished by the contractor, AR 25-
    1352. The Army also indicated in Amendment 0004 that an on-site laydown yard “can be leased
    to contractors by the [Army],” AR 16-938 to 39 (Amendment 0004, questions 19 and 24). While
    guidance about the laydown yard in the solicitation may be ambiguous, which may have caused
    Dunning and Zero Waste to form their bids using different assumptions, it is now too late to
    protest the language of the solicitation. See, e.g., Blue & Gold Fleet, L.P. v. United States, 
    492 F.3d 1308
    , 1313, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007). And in any event, the information in the solicitation
    was available equally to all.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, Dunning’s motion for judgment on the administrative record is
    DENIED and the government’s cross-motion for judgment on the administrative record is
    GRANTED. The clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.24
    No costs.
    It is so ORDERED.
    s/ Charles F. Lettow
    Charles F. Lettow
    Senior Judge
    24
    Dunning requested $8,150 in attorneys’ fees pertaining to preparation of its
    supplemental reply. See Pl.’s Fees Mot.; see 
    also supra, at 2
    . The fees “relate solely to [16.3
    hours for] preparing and filing the supplemental brief,” and not to time spent reviewing the
    documents added to the record by the third correction. Pl.’s Fees Mot. at 2, Attach. 1.
    Dunning’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees is DENIED. Dunning is not a prevailing party
    and the court finds insufficient grounds to impose sanctions on the government under RCFC 37
    for its belated third correction to the administrative record, even though that correction was quite
    extensive.
    22